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project, would probably continue to operate with reduced traffic, the payment of taxes for its operating costs, as well as for the capital investment, would still have to be made by Buffalo taxpayers.

Present transportation systems focussing on Buffalo have successfully with stood the test of peak wartime loads. Buffalo is the largest railroad center outside of Chicago. During the war, those roads, with the coordinated services of water and air transport, served efficiently the requirements of our huge war production. These transportation companies are planning to provide for future normal increments in demand centering in Buffalo. Because of their excellent immediate past performance and prospect of rendering continued good service, our existing transportation agencies should not be threatened by the intrusion of new subsidized and disruptive diversion of traffic. When there is an appreciable falling off of traffic, whether caused by business depression or diversion, increased rates must be imposed on whatever traffic remains. Thus the losses wrought by the seaway must eventually be borne by all industry. The seaway project is, therefore, a matter of concern to all business whether or not it deals in goods shipped over the St. Lawrence route.

All of the departments of the executive branch of the Government have been given an opportunity to voice their opinions on the subject. It is to be regretted that the Interstate Commerce Commission, the agency set up by Congress to regulate all of our surface carriers and the one most qualified in the Federal Government to appraise the economics of the nagivation features of the proposed project, has not been asked to express itself on the St. Lawrence seaway. The declaration of policy in the Interstate Commerce Act would, in itself, suggest that the Commission be given such an opportunity. Furthermore, the Commission is charged by the Congress with the power to issue or refuse certificates of public convenience and necessity as well as permits to all surface transportation agencies. It has the power to authorize or deny any proposed new services or extension of existing services after hearings in which all interested parties may participate. Yet at no time has it been consulted as to the economic aspects of the proposed St. Lawrence project.

We respectfully submit that before this proposed legislation is presented to the Congress for action, it be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a thorough survey of the economic impact of the proposed seaway upon existing transportation agencies.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Hon. Toм CONNALLY,

UNITED STATES SENATE,

March 3, 1952.

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I was out of the city last week and was unable to appear before your committee to present my views on proposals to construct the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. I am setting forth my objections to these proposals and sincerely hope that your committee will give them consideration, along with other testimony presented.

1. The project is not feasible. The testimony conclusively shows that it would not only be frozen over for at least 4 or 5 months a year, but that the contemplated depth will not permit of its use by vessels of sufficient burden com mensurate with economical operation.

2. The lack of year-round operation would necessitate stand-by equipment by other modes of transportation, not subsidized by the Government. Privately owned transportation cannot afford to have equipment available for use 3 or 4 months out of the year.

3. The project, as presently planned, could not possibly be self-sustaining. 4. It has certainly not been shown that the project is needed for defense. On the contrary, at a recent hearing before a congressional committee, General Bradley stated that in his opinion the waterway, with its 30-odd locks and appurtenances, could not be successfully defended. A large defense force would be necessary to protect the seaway against attack and sabotage.

5. It has certainly not been shown that the power to be derived from the project could be generated as economically as it could be by steam plants readily available in the locality, or now being planned under private management.

6. There has been no showing that the additional power is needed in the vicinity or, if needed, that it could not be more economically supplied by the private utilities now serving the community at a much lesser cost.

7. There has been no showing that the seaway is needed for the transportation of ore from Labrador because the entire supply from that source is used locally. Imported ore can be more effectively used in the eastern steel-producing areas. All information available indicates that there is a sufficient supply of highgrade iron ore in the Lake Superior district to take care of that area far into the future.

8. There is not now any well-conceived over-all plan in connection with the construction and operation of the project. Many loose ends and vexing problems are being left hanging in the air.

9. The use of manpower and critical materials so essential to meet military demands and to maintain our essential civilian economy, would at this time be actually detrimental to our national defense efforts.

10. The cost of the project is not readily available, although by conservative estimates, it would certainly be as much as $750,000,000, which, in the present financial condition of the country, is unthinkable.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, United States Senator.

STATEMENT BY JOE MULLINS, SECRETARY, COAL HANDLERS OF NEW YORK AND VICINITY

I am Joseph Mullins, secretary, local 933-1, Tidewater Boatmen's Association, 464 Dean Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., International Longshoremen's Association, which union represents about 1,000 men employed on canal boats operating in the port of New York and New York State barge canal.

If you permit the St. Lawrence seaway and power project to be constructed, a large percentage of our canal-boat men will be removed from employment. It is extremely difficult for workers in this field to adjust themselves to other lines of work. They usually start out in this business and spend their entire lives at it, and therefore many of them are not fitted to any other type of work.

If this project is approved, it is going to mean hardship and tragedy in the lives of hundreds of our workers and their families. Many of these men own their own barges, into which they have put their life savings. No member of this committee would accept any portion of the responsibility.

Furthermore, as a man of the ranks of labor, and as a representative of labor, it is only fair to point out that those whom I represent bitterly object to a project which will permit cheap foreign labor to enter within the actual continental borders of these United States to compete with our American labor, and the high standards of living and wages. This, we are confident, will happen if this St. Lawrence waterway project is completed.

MASSACHUSETTS STATE GRange, Letter TO SENATOR LODGE

Hon. HENRY CABOT LODGE,

FEBRUARY 21, 1952.

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR SENATOR: For years the Massachusetts State Grange with a membership of approximately 50,000 have at annual sessions endorsed the construction of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway and power project in view of the grave dangers facing the country in the immediate future and the vital necessity of both expansion and conservation of our natural resources. In behalf of the Massachusetts State Grange I solicit your support in securing early ratification of the project in joint cooperation with the Canadian Government and the earliest possible completion of the project consistent with the French needs. Will you kindly file this statement with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and urge favorable action by that august body?

Most sincerely yours,

96175-52-55

CHAS. H. BROWN,

Master, Massachusetts State Grange, Hampden, Mass.

STATEMENT BY L. L. KOCHIS IN BEHALF OF BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, SOUTHWEST LODGE No. 63, YOUNGWOOD, PA.

Have just learned your committee, will conduct hearings on St. Lawrence seaway and power project next week, I would like an opportunity to express our opposition to the resolution or file a statement.

We the members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen are opposed to this project. Due to the fact that it will be very detrimental to our welfare and livelihood, as it will cause unemployment among the railroad workers. We also disapprove of spending taxpayers money for the benefit of a certain few who disregard the welfare of the majority.

We would appreciate it very much if you would use all of your influence to defeat this bill, when it comes before your committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. ERLAND H. HEDRICK, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, FROM THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

We are being asked to finance the St. Lawrence seaway and power project at a cost ranging from $1 billion to $3 billion. The cost is indefinite because the proposal at present is for a 27-foot channel, which could be used by foreign ships but which could not be used by 95 percent of American-flag vessels. Therefore, if the 27-foot channel is authorized we will undoubtedly be asked subsequently to finance instead a 30-foot channel. A 30-foot channel, with the necessary alterations in harbor facilities, and with due consideration for past experience of the Government with respect to excess of actual costs over estimates in projects like this, would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $3 billion.

We are being asked to spend this huge amount of money and to divert from our defense effort a great amount of scarce materials, at a time when our people are already staggering under a tax burden so heavy we have reached the point of diminishing returns.

The principal argument being put forth by the sponsors of this proposal is that it is necessary for our defense, to make available to us iron ore from Labrador. The steel industry doesn't feel that Labrador ore is necessary. We still have over 30 years' supply of high-grade ore in the Lake Superior region, and the steel industry is fully prepared to supply our needs after that from second-rate ores, or taconite. Reserves of taconite in the Lake Superior region are measurable in billions of tons.

As a "defense" measure, this project fails for other reasons. If Canada were neutral, we would not be permitted to receive ore from Labrador during a war. Even with full cooperation of the Canadian Government, the seaway would be closed to traffic for 5 months of every year, because of weather conditions. Further, if the seaway were of vital importance, it would be practically indefensible from the standpoint of sabotage or enemy action.

There is no justification for this project as a defense measure, and if our defense is in such a precarious situation that we must depend upon Labrador ore in time of war, then we are already faced with defeat before all-out war even begins.

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The construction of the hydroelectric project would result in the displacement of thousands of West Virginia coal miners through the use of public funds. The evidence shows that private industry is adequately taking care of the power needs of the Nation, and is conducting the necessary expansion to continue to do On an economic basis, electric power can better be produced in this area through the construction of plants powered by coal, and private industry is going forward with the necessary construction program.

So.

The displacement of coal tonnage by the hydroelectric project would result in the further displacement of railroad workers who normally would be employed to haul that coal. Further, the construction of the seaway would result in the displacement of still more railroad workers. The economy of the whole eastern seaboard would suffer seriously, through the loss of shipping through this completely unnecessary project.

I see no justification for adding billions of dollars to the heavy load our people are already carrying, merely to eliminate the jobs of great numbers of our coal miners and railroad workers, and to weaken the economic structure of the eastern seaboard.

STATEMENT BY R. A. ELLISON, MANAGER, TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, CINCINNATI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce was organized in 1839. It is incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio as a not-for-profit association to promote the business and civic interest of Cincinnati and its metropolitan area.

ACTION BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

This statement is made under the direction of the board of directors of the chamber of commerce, which approved resolutions in 1934, 1940, and 1941 in opposition to the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. Representatives of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce have heretofore appeared before committees of Congress in opposition to past legislation, the last of such was by Mr. R. E. Howe in February 1946 who indicated the continued opposition by the membership of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce as expressed by its board of directors.

The basis for this historical opposition to the St. Lawrence seaway project has been and continues to be:

1. That the construction of this project would be a misuse of labor, materials, and money.

2. The project is economically unsound.

3. The estimates of the possible tonnage available for movement via the St. Lawrence seaway are overstated.

4. The estimates of the construction costs are grossly understated.

5. The project would cause irreparable injury to existing industry in the United States.

6. The expenditure of funds required to complete such a project would place additional burdens on the public, which cannot be justified by any remotely possible benefits.

THE SEAWAY PROJECT WOULD BE A WASTE OF LABOR, MATERIALS AND MONEY The United States is in the midst of a vast effort to provide defense of its own shores, as well as those of the greater part of the free world, and the shortage of men, materials, and money to perform such is apparent from the measures which have been taken by our Government in the recent past.

In every part of our land there is being projected multimillion-dollar plants for the production of essentials for defense, which will require thousands upon thousands of men for periods of time estimated to range from 1 to 5 years and materials of such enormous quantities as stagger the imagination.

As an illustration, the Defense Production Administration announced on April 12, 1951: "Certificates of necessity to encourage construction of 396 new or expanded defense facilities costing an estimated $1,310,799,399 have been issued by the Defense Production Administration."

And there must be added the very many and costly projects which the Government has contracted for or plans to complete at the earliest possible date.

As an illustration of the actual shortage of materials, the following is from the Port News of Charleston, S. C., for April, 1951, and is representative of many available:

"One hundred and thirty-eight miles of heavy 14-inch diameter pipe from Glasgow, Scotland, valued at $2,500,000 is being imported through the port of Charleston by the Plantation Pipe Line Co. of Atlanta.

"A series of six vessels is bringing the huge consignment, being used to construct a line to carry gasoline and other petroleum products.

"First vessel to discharge was the Norwegian freighter Christensen last month with 5.000 tons, enough for 38 miles. Following were the Norwegian vessel Husk and the British Andrew T. in late March and early April, with 2,500 tons each. Three more vessels are scheduled to arrive in series to discharge the remaining 10,000 tons."

The importation of even 20,000 tons of steel pipe indicates the shortage of steel in the United States and, if not, then attention is directed to the importations of steel from Japan and Belgium through the several ports on the Pacific coast, because the fabricators in Oregon, Washington, etc., are unable to secure supplies in the United States.

No reasonable person will disagree that the financing of the many stupendous undertakings of the Government, considered as essential to our welfare, has or

will strain the United States to the utmost and to which there must be added the obligations incurred throughout the world, which is further evidenced by the shrinking value of our currency in the world markets and with the everincreasing tax burdens being heaped upon the citizens of the United States.

In this time of dire need for men, materials, and money for the immediate and pressing needs for defense from our enemy, it appears diabolical on the part of those who would press for the construction of this project as a defense measure when the best estimate of the time required to complete the seaway is 5 years as a minimum, and it is quite likely that such estimate is very far from the actual time that would be necessary.

Mr. George M. Humphrey, president of the Ore Co. of Canada, one of the sponsors of the seaway, stated in the record before this committee on May 1, 1950, that

1. The present economy is overstrained.

2. Under wartime conditions there would be a shortage of men and materials. It is to be noted that wartime conditions have occurred since and the economy of this country has not improved in the interim.

THE SEAWAY IS ECONOMICALLY UNSOUND

Even if it be accepted as probable that the estimated tonnage will actually move over the proposed seaway, the project cannot be justified when consideration be given to costs in today's market.

Iron ore is the principal commodity indicated as probable to move over the seaway, and the estimated tonnage thereof is 30 to 37.5 million tons per year at a toll charge of 50 cents per ton. This toll charge cannot be increased, if we are to depend upon the statement of the president of the Ore Co. of Canada who said on May 1, 1950, that 50 cents per ton was the highest toll charge the ore could stand.

The Ore Co. of Canada stated that it plans to move 10 million tons of iron ore per year. The estimated ore tonnage over the proposed seaway was stated as 30 to 37.5 million tons. The difference (20 to 27.5 million tons) is an assumed possibility, evidently from sources other than Labrador and the origin and reason for the movement of this 20 to 27.5 million tons of ore to the Great Lakes has not been shown in a manner which is either clear or convincing. Pertinent to this is an article by John W. Love inserted in the record at page 150 of the April 27, 1950, hearings, and a letter from Mr. Sykes, of Inland Steel Co., inserted in the record on May 1, 1950.

The petroleum tonnage included in the estimate by the Department of Commerce is stated as "largely in the nature of a potential development rather than an immediate reality" (p. 64, April 24, 1950, hearings).

In view of the above-quoted statement the petroleum tonnage should be eliminated as a possibility, especially when consideration is given to the fact that the vessels now handling petroleum through the Welland Canal, without toll, will not likely be junked and pipelines connect practically every ocean and lake port in America and can be used to transport foreign petroleum to inland United States if such be required.

TONNAGE ESTIMATES OVERSTATED

The experience of every student of transportation shows that estimates of potential tonnages for waterway projects are invariably overstated and there is little reason to feel that the St. Lawrence seaway project estimates will differ from the usual pattern.

Without the iron-ore tonnage the proponents have little to support the seaway and the estimate of the iron-ore tonnage contemplates supplying from 40 to 50 percent of the known consumption on the Great Lakes and adjacent territory, but such estimate finds no real support from the industry.

Of the 10,000,000 tons of Labrador iron ore the developer thereof stated on May 1, 1950, that 5,000,000 tons would move to Great Lakes ports, 3,000,000 tons via rail to the Pittsburgh district, and 2,000,000 tons to Atlantic coast ports. The estimated iron-ore tonnage from Labrador to be handled through the Welland Canal is 10,000,000 per year. The total capacity of the Welland Canal is stated to be 25,000,000 tons in shallow-draft vessels. The movement through that canal in 1950 was 15,000,000 tons.

The producer of the Labrador iron ore moved would be 10,000,000 tons per year.

stated that the total tonnage to be Since the present waterway has a

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