WISDOM OF NOT RECOGNIZING CUBAN INDEPENDENCE.

From the inauguration of President McKinley March 4, 1897, until the 11th day of April, 1898, the press of the country had been constantly outlining a policy of intervention on the part of the United States, either advocating the recognition of belligerent rights or proposing the independence of the island. The Congress which met December 6, 1897, was slow to discuss the proposition, rather awaiting some recommendation from the President of the United States. The message of the President delivered to Congress on the 11th of April contained this paragraph:

Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recog nition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.

When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, as a mater of fact, the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

Upon this suggestion Congress was called to act. Party lines were not strictly adhered to, but the Democrats in the Senate and the House were almost solidly opposed to the recommendation of the President and in favor of the immediate recognition of the independence of Cuba.

On April 13 the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House reported the following resolution:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized and directed to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there and establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own in the Island of Cuba. And the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the purpose of this resolution.

Such resolution passed the same day.

On April 14 the Senate reported the joint resolution of the House with a substitute therefor in the following words:

First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent, and that the Government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

On April 18 the report of the committee on conference was agreed to, the following being the text:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

The wisdom of the foregoing resolution and recommendation of the President of the United States was never more forcibly illus trated than in the case of Cuba. Ever since the declaration of war it has more and more become apparent that the so-called insurgent government in Cuba was without stability either in form or purpose, and that the insurgent forces were acting more as independent semi-military organizations, being responsible to no distinctive authority. If we had recognized the independence of Cuba we would have been compelled to become an allied force to the insurgents, and to have followed their orders in the direction of the campaign.

It is a well-known fact that President McKinley sounded the keynote of the policy to be followed if war should be declared when he recommended to Congress that Spain's sovereignty must first end in Cuba and a stable government be provided afterwards.

If the resolution introduced by Mr. Bailey or reported by the minority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House had prevailed, the complications growing out of Cuban affairs would have exceeded any entangled situation known in the last century. The people of this country will certainly trust to the wisdom of President McKinley and the leaders of Congress who so wisely provided for the emergency which we have just passed in solving the problems of the future in the settlement of the complicated questions growing out of the war.

DIFFICULTIES IN PROSECUTING THE WAR.

Ignoring the rapidity of movements which marked the conduct of the war on the part of the navy and land forces, the success of every military operation, the wholly disproportionate damage done by the American forces to that of the Spaniards, and the fact that the United States in short order dislodged Spain from her bases of supply in three distinct places with an incredibly small loss of life, it remains for some self-delegated critics to find fault with the conduct of the war.

History furnishes no parallel to the results, when account is taken of the condition of the United States at the beginning of hostilities and the lack of preparations to meet an emergency like this. With a small Navy and a standing Army of but 25,000 men, the American fighting forces stood face to face with an enemy, their equal in naval armament and their superior in land troops, the product of long military training and with the advantage of inure. ment to peculiar climatic conditions and veteran experience, obtained from a three-year contest with the insurgents. In spite of these advantages, it required but 113 days on the part of the United States to bring the war to a successful close.

Few have any true conception of the responsibility that devolved upon the President and his advisers in preparing the Army and Navy for war, considering the means which Congress had placed at their command. It is true there was no party division over the appropriation of $50,000,000 just before the war began, but with this exception the Democrats in Congress antagonized every measure proposed to place our military forces on a war footing. In other words, they voted regularly for every measure calculated to hasten us into a struggle with Spain, but refused to vote for measures which increased appropriations to defray the cost of the war. The $50,000,000 was spent mainly in foreign countries to purchase ships and munitions of war, because the time was too short to build ships and manufacture guns and war material at home. Thanks to the opposition of the Democrats and their allies in Congress, this money that should have passed into the hands

of American mechanics had to be sent abroad to pay foreign shipbuilders and manufacturers. Meanwhile the President was confronted with conditions of war whose extent nobody could foresee, with material for its conduct only half adequate and conditions presenting embarrassing obstacles at every corner.

The following interview copied from the Washington Star (Independent) of the latter part of August presents the situation in a few words:

"In all the criticism about our lack of supplies for the proper equipment and sustenance of our forces during the war just closing," said an old officer, now retired, who served many years as a quartermaster, "I have not yet seen the proper reason assigned for the cause of the conditions. The whole trouble can be found in a single word-economy-which was the tocsin of the recent Democratic Administration's affairs in all the branches of the military service. I don't mean this for criticism of a political sort, but simply as the statement of fact. The heads of the Departments under the recent regime were simply pessimists. This was especially true, for instance, of Secretary Herbert. Estimates made by men of experience and knowledge were cut down ruthlessly, and Congress in its zeal for economy cut them down still further, and the result which was inevitable was reached when the recent crisis confronted us.

"I can relate one or two incidents regarding the branches of the service with which I am most familiar," he continued. "It had been the custom for quartermasters to endeavor to keep on hand supplies of clothing, equipment, and so forth, to last at least a year. The estimates for the appropriation for supplies for the Marine Corps, to use a specific case, were placed one year while Secretary Herbert was in office at $90,000.

"The Secretary called for a statement of the supplies on hand and found they amounted to $120,000. Asking for an explanation, he was informed that it was customary to keep such an amount ahead. He declared it to be extravagance, and further said, as an additional instance of extravagance, that he had found there was enough canvas in possession of the Navy Department to fit out every ship in the British navy with three sets of sails. The estimates for the Marine Corps were cut down to $50,000. The next year they were the same. Then it became necessary to raise again to $90,000. When the Marine Corps was raised from 2,700 to 4,500 men there was not clothing or equipment sufficient, and when the battalion went to Cuba it wore winter flannels and kerseys when it should have had canvas uniforms.

"It will be remembered," continued the officer, "that a board was appointed by Secretary Herbert, headed by Admiral Dick Meade, of which Paymaster Carmody of this city was a member, to visit every navy yard in the country and report on the supplies. The board found in the engineering department a great deal of waste and belting; it found in the equipment department the same things. Separately, these articles were not great in amount, but taken together they made considerable. The result was that a new bureau-the Bureau of Supplies-was created, and the supplies cut down. The same policy ruled in the War Department. Consequently, when it became necessary to suddenly equip a large addi

tional force in all branches of the service the error of the economiral and niggardly course persistently pursued in the directions noted became apparent. I have no doubt that the severe lesson taught by recent developments will be well remembered hereafter by those whose duty it is to look ahead and not behind."

As a summary of the work of the War Department in the prosecution of the war, the following list partially indicates the many difficulties that had to be contended with:

The work of the Adjutant-General's Department has been to muster and order to their station, to be precise, 216,400 volunteers and 24,900 for the Regular Army. This with a reduced force, as many staff officers from all of the departments had been promoted and ordered to the field.

The Chief of Engineers reports an expenditure of $5,830,000 for harbor defenses, building emplacements of heavy guns, mortar batteries, and mines.

The Surgeon-General has had the enormous work of fitting up hospitals and organizing the medical corps, employing male and female nurses, contract surgeons, being surgeons who are employed from civil life, besides those commissioned as corps, division, and brigade surgeons, furnishing medical supplies and answering the demands from all over the country and from camps at Santiago, Puerto Rico, and Manila. The work done in this line is almost beyond comprehension.

The Commissary-General had purchased and distributed, up to August 1, 110,907,235 pounds of rations, which have been transported and distributed to all armies in the field here and at Santiago, Puerto Rico, and Manila, besides the large quantity distributed among the destitute Cubans.

The Quartermaster-General's report is too long to give even an approximate idea of his work. In the way of transportation to Honolulu, Manila, Santiago, and Puerto Rico and return home there were sent 82,638 men, with artillery equipment and supplies. By rail in this country there were transported 9,700 officers, 233,962 enlisted men, also 40,582 animals, besides thousands of wagons, artillery, and other quartermaster, commissary, ordnance, medical, and signal service stores.

The total number of articles of clothing and camp equipage dis tributed to the Army by the Quartermaster's Department has been 6,274,483, of which only a few articles can be mentioned, as follows: Blankets, 288,739; blouses, 283,762; trousers, 596,423; hats, 334,106; canvas field uniforms, 83,200; shoes, pairs, 511,378; undershirts, 736,965; tents, 179,142, etc.

The total weight of food and forage distributed daily to the Army is approximately 900 tons.