Moreover, as the purpose and effect of steaming the cane and packing it in sugar and water was not shown we can not safely say that such a processing of the raw material did not advance it to the status of a manufacture by fitting it for a use for which in its untreated condition it was wholly unsuitable. That conclusion is applicable here, and the additional fact that the sugar cane here has been peeled adds emphasis to its applicability. In United States v. Shing Shun & Co. (2 Ct. Cust. Appls. 388, T. D. 32113) this court held that the peeling of melon seeds and the roasting thereof (the roasting being implied from the allegations in the protest) brought such seeds within the category of manufactured articles. It thus appearing that there is no fact of record which impeaches the presumed correctness of the collector's classification, what is there which, as matter of law, establishes his classification to be erroneous? The importers' contention, briefly, is that the quoted provision in paragraph 503 more specifically covers the importation. This argument assumes, in effect, that the dutiable imported article is sugar cane in other than its natural state. It is true that the sugar cane itself is in other than its natural state. The importation, however, consists not only of such sugar cane, but, as shown by the analysis, includes also a liquid, the percentage of sugar in which is greater by the polariscopic test than the percentage of sugar in the cane. The weight of this liquid is 6.61 ounces, while the weight of the cane is a little more than twice that amount, viz, 15.59 ounces in each tin or can of the importation. The actual amount of cane sugar in the liquid in each can is 1.22 ounces and in the cane 2.54 ounces. In other words, the importation is something more than sugar cane not in its natural condition. It also consists, in part, of a liquid containing a greater percentage of sugar than the cane itself. What is done with this liquid the record does not show. If it is worthless and thrown away, the sugar cane may perhaps be regarded as the dutiable article imported. If, on the other hand, this liquid is of value and serves a useful purpose, a different conclusion may follow. We are not informed how much sugar was, in fact, used in packing the cane. Whether some of the sugar in the cane was withdrawn therefrom by the liquid or whether the amount of sugar in the cane was increased by absorption from the liquid is not disclosed. Information as to some or all of these facts, it seems to us, is necessary before we can say as matter of law that the importation here should be classified as contended by importers. No error appearing in the judgment below, it is affirmed. (T. D. 42495) Damask LANG CO. ET AL. v. UNITED STATES (No. 2944) ENTIRETY--Tablecloth and Napkins in Set are not. A tablecloth and six napkins imported together in a set are not an entirety; and the collector's assessment of the napkins eo nomine under paragraph 1014, tariff act of 1922, and the cloth as a manufacture of table damask under paragraph 1013 was correct. United States Court of Customs Appeals, December 5, 1927 APPEAL from United States Customs Court, Abstract 1615 [Affirmed.] Allen R. Brown for appellants. Charles D. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General (William H. Futrell, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States. [Oral argument October 12, 1927, by Mr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and SMITH, BARBER, BLAND, and HATFIELD, Associate Judges BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: Paragraphs 1013 and 1014 of the tariff act of 1922 read as follows: PAR. 1013. Table damask composed wholly or in chief value of vegetable fiber other than cotton, and manufactures composed wholly or in chief value of such damask, 40 per centum ad valorem. PAR. 1014. Towels and napkins, finished or unfinished, composed wholly or in chief value of flax, hemp, or ramie, or of which these substances are, or any of them is, the component material of chief value, not exceeding one hundred and twenty threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, 55 per centum ad valorem; exceeding one hundred and twenty threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, 40 per centum ad valorem; sheets and pillow cases composed wholly or in chief value of flax, hemp, or ramie, or of which these substances are, or any of them is, the component material of chief value, 40 per centum ad valorem. Appellants imported certain flax table damask in sets, each set consisting of a tablecloth with napkins made to match. Each set was packed in a paper carton, one tablecloth and six napkins. The testimony shows that the goods were ordered in sets and are sold in sets. They were invoiced as "33 4/12 Doz. covers in total of yards 1306.40" and "200 Doz. napkins in total of yards 534.01." The invoice contains the German words "Reinleinentischtucher und Servietten," which the Government translates to mean "pure linen tablecloths and napkins." The collector separated the sets and classified the tablecloths at 40 per cent ad valorem under the provision in paragraph 1013, supra, for "Table damask composed wholly or in chief value of vegetable fiber other than cotton, and manufactures composed wholly or in chief value of such damask." He classified the napkins at 55 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 1014 of the same act. The importers protested the classification of the napkins and contended in the court below, and contend here, that the collector's action in segregating the values of the constituent parts of the sets, which appellants contend are entireties, was erroneous, and that the napkins and tablecloths, each, should have been assessed for duty under paragraph 1013 at 40 per cent ad valorem. The sole question in the case is, Do the tablecloth and six accompanying napkins constitute an entirety for tariff duty purposes, or are they segregable for such purposes? Altman & Co. v. United States (13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 315, T. D. 41232), and the decisions of the Board of United States General Appraisers (now United States Customs Court), found in Abstract 47559 (46 Treas. Dec. 606 and T. D. 40724, 47 Treas. Dec. 251), concerning footballs and football bladders, are relied upon by appellants. In the Altman & Co. case, supra, certain corsets and lace trimmings used to trim the corsets were held to be entireties. They were separate and unattached, but in the same container. This court held that they were entireties. We do not regard this case as supporting the contentions of appellants. There the lace was cut and separately prepared to be used on the particular corset it accompanied and no other, and could not be used, practicably, in any other way. It was a part of the corset. In the instant case the tablecloth is complete without the napkins. The napkins are complete articles independent of the tablecloth. The mere fact that they may be bought, sold, and used together, in sets, does not require that they be regarded as entireties for tariff purposes. As was pointed out in appellants' brief, there was no provision for footballs in the tariff act of 1913. The board held that bladders of rubber and cases of leather should be separately assessed, while in T. D. 40724 (47 Treas. Dec. 251) the board, having under consideration the same merchandise and the same record, held that the bladders and cases were entire ties. This was because the tariff act of 1922 made a specific provision for footballs. Footballs were known to be constituted of rubber bladders and leather cases. It is clear to us that this case does not support appellants' position in any particular. If Congress had not wanted napkins to be separately assessed it would not have named them specifically in the act. The eo nomine provision for napkins controls over the general provision for table damask. The separate eo nomine provision for napkins in the tariff act of 1922 compels the conclusion that the legislature did not regard napkins and tablecloths, imported in sets, as entireties. (United States v. Kalter Mercantile Co. et al., 11 Ct. Cust. Appls. 540, T. D. 39680; Sheldon & Co. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. Appls. 108, T. D. 41591.) A review of the cases of this and other courts touching upon the subject of entireties would not be helpful here, since this court set them out and discussed them somewhat in the Altman & Co. case, supra. The judgment of the United States Customs Court is affirmed. (T. D. 42496) Soap-bark siftings Appeal directed from the decision of the United States Customs Court (T. D. 42438), relative to the classification of soap-bark siftings TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, New York. SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of the 29th ultimo, inviting attention to the decision of the United States Customs Court, T. D. 42438, holding that soap-bark siftings made as a by-product when the crude soap bark is cut up into chips for easier transportation are entitled to free entry under either paragraph 1567 or paragraph 1622 of the tariff act of 1922, rather than dutiable at the rate of 10 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 34 of the said act. You refer to the proviso to paragraph 34 to the effect that the term "drug" wherever used in this act shall include only those substances having therapeutic or medicinal properties and chiefly used for medicinal purposes, and state that in your opinion the Government failed to establish that the chief use of the article was as a drug. It therefore follows that the merchandise would be excluded from both paragraph 34 and paragraph 1567, and you state that you believe the merchandise to be properly dutiable as waste at the rate of 10 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 1457 rather than free of duty as a crude vegetable substance under paragraph 1622. In view of the foregoing and in accordance with your recommendation you are hereby requested to file, in the name of the Secretary of the Treasury, an application with the United States Court of Customs Appeals for a review of the said decision. Respectfully, Approved: FRANK DOW, Acting Commissioner of Customs. By direction of the Secretary. SEYMOUR LOWMAN, Assistant Secretary. (T. D. 42497) Schedule for hearings by the United States Customs Court Schedule for hearings of cases by the United States Customs Court at ports other than the port of New York for the calender year 1928 TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Washington, D. C., December 14, 1927. To Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned: The appended schedule of hearings by the United States Customs Court is published for your information. E. W. CAMP, Commissioner of Customs. Schedule for the hearing of tariff cases by justices of the United States Customs Court at ports other than New York for the year 1928 UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT, 641 Washington Street, New York, December 10, 1927. Pursuant to the provisions of section 518, tariff act of 1922, the following schedule has been prepared for the hearing by justices of the United States Customs Court of tariff cases at ports other than New York, and is hereby promulgated: Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Port Jan. |