(186 N.W.) to recover on a policy of insurance the county [sible, the intent which the Legislature had in which the defendant has its principal office, in mind in making such amendment. A litor, at the election of the plaintiff, if a resi- eral construction of the statute in question, dent of this state, the county in which the as so amended, would clearly bring the propplaintiff resides or if the action is brought by a er place of trial under the seventh subdiperson in a representative capacity by appointment of a court of this state, the county vision of said statute, as above set forth. in which the proceeding resulting in such ap- On April 24, 1917, a decision was rendered pointment was had. by this court, in Re State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court for Waushara County et al., 165 Wis. 387, 162 "Against Other Corporations. Sixth. Of an action against any other corporation existing under the law of this state, the county in which it is situated or has its principal office or place. W. 436, in which it was held that, where the insurance policies are issued in Milwauof business, or in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose. kee the principal place of business of the domestic company, and are payable there, and where notice and proofs of death were to be furnished to the company at Milwaukee, and where the plaintiff in the action resided in Waushara county, and was there appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased "Other Actions. Seventh. Of any other action, the county in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the action; or if neither defendant resides within this state, any county which the plaintiff designates in his complaint." Subdivisions 8, 9, and 10 are omitted, not policy holder, the proper place of trial was being material to the issues involved. Prior to the enactment of chapter 334 of the Laws of 1919, the fifth subdivision above set forth was not included in said section of the statutes, and the sixth was numbered as fifth, the seventh as sixth, the eighth as seventh, and the ninth as eighth, so that the only difference between section 2619 as amended by the Legislature in that year, and as it existed prior to that time, consists of the interpolation of subdivision 5, and the renumbering of the subsequent subdivisions of said section, as above indicated. It is contended by the relator that it was the intention of the Legislature by such interpolation of subdivision 5, and the renumbering of the subsequent subdivisions, to constitute the proper place of trial in actions against domestic insurance companies other than those brought against an insurance company existing under the laws of the state, to recover on a policy of insurance, the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action, etc. On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the only object and purpose of the Legislature in enacting chapter 334 of the Laws of 1919 was to fix a proper place of trial for actions brought against an insurance company existing under the laws of this state, to recover on a policy of insurance, and that all actions against corporations existing under the laws of this state, other than those mentioned in subdivision 4 of said section, are triable in the county in which the corporation is situated or has its principal office or place of business, or in which the cause of action or some part thereof, arose, and that, inasmuch as the complaint alleges that the cause of action herein arose in Douglas county, that county is a proper place of trial of such action. in Milwaukee county. As the result of such decision, many life insurance policy holders were vitally affected in this state, and were obliged to maintain suit on their policies in the county where the principal office or place of business of the company was located and the insurance was payable, so that when the Legislature convened in its session of 1919 the amendment as aforesaid was enacted. Bearing therefore in mind the reason for the amendment, and the object and purpose the Legislature had in mind in enacting the same, and the language of the amendment, it becomes clear that it had no other purpose than to fix a place of trial in an action against an insurance company existing under the laws of this state to recover on a policy of insurance so as to enable a plaintiff, at his election, if a resident of this state, to bring his action in the county in which he resides, or, if the action be brought by a person in a representative capacity, by appointment of a court of this state, the county in which the proceeding resulting in such appointment was had. No other plausible reason can be assigned for the amendment, and, in fact, the entire statute, with the exception of the interpolation of subdivision 5, and the | renumbering of the subsequent subdivisions, remains in force to the full intent and purpose as it existed prior to 1919. [2-5] The great fundamental rule in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. 36 Cyc. 1106; State v. State R. Commission, 137 Wis. 80, 117 N. W. 846. The general rule is that the spirit or reason of the law will prevail over the letter. State v. Railroad Commission, 137 Wis. 80, 117 N. W. 846; Wis. Industrial Schoo' v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N. W. 422; Gilkey v. Cook, 60 Wis. 133, 18 N. W. 639. It has also been held that in In order to give section 2619 as amend-order to ascertain the object the Legislature ed by the Legislature of 1919 a proper construction, it is necessary to ascertain, if pos had in mind, it is proper to consider the occasion and necessity of the enactment, the defects or evils in the former law, and the remedy provided by the new one, and the statute should be given that construction which is best calculated to advance its object, by suppressing the mischief and securing the benefits intended. 36 Cyc. 1110. And every statute is to be construed with reference to the general system of laws of which it forms a part, and must therefore be interpreted in the light of the customary or unwritten law of other statutes on the same subject and of the decisions of the courts. Buell & Denu and Schrader & Lewis, all of Rapid City, for appellants. Geo. A. Jeffers and Geo. E. Flavin, both of Rapid City, and E. B. Adams, of Hot Springs, for respondent. POLLEY, J. The controversy out of which this appeal grows originated in the county court of Pennington county. A certain will was filed for probate; notice of the time and So that, bearing in mind that the decision in Re N. W. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court for Waushara County et al., 165 Wis. 387, 162 N. W. 436, was rendered in 1917, and that as the result of such decision a great inconvenience resulted to a large number of policy holders residing in all parts of the state, and that the amendment referred to follows immediately as the act of the next Legislature, the conclusion irresistibly fast-place for hearing the petition for the proens itself upon one's mind that the relief bate of the will was given by mail. All of by amendment intended by the new legisla- the heirs but one-the plaintiff in this action tion was to afford policy holders affected by lived in Rapid City. Plaintiff lived in Hot such decision a more convenient forum. This Springs. The party who mailed the notices construction, under the authorities above cit-made an affidavit that she had mailed a copy ed, gives effect to the spirit of the law, not- of said notice to each of the heirs, addressed withstanding, as above stated, a literal con- to Rapid City. struction leads to the conclusion contended for by the relator. [6] Even if by the amendment, the statute had been repealed, and re-enacted in the same words by an act which takes effect at the same time as the repealing act, the portion of the statute re-enacted would continue in uninterrupted operation such former statute, and there would be no change in the law. Laude v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 640; Glentz v. State, 38 Wis. 549, 554; State v. Gumber, 37 Wis. 298; Fullerton v. Spring, 3 Wis. 667; Hurley v. Town of Texas, 20 Wis. 634. The will in question was dated April 24, 1908, but in the proof of the execution of the will made by one of the subscribing witnesses the date of the will was stated as April 12, 1919; in the certificate of proof of the will the date of the will was stated as April 12, 1918, and in the order admitting the will to probate the date of the will is stated as April 12, 1918. After the order admitting the will to probate had been entered, plaintiff instituted a contest of the will. During the contest proceedings the executor of the will moved to have the above dates corrected so that the various instruments above referred to would We therefore hold that the motion of re-all show the correct date of the will, and spondents to quash the alternative writ of mandamus must be granted. It is so ordered, and the order staying proceedings is vacated. SIEBECKER, C. J., took no part. also to correct the return of the mailing of the notices so as to show that the notice was mailed to plaintiff at Hot Springs instead of Rapid City. After the hearing on the motion the county court made and entered an order directing the clerk to amend and correct said papers nunc pro tunc as of the original date of filing, so as to make them conform to the truth. Thereupon plaintiff secured a writ of prohibition from the circuit court prohibiting and restraining the county judge and clerk of STATE ex rel. LEWIS v. NYSTROM, County courts from "amending by changing, altering, Judge, et al. (No. 4913.) (Supreme Court of South Dakota. Feb. 8, 1922.) defacing, mutilating, or destroying" any of the above-mentioned files or records, "but without prejudice or hindrance to your exer Courts 116(5)-Records cannot be correct-cising the full jurisdiction and authority of ed by interlineation and mutilation of files. Records of county courts cannot be corrected by interlineation and mutilation of the files. your respective offices in accordance with the law, it being intended by this writ of prohibition to prohibit the amendment only as to the manner of such amendment, this court (186 N.W.) having no jurisdiction at this time to pass | being prorated in case of the insufficiency of upon any other question." From this writ the fund. defendants appeal to this court. Appellants' argument is based upon the contention that the county court has the power to correct its records, when necessary, so as to make them conform to the truth. But this question is not involved. The right of a county court to correct its records in a proper case is conceded by respondents, and is fully recognized by the circuit court in the judgment appealed from. It will be noted that the judgment does not prohibit the county court from making the amendment, but only from making the amendment in the manner pointed out in the order, to wit: * That the said papers and records be amended and corrected by the clerk "in the following particulars, to wit: That the date of the said will be correctly inserted as of April 24, 1908, instead of April 12, 1919, as appears in said proof of will," etc. This required the interlineation and mutilation of these files and is not the proper way to make amendments. Certified Questions from District Court, Burleigh County; J. A. Coffey, Judge. Action in mandamus by the First National Bank of Halstad, Minn., against S. A. Olsness, Commissioner of Insurance, and D. C. Poindexter, State Auditor, to require the issuance of hail insurance warrants. Warrants held binding and nonnegotiable. Questions certified to the Supreme Court for answer. Questions answered affirming the holding of the trial judge, and the cause remanded. E. T. Burke, of Bismarck, for petitioner., Sveinbjorn Johnson, Atty. Gen., for defendants. BIRDZELL, J. In a mandamus proceeding entitled as above and pending in the district court of Burleigh county, the petitioner seeks to have issued, to cover certain hail losses, a hail warrant, negotiable or assignable in form, payable out of the hail insurance fund, without being subject to prorating upon the contingency of the fund being insufficient. It was stipulated in the court below that the plaintiff's right depended upon the answers to two questions: An order that the affidavits of C. J. Buell and Martha Bochart made in support of the motion to amend should be considered as showing the correct date of the execution of the will, and the further order that, as to the certificate of proof of will and the order admitting the will to probate, "the same are hereby corrected to read April 24, 1908, in-negotiable: stead of April 12, 1918," would have been sufficient, and no changes or interlineations in the original papers would be necessary. The showing made by the appellants was sufficient to warrant the county court in making the necessary amendments but that court had no authority to change or mutilate the papers or records already on file. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, but no costs will be allowed to either party on this appeal. FIRST NAT. BANK OF HALSTAD, MINN., (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. States 140-Hail insurance warrants held assignable, but not negotiable. Under chapter 77, Laws 1921, hail insurance warrants are assignable, but not negotiable. 2. States 142-Hail insurance warrants are payable in full out of hail insurance fund, and not subject to pro rating. Hail insurance warrants are payable in full, when called by the state treasurer, out of the hail insurance fund, and are not subject to First, are the hail warrants heretofore issued in the following form negotiable or non For Certified Hail Loss Charge State Hail In- State of North Dakota. Pay to the order of the sum of To the State Treasurer No B Bismarck, $ Dollars of North Dakota Second, when the warrant is issued in the above form, is it, in case of the insufficiency of the fund designated, payable ratably out of the funds collected into the hail insurance fund for that year, or is it payable when called in the amount stated on its face with statutory interest? The trial judge ruled that the warrants, in the form above set forth, are nonnegotiable, and that they are binding obligations of the state payable in full, and not ratably. The above two questions are certified to this court for answer. [1] It being clear that such warrants are payable only out of the hail insurance fund, they are nonnegotiable. They are nevertheless assignable as ordinary warrants for the payment of money, and are so recognized by the express provisions of section 22 of the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Hail Insurance Act (chapter 77, Laws of 1921). [2] We are of the opinion that the warrants are payable in full, as they are called for payment by the state treasurer, and are not subject to any subsequent condition of repayment in case the fund should prove insufficient to meet all claims. Section 6 of the act provides for the levy of a flat tax of three cents per acre each year for five years for the purpose of carrying out the act and creating a surplus in the hail insurance fund for the prompt payment of losses. Section 21 requires the state treasurer to call the warrants for payment to the amount of collections remitted to him by the various county treasurers during the preceding month, and the warrants are made due and payable on the call of the treasurer. This clearly means that they are payable in full when called, and not subject to being prorated. The liability for payment is limited to the hail insurance fund, however, and is not a general liability of the state. See State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 109, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918B, 156 Ann. Cas. 1918A, 583; Sargent County V. Bank of N. D., 182 N. W. 270. Remanded to the district court. Appeal from District Court, Sheridan County; Nuessle, Judge. Bastardy proceeding by the State against George Fuchs. From a judgment for the state. From an order denying a new trial, the defendant appeals. Affirmed. Geo. Thom, of Denhoff, for appellant. Peter A. Winter, of McClusky, for the State. CHRISTIANSON, J. This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment rendered against him in a bastardy proceeding. On November 26, 1920, one Anna Moser made complaint, under oath, before a justice of the peace in Sheridan county, charging: "That she is an unmarried woman and is pregnant with a child which, if born alive, may be a bastard, begotten by the defendant, on or about the 22d day of June, 1920, at or near Denhoff, Sheridan county, N. D." Upon such complaint a warrant was issued, the defendant was apprehended and brought before the justice of the peace, where he was given a preliminary examination as provided by section 10486, C. L. 1913. On November 26, 1920, the justice of the peace made an order that the defendant be re CHRISTIANSON, ROBINSON, and quired to give an undertaking in the sum of BRONSON, JJ., concur. $1,000, with sufficient sureties, payable to the · GRACE, C. J., being disqualified, did not state of North Dakota, and conditioned that participate. 1. Bastards 65-Verdict against defendant held supported by evidence. On an appeal by the defendant from a judgment rendered against him in a bastardy proceeding, and from an order denying a trial, it is held that the verdict has substantial support in the evidence. new he would appear at the next term of the district court of that county, and from term to term until the final disposition of the proceeding, to answer the complaint and abide the judgment and orders of the court therein. On January 24, 1921, the complaining witness was delivered of a child, which was alive at the time of the trial. In the district court the defendant filed an answer denying the charge set forth in the complaint, and demanded that the issue framed thereby be 1921, and the jury returned a verdict declartried by a jury. The case was tried in June, ing the defendant to be the father of the child of the complaining witness. On June 11, 1921, the court entered judgment in con2. Bastards 65-Date on which child be-formity with the verdict. Thereafter the degotten not material except on question of paternity. In a bastardy proceeding, the principal question to be determined is whether the accused is the father of the child involved; and, ordinarily, the exact day on which the child was begotten is not material except as it bears on such principal question. 3. Bastards 92-Refusal to permit crossexamination of complaining witness as to civil action against defendant held not prej udicial error. For reasons stated in the opinion, error predicated upon a ruling made in cross-examination of the complaining witness is held to be nonprejudicial. fendant moved for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, and alleged errors in rulings on the admission of evidence, and in the instructions given to the jury. The motion was denied, and the de fendant has appealed from the judgment and from the order denying a new trial. [1] Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. The argument in support of this contention is almost wholly an attack upon the credibility of the complaining witness. It is pointed out that, in certain particulars, her testimony at the trial is different from her testimony at the preliminary examination. Thus it is said (186 N.W.) [2] It is next contended that the court erred in admitting evidence relating to the act of sexual intercourse which, according to plaintiff's testimony, occurred on May 11,, 1920. It is also contended that the court erred in instructing the jury as follows: These two assignments of error are both predicated upon the proposition that the complaint alleged that the child was "begotten by the defendant, on or about the 22d day of June, 1920." And it is asserted that the date so alleged was material; that it was improper to admit evidence relating to an act of intercourse said to have occurred on May 11th; and that it was error to permit the jury to find a verdict against the defendant on such evidence. that at the preliminary examination she testi- credibility of the witness, and refused to disfied that she had sexual intercourse with the turb the verdict. defendant on June 22, 1920, and that she became pregnant as a result thereof, and that upon the trial she testified that she had sexual intercourse with the defendant on May 11, 1920, and became pregnant at that time. While this in a sense is true, an examination of the transcript of the testimony "I charge you, gentlemen, that the particular given by the complaining witness before the date charged in the complaint need not be justice of the peace discloses that she at proved if in fact you find by a preponderance that time testified that she had had sexual of the evidence that a bastard child was beintercourse with the defendant not only on gotten upon the body of and delivered by the June 22, 1920, but also at a date prior to unmarried woman, Anna Moser, and that the June 22, 1920, and upon the trial in the dis-immaterial as to the particular date charged in same was begotten by the defendant, then it is trict court she still asserted that she had the complaint. The question is, Was such a had intercourse with him on June 22. It is child born, and, if it was, was the defendant undisputed that she gave birth to a child, the father of the same?" and that she is unmarried. The evidence shows that she and the defendant had been keeping company from June, 1919, till February, 1920. There is some intimation that at that time a disagreement arose; but the complaining witness says that the defendant later "made everything good." She also testified positively that on May 11, 1920, he came and took her for a ride, and that upon that occasion they had sexual intercourse, and that they again had such intercourse on June 22, 1920. She testified positively that she at no time had sexual intercourse with any one other than the defendant; and there is not the slightest proof in the record tending to show that she did. It is elementary that the credibility of witnesses and weight of testimony are questions for the jury. This rule is, of course, applicable in bastardy proceedings. See State v. Peoples, 9 N. D. 146, 148, 82 N. W. 749; State v. Brandner, 21 N. D. 310, 316, 130 N. W. 941. The complaining witness was given a thorough cross-examination. The discrepancies in her testimony were clearly pointed out. Judging by the record before us, the complaining witness was an ignorant girl. The jury saw her, and heard her story. That story is not so incredible as to be unworthy of belief. State v. Brandner, 21 N. D. 310, 130 N. W. 941, presented a situation very similar to that presented here. There, as here, it was contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict against the defendant. And it was pointed out that the complaining witness -"first accused the defendant of having but one act of intercourse with her and that upon February 10, 1908; and that after the child was born, September 19, 1908, she accused the defendant of but two acts of intercourse the first being on December 29, 1907, and the second February 10, 1908." 21 N. D. 316, 130 N. W. 943. The court held that this was a matter for the consideration of the jury as affecting the 186 N.W.-48 In our opinion the assignments are not well taken. In other words, we are of the opinion that the evidence relating to the act of intercourse said to have occurred on May 11, 1920 was admissible, and also that, under the evidence in this case, the instruction given was not erroneous. This is not a case like State v. Ryan, 78 Minn. 218, 80 N. W. 962, cited and relied upon by the defendant, or Menn v. State, 132 Wis. 61, 112 N. W. 38, where the complaining witness fixed the act of sexual intercourse in connection with some specified event or occasion, so that the proof, in effect, not only affirmed that the child was begotten by the accused at a specified time and place, but, also, negatived the idea that it could have been begotten by the accused on any other date than the one so specified. That is not the situation here. Ordinarily, the exact day on which the child was begotten is not "material except as it bears on the principal question, which is whether or not the accused is the father of the child." 7 C. J. 995; 2 Ency. Ev. 252. See, also, Duhamell v. Ducette, 118 Mass. 569; Francis v. Rosa, 151 Mass. 532, 24 N. E. 1024; Ross v. People, 34 Ill. App. 21; Holcomb v. People, 79 Ill. 409. And, while the question does not seem to have been squarely raised in this state, that is the rule which has been followed by this court. See State v. Peoples, 9 N. D. 146, 148, 149, 82 N. W. 749; State v. Brandner, 21 N. D. 310, 316, 130 N. W. 941. In this case the defendant moved for a |