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offered to the jury as evidence of another fact which is the usual consequence or accompaniment of the former.

A few of the most useful and usual cases only will be selected as examples.

In case of an ancient recovery, accompanied by possession, it will be presumed, that the tenant to the præcipe was seised of the freehold, and such seisin need not be proved. Gilb. Ev. 27. So a deed, thirty years old, or upwards, is presumed to have been duly executed, provided some account be given of the deed, where found, &c. B. N. P. 255. An endowment of a vicarage may be presumed, from the long and continued possession of tithes and other profits. Crimes v. Smith, 12 Rep. 4.; and see Wolley v. Brownhill, M‘Clel. 332. A licence may be presumed; thus, where an inclosure having been made from a waste twelve or fourteen years, and seen by the steward of the lord from time to time, without objection made, it was left to the jury to say whether or not the inclosure was made by the lord's licence. Doe v. Wilson, 11 East, 56. Bridges v. Blanchard, 1 A. & E. 536. The existence of an immemorial custom may be presumed from an uncontradicted usage of twenty years. R. v. Joliffe, 2 B. & C. 54. Jenkins v. Harvey, 1 C. M. & R.877. The flowing of the tide is presumptive evidence of a public navigable river. Miles v. Rose, 5 Tuunt. 705. But the strength of this prima facie evidence depends upon the situation and nature of the channel; R. v. Montague, 4 B. & C. 602.; and long obstruction of the right of navigation may be presumptive evidence of its legal extinction. S. C. Id.

A letter is presumed to have been written on the day on which it is dated, as against the writer. Hunt v. Massey, 5 B. & Ad. 902. An entry in a merchant's book, purporting to be a copy of a letter addressed by him to his partner abroad, is evidence, as against the writer, that it was also sent. Sturge v. Buchanan, 10 A. & E. 598. So indorsements on a promissory note, admitting the receipt of interest, are presumed to have been made at the time they bear date. Smith v. Battens, 1 M. & Rob. 341. And a bill is presumed to be made on the day of its date; Owen v. Waters, 2 M. & W. 91.; except when used to prove a petitioning creditor's debt. Anderson v. Weston, 6 New Ca. 296. 301.

In many cases though the fact of actual knowledge cannot be proved, it will be presumed. Thus, where the rules of a club are contained in a book kept by the master of the club, every member of the club must be presumed to be acquainted with them. Raggett v. Musgrave, 2 C. & P. 556. Alderson v. Clay, 1 Stark. 405. Wiltzie v. Adamson, 1 Phill. Ev. 252. 6th ed.

Presumption of payment.] If a landlord gives a receipt for the rent last due, it is to be presumed that all former rent has been paid. Gilb. Ev. 157. Where a bill of exchange, negotiated after acceptance, is produced from the hands of the acceptor after it is due, the presumption is, that the acceptor has paid it; Gibbon v. Featherstonhaugh, 1 Stark. 225.; but not without proof of circulation after acceptance. Pfiel v. Vanbatenberg, 2 Camp. 439. Proof that the plaintiff and other workmen employed by the defendant came regularly to receive their wages from the defendant whose practice was to pay every week, and that the plaintiff had not been heard to complain of non-payment, is presumptive evidence of payment. Lucas v. Novosilieski,

1 Esp. 296. Sellen v. Norman, 4 C. & P. 80. So where the demand was for the proceeds of milk sold daily to customers by the defendant as agent to the plaintiff, and it appeared that the course of dealing was for the defendant to pay the plaintiff every day the money which she had received without any written voucher passing, it was ruled that it was to be presumed, that the defendant had in fact accounted, and that the onus of proving the contrary lay on the plaintiff. Evans v. Birch, 3 Camp. 10. So where goods have been consigned to a factor to sell on commission, it may be presumed, after a reasonable time [e. g. 14 years] has elapsed, that he has accounted, Topham v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 572. A debt, whether by simple contract or specialty, may be presumed to be satisfied from mere lapse of time. Thus a loan thirteen years ago may be presumed to be repaid where no evidence to the contrary is offered; Cooper v. Turner, 2 Stark. 497.; even where the Statute of Limitations is not insisted on. similar presumption arises in the case of a promissory note. Duffield v. Creed, 5 Esp. 52. This however has been since doubted; Du Belloir v. Waterford, 1 Dow. & Ry. 16. The mere production of a check drawn by the defendant on his banker, and payable to the plaintiff, with proof that he indorsed his name upon it, and that it has been paid, affords prima facie evidence of payment to him. Egg v. Barnett, 3 Esp. 196. Boswell v. Smith, 6 C. & P. 60. But it was ruled by Dallas, C. J., that the mere proof of a check being made payable to A., and of A. having received payment of it, is not evidence of the payment of money by the maker to A., for it might have been given to a third person, and by him to A. Lloyd v. Sandilands, Gow. 16.

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Although the limitation of actions on bonds is now provided for by stat. 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 42. (see post " Debt on Bond"), yet a reference to the former law will still be occasionally necessary. Payment of a bond is presumed after twenty years without demand made; Oswald v. Legh, 1 T. R. 270.; and even after the lapse of a less time, if other circumstances concur to fortify the presumption, as a settlement of accounts in the mean time. Ibid. Colsell v. Budd, 1 Camp. 27. The presumption may be rebutted by circumstances, as by the defendant's admission of the debt, or by proof of payment of interest within twenty years. So by proof that the defendant has resided abroad during the whole of the time; Newman v. Newman, 1 Stark. 101.; Elliott v. Elliott, 1 M. & Rob. 44. But proof of the defendant's poverty is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Willaume v. Gorges, 1 Camp. 217. See, however, Fladong v. Winter, 19 Ves. 196., and Hull v. Horner, Coup. 102., and the note to 3 M. & R. 118., where the origin of the doctrine of twenty years' presumption is discussed. Indorsements on the bond, made by the deceased obligee, acknowledging the receipt of interest within twenty years, have been admitted to rebut the presumption, provided there be evidence that such indorsements existed before the presumption of payment arose. Searle v. Lord Barrington, 2 Stra. 826.; Rose v. Bryant, 2 Camp. 322.; Gleadow v. Atkin, 1 C. & M. 421. It was held otherwise where the indorsement was made after the lapse of twenty years. Turner v. Crisp, 2 Stra. 827. Since Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Geo. 4. c. 14., indorsements of this kind are no longer sufficient to prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations, but they are still admissible to rebut the presumption of payment. An indorsement, made within twenty years, of the payment of interest within

twenty years, is sufficient to rebut the presumption, though the interest accrued beyond twenty years. Sanders v. Meredith, 3 M. & R. 116.

Presumption of property.] Proof of the possession of land, or of the receipt of rent from the person in possession, is primâ facie evidence of seisin in fee. See post in "Ejectment." The owner of the fee-simple is presumed to have a right to the minerals, but that presumption may be rebutted by absence of enjoyment, and user by persons not the owners of the soil. Rowe v. Grenfel, R. & M. 396. See Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 737. Payment of a small unvaried rent for a long series of years [e. g. 38] to the lord of a manor, raises the presumption that the rent is a quit rent, and not that the lord is entitled to the land. Doe v. Johnson, Gow. 173. In ejectment for a mine, a former recovery in trover for a parcel of lead dug out of it affords no evidence of the plaintiff's possession of the mine. B. N. P. 102. Possession of personal chattels is primâ facie evidence of property; see post in “ Assumpsit on Policy of Insurance. Proof of Interest." And see more as to the Presumption of Ownership, post "Trespass."

Presumption of grants, &c.] Before the late statute 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 71., for shortening the time of prescription, evidence of the adverse enjoyment of an easement (as of lights or a way) for twenty years or upwards, unexplained, was held to afford a presumption of a grant or other lawful title to enjoy it; Lewis v. Price, 2 Saund. 175. (n); Campbell v. Wilson, 3 East, 294. Where the defendant pleaded a right of way granted by a lost deed, and the plaintiff traversed the grant, and the judge directed the jury that if they thought the defendant had exercised the right of way uninterruptedly for more than twenty years by virtue of a deed, they would find for the defendant; but, if they thought there had been no way granted by deed, they would find for the plaintiff; it was held that this direction was right. Livett v. Wilson, 3 Bing. 115. post, “ Case for Disturbance of Way." The uninterrupted possession of a pew for thirty-six years affords a presumption of title. Rogers v. Brooks, cited 1 T. R. 431. (n). Twenty years' exclusive possession of a stream of water in any particular manner was held to afford a presumption of right in the party enjoying it, derived from a grant or act of parliament. Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 215. See Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & Ad. 1. Magor v. Chadwick, 11 A. & E. 571. Where it was proved, that the owners of a fishery and their lessees had for above twenty years publicly landed their nets on another's ground, and had occasionally repaired the landing-places, it was held that it was properly left to the jury to presume a grant of the right of landing nets to the owners of the fishery. Gray v. Bond, 2 B. & B. 667. In order, however, to establish the presumption of a grant of a way, it must appear that the possession was with the acquiescence of him who was seised of an estate of inheritance; for a tenant for life or years has no power to grant such right; Bright v. Walker, 1 C. M. & R. 219.; Daniel v. North, 11 East, 372. ; Barker v. Richardson, 4 B. & A. 579.; but, if the easement existed previously to the commencement of the tenancy, the fact of the premises having been for a long time in the possession of a tenant will not defeat the presumption of a grant. Cross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686. post, p. 24. The above act for shortening prescription enacts, sec. 6., that in the cases provided for by that act (that is, in

cases of easements and profits a prender), no presumption shall be made in support of a claim on proof of enjoyment for a less period than the number of years specified in the act.

It has been doubted whether the enjoyment of a sawpit and timberyard for twenty years will establish a right to prevent a neighbour from intercepting the light and air. Roberts v. Macord, 1 M. & Rob. 230. See Gale and Whatley on Easements, 195—7.

Charters and grants from the Crown may be presumed from great length of possession (as, for instance, 100 years), not merely in suits between private parties, but even against the Crown itself, if the Crown were capable of making the grant. Mayor of Kingston v. Horner, Cowp. 102.; Jenkins v. Harvey, 1 C. M. & R. 877. Even where there is no person competent to make an indefeasible grant, an act of parliament may be presumed in favour of long user. Lopez v. Andrew, 3 M. & R.329. (n). But it has been said that “no judge would venture to direct a jury that they could affirm the passing of an act of parliament within the last 250 years on an important subject of general interest, of which no vestige can be found on the parliament roll, or other records, or in the history of the country:" and the court accordingly refused to presume any act sanctioning a mode of nominating by the Crown to a deanery which was shown to have begun in the sixteenth century, and to have continued without interruption for the last 250 years. R. v. The Chapter of St. Peter's Exeter, 12 A. & E. 512. See cases of presumption arising from long possession mentioned, arguendo, in Tenny v. Jones, 10 Bing. 78.; and post, tit.“ Ejectment." Where the origin of the possession is accounted for without the aid of grant or conveyance, and is consistent with the fact of there having been no conveyance, it is a question for the jury whether, in fact, any conveyance has actually been executed. Doe v. Reed, 5 B. & A. 232. And where there is no evidence of the right except mere user without any trace of the commencement of it, then there is no ground for presuming any specific grant; but it is evidence of a title by prescription. Blewett v. Tregon ning, 3 A. & E. 554.

The mere possession of a lease by the lessor, with the seals cut off, affords no presumption of a surrender by a written instrument according to the Statute of Frauds. Doe v. Thomas, 9 B. & C. 288.

Presumption of dedication of way to the public.] If the owner of the soil throws open a passage, and neither marks by any visible distinction that he means to preserve all his rights over it, nor excludes persons from passing over it by positive prohibition, he shall be presumed to have dedicated it to the public; per Lord Ellenborough, R. v. Lloyd, 1 Camp. 262.; but proof of a bar having been placed across the street, soon after the houses which form the street were finished, will rebut the presumption of dedication, though the bar was soon afterwards knocked down, since which period the way has been used as a thoroughfare. Roberts v. Karr, 2 Camp. 262. (n). The question of dedication depends upon the time and nature of the enjoyment of the passage over the land; therefore, where the plaintiff erected a street leading out of a highway across his own close and terminating at the edge of the defendant's adjoining close, which was separated by the defendant's fence from the end of the street, for twenty-one years (during nineteen of which the houses were completed, and the street

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publicly watched, cleansed, and lighted, and both footways, and half the horseway, paved at the expense of the inhabitants), it was held, that this street was not to be presumed to be so dedicated to the public, as that the defendant, pulling down his own wall, might enter it at the end adjoining to his land, and use it as a highway. Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125. It seems that there may be a limited dedication of a highway to the public; as a way excluding carriages, &c. Marquis of Stafford v. Coyney, 7 B. & C. 257. Trustees in whom land is vested for public purposes may lawfully dedicate the surface of it to the use of the public as a highway, if such use be not inconsistent with the purposes of their trust. R. v. Leake, 5 B. & Ad. 469. Accord. Surrey Canal Company v. Hall, 1 M. & G. 392. If a person opens his land, so that the public pass over it continually, they will, after a very few years, be entitled to pass over it and use it as a way; and if the owner does not mean to dedicate it as a way, but only to give a licence, he should do some act to show that he gives a licence only. Trustees of British Museum v. Furness, 5 C. & P. 460. It has been held in one case, that six years are sufficient to found the presumption of dedication; Trustees of Rugby Charity v. Merryweather, 11 East, 376. (n); and where the locus in quo had been in lease for a long term up to the year 1780, and from that year till the year 1788 the public were permitted to have the free use of it as a way, Lord Kenyon held it to be sufficient time for presuming a dedication. S. C. Ibid. Whether there be a dedication, or not, is always a question of intention, and may be disproved by the acts of the owner, or the circumstances under which the user has been permitted. Barraclough v. Johnson, 8 A. & E. 99. If the land is in the possession of a tenant, such tenant cannot dedicate it to the public, so as to bind the owner of the fee. Wood v. Veal, 5 B. & A. 454. But after a long lapse of time, and a frequent change of tenants, Lord Ellenborough said, that, from the notorious and uninterrupted use of a way by the public, he should presume that the landlord had notice of the way being used, and that it was so used with his concurrence. R. v. Barr, 4 Camp. 16. Antè, p. 22. Where a public footway over Crown land was extinguished by an inclosure act, but for twenty years after the inclosure took place the public had continued to use the way, it was ruled that this user was no evidence of a dedication to the public, as it did not appear to have been with the knowledge of the Crown. Harper v. Charlesworth, 4 B. &C. 574. And quære, if such dedication can be presumed against the Crown?

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Since the last Highway Act, 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 50. s. 23., a way can no longer be dedicated so as to make the parish liable to repairs, unless certain formalities therein pointed out have been complied with. But the act is not retrospective; R. v. Westmark, 2 M. & Rob. 305. it seems that, notwithstanding this act, and the stat. 43 G. 3. c. 59. s. 5. as to the dedicating of bridges, such dedication may still be made, though the parish or county will not be liable to repairs. Surrey Canal Company v. Hall, 1 M. & G. 392.

Presumption of the duration for life.] As to persons of whom no account can be given, the presumption of the duration of life ends at the expiration of seven years from the time when they were last known to be living. Per Lord Ellenborough, Doe v. Jesson, 6 East, 84.; Doe

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