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Opinion of the Court.

signed by the president and secretary of such corporation, duly acknowledged, with the Secretary of State and in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county in which such business is carried on, designating the principal place where the business of such corporation shall be carried on in this State, and an authorized agent or agents in this State, residing at its principal place of business, upon whom procuss may be served." General Laws of Colorado, 1877, ch. 19, 8 23.

Prior to the execution of the before-mentioned deed of trust or of the notes secured by it, the plaintiff caused to be filed in the office of the Secretary of State of Colorado and in the office of the recorder of Arapahoe County, a certificate signed by its president and secretary, and duly acknowledged, which stated

“ that the principal place where the business of said corporation shall be carried on in the State of Colorado shall be at Denver, in the county of Arapahoe, in said State, and that the general manager of said corporation, residing at the said principal place of business, is the agent upon whom process may be served in all suits that may be commenced against [said] corporation."

The contention of plaintiffs in error is that this certificate is materially defective, in that it does not designate the particular individual by name upon whom, as the agent of the corporation, process may be served; that until this foreign corporation filed such a certificate as the statute required, it was prohibited by the Constitution and laws of Colorado from doing any business in that State; and, consequently, that this deed of trust, executed and delivered in Colorado, and upon which its title to the premises in controversy rests, was void.

We are of opinion that the certificate in question was in substantial conformity to the law. The requirement of the statute was met by the designation of the “general manager of the corporation, residing at its principal place of business, as agent to receive service of process. It was not necessary, as we think, to give the name of the particular person who happened, at the date of the certificate, to fill that position. The object of the statute could be best subserved by a certificate of

Syllabus.

the character filed, for the obvious reason that the death or resignation of the incumbent would not long interfere with the bringing of suits against the corporation. Had there been, when the certificate was filed, no such officer of the corporation as a general manager, there would have been ground to contend that it had not performed the condition essential to its authority to do business in the State. But the answer makes no claim of that kind, but assumes that it was necessary to give the name of some individual upon whom process against the corporation might be served. We do not concur in this construction of the statute.

None of the points made by counsel for plaintiffs in error can be sustained, and the judgment must be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

.

MARTIN, Sheriff, & Others v. WEBB & Others, Trustees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

Submitted December 7th, 1883.-Decided January 7th, 1884.

be

Contract-Estoppel-Evidence-Principal and Agent. 1. Although a cashier of a bank ordinarily has no power to bind the bank except

in the discharge of his customary duties ; and although the ordinary business of a bank does not comprehend a contract made by a cashier without delegation of power from the board of directors, involving the payment of money not loaned by the bank in the customary way ; nevertheless : (1.) A banking corporation, whose charter does not otherwise provide, may represented by its cashier in transactions outside of his ordinary duties, without his authority to do so being in writing, or appearing in the records of the proceedings of the directors. (2.) His authority may be by parol and collected from circumstances or implied from the conduct or acquiescence of the directors. (3.) It may be inferred from the general manner in which, for a period sufficiently long to establish a settled course of business, he has been suffered by the directors, without interference or inquiry, to conduct the affairs of the bank ; and (4.) When, during a series of years, or in numerous business transactions, he has been permitted, in his official capacity and without objection, to pursue a particular course of conduct, it may be presumed, as between the bank and those who in good faith deal with it upon the basis of his authority to represent the corporation, that he has Opinion of the Court.

acted in conformity with instructions received from those who have the

right to control its operations. 2. That which directors ought, by proper diligence, to have known as to the gen

eral course of the bank's business, they may be presumed to have known in any contest between the corporation and those who are justified by the circumstances in dealing with it upon the basis of that course of business.

Mr. Eppa Hunton and Mr. J. Chandler for appellants.

Mr. R. T. Merrick and Mr. M. F. Morris for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree in two suits in equity cor menced in one of the courts of the State of Missouri and thence removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of that State, where, by consent, they were consolidated for final hearing.

The question presented is whether the appellant, the Daviess County Savings Association, a banking corporation of Missouri, doing business at Gallatin, in that State, is, under the circumstances of this case, estopped to deny that the cancellation, in its name and by its cashier, of certain notes secured by trust deeds upon real estate, and the release of record of the liens given by those deeds, was by its authority and binding upon it.

The facts bearing upon this question, as they are disclosed by the pleadings, testimony and stipulations of counsel, are substantially as will be now stated.

On the 30th day of June, 1879, one Patrick S. Kenney was largely indebted to that association. The indebtedness was secured by recorded deeds of trust upon several tracts of land, in some of which, embracing a large part of this indebtedness to the bank, his wife had not joined. These deeds bore date, respectively, February 8th, 1872, November 17th, 1873, Dec. 20th, 1873, August 28th, 1874, September 21st, 1874, May 24th, 1875, and April 1st, 1876. In three of them the trustee was Robert L. Tomlin, who, at the date of their execution and during the entire period covered by the transactions to be hereafter recited, was a director and cashier of the bank. Kenney and wife had also executed and delivered a deed of trust upon a portion of the same lands, for the benefit of

Opinion of the Court.

James D. Powers, to secure a debt of $5,000 and interest. As to the lands therein described, it gave a lien superior to that created by any of the before-mentioned deeds, except the one of date February 8th, 1872.

On the 15th day of July, 1875, and 1st day of November of the same year, respectively, the Exchange Bank of Breckinridge, Missouri, and one Thomas Ryan, obtained judgments for money against Kenney, which, on June 30th, 1879, remained, or were believed by those interested in them to remain, liens superior to that given by the foregoing deed of April 1st, 1876.

It was desired by Tomlin, the cashier, to have Kenney's indebtedness to the bank in better shape than it was, and to secure further time on his indebtedness to other parties. He also deemed it important that the liens upon these lands (whether created by trust deeds or judgments), which were prior to those held by the bank, should be removed, and that Mrs. Kenney's signature be obtained to a trust deed or deeds in favor of the bank, covering all the lands of her husband. He therefore requested Kenney to obtain a loan of money sufficient to satisfy all liens prior to those held by the bank. Tomlin did not wish his bank to make further advancements to Kenney, believing the latter would be more prompt with strangers, than with the bank, in paying interest as it matured. In order to effect the desired result, application was made by the cashier to Frank & Darrow, of Corning, Iowa, for a loan to Kenney. After some negotiations, that firm made an arrangement with Albert S. Webb, R. L. Belknap, and William H. Kane, of New York, trustees under the will of Henry R. Remsen, for a loan of money to Kenney for five years, at eight per cent. interest, to be secured by a trust deed on his lands, which would give them a lien prior and superior to that held by all others, including the bank. It was expressly agreed between Frank & Darrow, representing the trustees of Remsen on one side, and Kenney and Tomlin, the latter representing his bank, on the other side, that the money thus obtained should be applied, as far as necessary, to the debts secured by the before-mentioned Powers deed of trust, and to the two

Opinion of the Court.

judgments against Kenney; that the balance should be paid to the bank, which should then cancel and surrender the notes held against Kenney, taking a new note from him, and enter of record satisfaction and release of its liens under the several deeds; that Kenney and wife should execute a deed of trust, giving a first lien to Remsen's trustees to secure the loan by them made; a like deed, giving a lien subordinate to that of Remsen's trustees, to secure Frank & Darrow in the sum of $1,000, the amount stipulated to be paid them for effecting the loan; that Kenney and wife should also make a deed of trust on the same lands to the Daviess County Savings Association, giving a lien subordinate to those given to Remsen's trustees and to Frank & Darrow, for the balance of their claims against Kenney remaining after crediting such portion of the $10,000 received from Remsen's trustees as should be paid to the bank.

No part of the sum received from Remsen's trustees was paid directly to or disbursed by Kenney ; but, conformably to the agreement between the parties, $5,200 of it was applied in satisfaction of the debt secured by the Powers deed of trust, $1,689.86 in discharge of the two personal judgments against Kenney, and the balance, $3,110.14, was paid to the bank. A new note was then executed to the bank by Kenney, and the $3,110.14 entered on its books as a partial payment thereof. Satisfaction was entered of record in the name of the bank by its cashier of all the debts held against Kenney, and the old deeds of trust held were also cancelled of record in its name by the cashier. Deeds of trust executed by Kenney and wife, of date July 1st, 1879, were then placed upon record, all on August 6th, 1879, but distinctly giving liens upon the lands in the order already indicated.

The new deed to the bank, in addition, expressly provides that the lien thereby created is subordinate to that given Remsen's trustees.

The old notes of Kenney were marked by the cashier on the books of the bank as paid, and the new note entered as the one Kenney was to pay. The $3,110.14 went into the general funds of the bank, and was used in its business. The old notes and deeds, being first stamped by the cashier as “paid,” were

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