tions." Fifty-seven voted for, and ninety-eight against the passage of this dissent from the majority. Besides the above documentary evidence, Mr. Madison, in 1835, in commenting on his report and the proceedings of Virginia, makes the assertion, "That the right in the states to interpose declarations and protests against unconstitutional acts by Congress had been denied; and that the reasoning in the resolutions was called for by that denial."

It will be observed that great care is taken, in the commencement of these proceedings, to proclaim the constitution to be a compact to which the states are parties. On this broad truth is established the Democratic doctrine of state rights and of strict construction. On the theory that it is not a compact between the states, but a constitution, in a different sense, formed "by the people in the aggregate," rests the doctrine of centralization. Mr. Webster, the greatest champion of this theory, declared it when opposing a doctrine equally false, he declares in these celebrated words: "The constitution of the United States is not a confederacy, or compact, between the people of the several states in their sovereign power. The constitution itself, in its very front, declares that it is ordained and established by the people of the United States. So far from saying that it is established by the governments of the several states, it does not even say that it is established by the people of the several states, but pronounces that it is established by the people in the aggregate."

To this it may be replied, that in the original draft of the constitution, after all its provisions had been adopted, the preamble instead of saying, "We, the people of the United States," specified each state by name, as the previous articles of confederation had done. During all the debates the preamble remained in this form in the front without objection. The constitution, thus agreed to, was then referred to a "Committee on Style," for verbal supervision and correction. By this committee the names of the states were omitted, and the clause made to read as at present, for the obvious reason that in its original form it became irreconcilable with the 7th Article after its adoption, which was that "the ratification of the conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so ratifying the same." It was thus rendered necessarily uncertain whether or not all, or which and what number, would ratify, and if only nine,

which would constitute that number. This, therefore, caused a change merely in the style of the expression, to "We, the people of the United States," thereby obviating the difficulty without changing, or intending to change, the meaning; the true sense still being, "We, the people of the several states united." Surely the constitution did not lose its character as a compact by this alteration of the "Committee on Style." Mr. Morris, a member of that committee and the author of the change, afterwards said: "The constitution was a compact, not between individuals, but between political societies; the people not of America, but of the United States, each enjoying sovereign power." Besides, the only way in which the people ordained and established the constitution, was by its establishment" "between the states" in ratifying it through their conventions, as provided for in the 7th Article. The people, therefore, named in the preamble, are identified to be the same who, by separate state conventions, established in their ratifications the constitution between them. Thus the constitution itself conclusively proves it was not established by the American people "in the aggregate," but by separate conventions of the people in their sovereign capacities as states. Not only so, but by the terms, "the establishment of this constitution between the states," it defines itself to be a compact. Hamilton said in Number 9 of the "Federalist:" "If the new constitution should be adopted, the Union would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy, (the word, confederacy, put by himself in capitals). "Will it be said," demanded the "Federalist," "that the fundamental principles have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that in the establishment of the constitution the states should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the constitution proposed." In number 39 of the Federalist," it is said: "Each state, in ratifying the constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others. The act, therefore, establishing the constitution, will not be a national, but a federal act-the act of the people as forming so many independent states; not as forming one aggregate nation." Hamilton, in the 85th number of the same work, in speaking of the provisions of the constitution, calls them "The compacts which are to embrace thirteen states, who are the parties to the compact."

The position, that because the federal instrument declares itself to be a constitution, therefore it is not a compact, cannot be maintained. These terms were interchangeable, and were not considered inconsistent with each other at the time of the formation of the government. In the circular (written by Hamilton) of the Annapolis Convention, of 1786, in the address of Congress, responsive to it, and in each and all of the responses of the states to this call for the convention of 1787, the articles of confederation are called the federal constitution. In these official documents that instrument is mentioned in all twenty-seven times; and in twenty, out of that number, is called a "constitution," as synonymous with articles of confederation," or "compact."

Mr. Madison, in his letter of 1830 to Mr. Everett, says: "It (the constitution) was formed, not by the governments of the component states, as the federal government, for which it was substituted, * * nor was it formed by a majority of the people of the United States, as a single community, in the manner of a consolidated government. It was formed by the states, that is by the people in each state, in their highest sovereign capacity." "The constitution is a compact." In his letter to Prof. Davis, of 1833, he says: "The federal compact was not formed by individuals as the parties-that is by the people acting as a single community-it was formed by the people as separate communities in their sovereign and highest capacity." In his letter, of 1833, to Mr. Webster, in which, while exulting with his distinguished correspondent in his triumph over the nullification and secession doctrine of South Carolina, he expounds to him, with great ability, the true Virginian construction of the constitution of 1798, and closed with these significant words of instruction: "While the constitutional compact remains undissolved, it must be executed according to the forms and provisions specified in the compact. It must not be forgotten that compact, express or implied, is the vital principle of free governments, as contradistinguished from governments not free; and that a revolt against this principle leaves no choice but between anarchy and despotism."

Thus, one cardinal doctrine of the Virginia Proceedings of 1798, viz: that the constitution is a compact between the states, has not only been proven to be true, but great care, it is evident, was taken by the fathers of it, that it should be explained and proclaimed as

such; because they considered that feature of it should ever be remembered as one of vital importance.

Another cardinal doctrine recognized and mentioned by those proceedings is, that the constitution creates a division of the powers of sovereignty in a mode which never existed before, in which there is granted to the Federal Government certain specified sovereign powers, to be exercised and enforced through its legislative, judicial, and executive departments; while all other powers of sovereignty not granted, or prohibited, are reserved to the states or the people. The states, while agreeing to this division for the good of all, were so distrustful of the general government, that a majority of them in their ratification proposed amendments to restrict it, or guard it against the exercise of unauthorized powers. Massachusetts proposed 9; South Carolina, 5; New Hampshire, 12; New York, 33; North Carolina, 26; Rhode Island, 21; Virginia, 20. Among those adopted, was article 10, which reads as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." This amendment was added by way of precaution against misconstruction, and to proclaim in unmistakable terms such a division of sovereignty to exist. From it, this great truth must result, that on the one side of this division, within the limits of the powers specifically granted in the constitution, the general government alone is sovereign and supreme, and no where else; and on the other hand, outside of those powers therein granted, or prohibited to the states, the latter are equally sovereign and supreme; in other words, while it is true, that, "this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land," it must follow that the laws of the United States, made not in pursuance thereof, cannot be the supreme law of the land. It is equally true, that all the laws made by each state within the powers reserved to it by the constitution, must also be the supreme law of the land in that state; for if this is not so, it follows that the 10th Article of the Constitution itself is not supreme. Each state, therefore, is as sovereign in the exercise of its rights within the powers reserved by it, as the general government is sovereign within the powers granted to it.

* *

CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, in the case of Mc Culloch vs. Maryland, 4,

Wheaton, said: "In America the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union and those of the states. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it; but neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other."

MR. MADISON, in 1835, writes as follows: "It has hitherto been understood that the supreme power, that is, the sovereignty of the people of the states, was in its nature divisible, and was, in fact, divided, according to the Constitution of the United States, between the states in their united, and the states in their individual capacities; that as the states in their highest sovereign character, were competent to surrender the whole sovereignty, and form themselves. into a consolidated state, so they might surrender a part and retain, as they have done, the other part forming a mixed "government."

These sovereign powers, as allotted in this division, are thus in general terms described by the "Federalist," in No. 14: "The powers delegated to the Federal Government, are few and defined, and will be exercised principally on external objects as war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce. The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all those, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the state." Virginia, therefore, as has been seen in her proceedings, declared the constitution to be a compact between sovereign states, in which the powers of sovereignty are, in the way we have shown, divided.

She further declared, that when the Federal Government, as in the alien and sedition laws, violates that compact, there are only three remedies within its provisions open to the states for relief.

First, the states, as forming the constituent body of the general government, have the right to act as such by co-operation and concert in effecting a repeal of such laws; that to this end, the legislature of each state has the right to interpose a declaration of its opinion on the question of their constitutionality, and by such concurrent action at the recurring elections, the states could elect members in both houses of congress, and a president to conform to their views, and thus gain the desired result through a change in the administration of the government.

Secondly, the question of the validity of such laws might be submitted according to the forms of the constitution to the Federal Judiciary, and if decided unconstitutional, thereby rendered inoperative.