raise it to $1,000; but that is a poverty-stricken measure. The day will soon come when Gould's and Vanderbilt's cases alone will swamp the court, not one of them involving less than a million of dollars. The Supreme Court of the United States has already sought refuge behind a $5,000 barrier, but it is of no use. The court is hopelessly in arrears. The remedy evidently lies further back. If we must choke off litigation, let us nip it in the bud. The General Terms are just as badly off. Heaven knows they are grinding out opinions not only faster than the Court of Appeals can reverse them, but much faster than the reporters can publish them, or we of the profession can reconcile or even read them. The State, to be sure, recently embarked upon the dangerous experiment of increasing the number of judges in the Supreme Court; but this was done evidently in a spirit not only reckless of expense, but not even stopping to think of the sure increase of labor such a step must devolve upon the Court of Appeals. Clearly the remedy lies still further back. The device of refusing to allow appeals unless the court below shall "certify," etc., that a difficult and important question is involved, is also, while obviously excellent in principle, not radical enough. Do you not see that when you have struck the right principle, you should carry it out to its full extent? Suppose now each judge at Special Term or circuit or chambers should first be required to "certify" that he feels a little shaky about his decision, before any appeal whatever is allowed to be taken from it? Think what a relief it would be to the General Term, and thus ultimately to the Court of Appeals; we all know how common it is for a judge who has "carefully considered "a case, to be absolutely sure he is right in his determination of it. The reported opinions abound with such expressions as "it has long been settled law," and "it is entirely clear in this case that," etc. Thus we see how, by a simple extension of this salutary principle already embodied in the jurisprudence of our State, an immense reduction of our appellate calendars could be effected. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Of course our General Terms are sometimes reversed, but so is the Court of Appeals sometimes reversed (on a Federal question) at Washington, and sometimes it overrules itself, and the Supreme Court of Washington, if not directly overruling itself, sometimes "distinguishes" cases in a way that looks very much like overruling. All this, in a moderate amount, is no reflection on judges, but only illustrates the intrinsic difficulties of law, human language and human thought. Instead of "not looking at the cases and points," I have sometimes wondered how they got at the real hinging point in a case as quick as they do. I have seen them decide a case "out of hand," without looking at the papers, and without hearing respondent's counsel-deciding it on the opening statement of appellant's counsel, and I have seen that case affirmed in the Court of Appeals. I have felt like "swearing at the judges" but once. They limited counsel to fifteen minutes each, on pain of going over to next term, when I thought an hour would have been nearer right; and then the disposition to "swear" was not discovered, to any irrepressible extent, until they had beaten me. On the contrary, I have sometimes joined with opposing counsel in a request to submit an appeal on the papers without oral argument, and have been refused, the court requiring such argument. If this is not enough to relieve the glut of litigation, let us carry the principle a step still further. Let no action be tolerated in the courts in which the amount involved is less than $500 or $1000. It is a poor "limit" that won't work as well for an action as for an appeal; and it must be obvious to the dullest mind that the fewer actions there are, the fewer appeals there will be But I have still a final and sovereign remedy to propose, and it is for this in particular that I claim a patent. It illustrates better than any thing else the excellence of the system of restricting appeals, which as already pointed out is in vogue at present only to a limited extent. I propose that no appeals whatever be allowed unless the prevailing party and his attorneys shall "certify" that he or they, or a majority of them, deem the questions involved to be of sufficient importance to require the determination of an appellate tribunal. Since pride of opinion is established as a useful factor in the work of repressing appeals, let us have more of it. Let us have the responding philippic of Mr. Yeatman ought not to be accepted as Many of the judges sitting at General Terms here are often criticised by the bar as talking too muchtalking with each other during the argument, and "bandying" with counsel. The first may be well founded, but as to the second, making inquiries of, or suggestions to counsel, asking them questions or propounding difficulties, it seems to be done constantly in England, whose courts and judges we habitually admire, and while it does tend to upset some debates, I do not know any thing, when it is well and properly done, that so tends to bring things to a point. some measure ent's and his counsel's pride of opinion, as well as that The real evil lies in the vast number of cases to be disposed of; in the printed records being made much more bulky than necessary; in the briefs of counsel being too long. and sometimes in the court actually overlooking a material point. But the sweep an exact statement. It needs reviews, modification, moderation, and therefore should be reversed. NEW YORK, Feb. 9, 1884. GEO. H. YEAMAN. CONCERNING DIGESTS. There should be a general digest of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of the several States, giving the leading cases and the law as it is substantially settled on the different topics on which decisions have been rendered, leaving out all irrelevant matters and things, which only serve to confuse issues and courts, bar and jury. All dicta should be sponged out, and unsettled points which can but lead to confusion. Such a digest should only embrace a sufficient number of such opinions of the several Supreme Courts of the States as go to establish the law on the numerous subjects contained in all the reports. Such a digest would be one step toward abridging and simplifying the law which is beginning to be much needed. E. S. WHITTEMORE. SANDWICH, MASS., Feb., 1884. MARRIED WOMEN'S CONTRACTS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: I notice that you refer in the last number of the JOURNAL to Mr. Kruse's bill in the Assembly in relation to married women, with the remark that "the measure had been introduced in former legislations, but we belive has never passed." I think you have overlooked the fact that this measure or one to the same end was introduced in the Senate on the 9th day of January, 1879, was passed on the 28th of February by a vote of 19 to 5. On the 17th of April it passed the Assembly by 68 to 29, went to the governor (Robinson) and on the 28th of April returned to the Senate with his veto. Senate Journal, 1879, page 649. You also say "it ought to prevail. So thought the Legislature, 1879. So this Legislature ought to think and to meet a more progressive executive. to find what ought to be found in the authorized reports of the Supreme Court. Very respectfully yours, CHAS. BLANDY, [We take it for granted that the discrimination is made by the judges, and not by the reporter. EDITOR ALBANY LAW JOURNAL.] NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. DIGEST ENGLISH REPORTS. Digest of Moak's English Reports, volumes 16 to 30, inclusive. With a list of cases reported, and table of cases affirmed, considered, overruled, or reversed. By James Simmons. Also a digest of American notes, by Nathaniel C. Moak. Albany, N. Y., Wm. Gould & Son, 1883. Pp. xxxvi, 1007. This is a very thorough digest of a large portion of Mr. Moak's excellent series. The digest of American notes alone covers 336 pages. The digest is very timely, and will be indispensable to those who have the reports themselves. JACOB'S FISHER'S DIGEST SUPPLEMENT. This volume is the tenth of the series, and is the first supplement, giving the decisions from 1878 to 1883. The work is well executed, and is in every way worthy of a place with the preceding volume. Published by John C. Remick, New York. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In the recent volumes of Hun, the official reporter has adopted a new system, that of discriminating between cases, some of which are reported in full, others in "memoranda, not reported in full," while others are simply among the "decisions" only. I can conceive the necessity for discrimination, otherwise the reports would simply be a rehash of oft decided principles, but my attention has recently been called to what I consider poor judgment in this discriminating; take for instance the case of Barclay v. Culver, on p. 1 of vol. 30; the principle there decided is as old as the hills, and known to almost every lawyer, while in the case of Higgins v. Higgins, p. 84 of the same volume, novel and instructive principles, known only to the few, were there decided, and yet the latter case is among the "decisions," while the former case is reported in full. If this system of discrimination is to be adapted in the future, we shall have to look to such publications as yours and the Daily Register, and the Weekly Digest, MR NOTES. R. Justice Field, at his residence, at Washington, on the 13th inst., gave his brother, David Dudley Field, a dinner in celebration of his 79th birthday, at which the President and some twenty others of the highest dignitaries of the Nation were present. Like another great law-giver, Mr. Field may not live to enter the Canaan of his desire, but he has at least been accorded a well deserved sight and promise of it. The Vermont judges, it seems, have lately been looking into the witness bible. In Lewis v. Bowker, 55 Vt. 21, Taft, J., quotes: "Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labor until the evening." (Ps. civ. 23.) And in School District v. Brown, 55 Vt. 61, Redfield, J., says: "This case savors of mint and cummin,' while 'the weightier parts of the laws' are not much invoked." We do not know why Judge Redfield left out "anise," unless perhaps the use of that herb in coursing foxes has rendered any reference to it objectionable to the rural population.-Here is the fine way in which a California counsellor excuses his forgetfulness. "In the case at bar there was an obliteration of memory-a misfortune that may overtake even the plaintiff's counsil. It was not a negligence, a carelessness, or a lack of diligence. It was a misfortune, in itself burdensome enough without being stigmatized as 'negligence, carelessness, and lack of diligence.' Against the faults of memory no man is perfectly secure. The black screen of oblivion stands ready at the subtle touch of countless forces to obscure that mirror of the mind called memory, at any time."-In Smith v. Smith, 62 Cal. 466, it was held that the wife leaving her husband and children for three months, and going to Germany to "perfect herself in the art of painting" was not cruelty justifying a divorce. It may not have been cruel to the husband, but we should think it probably would be cruel to the public. The Albany Law Journal. M ALBANY, MARCH 1, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. [R. AUSTIN ABBOTT says, in the Daily Register, in speaking of Mr. Throop's revision of the statutes, now presented to the Legislature: "This bill covers, in its way, much the same department of jurisprudence which Mr. Field's Civil Code covers in quite a different way. The aim of the Civil Code is to state the rules of law, rather in the form of principles; and while avoiding minutiae of detail, to state all the important general rules, which the courts ought to recognize and respect, in dealing with the subject in hand. This method naturally results in comparatively short sections, each enunciating a general doctrine, and the whole aiming to form a systematic outline of the entire law on the subject, without minute regulation or details of application. The revision bill, on the other hand, aims at a method perhaps more in consonance with the views expressed by the opponents of codification. It does not attempt to reduce to written form the doctrines of the courts, but embodies all the existing statutes on the subject in hand, with such modifications as appear to the draftsman to be necessary to bring them into harmony with each other, and with a limited number of modifications originating in the judgment of the draftsman or suggested by reported cases as being desirable to improve the statute, and with quite a number of additions intended to carry into further application the specific regulations of detail, such as are already contained in many of our special statutes. Many pages of the revision therefore present long sections furnishing minute regulations as to matters of detail incidental to the administration of the law, such as are apparently rather avoided by the Civil Code. The one bill proposes a systematic and complete formulation of general principles, and this brings into the statute law very much which has not been heretofore regulated by it at all. The other leaves unregulated what has not been regulated heretofore, but proposes to regulate in much further detail what is already the subject of regulation. We should like to know which bill, on the whole, would be preferred by those whose opinions are represented in Mr. Carter's pamphlet." Mr. Throop's bill approximates in size to the Civil Code, but contains less than a thousand sections. Mr. Carter ought, to be consistent, to be more hostile to this than to the Civil Code. But we shall see. In a work by a distinguished English legal writer there is a table, prepared it is said by "a very eminent American jurist," of the relative value and authority outside their respective States of the American Reported Decisions. They are divided into four classes, A. B. C. and D. A stands for VOL. 29 - No. 9. B and C are very high and D for very low. "middling." Under A are placed all the Federal Reports both Supreme and Circuit, all the Reports of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and all the Reports of New York, except Anthon. Under "D" (a sort of index expurgatorius, for the English bar, we suppose,) no fewer than nineteen reporters have the misfortune (in several cases quite well deserved) to figure. Kentucky and Tennessee lead the procession, Bibb, Hardin, A. K. & J. J. Marshall, Monroe, Peck, Martin & Yerger, Humphrey, Cooke and Yerger all appearing. Ohio appears twice (Wright and Hammond), and Alabama (Porter), North Carolina (Martin), Connecticut (Kirby), Maryland (Harris & McHenry), Indiana (Blackford), Virginia (Va. Cas.), and New York (Anthon), each once. All the rest of the Reports and Reporters are rated “B” and “ C,” fair and middling. ** ** * More than an ordinary book notice is deserved by Mr. Austin Abbott's Annual Digest of New York Statutes and Reports of 1882-3. This is an extensively annotated digest. The author says in the preface: "An annual digest ought to be much more than a compilation of the head notes of the year's reports. It appears to me that it may be made the instrument of gathering and concentrating upon each subject all the light which the cases of the period can shed for the reader; and to do this com pletely it must include not only new points in judgment, but also what has been done by way of confirming, explaining, limiting or overruling the has seemed to me that a digest might fairly be made doctrines of previous cases. In addition to this it to represent in a condensed form -' photographed all that is valuable in the entire down,' as it were body of judicial discussion of the period, by indicating intelligibly, in connection with each decision, the authorities which the courts during the current year have deemed worthy of recognition as precedents in the present state of the law. This volume is the first attempt to reduce the growing mass of annual decisions to a form in which they will afford this service," i. e., "turn the otherwise unmanageable mass of reported decisions into an inexhaustible mine of authorities." Accordingly, on every page are notes, frequently quite extensive, stating what authorities were cited in the particular case, and to what point, and what was said of them; and information is frequently given as to other sources of knowledge, such as law journals and the like. In these notes other cognate decisions are also pointed out and described and commented on. The cross-references are singularly abundant and detailed. There is a table of constitutions, statutes and rules cited; and a table of cases digested and cited, briefly stating the points of decision, the two classes of cases being distinguished by different type. We believe we pronounced Mr. Abbott's last volume before this the best digest we had ever seen, but we must now transfer that praise to this. immense mass of current law is compressed within 650 pages, which shows that there is no padding. This We do not know of another guide-book and directory to recent decisions so judicious and useful as this, and we believe that it can never be surpassed, either in plan or execution, unless by Mr. Abbott himself. Mr. W. I. Babb has introduced in the Iowa Legislature a joint resolution requesting the governor to invite the several States and Territories to send each two representatives to attend a convention at Des Moines, on the first Wednesday of May, 1885, to consider the subject of uniform laws in relation to divorce, mercantile paper, and conveyancing. The preamble deprecates any constitutional amendment in the premises. The evils of the present divorce system, or rather want of system, are rather luridly set forth as follows: "Whereas, The great and underlying evil of the whole subject grows out of the diverse systems of procedure and causes of divorce in the different States and Territories, enabling parties who for any trivial cause may desire a separation from those with whom they have vowed to live until death do part,' to resort to the divorce courts of distant States, and by testimony of at least doubtful character procure a decree of divorce, without even the actual knowledge of the other party, a system, or rather want of system, which puts it in the power of the pettiest State to make itself a nuisance to all its neighbors, a spot for the breeding of infectious social disease which unfortunately cannot be stayed by the imaginary lines which marks its political boundaries, but which must affect the whole sisterhood of States- a system which enables the procurement of a divorce which is recognized as valid in one State and invalid in another; a system, which should the parties re-marry another person, makes them criminals in one State and innocent in another; a system which permits the sentence of illegitimacy to be pronounced against the innocent offspring in one State and declares them legitimate in another; a system which seriously affects the inheritance and succession of all property in such cases depending upon the conflicting decisions as to the validity or invalidity of such decree; a system which cannot be otherwise than wholly demoralizing in its results and tendencies." Probably this is the best way to go to work, and perhaps the attempt is well enough, but we have very faint hope that any thing will ever be accomplished by joint action toward remedying the mischief. The divorce laws of some States show such an utter lack of conscience that we have no faith in the power of furnishing any substitute by innoculation. The Tribune's fishing expedition for opinions as to codification must be disappointing to it in one respect, however agreeable in another. Of twelve hundred lawyers consulted, 640 favor codification and 569 oppose it. This is the disappointment. But only 364 approve Mr. Field's code, while 745 oppose it. This is probably agreeable to the Tribune, allowing its computation to be correct. We are assured, however, that of the 640 in favor of codifica tion only 75 expressedly oppose Mr. Field's code, and that the Tribune makes out its majority by classing all those who omitted to answer that question, in the negative. Those who expressed an opinion on this point were almost equally divided. The 364 have probably read Mr. Field's code, and the 745 probably have not. If "lions could be painters "if we should send out for statistics, we could probably reverse these figures. After all these "straws" amount to very little on either side. Another thing must be borne in mind, the question at issue is not one of pleasing the lawyers, but of doing justice to the public. We hope the day is far distant when systems of laws shall be enacted or not, according to the dictation and interest of the lawyers. There are now eight judges in our Court of Appeals' Chamber in gowns. The seven judges of the court put on gowns on re-convening on Tuesday morning. The change of dress is scarcely noticable, but looks well on scrutiny. Just as many lawyers are present anxious to be heard as usual. But now we expect that the next breeze that blows from the west will bring to our ears the clash of resounding quills of legal editors who see in this change of garb a shaking of the pillars of the State. The eighth gown is worn by Palmer's statue of Chancellor Livingston. This bronze statue, the noblest in-doors portrait statue in the United States, has been removed from its former position in one of the corridors, and placed between the south windows of the court-room. It is a duplicate of that in the capitol at Washington, which puts to shame those staring white abortions by which it is surrounded. This statue furnishes a reason why the man thus looks so judges should wear robes much better in statuary. The State ought to buy Mr. Palmer's statue. A bill once passed both houses, for its purchase, but was vetoed, on the ground, we believe, that the capitol should first be paid for. It would be better to cut off some of the useless, extravagant and tasteless outlay on this building, and buy a few real works of art. This State, we believe, has never spent a dollar for a statue, bust, or painting of a single one of its great It would be well to begin with this superb figure of one of the most useful and influential citizens that our State has ever had, and who did more for the law and the State's national prosperity than any other. men. IN NOTES OF CASES. collateral security for the loan made to him, the bank did not transcend its powers." The Kansas Supreme Court seem to think that a counsellor should be like Cæsar's wife, not only pure but unsuspected. In Farlin v. Sook, to appear in 30 Kans. 401, the court said: "This case has been once to this court, and the opinion will be found in 26 Kans. 397. At that time we felt called upon to animadvert upon the conduct of counsel for plaintiff in error. We did so reluctantly, but because under the circumstances we felt it our duty so to do. The learned counsel feels hurt by our criticism, and in connection with the present presentation of the case, calls our attention again to the matter, and earnestly insists that he was wronged by such criticism. Coupled with his own statement are presented the statements and suggestions of other counsel from that district, some of whom were familiar with the facts as they really existed. The writer of this opinion was not on the bench at the time that case was argued, and his information concerning what then took place is derived solely from the representations of his associates and others. We have carefully considered the suggestions made by counsel and others, coupled with the facts as they then presented themselves to the court, and upon them desire to make these comments. First, we refer to the claim of counsel as now presented; and in order that there shall be no mistake, we quote the language of his statement: First. I do not think your honors ought to have investigated the quality of my moral or professional conduct upon a motion to dismiss a petition in error. The attorney for defendant in error said, by his motion, that as a matter of law such unprofessional conduct with which he charged me was sufficient cause for the dismissal of the case of my client. It seemed to me then, as a matter of correct practice, that I was called upon to say no more than, 'Admitting everything you say about me to be true, that is no reason that the petition in error should be dismissed;' and your honors agreed with me.' We must most respectfully but firmly dissent from the ideas presented in this claim. It is true, that this court sits mainly as a court of review and to correct the errors in the proceedings of trial courts; but beyond that it has a duty to discharge to the people of this State, and to the members of the bar who practice before it. All gentlemen admitted to practice in this court are officers of the court, and it is not only the privilege, but it is also the duty, of this court to see that they so conduct themselves as to justify the confidence of the community. We all know that certain general rules of law and practice are estab Cleveland v. Shoeman, Ohio Supreme Court Commission, to appear in 39 Ohio St. 176, it was held that a National bank may lend money on a note secured by pledge of a warehouse receipt. The court said: "A warehouse receipt, like a bill of lading, is a symbol of the property designated in it, and stands in the place of the property it represents. The question therefore arises, whether the bank transcended its power in taking the warehouse receipt as collateral security for the note of Lester. The section of the statute under consideration contains several distinct and independent grants of power- neither grant being a limitation on any other - and describes the kind of banking in which National banking associations are authorized to engage. To render these grants effective, such associations are authorized to exercise such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the kind of banking permitted. A national bank therefore empowered to carry on the business of banking 'by loaning money on personal security,' may also exercise all powers incidental thereto. Vested with such authority, we do not think, that in making a loan on the personal obligation of the borrower with a warehouse receipt as collateral security thereto, the bank exceeds its statutory powers. It is not to be limited, in taking security for discounts and loans, to the personal undertaking of the borrower, or to the security afforded by the names of indorsers or personal sureties, but may take a pledge of bonds, choses in action, stock of a corporation, bills of lading, and other personal chattels. The language 'personal security' would seem to refer to other personal security than is mentioned in the first grant of power in section 5136 — authorizing the business of banking by discounting negotiable promissory notes, etc.' Dillon, J., in Pittsburgh Car Works v. State National Bank of Keokuk (Thompson's National Bank Cases, 315), says, 'The words 'loans on personal security' in the banking act are used in contra-distinction to real estate security;' and in that case it was held, that a National bank might take personal chattelse. g. a locomotive, as security for discounts and loans. And while section 5136, if not in terms clearly by implication prohibits a loan on real estate, yet the Supreme Court of the United States in National Bank v. Matthews, 8 Otto, 621, not narrowing the application of the words 'personal security' held, that where a National bank loaned money, and as collateral security took the assignment of a note secured by a mortgage of lands with a power of sale thereto annexed, the bank was entitled, upon non-payment of the loan at maturity, to enforce the collection of the note by a sale of the lands. Without comment-lished, conformity to which is essential to the due ing upon the numerous authorities which have been brought to our notice, we are of the opinion, that the court below did not err in refusing to charge the jury, that a National bank could not lawfully take personal property as security for a loan of money; and in taking the warehouse receipt from Lester, as administration of. law and to the good order of society, and yet that often parties, keeping themselves within the limits of those rules and thus safe from legal condemnation, take advantage of the ignorance and inexperience of others, and accomplish results, which however justified by considerations |