such forfeiture his said son would have been entitled, for the benefit of the wife and children of such son, in such manner as his said trustees or trustee should think fit. Thomas Longworth, the testator's son, was married at the time of his father's death, but had no issue. He subsequently became bankrupt, and his wife then died leaving him without issue. He afterwards married again and had two children. The bill was filed by the present Mrs. Thomas Longworth and her two children, for administration of the testator's estate. Mr. Dundas Gardiner (Mr. Eddis with him) asked, amongst other things, for a declaration that the plaintiff's were entitled during the remainder of the life of Thomas Longworth to the income of one-tenth of the estate originally given to him, in such shares as the trustees might think fit. They did not dispute that the income went over to the other cestuis que trust, during the interval between the death of Thomas Longworth's first wife and his marriage with his second. Mr. Southgate and Mr. W. W. Karslake, for the executors, stated that they did not wish to oppose the plaintiff's claim, but they were bound to bring the authorities before the Court. They would be found in Jarman on Wills, vol. i. p. 304, where the result of them was summed up by saying that, under a gift to the wife of another person, the individual standing in the conjugal relation at the date of the will, and she alone, would take. Mr. Lindley, for another party. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that it was clear that the trust in favour of the children of Thomas Longworth revived as soon as there came to be any child to take under it, and he was of opinion that that in favour of the wife revived also. The plaintiffs were entitled to the decree they asked for. Solicitors Messrs. Dangerfield & Fraser, agents for Mr. John Hall, Manchester, for plaintiffs; Messrs. Bridges, Sawtell, Heywood & Ram, agents for Mr. J. Price, Abergavenny, for defendants. County Courts-Equitable Jurisdiction— Suit against Officers of the Court-Transfer of Cause to Court of Adjoining District. Where a redemption suit was commenced in the Court of Chancery against the registrar of the County Court, within the jurisdiction of which the property dealt with by the suit lay:-Held, that an order might properly be made under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 8, to transfer the suit to the County Court of the adjoining district. The word action in s. 21 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108 includes suit. This was a redemption suit relating to property at Stonham, Suffolk, which is within the jurisdiction of the Stowmarket County Court. The mortgage was for 4007., but the bill was filed in the Court of Chancery because the defendant was registrar of the Stowmarket Court. Upon the application of the defendant, Vice Chancellor Stuart made an order transferring the suit to the County Court at Hadleigh, the district of which adjoins that of the Stowmarket Court. The plaintiff appealed from this order. Mr. Everitt, for the appellant.-This application was made under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 8, but I say that the Court has no jurisdiction under that section to send the suit to any but the Court within whose district the property lies. To do so would be improper in the present case, therefore no order to transfer the cause can be made. Mr. Phear, for the defendant.-This is an order made in the discretion of the Court. [Their Lordships desired him to confine his argument to the question of jurisdiction.] The section of the Act of 1867 must be read in connection with 19 & 20 Vict. c. 95. s. 21, which provides that where an action is commenced against an officer of a County Court it may be brought in the Court of the adjoining district. That section is incorporated with the Act conferring equitable jurisdiction (28 & 29 Vict. c. 99. s. 21), and of course the word action includes suit. Hence the Hadleigh Court was the Court in which the suit might have been properly commenced, and therefore it may be transferred there. Mr. Everitt in reply. JAMES, L.J.-This seems to me to be a simple question of jurisdiction, and I think that the Court had jurisdiction to make the order. As to the question of discretion in making the order, we did not think it necessary to hear the respondent, because if the Vice Chancellor had jurisdiction we should require proof beyond all reasonable doubt that there had been a miscarriage of justice, before we should interfere with the discretion of the Judge. As to the main point, the Act of 1856 was framed for actions at Common Law only, and it contains provisions to meet the case of officers of the Court being parties to actions. But the Statute of 1865, which first gave to County Courts an equitable jurisdiction, provided that certain Acts, including that of 1856, should be read as if their provisions, so far as they were not inconsistent with that Act, had been therein re-enacted. That being so, if the same difficulty arises in a suit in equity against an officer of the Court, there is nothing unreasonable in holding that the same remedy as in the case of an action should apply, so that the suit may be brought in the Court of an adjoining district. Neither does there appear any hardship in doing this, because if the progress of the suit in the adjoining Court should be impeded by any inconvenience, an application can always be made to transfer the cause to the Court of Chancery. I am, then, of opinion that the transfer was rightly made to an adjoining Court, the Judge of which is not the Judge of the Court in which the defendant is an officer. MELLISH, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. The question is whether the 21st section of the Act of 1865 incorporates the 21st section of the Act of 1856. The Act of 1865 makes no provision at all as to suits to which a Judge or officer of the Court is a party. It seems to me highly probable that the reason for this omission was that the legislature considered that the section in the former Act was incorporated in the Act of 1865, and Contract to Alter Ship-Alternative Provision for Default-Specific PerformanceInjunction-Bankruptcy Jurisdiction. A firm of shipbuilders having agreed to make certain alterations in the plaintiff's ship, or in case of their default to allow the plaintiff to enter upon their dockyard with workmen and use it and the machinery in making the alterations, took the ship into the dockyard, cut it in two, and then became bankrupt. The defendant (their trustee in bankruptcy) being about to sell the dockyard, the bill was filed praying for an injunction to restrain him from dealing therewith so as to interfere with the plaintiffs' right to enter and make the alterations:-Held (on demurer), that as the Court could not enforce performance of the whole agreement, it would not interfere. Held also, that the Court of Chancery had concurrent jurisdiction. This was a demurrer for want of equity, and also to the jurisdiction. The bill stated to the following effect The plaintiff company being the owners of a steamer, made an agreement in writing with W. C. Miller & Sons who were shipbuilders, for the making of certain alterations therein which were to be done by the latter taking the ship into their dockyard, and then cutting her in two and proceeding with the works according to a certain specification. The said agreement further provided as follows "That during the alteration of the said steam-vessel, so much and such parts of the said steam-vessel, and of her engines, boilers, and machinery as shall be added to and built in or to the said vessel shall be deemed to be, and shall be the property of the said company, its successors or assigns, but without prejudice to the lien of the said W. C. Miller & Sons for any unpaid instalments, and in case the said W. C. Miller & Sons shall refuse, neglect, or fail to carry on and complete the said steam-vessel according to the true intent and meaning of these presents, then and in that case the said company, its successors or assigns, shall be entitled, not only to the possession of so much and such parts of the said steam-vessel, and of her engines, boilers, and machinery as shall be built in and added to the said steam-ship, but also to all such articles, matters, and things as shall be then lying and being in and about the said yard and wharf as shall by the said W. C. Miller & Sons be intended for the alteration and completion of the said steamship, on the terms that the said company shall pay to the said W. C. Miller & Sons, their executors, administrators, or assigns, such a reasonable amount as shall be ascertained by arbitrators as hereinafter mentioned, to be the value of the said articles in the condition in which the same may be at the time. And it is hereby further agreed that in case of such refusal or failure as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful for the said company, its successors, or assigns, with workmen or others, to enter or go into the yard or dock of the said W. C. Miller & Sons, wherein the said vessel shall be building or be in progress of construction, and either to take away the said steam-vessel, or parts thereof, and the said engines, boilers, and machinery, or parts thereof, or to employ workmen to finish the same, without any hindrance whatsoever from the said W. C. Miller & Sons, their executors, administrators, or assigns, or the workmen or other persons employed by them, and without making any allowance for the use of the said dockyard, machinery, or premises." In pursuance of this agreement, Miller & Sons took the vessel into their dock and cut her in two, but before proceeding further became bankrupt. The defendant was appointed trustee of their estate under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. At the time of the bankruptcy there was lying in the dockyard a considerable quantity of articles intended for the completion of the ship, and the defendant having advertised the dockyard and everything else for sale, this bill prayed for a declaration that the plaintiff company was entitled to enter upon and use the yard where the ship was, and the workshops and machinery therein, and the articles intended for her completion, upon paying for the latter in manner provided by the said agreement. It also prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendant from selling or otherwise dealing with the dockyard and workshops, machinery, and articles, so as to exclude or interfere with the right of the plaintiff company to enter and use the same in manner provided by the agreement, the plaintiff company offering to pay for such things as they were bound to pay for according to the agreement. Mr. Swanston and Mr. H. A. Giffard, for the defendant.-If there had been no bankruptcy, money damages would be a sufficient compensation for breach of this agreement, and for the amount of such damages the plaintiff can go in and prove; the hardship on the plaintiff is therefore not the breach of contract, but the bankruptcy, which is a hardship common to all the creditors. The Court will not enforce one clause only of an agreement when it is merely ancillary to the substantial object of the whole and the whole cannot be enforced Brett v. East India Shipping Com- Kernot v. Potter, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 447. The Court is here in effect asked to give the company a lease of the dockyard for an indefinite time, during the whole of which the proceedings in the bankruptcy will be suspended. The stipulation is altogether too vague. How is the Court to say for how long the company is to have possession, or how many workmen it ought to employ? If the injunction be granted it must be upon some terms as to the mode of working; every breach of such terms would involve a motion to commit, and the Court would in fact have to superintend the works. This it will not do Peto v. The Brighton, &c., Railway Blackett v. Bates, 35 Law J. Rep. 117. As to the chattels, there can be no specific performance of an agreement to sell them. There was no registered bill of sale of them, and even if they had belonged to the plaintiff they were in the order and disposition of the bankrupts. Lastly, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), every question relating to a bankrupt's estate must be tried in the Court of Bankruptcy, which has full jurisdiction to give the relief asked for. See ss. 65, 66, 72; Re Anderson ex parte Anderson, 39 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 49; s. c. 5 Ch. 473. And even if this Court have concurrent jurisdiction it ought not to interfere, but let the plaintiff apply in that Court Phillips v. Furber, 5 Ch. 746; Stone v. Thomas, ibid. 219; s. c. 39 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)Chanc. 168. Sir R. Baggallay and Mr. Rowcliffe, for the bill. [THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS expressed his opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was not taken away.] There are here two agreements, the first that the builders were to do certain alterations, and the second an entirely new and different one which was to take effect on their refusing, neglecting, or failing to perform the first. The second is not ancillary to the first, but an alternative and new one, as much as if it had been provided that on failure to perform the first the company should have had a lease granted to it or should receive a sum of money. The language clearly points to its having been inserted expressly to meet the case of the builders getting into pecu niary difficulties. The company is only asking your Lordship to restrain the defendant from acting so as to deprive it of the rights it has contracted for, upon the same principle as in Lumley v. Wagner, 21 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 898; s. c. 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604. No other relief is sufficient compensation; the vessel is in such a state that it cannot be taken away for completion elsewhere. Then this is not like Phillips v. Furber (supra), where the property had to be administered in bankruptcy, or at all events the defendant ought to have applied in that Court to restrain us from proceeding here. [THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-If this be a case of specific performance, it is better to have it in this Court than in the Bankruptcy Court, but my difficulty is this, supposing I give you the privilege you ask for, how am I to secure to the defendant that you will act properly? Give him leave to bring an action, or how ?] That is a question for the hearing, and not one to be disposed of on demurrer ; we have a clear right to an injunction in some form. Mr. Swanston, in reply, referred to THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS (on April 21) considered that the demurrer for want of equity must be allowed. He had looked at the case from every point of view, and come to the conclusion that he must regard it in the same light as if there had been no bankruptcy and the company were seeking to enforce specific performance against Miller & Sons. The contract was really of the same nature as the usual contracts entered into by a railway company for the making of its line, which always contained a power for the company to resume possession and oust the contractor in default of his ful filling his engagement. If the Court could enforce this contract it could also enforce the railway contracts; but it was settled that it could not enforce the latter, and therefore it could not enforce per formance of the whole of this contract. And if the whole could not be enforced, a part, which was merely ancillary to the general scope of the agreement, would not be. In Lumley v. Wagner (supra) and other cases, the Court, besides a positive agreement to do some act, had found a separate and distinct negative agreement which it could enforce. This was not a case of that sort; it was one where the contract for alteration of the ship must be enforced in its entirety if at all, and it was clear that the Court could not see to the performance of the whole. The Court of Bankruptcy could give the plaintiff all the relief he might be entitled to; this Court could not give him what he asked for. Solicitor-Lien for Costs-23 & 24 Vict. c. 127-Jurisdiction of Court. Any branch of the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to make an order under the Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1860, declaring a solicitor entitled to a charge for his costs upon property recovered by his diligence, although the suit in which the costs were incurred was in another branch of the Court, and though the suit is no longer pending. This was a motion to discharge an order made under the Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1860, declaring Mr. Charles Fiddey entitled to a charge on property recovered in the suit of Jones v. Frost, which had been instituted in the Court of the Master of the Rolls, and in which all proceedings had been stayed. The costs now claimed had been incurred for the recovery of property in the suit of Jones v. Frost, the object of which was to set aside a sale for fraud, and to recover the property sold; the plaintiff's were successful in that suit, and the property was reconveyed to them. The costs in Jones v. Frost had been taxed at 120, and no application had been made to review the taxing-master's decision. The plaintiff in Jones v. Frost having recovered her property in that suit, afterwards filed her bill in Heinrick v. Sutton, to maintain her rights to the property so recovered, against other persons who claimed an interest in the property and all proceedings in the suit of Jones v. Frost were stayed. Mr. Charles Fiddey had been the solicitor of Mr. and Mrs. Jones in the suit of Jones v. Frost, and as the same property formed the subject-matter in Heinrick v. Sutton, he issued a summons in the suit of Heinrick v. Sutton for the purpose of having a charge declared in respect of his costs on the property in question. The Vice Chancellor in Chambers granted the order, and this was a motion to dismiss the order. The plaintiffs urged in opposition to the application: 1. That the Vice Chancellor had no jurisdiction, the words of the Act being, "It shall be lawful for the Court or judge before whom the suit has been heard or shall be depending." So that the suit of Jones v. Frost having been attached to the Rolls Court, any such application as this ought to have been made there. 2. That it was not competent for the Court to make an order in one suit to provide for costs incurred in another, but the order must be made in the particular suit in which the costs were incurred. Mr. Ramadge, for the plaintiff, cited on the question of jurisdiction Re Thompson, 3 Law Times, N.S. 317. Mr. Shapter and Mr. Story Maskelyne, in support of the order, were only called on upon the question of jurisdiction; and they relied on Wilson v. Round, 4 Giff. 416; Ex parte Sleeman, 12 W. R. 748. MALINS, V.C., said, that he had had some doubt on the question of jurisdiction, but he thought it was clear that the words "Court," as used in the Act, and wherever it was used of Chancery pro |