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anyone can accurately guess what these results would be. It appears evident that the seaway, in itself, would either be a huge success or a terrible failure. We respectfully submit that the end result would be disastrous in either event. A vast tonnage of cargo diverted from trade channels now in use may be carried on the seaway during the 7 months of a year in which it could be used. In this event, many existing transportation facilities which require a 12-month-a-year operating potential would be inescapably forced into curtailed activity, and in some cases might well be forced into complete abandonment. The untold billions of dollars that have already been invested would largely go to waste. When demands were made on these existing facilities during the winter months, it is possible that from a practical standpoint, they may no longer be in existence. The labor facilities and the executive know-how that has brought this country through every war successfully would have been displaced. In sum and substance, if the seaway as such were a huge success, the economic upheaval would be catastrophic.

Taking the other view of the unknown factor, i. e., the traffic potential of the seaway, we face these prospects. If the traffic resulting from the completion of the project is not materially increased over the traffic presently handled in the existing 14-foot canals connecting the Great Lakes with the sea, the vast expenditure of capital made on the project would in itself be a complete waste. The efforts of labor and skilled and technical manpower would go for naught. This waste would take place at a time when our labor supply and capital are already being strained.

We just can't believe that any scheme that has a 7-month-a-year top operating potential and that even remotely threatens to ruin our existing transportation facilities serving us regularly 12 months out of the year, can be in the best interests of the Nation as a whole. Nor can we believe that the investment of millions of dollars on a project that would make hungry demands on manpower and technical skill and which may well prove to be a dismal failure is in the best interests of the Nation as a whole.

Many cost estimates for building the project have been prepared over the past 30 years. The truth in this respect appears to be that the total cost of a 27-foot channel, including the harbor developments that would be necessary at Great Lakes ports, would be well in excess of a billion dollars. Deeper channel cost estimates rise geometrically with each additional foot of planned depth. It is known that the best estimates made on projects of this nature in the past fell far short of what the actual expenditure turned out to be.

In connection with the cost factor, which in any event is extremely high, a possible and probable plan of the forces that seek our destruction must also be considered. An economic plan to destroy our way of life may well be in the working at this moment. The plan of communism to first sow seeds of discontent among the populace of its victims is well known. Many good and soundthinking Americans believe that the spending which our Nation has been forced into is the initial stage of a formula designed to destroy us. Concededly we must spend billions of dollars to prepare our defense, but surely when billions are spent they should be spent on projects, materials, and supplies with no doubtful usefulness. An expenditure of the sum required for this project could well afford to make enemy planners gloat at the success of their economic warfare. Great emphasis has been placed on the extreme necessity for the seaway at this time as a means of transporting Labrador ore supplies to the industrial heart of the country. If the honest fact is that this transportation route is indispensable for a continuing ore supply, the United States is indeed in a sorry predicament. Our conviction is that ore-supply prospects are not nearly so gloomy. Vast quantities of domestic high-grade ore undoubtedly exist undiscovered. Previous experience has shown that a certain amount of new discovery is made with every ton mined. The importation of foreign ore from sources other than Labrador, a supply which needs no investment in a billion-dollar seaway, is most promising. The Labrador supply can undoubtedly be imported by extended rail service, by the existing canals, and by vessels traveling intercoastally. Most important, however, is the fact that the development of processing methods for our own domestic taconite would give us an almost inexhaustible supply of ore. This would place us in the positon of having a sufficient American supply for any eventuality.

In addition to the tremendous cost of the project, which is at best of doubtful necessity, other factors should be considered in the light of possible enemy planning.

More than 1,000 miles of the project lie exclusively within the confines of a foreign country. A very small portion of the entire 2,200 miles is exclusively

within our own domain. The entrance, which is the pivotal portion and key to any waterway or harbor, is located hundreds of miles from our land. A single act of sabotage, or a single bomb dropped by an enemy plane would completely jam the entire waterway for an inestimable length of time. The air approaches to the project on the shortest route between us and what we perceive to be our most potential enemy lie exclusively over largely isolated foreign lands. If we were to become engaged in open warfare, the task of guarding and protecting this waterway would be monumental and probably impossible.

In conclusion, we respectfully submit that we just can't believe that the expenditure of over a billion dollars on this seaway can be in the best interests of our national defense and of the Nation as a whole; when the project is at best of doubtful necessity; when enemy planners may be engaged in a concerted effort to strain our economy and billions must be spent on other defense measures; when the project is almost exclusively located within the confines of a foreign country; and when it so clearly would be an easy prey to saboteurs and enemy action, and is almost incapable of adequate defense.

Mr. GIESSON. We have included in our association practically every major steamship operator doing business in the eastern portion of the United States. Nothing has transpired since the time of the House committee hearings to change our opinion as presented at that time, and we still remain opposed as our association has been for many years in the past.

The one facet of the question which has been discussed during the last 2 days, which I would like to deal with very briefly, is as follows, and I am reading a portion of the statement which I have filed.

PERCENTAGE OF UNITED STATES VESSELS ABLE TO USE SEAWAY

We are firmly convinced that the virtual outmoding of over 90 perment of American-flag vessels, so far as use in what has been styled "a new sea front," is unsound from an economical, practical, and national defense standpoint. In this connection the facts appear to be as follows:

Approximately 90 percent of existing American-flag vessels could not use a 27-foot channel when fully loaded, even if it were desirable to do so, because of the excessive draft of the vessels. This fact is not subject to controversy.

The controversy in this connection is whether or not an economical operation could be pursued despite the fact that fully loaded vessels. could not use the seaway.

It has been alleged that many ships can be operated profitably at a 75-percent capacity average over a period of a year. If it is true that a profitable operation can be planned with a yearly average of 75-percent capacity, this is a far cry from knowing in advance that 5 percent represents a ship's top capacity if the vessel's operation is planned for use in the contemplated seaway. An average can only be obtained by an averaging process. When 75 percent capacity is the limit, maintaining it as an average is manifestly an impossibility. Shallow-draft foreign vessels could operate with 100-percent capacities. These vessels are and would be in competition with Americanflag vessels. This tremendous advantage, coupled with existing foreign cost advantages, cannot be overlooked from a competitive standpoint.

Commodore Robert C. Lee, executive vice president of MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., stated the steamship operators' view on this topic at a meeting held in New York City on February 27, 1951. After mentioning the admitted fact that 90 percent of American-flag vessels

could not operate fully loaded in a 27-foot channel, Commodore Lee said:

The suggestion has been made that a greater number of American-flag ships could use the seaway if they were only partially loaded. Sometimes ships are required, by reason of schedule to sail although they are not fully loaded, but no operator, American or foreign, would find it economically feasible to be forced to accept the fact that all his ships must sail all the time only partially loaded.

OPINION OF STEAMSHIP OPERATORS

The considered opinion of steamship operators in connection with the St. Lawrence seaway is available to this committee in the form of the answers obtained by the late Senator Josiah W. Bailey when he requested the views of steamship companies in 1946; 32 companies answered this inquiry; 30 said they were opposed, 1 expressed a neutral position, and 1 was for the seaway. A review of the reasoning contained in these letters published in the Congressional Record in 1947 will disclose that a channel of greater depth than 27 feet would not cure the basic defects of the project. Navigational hazards in the tortuous route of approximately 2,200 miles from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to Chicago or Duluth are so great, despite adequate channel depths, that most operators would not assume the risk. It must be remembered that this voyage covers many miles cut through solid granite, where high wind and blanketing fog frequently prevail, and where anchorage may be impossible. The possibility of a large ocean-going vessel getting out of the channel and becoming severely damaged that is constantly present.

The CHAIRMAN. Your time has expired.

Mr. GIESSON. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. J. L. Stanton of Baltimore. You have 3 minutes, Mr. Stanton.

STATEMENT OF J. L. STANTON, BALTIMORE ASSOCIATION OF

COMMERCE

Mr. STANTON. Chairman Connally and gentlemen of the committee, my name is Joseph L. Stanton. I am director of the export and import bureau of the Baltimore Association of Commerce.

I have been requested by the mayor of the city of Baltimore to enter a brief statement for him and also a brief statement for August Idzik, the vice president of the ILA, the International Longshoremen's Association at Baltimore, as well as resolutions from our city council, our house of delegates, and our State senate. May I enter such statements? The CHAIRMAN. Any objection?

All right, you can print them.
(The statements are as follows:)

STATEMENT OF J. L. STANTON, DIRECTOR, EXPORT AND IMPORT BUREAU, BALTIMORE ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE, BALTIMORE, MD.

In appearing before this committee I wish to register the strong opposition of the business community, port interests, transportation agencies, and others concerned with shipping at the port of Baltimore to the proposed St. Lawrence seaway. This statement of opposition is offered only after very careful consideration of the merits of proposed project, its defense aspects, its cost, and potential effects on our port of Baltimore.

The bureau which I head is a unit of the Baltimore Association of Commerce, an organization of 2,300 business, commercial, and industrial firms of this community. It should be noted that this opposition represents no deviation from our previous position on the seaway. In years past we have consistently opposed this project on the grounds that it is unnecessary and uneconomical, and that it would have a detrimental effect on the commerce of our port.

To fully understand Baltimore's position with respect to the seaway project, it is necessary to have a full appreciation of the importance of the port to the community of Baltimore. Our conservative estimates are that some 40,000 citizens of this city are directly employed in port activities. Some $200 million of our annual income is derived from the port of Baltimore. The investment in piers, wharves, storage facilities, and other necessary equipment for the operation of a modern port is about $250 million.

It is an accepted axiom in our city that "as the port goes, so goes Baltimore." The port and its commercial activities are unquestionably the greatest single economic asset of the State of Maryland. With approximately one-half the population of the State living in Baltimore and its environs, the effects of the port are directly felt throughout the entire area of Maryland.

It is therefore understandable why we present such vigorous opposition to the proposed seaway, which could logically be expected to divert substantial tonnage from the port of Baltimore. Employment and income from our port are directly proportionate to the volume of cargo handled here. Any diversion of commerce from Baltimore thus would have a direct effect on our economic livelihood. The effects would not be confined to the longshoremen, the tugboat crews, or other harbor employees, but would be felt by every business throughout the area.

That such a diversion would result from completion of the seaway appears to be a reasonable conclusion. In fact, the Department of Commerce in reviewing the effects of the seaway on traffic at North Atlantic ports in 1946 estimated that some 10 percent of Baltimore's cargo would be lost to a completed seaway. We feel that this estimate is conservative. The types of cargo in which this port specializes are extremely well adopted to a water haul such as would be possible through the seaway. Baltimore has long been known as a bulk-cargo port. Such commodities as iron ore, grain, coffee, bulk rubber, chemicals, fertilizers, and sugar compose the greatest portion of our commerce. All of these commodities would be subject to diversion through the seaway. We, of course, realize that a completed seaway would not close the port of Baltimore. We would still enjoy the traffic destined for immediate areas in the State and adjacent sections of West Virginia and southern Pennsylvania. However, a large portion of Baltimore's commerce is destined to or originates at points in western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. With an allwater or a longer water routing possible from major points along the Lakes, it can be seen that Baltimore would stand little chance of holding the inland business we now enjoy.

During the past year we have noted increasing shipments of metallic ores, including iron ore, manganese, and chrome, to the steel centers of western Pennsylvania and Ohio. If cargoes of this type could be unloaded directly from ocean-going ships at Lake ports such as Buffalo or Cleveland, the shorter rail haul to consuming centers would divert this cargo from our port. The potential business in the movement of iron ore is one of the most promising aspects of Baltimore shipping. With high-grade iron-ore fields in the Mesabi area approaching exhaustion, major steel firms have indicated that Baltimore will be one of the principal ports of entry for ore mined in such foreign areas as South America, Liberia, and Newfoundland. This picture would, of course, change radically if the seaway became a reality. Ores from these distant fields could move directly to such steel centers as Cleveland, Gary, and Chicago. Also ores could then be transported to Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Canton, Masillion, and other steel-producing points with a much shorter rail haul than is now possible via Baltimore.

Probably one of the strongest arguments in opposition to the proposed seaway is the fact that meteorological studies definitely establish that this waterway would be usable only about 7 months out of each year. While a heavy movement would be expected during these 7 months, the 5 winter months would close out this traffic. It is assumed that ocean commerce would continue to be necessary during these 5 months and that the facilities at Baltimore would have to be maintained at their present peak of efficiency to take care of traffic during the period when the seaway would be closed. This would mean that piers, 96175-52-47

cranes, and our labor force would have to be maintained at a high level to meet the needs of commerce during the winter months, although we could expect a sharp drop in our business during the remaining 7 months of the year.

This spotty type of employment of our facilities and labor is certainly not a welcome prospect for Baltimore,

The excellent rail facilities that now connect this port with the great inland East and Midwest would have to be maintained to meet the needs of commerce when the seaway was closed.

My comments have centered around metallic ore movements. However, the same applies to the many other imports that now utilize Baltimore. Equal, if not more serious, are the potential effects of such a seaway on our export picture. Baltimore's huge grain trade would suffer heavily in competition with a seaway. The major portion of the grain moving through this port originates in the Great Plains area and in Canada, It moves via Lake ports to Buffalo where it is transferred to cars and moved to the seaboard elevators at Baltimore. This traffic could be expected to die completely if ocean-going vessels could take on grain at the Buffalo elevators.

A point that is desired to emphasize to this committee is the fact that Baltimore is largely a port under the free enterprise system. Our ocean-going facilities are almost entirely owned and controlled by private business. Thus, this is not a complaint of one governmental agency against the proposed plans of another Government branch. Rather, it is an honest protest of businessmen opposing a Government project that threatens serious damage to their tax-paying employment-creating private enterprises.

The committee should further be informed that the completion of this seaway would seriously hinder this community's plan for port development. At the last session of the General Assembly of Maryland only a few months ago the port's vital part in our State affairs was recognized by delegates, and an enabling act to make $30 million available for further port improvement was approved. While this is public money it would be so utilized as to fully protect the taxpayers through guaranteed amortization plans.

Thus, private business would continue to play the vital role in the port's activities, that is traditional in Baltimore.

This committee has been fully informed of the detrimental effects of such a seaway on the trunk line railroads of the country, and it is not my intention to burden the record further with arguments on this theme. I do wish to point out, however, that Baltimore is a railroad port; that is, 90 percent of our ocean commerce passes over railroad piers. The same detrimental effects that would result to the rail carriers from the seaway project would in turn have an equally detrimental effect upon the rail aspects of our port commerce.

Despite the fact that this seaway project would have serious, detrimental effects on the economic life of Baltimore and Maryland, our State would be called upon to bear a proportionate share of its cost. Based on Maryland percentage responsibility in the national budget, the St. Lawrence seaway would cost our State nearly $18 million.

While our opposition is primarily based on the detrimental effects of such a completed seaway on the economic life of the community, we desire to point out that our position was determined after careful consideration of the national aspects of this problem. As a defense measure we agree with expert witnesses that such a seaway would be extremely vulnerable to attack, and that it could not be completed in time to have any telling effect on our current defense efforts. We agree that the billion dollar cost of this project is an extravagance that we can ill afford at this period in our national economic life, and we further agree that diversion of a huge manpower force from defense industries to such a project at this time would be most unsound.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST IDZIK, VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, BALTIMORE, MD.

Representing the 7,500 members of the International Longshoremen's Association, employed at the port of Baltimore, I rise to voice our unanimous opposition to the proposed St. Lawrence seaway project.

Our city mayor, Thomas D'Alesandro, Jr., has presented the reasons why Baltimore as a community is opposed to this project at the present time, but my opposition is more specific. In addition to the 7,500 longshoremen, there are approximately 32,500 other persons directly employed in port and shipping

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