porter (1880), 137-146. Same article with additional 1 Ind. Law Mag. (1883) 1-23.

matter.

Voluntary payments. I. H. Lionberger, 18 Central Law Journal (1884), 188-190.

Payment under protest; constructive duress. 72 Law Times, London (1881), 129.

Recovery of money paid under duress. Note of cases, vol. 2, Smith's Leading Cases, 7th Am. ed. (1873), 415-416; id., 8th Eng. ed. (1879) 429, 431.

What constitutes duress. Wm. L. Murfree, Jr., 12 Central Law Journal (1881), 121-122. John Profatt's Note of Cases, 4 Am. Dec. (1878) 172-173. M. D. Ewell's Notes of cases, 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) (1879( 747-751; 22 id. (1883) 190-191. N. C. Moak's Note of Cases, 24 English Rep. (1880) 634-637.

Defense of duress. Vol. 6, Wait's Actions and Defenses (1879), 649-664. Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876) 788, 794.

Need and duress; gifts, etc. Note of Cases, Vol. 2) Part 2, White and Tudor's Lead. Cas. 4th Am. ed. (1877, 1245-1250.

Fraud and duress; compromises. Note of Cases, vol. 2, Part 3, White and Tudor's Lead. Cas., 4th Am. ed. (1877) 1731-1834.

Duress on married woman avoids deed. J. H. Stewart's Note of Cases, 34 N. J. Eq. Rep. (1882) 13.

Marriage void for duress, ratification, etc. J. H. Stewart's Notes of Cases, 37 N. J. Eq. Rep. (1884) 196.

When payment to carrier of extortionate prices is duress. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 169; N. C. Moak's Notes of Cases, 13 English Rep. (1876) 52; 16 id. (1877) 215.

Duress per minas. W. H. Phillips, 14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) (1875) 201-207; Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876) 771-773.

Duress by actual or threatened imprisonment. N. C. Moak's Note of Cases, 12 English Rep. (1876) 741-743; John Proffatt's Note of Cases, 4 Am. Dec. (1878) 172-173; A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 158-159.

Duress of imprisonment by abuse of legal process. Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876 766-767.

Threat of legal proceedings, civil or criminal. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 157-158; N. C. Moak's Note of Cases, 16 English Rep. (1877) 215. Duress by threat of imprisonment of third persons. 26 Albany Law Journal (1882), 424-426. Extorting money by process.

J. H. Stewart's Note of Cases, 32 N. J. Eq. Rep. (1880) 51-56.

Menaces actionable when followed by damage. Note of Cases, Bigelow's Lead. Cas. Torts (1875) 226227.

Duress of goods. Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876) 775, 785-787; John Proffatt's Note of Cases, 1 Am. Dec. (1878) 644-645; A. C. Freeman's Notes of Cases, 26 Am. Dec. (1881) 376-878; 45 id. (1883) 159-160.

Duress of real property. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 46 Am. Dec. (1883) 160-161.

Res gestæ; declarations in criminal cases. J. G. Thompson's Note of Cases, 10 Am. Rep. (1874) 28-29; Stewart Rapalje's Note of Cases, 1 Criminal Law Mag (1880) 69-71; Irving Browne's Notes of Cases, 34 Am. Rep. (1881) 479-482; vol. 4 Central Law Journal (1877), 435-439; vol. 21, Albany Law Journal (1880), 484, 504; vol. 22, Albany Law Journal (1880), 4-6; vol. 24, Journal of Jurisprudence, Edinburgh (1880), 75-81, The Bedingfields case. Cockburn and Taylor's Letters (1879 80), reviewed by J. B. Thayer, 14 Am. Law Rev. (1880) 817-838; 15 id. (1881) 1,71; reprinted in 15 Irish Law Times, Dublin (1881), 33 61, 102, 119, 140; criticism of L. C. J. Cockburn's views, 68 Law Times, London (1879), 58, 146.

Expressions of mental and bodily feelings; declarations to surgeons by the injured party. 22 Albany Law Journal (1881), 364-365.

Hearsay evidence; imposition, fraud or duress. John Anthon, 24 Am. Jurist (1840), 118-162.

Law in relation to threats. Notes of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1874), 612-615.

Threats of the deceased as evidence in criminal cases. Joel P. Bishop, 4 Central Law Journal (1877), 435-439.

Evidence of previous threats in mitigation of the quantum of punishment. Note of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1874), 475.

Threats of the deceased when evidence in favor of the defendant. John Proffatt's Note of Cases, 1 Am. Dec. (1878) 373.

Nervous fears no excuse for homicide. Notes of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1874), 242, 309, 687.

Fear of danger which will excuse homicide. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 26 Am. Dec. (1881) 279-280. Fear from threats. Francis Wharton, 15 Central Law Journal (1882) 262-265.

Scientific aspects of fear. A. Wilson, 159 Colburn's New Mo. Mag., London (1876), 67-72.

Communicated threats. Note of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1876), 589-596.

Uncommunicated threats. By S. G. Graham with Note by George L. Christian, 3 Va. Law Journal (1879), 65-72; note by Joel P. Bishop, 4 Central Law Journal (1877). 354.

Confessions obtained by threats or undue influence. A. C. Freeman's Notes of Cases, 20 Am. Dec. (1880) 505-506. Respectfully yours,

NEW YORK CITY, March 19, 1881,

LUCRI CAUSA.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

W. H. W.

In November, 1872, the General Term of this third department, Miller, Potter and Parker, justices, in Harding v. People (not reported), but a case singularly like People v. Woodward, 31 Hun, 57, said, Miller, P. J., writing the opinion: "After a careful examination I am satisfied that the tenor and weight of the authorities to which I have referred is, that when the prisoner intends to deprive the owner of the property permanently a case of larceny is made out. The taking and killing of the horse in the present case, clearly shows such intent, and it follows, that no error was committed by the judge in refusing to charge that the lucri causa was an essential element of the crime and must be proved, or stated in the various requests made by the prisoner's counsel on this subject."

The judgment however was reversed and a new trial ordered, upon the ground that under the third count of the indictment, "evidently framed to meet a case of cruelty to animals," no conviction for burglary or larceny could be had.

Were this case reported, Justice Learned need not have searched in vain for a "decision on the point in this State" fully sustaining his position in People v. Woodward."

ELIZABETHTOWN, March 26, 1884.

HARRY HALE.

LAWYERS AS SPEAKERS.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I think you are in error in the "impression that the office of speaker in our National House of Representatives, has not been generally held by lawyers." Mr. Carlisle is a lawyer, a member of the Lexington, Ky., bar of good standing. And Mr. Keifer is also a law

LEGATEE FORFEITING LEGACY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

A Reader," [whose letter is published on page 260 of the current volume asks for cases on a question which he will find discussed and decided by Justice Van Vorst, in his opinion in the case of Jackson v. Westerfield, Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y. Co., July 14, 1881, published in New York Daily Register of August 6, 1881.

If he has not happened to see the case mentioned, this may be of service.

BAPTISMAL NAMES.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

If the author of "A Dictionary of Baptismal Names, etc.," noticed in your last number, is not more accurate in his other definitions than in those which you cite, the lack of an "alphabetical sub-arrangement" is by no means the "gravest defect" of his performance. Arnold, e. g., which he defines "a maintainer of honor," denotes rather a combination of strength with amiabilty or affection; Aristides and Austin were both, doubtless, "lovers of justice," but one signifies the illustrious, while the other is simply a contraction of Augustine, Augustinus, a diminutive of Augustus; Brian is the Celtic for strong, without special reference to the voice; Hector means holding fast, or perhaps holding off, restraining from attack; Hortensius was unquestionably a great "orator," but 'his name signifies gardener; Ibzan is Semitic for tin; Lycurgus was probably a wolf-slayer; Marcus is a hammer, like its diminutive Marcellus or Martellus, French Martel; Othniel was "a judge," in the sense of a chief magistrate of Israel, but his name means "the hour of God; " Solon is the man of quoits, the quoitpitcher, discobulus; Sergius was "the silken," and was perhaps distinguished, like our Court of Appeals, by his robe; Torquil, one would say, must mean "the twister;" and William is the German Wilhelm, "hel met of resolution." I congratulate the author on the happy hit he has made in Harold; his other definitions are all astray.

NEW YORK, April 1, 1884.

A. V. S.

NECESSARY IMPLICATION IN THE CONSTITUTION. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Some years ago, there was a society formed for the purpose of advocating an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, so that it should contain an express recognition of God as the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. If I am not misinformed, Judge Strong, of the Supreme Court of the United States, was its president. Of course nothing could be more flattering

to the Almighty, or better calculated to assure Him a firm seat on the throne of the universe, than the existence of a society of this description. But for several years past, nothing has been heard of this society, and its annual proceedings and resolutions have ceased to gladden the hearts of the few chosen ones, who have not "bowed the knee to Baal." Why is this thus? I am sure I don't know, but since reading the recent "legal tender" decision, I have a theory which I desire to submit to your candid judgment. I hold that Judge Strong and a majority of the Supreme Court have discovered that no amendment is necessary, inasmuch as a recognition of the Deity is found in the Constitution by "necessary implication." The rea soning, upon which this conclusion is founded, is remarkably clear and convincing. We learn, from the legal tender decision, that all the "powers, universally understood to belong to sovereignty," were conferred by the Constitution upon the government and executive of the United States, where such powers were not expressly prohibited. But one of the universal attributes of sovereigns in Europe, is that they govern by Divine right. This idea is expressed in their formal titles. The ancient title of the kings of England was: "Edward, Charles and James, by the Grace of God, of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, King." "It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary consequence;" that the constitutional title of our present executive is: "Chester, by the Grace of God, of thirty-eight States, nine Territories,and Alaska, President;" and that here is an acknowledgment of the Deity, plainly implied in the Constitution. Again we learn, from the legal tender decision, that the power to borrow money not only implies the power to emit bills of credit, but to annex to those bills of credit any advantage to the holder thereof, which in the judgment of Congress will render them a more desirable acquisition. It follows therefore that the Constitution au. thorizes Congress to provide by statute that every clergyman in the country, "without respect to race, color, or previous condition of servitude," shall each Sunday, after putting up the usual petition to the Almighty, for "the heathen in distant lands, and the sister churches, and all them in authority," add a spe-. cial prayer for the holders of the National bills of credit Such a prayer, among pious people like ours, would certainly dispose them to acquire all the National currency they could honestly obtain-if not more-and "we are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that it is an appropriate means conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress." It will be seen therefore that the Constitution not only recognizes an overruling Providence, but prays for its aid in borrowing money, and that an acknowledgment of God, as the ruler of the universe, is clearly implied in the clauses conferring upon Congress the power to borrow money, and provide a National currency. Q. E. D.

I have no doubt that your readers will perceive that the reasoning of this article, and that of Judge Gray in the case of Julliard V. Greenman, are almost identical, but it does not follow that I have copied from Judge Gray, or Judge Gray from me. The tendency of great minds to come to like conclusions upon the same state of facts is sufficient to account for the resemblance. But

I flatter myself that I have settled-in accordance with the latest decisions-a vexed question, one that since the adoption of the Constitution has proved a stumbling block to many, and there is no use in denying that I am experiencing at this moment "that general warmth adown the small of the back, which one feels when he has said a good thing."

Yours, exultantly,

THE MODERN WEBSTER.

with less imprisonment than the man. It is right that adultery should be recognized as a crime in the eyes of the law. It has been practically so recognized for many years by the repeated refusals of juries to convict the slayer of his wife's seducer. We have always advocated punishing adultery as a crime, and then punishing the man who takes the law in his own hands. It is high time to get some of this wild-beast notion of justice out of the minds of men. But why should the woman be any less punished than the man? She is generally even the worse sinner of the two, and should be given to understand that she runs an equal risk.

The great libel suit of Belt v. Lawes has come to an ignoble end- both parties have financially col lapsed, ruined, we suppose, by the expenses of the suit. So we shall have no appeal to the House of Lords, and the case goes out of court as did that of Jardyce v. Jardyce, for want of oil to trim the legal lamps.

The lord chief justice of England and Justice Stephen have recently decided that a rule of a board of health, that no pig shall be kept within fifty feet of a dwelling-house, is unauthorized by a statute enabling them to make by-laws to prevent the keeping of animals on premises so as to be injurious to health. Down-trodden Ireland should now give the chief justice a long mark to his credit.

A correspondent points out to us that under the laws of Pennsylvania the admission of lawyers to practice is in the discretion of the courts, the judges being authorized "to admit a competent number of persons." He also argues - not to our satisfaction

that the Constitution prohibits women from being lawyers. But grant all this, and our criticism is not touched. The judges may be right, but they have given wrong reasons for their decisions.

We do not hear much of late about the relief of the United States Supreme Court. The Davis bill seems to sleep. But our attention has been called to the Dorsheimer-Mitchell bill, which provides substantially as follows: 1. That where the sole ground of jurisdiction of the United States Court is the fact that the suit is between citizens of different States, the appeal shall lie to a new court, called the United States Court of Appeals, to be composed of seven judges (§ 1). 2. That this court shall sit at New York, New Orleans, Chicago, and San Francisco, and shall assign, by districts, for hearing at each of these places the appeals from the various circuits (§ 6). 3. That in cases where the amount involved exceeds $20,000, there shall be an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court (87). 4. That all appeals from the Supreme Court of a Territory, not involving a Federal question, shall go to the Court of Appeals (§ 8). 5. That of cases involving $20,000 or less, now on docket of

the Supreme Court, there shall be transferred to the new Courts of Appeals all cases which would have gone to the latter, had the present bill been law when these cases were taken up (§ 12). 6. That the Circuit Court in banc for every species of review shall consist of four judges, viz.: The circuit justice, the circuit judges, and two district judges, with substitutes from neighboring circuit or district judges, and that an additional circuit judge shall be appointed for every circuit (§§ 14, 15). 7. That, except on motions for new trials, etc., the judge whose ruling is the subject of review shall not sit (§ 16). We understand that the Supreme Court justices strongly favor the Davis bill.

IN

NOTES OF CASES.

'N State v. Carman, Iowa Supreme Court, March 20, 1884, 18 N. W. Rep. 691, it was held that a defendant in felony cannot waive a jury trial. The court thought the statute imperative, but said further: "The question presented is not as to the waiver of a mere statutory privilege, but an imperative provision, based, as we view it, upon the soundest conception of public policy. Life and liberty are too sacred to be placed at the disposal of any one man, and always will be, so long as man is fallible. The innocent person, unduly influenced by his consciousness of innocence, and placing undue confidence in his evidence, would, when charged with crime, be the one most easily induced to waive his safeguards. There is no resemblance between such a case and that of a person pleading guilty. In the latter case there is no trial, but mere judgment upon the plea. If the language of the statute were less imperative than it is, the adjudications would support us in reaching the same conclusion. Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; State v. Maine, 27 Conn. 281; Bond v. State, 17 Ark. 290; Wilson v. State, 16 id. 601; League v. State, 36 Md. 259; Williams v. State, 12 Ohio St. 622; People v. Smith, 9 Mich. 193; United States v. Taylor, 11 Fed. Rep. 470." Seever, J., dissented.

Women are getting their rights in the far west. In Kelly v. Kelly, Nevada Supreme Court, July 11, 1883, it was held that a husband was entitled to a divorce on the ground of cruelty where the wife circulated false reports of his infidelity. The court said: "We scarcely need the aid of judicial authority for the enforcement of the truth that there may be cruelty without personal violence, and that such cruelty, working upon the mind, may affect the health. Wretchedness of mind can hardly fail to have this result. In causes of divorce, upon the ground of cruelty, wives appear as complainants more frequently than husbands. This arises from the fact that the husband is generally physically stronger than the wife, and less susceptible to the effect of ill-treatment than she. He too, may, in fact, frequently restrain the wife's violence by the