"The people are now here in their unclouded power. They have taken the Government into their own hands. They have rebuked and trodden down the arrogant pretensions of the Executive. They have stricken the veto dead in his hands. They have declared that he shall not stand at your doors to arrest your legislation, as he has publicly threatened that he would do. They have degraded him, for the time being, from your associate in council, to the mere minister of your will. It is their high and irreversible decree, that the public servant who presumed to deny their jurisdiction and yours, over the most momentous question of your history, shall stand aside until you have disposed of it, and then execute your judgment in good faith, whether it be agreeable to him or not. They have now reviewed and reaffirmed their decision of 1864, and again instructed you to enact such, laws as you may think proper, and to see that they are honestly enforced, or that the impediment is removed. Pass this bill, as the first in the order of necessity, and the residue of the work will be of easy accomplishment. Reject it, and posterity will grieve that the courage which had conquered treason twice was not seconded by the spirit that might have shorn its locks, and bound it in everlasting chains."

The motion to reconsider prevailed, various amendments were offered and ordered printed, and the consideration of the bill postponed to December 12th, when it was taken up. Mr. Williams then offered the following amendment:

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That the heads of the several departments of the Government shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the official term of the President by whom they were appointed, unless removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and they shall severally appoint their assistants and all other officers pertaining to their respective departments, subject to the approval of the Senate, on report to be made to that body if then in session, or if, during the recess, at the next meeting thereof, to hold for the like period, unless removed with the like concurrence of that body.

He said: "This section, it will be observed, consists of two propositions. The first makes the heads of the several departments irremovable at the mere pleasure of the President. Having thus made them, as I think, practically independent, then the second clause authorizes them to appoint, as we have unquestionably a right under the Constitution to do, the subordiates in their respective departments. This clause is so framed as to take it out of the rule or precedent established by the Congress of 1789, to the effect that, in the absence of any statutory provision or of any legislation defining the term of office, the President might remove at will. I propose here, in order to obviate all possible difficulty on this ground, to define the term. As it stood originally in the bill it was in the words, for the term of four years.' It suggested by my friend from Iowa, and

Was

other gentlemen, that this would make a difficulty at the incoming of a new administration. I have endeavored to obviate that by so modifying the section as to confine the period to 'the official term of the President by whom they were appointed.'

"The second clause is dependent. If the first should prevail, I see no reason why the other should not prevail also. If, in other words, the heads of the departments can be lifted from their present abject attitude and made independent of the Executive, then I see no reason against conferring the appointing power upon those officers. Under our present legislation and under the precedent that has already been established, so far as regards the Post-Office Department, we know in some few cases, where the salary is some one thousand or two thousand dollars, the appointments are made by the Postmaster-General without any supervisory power or power of revision in any quarter, except it be on the part of the President himself; and I think the experience of the country shows how this power has been abused. I think there ought to be a limitation on it. I propose, therefore, that no appointment shall be made except subject to the approval of the Senate, and no removals except upon the same terms.

"The gentleman from Iowa, in his remarks yesterday, had something to say in reference to the confidential relations of these officers to the President. He seemed to think that they were

intended to be confidential advisers of the President. I do not know that any such thing as advisers of the President is known to the Government. I suppose the President may take advice elsewhere; and if he should take such advice it would perhaps be better and more honest than that he now receives."

the attention of the House to the situation of Mr. Kasson, of Iowa, said: "I wish to call the President and the Secretary of State if this proposition should be adopted. Every thing is done in relation to foreign affairs nominally by. the Secretary of State, theoretically by the President. If in the settlement of intricate questions of foreign policy a division of policy shall spring up, and the President shall sustain one policy in dealing with foreign nations and the Secretary of State another, you will find the Secretary of State with his hands tied or the President with his hands tied. You must enable the responsible head of the Government to control its policy. You must enable him to change his agent even in the recess of a session of Congress. You must secure harmonious action in the policy of the Government by the President's direct action in the choice of those through whom alone that action can be had.

"It is not so only in respect to foreign affairs, but in some respects also to domestic affairs. The President is by law, and to some extent by the Constitution, the responsible head of the executive office. The proposition of the gentleman now is, to make these Secretaries, who are themselves theoretically or actually agents of

the President in respect to his policy, independent of the President, and leaves him but a sounding title in the administration of the af fairs of the Government.

"Now, I say that this is a radical change of the Government of the United States, and that Congress ought not adopt that change without a more careful consideration than is involved in a proposed change in the tenure of minor officers of the Government. In respect to the Postmaster-General's department, it has already some twenty-seven thousand offices. It is impossible for the President to make all these appointments, and the power must necessarily be vested in the Postmaster-General, just as you invest power in the courts to appoint commissioners and in deputy postmasters to appoint their clerks; but this goes further, this goes to the very essence of the Government of the United States, and proposes to take from the President the powers which the Constitution and laws confer upon him."

Mr. Thayer, of Pennsylvania, said: "I move to strike out the last line of the amendment, simply for the purpose of saying a few words. It seems to me that the proposition which is now made by the gentleman from the Committee on the Judiciary (Mr. Williams) is called for by no public exigency, and is only fraught with future embarrassment and inconvenience. If the law with regard to the appointing power is so arranged and so bound up that the power shall be controlled by the Senate and the President as regards all the subordinate officers of the Government, I see no possible necessity for trammelling the President in regard to his confidential advisers; or as John Randolph was wont to say, 'his head clerks.'

"It seems to me that it will lead to embarrassment in this way: if a cabinet officer dissents from the opinions of the Executive, the Executive should possess the power of removing that cabinet officer; otherwise your plan leads to this result, as was suggested by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Kasson), that you transfer the executive office from the Executive of the United States to his cabinet council. And in transferring it you make a new executive consisting of many heads instead of one; because if those officers are not removable from office at the will of the President, they may remain in office and outvote the President; they take such a course with regard to the administration of the executive office as by a majority of their number they may determine. And what is that but the substitution of a new executive in the place of the constitutional Executive? I think the future would reveal the impolicy of the great and fundamental change contemplated by this amendment. It seems to me to be fraught with future evil; to be, indeed, as was said by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Kasson), a radical revolution in one department of the Government. I hope, therefore, that the House will adhere to its position of yesterday."

Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, said: "Mr. Speaker, I

do not accept the doctrine which has been advanced by my colleague from Iowa (Mr. Kasson), and by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Thayer), in regard to the executive department of the Government as correct. I find, sir, that the Constitution says that the executive power shall be vested in the President of the United States of America. Now, I should like to know what there is in the executive part of the Government as we find it in the Constitution which would confer upon the heads of departments power to override the President of the United States in the determination of any policy however independent of the President you may make these heads of departments? What right has a head of a department to a policy except it be that policy established by law? What right, under the operation of this amendment offered by my colleague on the Judiciary Committee, would the heads of departments have to convene themselves together and override the President in the exercise of his power? The President is, as the Constitution says, the Executive of the United States. He is to executewhat? He is to execute the law, and any policy which he may have, or which his cabinet may have, or the two combined may have, in violation of law, is a violation not merely of the law, but of the Constitution itself.

"Now, sir, the practice that this amendment proposes radically to change in the executive branch of our Government is one which has obtained too often and too long in our Government. It is in regard to foreign affairs and the administration of domestic concerns as alluded to by my colleague from Iowa. Sir, it is the duty of the legislative department of the Government to determine the policy of the Government, internal and foreign. The laws passed by Congress impose duties upon the President and upon the heads of departments, and they are to see to the execution of these laws. I ask any gentleman to point out to me how we are creating another branch of the executive department. I say cabinet officers, if you are pleased to call them such, shall hold their offices during the term of the President by whom they are appointed. How does that make them independent in the determination of the policy of the President? What have they to do but to obey the laws and to obey the order the President may issue as Executive of the United States? Suppose a cabinet officer should have one line of policy in his department, and the President should conclude that another line of policy should be pursued, what has the President to do but to order this head clerk to pursue his policy? Suppose he should disobey any mandate of the legislative department embodied in law, what right has he to override the order of the Executive of the United States, who is made by the Constitution chief executive officer, any more than he has to override a mandate of the law, provided the order of the President is within the proper limits of the executive power?"

The debate was further continued until the

the state of relations between him and any of them had become so as to render this relation of confidence and trust and personal esteem inharmonious, he should in such case be allowed to dispense with the services of that officer in vacation and have some other person act in his stead. We thought that so much discretion, so much confidence, so much respect ought to be properly attributed to the Chief Magistrate of the nation. It may happen that at some particular time-some people may suppose that it has happened now-the Chief Magistrate for the time being ought not to be invested with such powers; but the committee have recommended the adoption of this rule respecting the tenure of officers as a permanent and systematic and as they believe an appropriate regulation of the Government for all administrations and for all time."

Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, said: "The Constitution imposes upon the President of the United States the duty of executing the laws; it does not impose that duty upon the Secretaries. They are creatures of the law and not of the Constitution directly. Some, and perhaps the greater part, of their functions are as advisers of the President and to aid him in executing the laws in their several departments. There are some duties that are specifically conferred upon them by Congress. Their relations to the President, as has been well said by gentlemen, is that mostly of confidential advisers. With the exception of the particular duties imposed upon them by law, and on the Secretary of the Treasury more than on the others, they do nothing of their own notion, but act by order of the President in discharging the particular duties of their office.

"Standing in that relation to him, as his aids, his confidential advisers, the men upon whom he relies for advice in the first place and for aid in carrying out what is determined to be best in the second, their connection with him is a very peculiar one. It is very important as a general principle unquestionably, as all gentlemen here will admit, that that relation should be a harmonious relation throughout; and, if we may trust to what we have heard, it is not many years since it was considered by the great majority of the Senate a sufficient reason for wishing that the cabinet should be changed in some degree, because there was the want of that harmony among themselves, and consequently, perhaps, with the President, that was desirable.

That being the peculiar condition of affairs, it has always been considered, since the foundation of the Government, as a matter of course, as a general rule-there may have been one or two exceptions, and, I think, there have been, but I am not very positive on that point-that the President might select such persons as he pleased to be members of his cabinet. Of course, the confirmation of the Senate is necessary; but the general idea of the Senate has been, whether they liked the men or not, to confirm them without any difficulty, because in

executing the great and varied interests of this great country, it is exceedingly important that there should be the utmost harmony between those who are charged with that execution.

"It seems to be very obvious that, with reference to the transaction of business which is peculiarly executive, the confidential advisers that we put about the President should always be men who, for the greater part, are satisfactory to him."

Mr. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, said: "This bill comes from the joint-committee of the two Houses upon retrenchment, of the Senate branch of which the Senator from Vermont is chairman. I desire, in addition to what he has just said, the propriety of which will attract the attention of every Senator, to say that there are several subjects comprised in the bill, each of which is perfectly distinct; and what is to be done by the Senate in coming to a correct conclusion on this bill will be, to keep the argument upon each point perfectly distinct and separate from the others.

"The first section of the bill, and the matter contained in the second also, raises a very great question; and I hope that the members of the Senate will not commit their judgments upon it until it is distinctly and separately debated. It is new to us, and it is hazardous, if not improper, that we should form hasty conclusions upon it.

"Another and a distinct question is raised by the latter part of the second section-the conferring upon the President of the power of suspending from office without dismissing an officer. A provision of this kind in our legislation, if not altogether new, is new as a general provision, and it may likewise deserve separate consideration.

"Finally, the third section is intended to meet a class of cases which has been spoken of in this debate-where the President fills a vacancy, during a recess, between the sessions of the Senate-by issuing a commission, which shall expire at the end of the next session, by virtue of an express provision of the Constitution; then, if during such next session that of fice shall not be filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, it shall, after the adjournment of the Senate, remain vacant; the appointments shall remain in abeyance-to use the words employed in the section-and the duties of that office shall be discharged by some other officer, who may be appointed or selected by law.

"Now, sir, the first question, to wit, the power of the President to make removals from office, is one which was settled in the first session of the first Congress which met after the organization of our Government, and that decision, if not unchallenged, at least has not been reversed in the practice of this Government seventy-seven years; and when we come to reopen the debate upon it we must take care that we approach this great subject in the proper temper, in a spirit of impartiality, and without any disposi

tion or proclivity of mind to be influenced by considerations other than those which pertain to the merits of the question itself. I intend, at some point in the debate, to be heard upon this one question involved in the bill; but for the present, I join in the hope expressed by the chairman of the Senate branch of the committee on retrenchment, that we shall not raise that general debate. It is not necessarily involved in the motion now pending before the Senate for the amendment of the first clause of the committee's substitute, to wit, the question whether the power of the President with regard to removals from office shall be curtailed so far as his own Cabinet ministers are

concerned. That is a distinct and independent question, and I hope we shall determine it without extending ourselves, or permitting the debate to extend itself, into the whole field."

Mr. Howard, of Michigan, on January 11th, moved an amendment in section two, line eleven, after the word "Senate," which Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, moved to modify as follows:

And such person so designated shall take the oaths and give the bonds required by law to be taken and given by the person duly appointed to fill such office. Mr. Edmunds then moved further to amend by adding the following sections:

And be it further enacted, That if any person shall, contrary to the provisions of this act, accept any appointment to or employment in any office, or shall hold or exercise, or attempt to hold or exercise any such office or employment, he shall be deemed and is hereby declared to be guilty of a high misdemeanor, and he shall be punished therefor by a fine not exceeding $10,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

And be it further enacted, That every removal, appointment, or employment made, had, or exercised contrary to the provisions of this act, and the make ing, signing, sealing, countersigning, or issuing of any commission or letter of authority for or in respect to any such appointment or employment, shall be deemed and are hereby declared to be high misdemeanors, and every person guilty thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both said panishments, in the discretion of the court.

And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the secretary of the Senate, at the close of each session thereof, to deliver to the Secretary of the Treasury and to each of his assistants, and to each of the Auditors and to each of the Comptrollers in the Treasury, and to the Treasurer, and to the Register of the Treasury, a full and complete list, duly certified, of all persons who shall have been nominated to and rejected by the Senate during such session, and a like list of all the offices to which nominations shall have been made and not confirmed and filled at such session.

And be it further enacted, That whenever the President shall, without the advice and consent of the Senate, designate, authorize, or employ any person to perform the duties of any office, he shall forthwith notify the Secretary of the Treasury thereof, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury thereupon to communicate such notice to all the proper accounting and disbursing officers of his depart And be it further enacted, That no money shall be paid or received from the Treasury, or paid or re

ment,

ceived from or retained out of any public moneys or funds of the United States, whether in the Treasury pointed to or authorized to act in or holding or exeror not, to or by or for the benefit of any person apcising the duties or functions of any office contrary to the provisions of this act nor shall any claim, account, voucher, order, certificate, warrant, or other instrument providing for or relating to such paylowed, approved, certified, or paid by any officer of ment, receipt, or retention be presented, passed, althe United States or by any person exercising the functions or performing the duties of any office or place of trust under the United States for or in respect to such office or the exercising or performing the functions or duties thereof: and every person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be punished therefor by a fine not exceeding $10,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the

court.

Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, said: "I think the honorable member who proposes the amendment had better follow what I believe has been the precedent in all such cases, and provide that the punishment shall be inflicted upon trial and conviction of the offence. As it stands, the case is submitted to the court apparently, and the court can award the punishment. The result, of course, would be the same; they would stitution of the United States; but it might be be obliged to try him by a jury under the Conheld to give the power to the court itself. I think the Senator will find, upon looking at the penal statutes, that they always say that upon trial and conviction the punishment shall be inflicted."

Mr. Edmunds accepted the amendment as suggested.

The amendment as moved by Mr. Edmunds was then agreed to, and the bill reported to the Senate.

An amendment was offered by Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, which was subsequently withdrawn. During the debate upon it, he said: “But the question here is, whether, in a case where the President and Senate have been unable to agree upon some man for an office and the Senate adjourns, the office shall remain vacant during the ensuing recess. That is the question: whether the President shall have power to appoint, not the rejected man, but anybody to the office; whether, as I said before, the office shall remain vacant, the interests of the people shall be neglected, because the President might appoint somebody not agreeable to the majority of Congress. That is the whole question."

Mr. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, said: "Mr. President, I understand this question to be simply a question whether the Constitution of the United States shall or shall not be observed. I understand that the Constitution makes two things requisite to an appointment -a nomination by the President and the consent of the Senate. It would be revolutionary for the Senate to undertake to make a nomination, and it is equally revolutionary for the President to undertake to make an appointment