Robins v. Coryell. any case a valid subscription, without any mark or sign of the testator thereto, then the will in this case was properly executed. If not, this provision was always, in the act of 29 Car. 2, and in our former statute, (1 R. L. 364, sec. 2,) as well as the above provision in section 33 to the same effect, utterly unnecessary and nugatory. But the counsel for the appellant also insists that a will must be personally signed by the testator, and cannot be executed by an agent; that while all other deeds and contracts or instruments in writing may be executed by an agent, wills cannot be so executed. If this be so, it is, I think, a mistake, to regard a will to which the testator's name is subscribed by another person in his presence and by his express directions, as executed by an agent. What is done for a man in his presence and by his express directions, is his act and deed. If a man tells his wife or his son, or any other person, to put his name to a deed or promissory note, and it is done in his presence and in pursuance of such directions, it is well executed by him. Such execution, not being in his handwriting, would of course require proof of such authority and directions and manner of execution. To meet this necessity in respect to wills, said section 33 requires that "every person who shall sign the testator's name to any will, by his direction, shall write his own name as a witness to the will." Such an execution of a will is not done by an agent. It is done by the testator himself. Upon the point in question, I think the law in regard to the execution of wills remains as it is, in England, and as it was in this state before the revision of 1830; except that a subscription at the end of the will is substituted for a signing, and a provision made for acknowledging and publishing the will, and the number of witnesses is reduced from three to two. That no other alteration was intended by the legislature at the time of the revision; and that the execution of the will in this case in the manner stated in the case, as it would have been clearly valid before 1830, is valid still, under the present VOL. XXVII. 36 The People v. The Commissioners of Emigration. statute. The decree of the surrogate admitting the said will to probate and establishing the same as a valid will, should therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed. [CAYUGA GENERAL TERM, June 7, 1858. Johnson, Welles and Smith, Justices.] THE PEOPLE, ex rel. Addison W. Durfee and others, superintendents of the poor of the county of Monroe, vs. THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION. All the power conferred upon the county superintendents of the poor, to support and maintain the county poor, must be exercised according to the provisions of the revised statutes, at the county poor-house, or at such other place as may be provided for that purpose, under the direction of the board of supervisors. They have no power to expend money for the temporary relief of the poor, or for their support elsewhere than at the poor-house, or place provided for their support, as a substitute therefor, under the direction of the supervisors. If superintendents of the poor expend the money of the county for the temporary relief of the poor, elsewhere than at the poor-house, they cannot by mandamus compel the commissioners of emigration to reimburse them, or the county, for money thus unlawfully expended. THE HE poor authorities of Monroe county afforded temporary to relief to certain emigrants, and the commissioners of emigration considered, but refused to allow or pay, the charges for this relief. The superintendents of that county obtained an alternative writ of mandamus, with a view to a peremptory writ, to compel the allowance and payment of these charges. The commissioners made a return, denying their liability for temporary relief; to this return a demurrer was interposed by the relators, which was sustained by the special term. Judgment to that effect, and granting a peremptory writ, was entered. This is an appeal from such decision and judgment. The People v. The Commissioners of Emigration. John E. Develin, for the appellants. I. A mandamus is not the proper remedy in this case. If the commissioners of emigration are liable to the relators at all, the relators have a specific remedy by action. The commissioners of emigration may by that name sue and be sued. (Laws of 1847, ch. 105, § 4.) If the commissioners be liable to the relators, they are liable by express statute, that is by law, and the relators are thus creditors of the commissioners. In this respect the commissioners do not differ from a corporation or individual under legal obligation to pay a creditor. The obligation in each case to pay is by law. A mandamus does not lie where a specific remedy by action exists. (Ex parte The Firemen's Ins. Co., 6 Hill, 243. The People v. Lawrence, Id. 244. Justice Cowen, in Ex parte Lynch, 2 id. 45. People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 1 Kern. 563, and cases cited by the court and counsel.) II. The commissioners of emigration, in allowing or rejecting the charges of counties, act as judicial officers. By § 5 of chapter 195 of Laws of 1847, the commissioners are directed to prescribe "such rules and regulations as they shall deem proper for the purpose of ascertaining the right, and the amount of the claim of any city, town or county to the indemnity under the provisions of this and the preceding section." This enactment confers upon the commissioners power to decide upon the right of the relators to the indemnity, and therefore makes the commissioners, quoad hoc, judicial officers. (Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 John. 150. Wilson v. Mayor of New York, 1 Denio, 595.) A mandamus will not be issued against judicial officers or officers vested with a discretion, to define what judgment or decision they shall give: it lies only to put them in motion. (People v. Judges of Dutchess, 20 Wend. 658.) In the present case, the commissioners have acted, but as the relators claim incorrectly; a certiorari is therefore the remedy-on it, the court will inquire into the principles upon which the commissioners acted. (Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. 167.) The People v. The Commissioners of Emigration. III. The commissioners of emigration are not liable to the counties for the "temporary relief" afforded emigrants. The legislature in all its poor laws has kept up a clear distinction between the "temporary relief" and the "support" of the poor. The words "relief" on the one hand and "maintain" and "support" on the other, are distinct in their etymological meaning. Relief, from rem and levare, is to lighten a burden, to assist one in bearing a thing. (See Johnson's Dictionary, Webster's Dictionary, Richardson's Dictionary, words "relief," "maintain" and "support.") "Support," on the other hand, is to take the burthen entirely off from the party bearing it. The etymological meaning of the word is also the popular one. To relieve a person, and to support a person, convey very different ideas, and "temporary relief" is still further from support. The commissioners are directed by § 4 of ch. 195, of the Laws of 1847, to provide for "the maintenance and support" of the emigrant, and to indemnify the counties for any expense or charge incurred by them "for the maintenance and support of the emigrant, as far as may be." IV. This construction has, up to the present time, been acquiesced in by all the counties; and this court will not try the rights of these parties on a mandamus, but should put the plaintiffs to their civil action, in which all questions can be properly determined. John N. Pomeroy, also for appellants. The rights and duties of the relators depend upon the revised statutes, and not upon the act creating the defendants. The revised statutes prescribe the duties of the county superintendents of the poor, and declare what moneys expended by them shall be a county charge, and it is only such sums of money expended by them as are a county charge, that can be recovered from the defendants. I. The case shows that the several sums of money paid by the relators were not so disbursed by them as to be a county The People v. The Commissioners of Emigration. charge, and cannot therefore be recovered from the defendants. In this branch of the case I concede that "temporary relief" may be given to transient paupers, who have no settlement in the towns; and that such "temporary relief" may be made a county charge if done in the proper way, but it cannot be made a county charge by the county superintendents of the poor. The revised statutes (2 R. S. 4th ed. p. 12) define the powers and duties of county superintendents. Section 25 declares that "they shall have a general superintendence and care of the county poor who may be in their respective counties, and shall have power, and it shall be their duty" &c. and the section goes on to specify 11 subdivisions, all of which relate to the permanent relief in the poor-house. It is claimed by the counsel for the relators, that these general words confer the power on the county superintendents to grant "temporary relief" to "transient paupers ;" and it is conceded that there is no other express or implied grant of power than this; so that the right of the relators to grant temporary relief, and make it a county charge, must be found here or nowhere. We say, 1. These words do not expressly or impliedly confer the right on the relators claimed by them. The "general superintendence and care of the poor" does not include the power to bestow money upon them at all, either permanently or temporarily. The power and duty to disburse moneys is given in the succeeding subdivisions. 2. This language is general, and it is explained, limited and applied in the 11 subdivisions following. These 11 subdivisions explain how, and where, and when the county superintendents are to have this "general care and superintendence of the poor." It is one of the most familiar rules of construction of statutes or writings, that when general terms are followed by several particulars, or several particulars are ended by a sweeping general term, the general language is to be construed as only applicable to things of the same kind as the particulars. This is too familiar a principle to need the citation of any authorities. When we see this statute, then, giving to the county superintendents "gen |