moved to the central mid-continent states, served primarily by Gulf ports, insofar as export is concerned. In its last report on the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1948, the Chamber pointed out: "The imposition of tolls to make the St. Lawrence Project self-liquidating is proposed without any investigation of what tolls would be necessary, and secondly, whether the canal would be used by shippers of freight when self-liquidating tolls. are imposed. Up-to-date engineering, economic and other investigations, should be made before the Federal Government commits itself to this gigantic undertaking." It is important to note that no such study as was suggested by the Chamber has yet been made. As a necessary preliminary to the final determination of the question of the Seaway-Power project, it is essential that such a study be madeby a recognized, wholly disinterested institution. THE SEAWAY AND THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE The 1948 report of the Chamber summarized the opposition of American ship operators to the St. Lawrence Seaway, as follows: * * * "1. All war-built cargo ships and tankers, which comprise 92 percent of the American merchant fleet, draw too much water when fully loaded to navigate the twenty-seven foot channel planned. If plans were changed to provide a thirty-five foot channel the extra cost would not justify the Seaway's construction. "2. Present lake ships probably could not be successfully operated on the ocean because of their narrow beam and shallow draft. "3. The Seaway would encourage an invasion of inland waterways by foreign operators of tramp shipping, using medium-sized ocean ships of shallow draft. American shipowners anticipate a consequent reduction in cargoes available to American flag vessels using the major seaports of the United States. "4. It is estimated that the Seaway would be closed by ice in the St. Lawrence five months out of every twelve, causing an uneconomical peak and slump traffic pattern. * "5. Steamship companies doubt that the channel to be blasted through the narrowest and shallowest part of the St. Lawrence will be safe to navigate. "6. The project's expense does not justify its completion. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS On the basis of available evidence, there can be no justification for the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, either as an economic necessity or as a National Defense measure. And on those grounds, therefore, the project must be opposed as being economically unsound and commercially unwise. It is the view of the Chamber, therefore, that the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project should not be approved by the Congress. It is recommended, further, that Congress authorize a complete study of the entire proposition to be undertaken by competent non-government engineers and others who could bring a wholly objective view into their study and evaluation. The last study, conducted by the Brookings Institution in 1929, concluded that the project was not a feasible one. In this connection it is noted that the Federal Government has never issued a report setting forth in one document factual studies covering all of the aspects of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project; and such separate reports as have been issued, such as those on cost estimates, traffic potential, et cetera, have been presented as being of a very preliminary nature and not based on thorough study and investigation. Because of the widely divergent views regarding the relationship of the proposed Seaway and Power project to National Defense, as well as regarding the traffic potential, and the lack of fundamental data regarding the proposal, it would be helpful if there could be inaugurated now, an objective investigation of all of the economic and other aspects of the St. Lawrence proposal. This study should include an examination of the costs of alternative facilities, transportation as well as power, which would produce the same results as would be provided by the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. Senator WILEY. I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, that he quoted Mr. Richards of Republic Steel Corp. I would like to at this time just put into the record a number of questions and answers which are very brief, found in this little pamphlet which explains some of the things the gentleman has testified to and what the steel company feels about this whole situation. It is found on pages 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Instead of cross-examining him on it, I just want to put that in. The CHAIRMAN. That is the testimony of proponents and this is for the opponents this afternoon. Senator WILEY. I realize that, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. All right, put it in. [EXCERPT FROM PAMPHLET ON PROPOSED ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY PROJECT BY E. M. RICHARDS, VICE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC STEEL CORP., PAGES 7, 8, 9, 10, AND 11] OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS Objection 1: The estimated tonnage is too high. Answer: Possibly, at the outset, the tonnage would be closer to the critics' claim than the proponents. As time goes on, the tonnage would be bound to increase and then the proponents probably should be right. We should bear in mind that the first Soo lock and the Panama Canal were built against predictions of low tonnage; now there are five Soo locks instead of one and the Panama Canal is exceeding all original estimates. Objection 2: The capacity of the waterway is limited by lock No. 2 on the Welland Canal. Assuming all the little ships would continue to operate, this lock would limit the capacity of 30,000,000 tons against the proponents claims of 45,000,000 to 65,000,000 tons for the waterway. Answer: This should be a temporary condition. It is due to the large amount of space and time that would be taken by the small boats in relation to their tonnage. Time should correct this situation because with the bigger locks there should be a trend to bigger vessels with the consequent result that eventually the lock capacity claimed by the proponents should be reached. Furthermore, a substantial tonnage does not get inland as far as the Welland Canal: and besides, the capacity of the Welland Canal could almost be doubled by building twin locks at lock No. 2 and at four of its other locks. Objection 3: Few ocean going vessels have sufficiently small drafts to use this waterway. Answer: When vessels cross the ocean, much of their fuel and supplies have been consumed; and so the vessels would not be at full draft when they enter the waterway. Conversely, on the return trip, the vessel need not be given their full complement of fuel and supplies until they pass through the waterway and reach Montreal. To demonstrate this contention, 63 percent, 84 percent and 89 percent of the vessels of 11-foot draft or more which entered the harbors of New York, Baltimore, and Boston, respectively, in the year 1949, were boats of 11- to 24-foot draft and all these could have gone through the waterway. On this basis, a considerable percentage of the large vessels of the world, which is equivalent to many times the capacity of the waterway, should be able to negotiate it. Objection 4. Venezuela and Labrador ore logically should be used on the Atlantic coast as well as transported inland for use as far west as Pittsburgh. This would reduce the need of the waterway. Answer: Whether Venezuela ore can be transported cheaper by railroad compared to the waterway is debatable; but as for Labrador ore, the suggested use of Labrador ore in the east coast is not realistic because this ore is mostly the property of Middle-West companies and they would be expected to use most of it in their Middle-West plants. In speaking of delivering ore to the Atlantic coast, we must also bear in mind the much greater exposure to attack by submarines on the high seas in times of war. Objection 5: The railroads as well as the seaports would lose the revenue on the cargoes that would go through the waterway. Answer: Much of the estimated cargo is new tonnage. The amount affected would be a small tonnage of the existing business which in a short time should be onset by the natural increase in business with the growth of the country. Objection 6: The coal companies would lose the coal business by the power produced by water. Answer: The coal companies would retain their business; and the proposed power is for new business. Furthermore, water power conserves our natural resources and it is to the best interest of the country to use it. Objection 7: There is not a market for the additional power. Answer. Actually there is a power shortage. The New York State Power Authority says that the United States portion of the power at the waterway plus that from the proposed increased output at the Niagara Falls area will not be sufficient for New York State's increased needs by 1960; and that, at least 1,000,000 horsepower of steam horsepower must be added by private utilities. Objection 8: The project would not be self-liquidating because the estimates do not include liquidation of the money already spent. Answer: The money spent to date is gone. To be realistic, the question should be: Would the money spent from here on in be self-liquidating? We have already stated, with power sold at one-half present market prices, this is expected to be accomplished in 50 years. With power at full market prices, the project can be liquidated in considerably less time assuming the tolls are collected as proposed. Objection 9: The Army engineers' estimates do not include the cost of harbor improvements necessary to coordinate Great Lakes harbors with the proposed waterway. Answer: For 17 major ports the Army engineers estimate this amount to be $28,848,000. These harbors could be deepened when the traffic increases to the point to make it a necessity. This probably would be spread over many years. Objection 10: The history of most such projects is that the actual costs exceeded the estimate. Answer: In the past, on other jobs, inflationary trends have pushed costs above estimates. However, at the same time, all other things have kept a comparative pace. The estimates of this project were made by both Canadian authorities and United States Army engineers and the figures were approximately the same. We understand, the Canadian engineers feel the estimates are too high, recognizing the high efficiency of new equipment and techniques. Objection 11: Cheap foreign goods would be dumped into the center of our country. Answer: This can be controlled by a tariff. Objection 12: The waterway would be iced over 5 months of the year and so it could not be used all the year. Answer: The Great Lakes too are open only part of the year. Yet, in spite of this, their annual traffic through the Soo locks still exceeds that of the Panama and Suez Canals combined. In time, a similar intensive use should be experienced in the proposed waterway, because its cargoes should be much the same. Furthermore, both industry and agriculture in this entire area are adjusted to seasonal transportation. Above all, the power developed is available 12 months of the year. Answer: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest authority on military affairs, have asked for this waterway. Would they have done so, if they did not think they could protect it? OTHER CONSIDERATIONS Here are some other considerations: 1. New York State is willing to assume the $192,493,000 power construction costs, leaving for the United States $374,301,000 for the navigation; and this is the price of three aircraft carriers and is less than six-tenths of 1 percent of the fiscal budget for this year. 2. It would provide substantial savings to those private enterprises that would use its navigation and its power. This savings should react to the benefit of the country as a whole. 3. The position of the New York Power Authority and the Ontario Hydroelectric Power Commission is that the power dam in the International Rapids section may be built by Canada and New York State through the International Joint Commission established by the treaty of 1909 and the Federal Power Commission. Once the water level in the International Rapids section is so changed, Canada has the right on her own to put in the navigation channel. If the United States will not join her, Canada intends to put in the navigation on her own. Why be like Russia with no control at the Dardanelles and let Canada likewise control all our waterway traffic, particularly when Canada now wants to enter into an agreement of joint control of this waterway? 4. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff, our State Department, and Secretary of Commerce advocate the waterway because, in time of war, it would permit considerable oceangoing shipbuilding and repairs to be done on the Great Lakes, it would help ease congested rail facilities, it would shorten the time in which trans-Atlantic shipping would be exposed to enemy action in wartime by reducing the open water route from North American ports to Europe by 1,000 miles. 5. Every President of the United States, both Democrat and Republican, including men with widely different philosophies and temperaments since Harding, that is, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt and Truman have all advocated it. This is the story of the St. Lawrence waterway and the arguments for and against it. I feel it has been definitely proved that the area needs the power and that it would be economically sound to produce it; and in so doing, we would be saving our natural resources. The power alone, if sold at prevailing prices, could liquidate the investment by itself. At any rate, with the dams built for power, why not go the rest of the way and include navigation? In view of all the foregoing, it seems that the benefits far outweigh the disadvantages; and, in consequence, in our opinion, the St. Lawrence waterway project should be approved, on a self-liquidating basis with the power distributed through existing private utilities. The Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River are a great gift of nature. Why not utilize to the fullest these great natural resources? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. W. D. Johnson. They have limited your time to 3 minutes. Will that be satisfactory? Mr. JOHNSON. I believe so. STATEMENT OF W. D. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, my name is W. D. Johnson. I am vice president and national legislative representative of the Order of Railway Conductors of America. I reside in Washington, D. C., and I maintain an office at 10 Independence Avenue. The general headquarters of the Order of Railway Conductors is located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The Order of Railway Conductors of America was organized July 6, 1868, and is the second oldest railway labor organization in the United States. As a representative of the Order of Railway Conductors, I am fully authorized to appear before this committee and file this statement in opposition to the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway project. Our opposition to this project dates back for approximately 20 years. We are not opposing the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway project merely from the standpoint of railroad employees, regardless of the fact that if this project is constructed, many conductors will be adversely affected. In addition to our interest as railroad employees, we are very deeply concerned as taxpayers, both State and Federal. We are, therefore, at a loss to understand why the Federal Government should be urged by a few individuals to appropriate more than a billion dollars of Federal funds to be used to subsidize the construction of a water transportation system that cannot in our judgment be justified by the widest stretch of imagination, particularly so from the standpoint of national defense. PRESENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS The records show that our present transportation systems are fully adequate to meet present and future transportation needs even though there would be a substantial increase in both freight and passenger traffic. Therefore, the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway will simply mean taking away from present transportation systems ton nage that they are capable of handling and transferring it to another system. This is merely "robbing Peter to pay Paul." In World War II, the proponents of the St. Lawrence project pleaded national defense, the same as they are doing at the present time. However, we have successfully fought two world wars without the St. Lawrence project and I feel confident we will come out victorious in the present conflict without this added means of transportation. TIME NEEDED TO CONSTRUCT SEAWAY It has been estimated that it will require from 7 to 10 years to construct this project. I am, therefore, wondering just how we will be able to carry on and meet the transportation needs during the interim period of construction. If we are able to carry on and meet the needs during the construction period, why can't we carry on after the project is constructed? In other words, if the future security of our great country is dependent upon the construction of a project that cannot be put into operation short of 7 or 10 years, I fear that our security will be destroyed long before the project is constructed, so why consider an expenditure of over a billion dollars of Federal funds for the construction of a nonessential project. WAR RECORD OF AMERICAN RAILROADS During World War II, the American railroads handled 97 percent of all organized military traffic and 90 percent of all war freight. Railroad management and employes were highly complimented by the President and other high ranking officials for the efficient service rendered. It has been said many times by those in authority that if the railroads had failed to render prompt and efficient service, we would have suffered defeat in World War II. However, regardless of this outstanding transportation record, special effort is being put forth to deprive the railroads and the employees traffic that rightfully belongs to them. I recall that General Eisenhower, on his return from his inspection tour abroad, stated in substance that our foreign allies are not inclined to give up, but on the contrary, they are eager to carry on provided they are supplied with the necessary implements of war. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be far more profitable and effective to use the vast sums of money that would be required to construct the St. Lawrence project to provide the necessary implements of war and get them in the hands of our allies at the earliest possible date. COST OF SEAWAY I know that the engineers for the proponents have estimated the cost of construction of this project to be less than a billion dollars. However, past experience will show that the cost of construction of water projects far exceeded the estimates submitted and I daresay that the St. Lawrence project if constructed will not be an exception to the rule. Railway employees are deeply concerned with respect to our national defense. They have no desire whatsoever to do anything that would in any way retard our defense program. We, therefore, feel that |