CH. XXIII. messenger with orders to Captain Vogdes to land his company at Fort Pickens and increase the garrison. Both President and Cabinet had since then considered that point disposed of for the moment. 1861. Scott, Memoran dum. W. R. Vol. I., pp. 200, 201. Blair to May 17, 1873. "Lincoln On the evening of March 28, the first state dinner was given by the new occupants of the Executive Mansion. Just before the hour of leave-taking, Lincoln invited the members of his Cabinet into an adjoining room for a moment's consultation; and when they were alone he informed them, with evident emotion, that General Scott had that day advised the evacuation of Fort Pickens as well as Fort Sumter. The general's recommendation was formulated as follows, in his written memorandum to the Secretary of War: It is doubtful, however, according to recent information from the South, whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon the States now wavering between adherence to the Union and secession. It is known, indeed, that it would be charged to necessity, and the holding of Fort Pickens would be adduced in support of that view. Our Southern friends, however, are clear that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe and give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual. The holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor on the ocean keys depends on entirely different principles, and should never be abandoned; and indeed the giving up of Forts Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that we should thereby recover the States to which they geographically belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining the eight doubtful States. A long pause of blank amazement followed the ard," p. 65. President's recital, broken at length by Blair in and Sew strong denunciation, not only of this advice, but CH. XXIII. of Scott's general course regarding Sumter. He charged that Scott was transcending his professional duties and "playing politician." Blair's gestures and remarks, moreover, were understood by those present as being aimed specially at Seward, whose peace policy he had, with his usual impulsive aggressiveness, freely criticised. Without any formal vote, there was a unanimous expression of dissent from Scott's suggestion, and under the President's request to meet in formal council next day, the Cabinet retired. That night Lincoln's eyes did not close in sleep. It was apparent Diary. Ms. that the time had come when he must meet the nation's crisis. His judgment alone must guide, his sole will determine, his own lips utter the word that should save or lose the most precious inheritance of humanity, the last hope of free government on the earth. Only the imagination may picture that intense and weary vigil. Meigs, CHAPTER XXIV THE REBEL GAME CH. XXIV. 1861. THE HE rebel conspirators were not unmindful of the great advantages they had hitherto derived from their complaints, their intrigues, their assumptions, their arrogant demands. No sooner was the provisional government organized at Montgomery than they appointed a new embassy of three commissioners to proceed to Washington and make the fourth effort to assist, protect, and if possible to establish the rebellion through negotiation. They not only desired to avert a war, but, reasoning from the past, had a well-grounded faith that they would secure peaceful acquiescence in their schemes. The commissioners were instructed to solicit a reception in their official character, and if that were refused, to accept an unofficial interview; to insist on the de facto and de jure independence of the Confederate States; but nevertheless to accede to a proposition to refer the subject of their mission to the United States Senate, or to withhold an answer until the Congress of the United States should assemble and pronounce a the Com- decision in the premises, provided the existing MS. peaceful status were rigidly maintained. Toombs to missioners, Feb. 27, 1861. This modest programme was made necessary by the half-fledged condition of the rebellion: its personal jealousies were not yet hushed; its no- CH. XXIV. tions of States rights were not yet swallowed up in an imperious military dictatorship; above all, its military preparation consisted mainly of a selfsacrificing enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the two months' drill and battery-building at Charleston, Davis did not agree with Governor Pickens that the moment had come to storm Sumter. "Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest moment possible,” wrote the rebel war secretary, but "thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted. . . A failure would demoralize our people and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world as reckless and precipitate." Therefore they made Beauregard a brigadier-general and sent him to command in the harbor of Charleston. Beauregard's professional inspection justified this prudence. He wrote: If Sumter was properly garrisoned and armed, it would be a perfect Gibraltar to anything but constant shelling night and day from the four points of the compass. As it is, the weakness of the garrison constitutes our greatest advantage, and we must for the present turn our attention to preventing it from being reënforced. This idea I am gradually and cautiously infusing into the minds of all here; but should we have to open our batteries upon it, I hope to be able to do so with all the advantages the condition of things here will permit. All that I ask is time for completing my batteries and preparing and organizing properly my command. The first of the three commissioners, Martin J. Crawford, arrived in Washington the day before Lincoln's inauguration. He would have nothing more to do with Buchanan, he wrote. "His fears for his personal safety, the apprehensions for the Walker to Mar. 1, 1861. I., p. 259. Pickens, W. R. Vol. Beauregard to Walker, Mar. 6, 1861. I., p. 26. CH. XXIV. security of his property, together with the cares of state and his advanced age, render him wholly disto Toombs, qualified for his present position. He is as incapable now of purpose as a child." Crawford Mar. 3, 1861. Senate Speech, "Globe," Jan.12, 1861, p. 343. Washing ton to Walker, W. R. Vol. With the arrival of the second commissioner, John Forsyth, they prepared to begin operations upon the new Administration. It was comparatively easy to call into caucus the active and disguised secessionists who yet remained in the city. Wigfall, Mason, Hunter, and Breckinridge were still in the Senate; Virginia and the other border States had a number of sympathizing Congressmen in the House; Bell, Crittenden, and Douglas, though loyal, could be approached with professions of peace; Seward, in order to gain information, had kept himself during the whole winter in relation with all parties, and had openly proclaimed that his policy was one of peace and conciliation. The prospect of beginning negotiations seemed flattering; nevertheless, their first caucus over the inaugural agreed that "it was Lincoln's purpose at once to attempt the collection of the revenue, to Mar. 5, 1861. reënforce and hold Forts Sumter and Pickens, and to retake the other places." A day or two later, on comparing the fragmentary gossip they had raked together, in which the difficulties of reënforcing Sumter were dimly reflected, with a general conversation alleged to have been held by one of their informants with Seward, they framed and reported to Montgomery a theory of probable success in their mission. Seward, they thought, was to be the ruling power of the new Administration. Seward and Cameron were publicly committed to a peace policy. They |