1. A court of admiralty is not
restrained from doing substantial justice by mere
forms or technicalities. Dexter v. Munroe, 39.
2. The power which a court of admiralty possesses over its own process will
enable it to do complete justice to all parties. Ib.
3. Equitable co-owners of a vessel, who are also material-men, cannot main-
tain a libel in admiralty against the other co-owners to recover their bill
for supplies, if their claim constitutes a portion of the accounts of the
part-owners. In such case, admiralty has no jurisdiction. Hall v. Hud-
son, 65.
4. Where the master of a whaling vessel is also a co-owner, a libel in admiralty
against the other owners to recover his lay, disbursements, and commis-
sions on sales of slops will be sustained as within the jurisdiction of the
court, so far as the lay is concerned, but not in respect to the other
claims. Hazard v. Howland, 68.
To Supreme Court in prize, Prize Act, secs. 13, 15, 333, 334.
Fees in prize sales. The Amy Warwick, 160.
See Prize Act, secs. 8, 22, 330, 337.
1. An award of a referee will not be recommitted because the counsel for the
libellants omitted to call the attention of the referee to a matter which
might have influenced the referee, if his attention had been called to it,
to increase the amount of salvage. The Liverpool Packet, 37.
2. An award, made in pursuance of a rule of court directing a referee to deter-
mine the amount due and the question of costs, is sufficiently certain
if it states the amount due, and that the libellants are entitled to costs,
without stating the amount of the costs. Ib.
A bill of lading which contains no admission of the receipt of the cargo in
good order, or promise to deliver it in good order, or exception of
perils of the seas, but provides that, upon the delivery of the cargo in
sound condition, the freight shall be paid, is to be construed as impliedly
admitting the receipt of the cargo in good order.
See CARRIER, 1, 2; Freight, 1.
BILL OF SALE.
See EVIDENCE, 1.
1. The facts in the case show that the port of Beaufort, N.C., was effectively
blockaded on the 6th September, 1861. The Revere, 107.
2. It seems, that, by the true construction of the proclamation of the President,
of April 19, 1861, only those who are ignorant of the blockade are
entitled to the warning and indorsement mentioned in the proclamation.
Ib.
3. As against the rebels, the United States has both sovereign and belliger-
ent rights. In establishing the blockade, it has exercised only belligerent
rights. As a sovereign, it might, by a municipal regulation, have inter-
dicted all commerce with ports in the States of the insurgents. Ib.
4. In establishing the blockade, the President exercised a great belligerent
right. The Amy Warwick, 123.
5. He could not prohibit or restrict the commerce of any State by a mere mu-
nicipal regulation. Ib.
6. The blockade, and the orders of the President to the navy, by which cap-
tures have been made, have been confirmed by Congress, by Statute
1861, chap. 63. lb.
7. This has the force of instructions to prize tribunals to regard those pro-
ceedings of the President as legal and valid. Ib.
8. Vessel condemned for an attempt to break the blockade of Beaufort, N.C.
The Julia, 164.
9. Cargo condemned for breach of blockade and for being contraband of war.
The Richard O'Bryan, 197.
10. In case of breach of blockade, the owners of the vessel, in a prize court,
are conclusively bound, in all cases, by the act of the master. The
Aries, 198.
11. It is also a general rule, that the owners of the cargo are bound in like
manner; and the few cases in which persons interested in the cargo are
permitted to show that the act of the master in violating blockade was
against their wish, are carefully guarded, and are chiefly such as present
a kind of physical impossibility of their knowledge or desire. Ib.
12. Examination of facts to show a hostile destination and ownership of cargo.
Ib.
13. The President's proclamation of 14 May, 1862, "relaxing the blockade"
of Beaufort, N.C., and opening it to trade under regulations of the
Treasury Department, the port being in our military possession, must be
construed, so far as neutrals are concerned, as having entirely raised the
blockade; and neutral vessels bound there, in violation of the regulations
of the Treasury Department, are not guilty of an attempt to break the
blockade. The Alma, 203.
14. Vessel and cargo condemned for breach of blockade, the evidence showing
an actual hostile destination. Ib.
15. Vessel ostensibly bound to Port Royal, then in the possession of the United
States forces, condemned for an attempt to break the blockade of other
ports. The Ocean Bird, 261.
See CAPTURE, 5; ENEMY'S PROPERTY, 37.
Where a vessel in an unseaworthy condition goes ashore in a gale, and the
cargo is injured, the burden is on the ship-owner to prove that the loss
was in no way owing to the unseaworthiness. The Sarah, 31.
1. Captors are not liable for damages in a case where the vessel captured pre-
sents probable cause for the capture, even though she was led into the
predicament in which she is found, involuntarily, and by the mistakes of
the revenue officers of the captors' own government. The Ship La
Manche, 207.
2. What constitutes probable cause which will justify a capture. Ib.
3. Distribution among vessels engaged in a capture. The Victory, 226.
4. Vessels which pick up enemy's goods thrown overboard during a chase, are
entitled to them as captors, and not as salvors. Ib.
5. Joint capture of prize. Who are entitled to share. Co-operation in a
blockade does not constitute the blockading vessels joint captors. Dis-
cussion of the English doctrine of constructive captors. Construction of
the Prize Act of 1862. The Cherokee, 235.
6. What co-operation constitutes a vessel one of "the vessels making the cap-
ture," for the purpose of determining the relative force of the captors
and the prize. The Atlanta, 251.
See PRIZE ACT, sec. 10, 330.
1. Under a bill of lading containing a stipulation that the oil, which was part
of the cargo, should be wet twice a week, and also the clause "not ac-
countable for leakage or stowage," the carrier is liable for loss of oil by
leakage caused by the casks not being properly wet. Hunnewell v. Ta-
ber, 1.
that the carrier is also liable, under such a bill of lading, for leak-
age occasioned by want of reasonable care of the cargo on the voyage.
Ib.
3. The French commercial code does not substantially differ from the maritime
law of the United States as to the extent of the lien on the ship for dam-
age to the cargo. The Zone, 19.
4. If the cargo is received in good condition, and delivered in bad order, the
burden of proof is on the carrier to show that the damage was caused
by perils for which he is not liable. Ib.
5. A vessel is liable in rem for damage caused to goods of one shipper by those
of another, although the goods are stowed in the usual way, if the injury
is caused by the goods of the third party being in bad condition when
put on board. The Cheshire, 28.
6. Where the crew of a coasting vessel, anchored in a harbor, were absent at
night with the consent of the master, who remained on board alone, and
the vessel was driven by a gale on a ledge of rocks; it was held, that
the vessel was liable for the damage done thereby to the cargo, although
the gale arose after the crew left, the absence of the crew rendering the
vessel unseaworthy. The Sarah, 31.
See BILL OF LADING, 1; CHARTER PARTY, 1, 2.
CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY.
May, 1861, 279.
October, 1861, 285.
March, 1863, 292.
1. A charterer of a vessel who puts her up as a general ship is liable to the
owner of the ship for damages which the latter has to pay other shippers
for injury to their goods caused by goods put on board by the charterer,
although the charterer did not know that his goods would do any dam-
age.
2. The charterer is also liable in such a case for the extra expense of getting
his goods out of the ship. Ib.
See The Cargo of The Anna Kimball, 33.
CHOATE, RUFUS,
Remarks on death of, 348.
1. If a steam-tug with a ship in tow, both vessels being under the charge of a
pilot appointed by the owners of the ship, negligently causes the ship to
come into collision with another vessel, the steam-tug is liable. The
Rescue, 16.
2. A schooner, going out of a harbor in the daytime, came into collision with
a sloop at anchor in the channel, outside the harbor-master's line. Both
vessels were held in fault: the schooner for not keeping a look-out sta-
tioned forward, and the sloop for being anchored in an improper place.
The Marcia Tribou, 17.
3. In collision cases, if both vessels are in fault, the damages and costs are
borne in equal proportions. Ib.
4. It seems, that in the daytime a vessel at anchor out of the channel and inside
the harbor-master's line need not keep an anchor-watch, if her crew con-
sists of but two men. Ib.
5. Where a vessel anchored in Boston Harbor, without an anchor-watch, was
run into by another vessel while getting under way, and the collision
could have been avoided if there had been an anchor-watch, both vessels
were held in fault: the one at anchor for not having a watch, and the
other for not notifying the one at anchor of the intention to get under
way, it appearing that there was danger of a collision, and that it was
known to the vessel getting under way that the other had no watch.
O'Neil v. Sears, 52.
6. Where both vessels are in fault, the damages and costs are divided. Ib.
7. Where a collision occurred in consequence of the third mate of one of the
vessels obeying a direction given at the time by the master of the other
vessel, held, that the owners of the latter vessel could not sustain a
claim for damages. The Huntress, 61.
Under Act of 1861, chap. 3. The James Andrews, 121.
See ENEMY'S PROPERTY.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See The Zone, 23, 24.
See PRIZE, 17; Seamen, 4.
CONTRABAND.
See BLOCKADE, 9.
Counsel fees cannot be allowed as part of the taxable costs, beyond the
amount mentioned in U. S. Stat. 1853, chap. 80. The Liverpool Packet,
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