Dec., 1904] Opinion of the Court-CORSON, P. J. The anything for the loss of her support after that time." first instruction requested was clearly erroneous, in that the court was requested to instruct the jury that "the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything for loss of support after April 1, 1901." If the sale of intoxicating liquors to Garrigan resulted in his suicide, and was the proximate cause of the same, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages she might sustain by reason of the loss of support caused by his death. Stafford v. Levinger, supra, 16 S. D. 118, 91 N. W. 462. As was stated in Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493, 41 Am. Rep. 386: The injury to the means of support was one of the main grounds of the action, and when the party is deprived of the usual means of maintenance which he or she was accustomed to enjoy previously, by or in consequence of the intoxication or the acts of the person intoxicated, the action can be maintained. If the injury which had resulted to the deceased in consequence of his intoxication had disabled him for life, or to such an extent as to incapacitate him for labor and for earning a support for his family, it would, no doubt, be embraced within the meaning and intent of the statute. That death ensued in consequence thereof furnishes much stronger ground for a claim for a loss of support; and a different rule in the latter case would make provision for the lesser and temporary injury, while that which was greatest and most serious would be without any remedy or means of redress. Such could not have been the intention of the lawmakers, and the statute was designed to embrace and most manifestly cover and include all injuries produced by the intoxication, and which legitimately result from the same." The second requested instruction is also clearly objectionable. * * * Whether Opinion of the Court-CORSON, P. J. [19 S. D. Garrigan was sober or intoxicated at the time he committed suicide was not material, providing his suicide was the result of his previous intoxication. If such was the result, then such intoxication was the proximate cause of his death, and this was a question for the jury to determine upon all the evidence in the case. The defendants excepted specially to portions of paragraphs 7 and 9 of the judge's charge to the jury of its own motion. The portions of the paragraphs excepted to are as follows: "So it is only in regard to the damages arising from the want of support that the jury are entitled to return damages. In that regard you have a right to return damages if you believe that Mr. Garrigan was a person in the habit of be coming intoxicated, and that this defendant Samuel Kennedy, by himself, agent, or servants, sold or gave him intoxicating liquor, after the 1st of July, 1900, that contributed to his habitual intoxication, and you further believe that such habitual intoxication injured the plaintiff and her son in their means of support." "If you find for the plaintiff she will be entitled to recover such reasonable sum of money, not to exceed $2,000, as, in your judgment, will compensate her for the actual damage, if any, to her means of support, caused by sales of intoxicating liquor by defendant, his agents or servants, to the plaintiff's husband." It is contended by the appellants that by that portion of instruction No. 7 the court left to the jury, without any limitation whatever as to time, the question of the assessment of damages, and that by that portion of the charge contained in paragraph No. 9 to which exception was taken the jury was authorized to return damages in any sum not exceeding $2,000, and that nothing whatever was said to the jury Dec., 1904] Opinion of the Court-CORSON, P. J. in regard to the suicide of Garrigan in any part of the charge, and that the jury were not in any manner instructed that the plaintiff was not entitled for loss of support from April 1, 1901. It is true the court did not, in express terms, instruct the jury that they could not find for the plaintiff damages for any loss of support after the 1st of April, 1901, and it could not have properly so instructed the jury. The court did not instruct the jury that they could not find against the defendants for any damages resulting after the death of Garrigan unless they were satisfied that his death was caused by intoxicating liquors furnished to him by the defendant Kennedy. The objection that the court failed to charge the jury that the plaintiff could not recover for any damages sustained by her by reason of the death of Garrigan, unless they were satisfied that his death was caused by intoxicating liquors furnished to him by the defendant Kennedy, is not available to the defendants, for the reason that they failed to request any such instruction. The omission of the court to instruct upon any given question or issue will not be regarded as reversible error unless it has been requested to give the instructions it is claimed it has omitted. Dell Rapids Merc. Co. v. City of Dell Rapids, 11 S. D. 116, 75 N. W. 898, 74 Am. St. Rep. 783; Winn v. Sanborn, 10 S. D. 642, 75 N. W. 201; Frye v. Ferguson, 6 S. D. 392, 61 N. W. 161. It is true that counsel asked for an instruction: "If you find * that said Michael Garrigan took his own life on the 1st day of April, 1901, then the plaintiff is not entitld to recover anything for loss of support after April 1, 1901;" but this does not suggest to the court or call for instructions such as is claimed the court should have given by the appellants. It is true the court left to the jury, without any limitation * * In whatever as to time, the question of assessing damages. this the court was clearly correct. He had previously instructed the jury that the legal duty devolved upon the husband to support his wife and family, and that the licensed saloon keeper who contributed to the impairment of the husband's power and ability to support his family is liable for the damages the wife might sustain. It was therefore competent for the jury, under the instructions of the court, to determine the damages the wife had sustained in her means of support for herself and minor child, and to consider the question whether or not the intoxicating liquors furnished Garrigan by the defendant Kennedy was the proximate cause of his death, and consequently deprived the plaintiff of her support due from her deceased husband to herself and son; and, as before stated, the defenddants requested no such instructions upon this subject, and are not in a position, therefore, to complain of the failure of the court to instruct the jury upon these questions. The instructions of the court were eminently fair, and presented to the jury the law of the case in such manner as to enable the jury to intelligently pass upon the questions presented for consideration. Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the circuit court and order denying a new trial are affirmed. MORRIS V. REIGEL. 1. Where there is no preponderance of evidence against the findings of the trial court, and the evidence justifies the court's inferences therefrom, they are conclusive on appeal. 2. Where an agent purchases real estate for his principal, but takes the title in his own name, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the principal, though the agent used his own money in payment of the price. 3. The authority of the agent need not be in writing to make the trust enforceable under the statute of frauds. (Opinion filed December 21, 1904.) Appeal from circuit court, Beadle county; Hon. J. H. McCOY, Judge. Suit by Frank A. Morris against Andrew Reigel. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. T. H. Null, (Horner & Stewart, of counsel,) for appellant. Where the person claiming the beneficial interest in land purchased in another's name has not actually paid any part of the purchase money it is not competent to raise a trust in his favor by showing, by parol, that the purchase was made by agreement for his benefit. Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen 17; Alexander v. Tams, 13 11. 223; Perry v. McHenry, 13 Ill. 227; Botsford v. Burr, 2 Johns ch. 405; Walter v. Klock, 55 Ill. 362; Tevy v. Brush, 45 N. W. 589; Richardson v. Johnson, 41 Wis. 100; Payne v. Patterson, 77 Pa. St. 134; Howland v. Blake, 98 U. S. 624; Loomis v. Loomis, 35 Barb. 624; Rogers v. Summers, 55 Ill. 76; O'Hara v. Dilworth, 72 Pa. St. 403; Minot v. Mitchell, 30 Ind. 288; Homer v. Homer, 107 Mass. 82; Hackney v. Butts, 41 Ark. 393; Walker v. Burnyard, 12 Sm. & M. 723; McCalls Appeal, 11 Alt. 206; Collins v. Sullivan, 135 Mass. 461; Burden v. Sheldon, 36 Iowa 125; Watson v. Erb, 33 Ohio St. 35. Crawford & Taylor and W. A. Lynch, for respondent. Plaintiff may prove by parol that he paid the purchase |