but they did so in the belief that the estate was sufficient to discharge both, and that on a criminal indictment they had been found "not guilty," having in truth no object to gain or advantage to obtain, would that fact have paralysed the arm of equity, and would it have exonerated them from the consequence of having innocently said what was false? Certainly not. This is a somewhat similar case. Here the directors were not only bound to know the state of the concern, but they did actually know it, and they suppressed the fact. They did so innocently, in this sense, that they did not gain and that they did not seek to gain any advantage to themselves by such concealment; but they were, nevertheless, highly culpable in a moral point of view, although the act was not one cognisable in a Court of criminal procedure, and was not one which by the English law (and I think very properly), is treated as a crime. But the equitable jurisdiction and the consequences remain untouched, and I should, in my opinion, be acting improperly if I were to give costs to persons who, in my judgment, have by their misconduct occasioned the calamities caused by the failure of Overend, Gurney & Co., even though the calamity has, to some extent, fallen upon themselves. The bill will be dismissed without costs. This was a motion on the part of trustees of a building society, which was also a bank for deposits at interest, for an injunction to restrain, until an action for libel could be brought in a Court of law, the printing, publication, sale or advertisement of a book, or certain paragraphs therein, which were alleged by the bill to be untrue and libellous, and likely to affect the credit and stability of the society. It appeared that the author of the book had impugned and reflected upon the principles of the calculations on which building societies generally were based. In doing that he had singled out the name of the plaintiff society, whose rules had been duly certified by the late Mr. Tidd Pratt, the barrister appointed to certify the rules of such societies. The bill also prayed that all copies of the book now in the defendant's possession might be destroyed, and for damages. Mr. E. K. Karslake and Mr. Hemings, for the plaintiffs, contended that to the society its reputation was property, and that the Court had jurisdiction in such a case Springhead Spinning Company v. They also referred to Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Lyrd Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29; publication of a libel. Lord Ellenborough's dictum in Dubost v. Beresford (1) that an injunction would be granted against the exhibition of a libellous picture had been disapproved by Lord Campbell in the case of the Emperor of Austria v. Day (ubi supra), and was inconsistent with the dictum of Lord Eldon in the case of Gee v. Pritchard (ubi supra), with that of Lord Langdale in Clark v. Freeman (ubi supra), with that of Sir L. Shadwell in Martin v. Wright (2), and lastly, it seemed inconsistent with what might be clearly discovered to have been Lord Cottenham's opinion in Fleming v. Newton (3), which opinion was there supported by very strong reasons. The decision in Dixon v. Holden (ubi supra) had introduced a rule which, if not contrary to the previous decisions of the Court, was a material qualification of it. It was laid down in that case that the Court will restrain the publication of a libel where it affects property or the potentiality of acquiring property, at least where professional or commercial interests are concerned, and even that any man who is libelled may have an injunction against the publication if not published, or the continuance of the sale, if it has been published. It was not for him to say that the rule so laid down was erroneous; but he thought it was wholly new, and that nothing what ever was said in the case of the Emperor of Austria v. Day (ubi supra), nor in any other case, except possibly in the peculiar and very different case of Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley (ubi supra), which supported it in any way. But Dixon v. Holden (ubi supra) was a very strong case. It turned upon what the Court considered an advertisement of an absolutely false statement, calculated to injure a merchant carrying on a large business, and which emanated from a discharged solicitor, who had probably acquired his knowledge of the facts while in the employment of the firm, and who appeared to be actuated by no motive but a malicious one. (1) 2 Campb. 511. NEW SERIES, 41.-CHANC. In the present case he did not feel himself called on to express an opinion whether the calculations adopted by the defendant, the author of the book, were true or false; he thought the author would have acted more wisely, and indeed better in every way, if he had not mentioned the name of the plaintiff's society," but his remarks were condemnatory rather of principles and theories than of anything in the conduct of this society, and there did not appear to have been any malice on the part of the author. He should not express any opinion as to his liability to damages at law. But the defendant seemed to have selected the plaintiffs' society, partly because of its size, partly from his access to its balance-sheets, and partly and principally on account of his extreme dissent on scientific grounds from the manager's evidence before the commissioners on friendly societies. That evidence was publici juris, and the defendant, the author, had a perfect right to criticize it. Lastly, he could not help doubting whether the position of a society like this was precisely analogous to that of an association in trade; a building society. was an arrangement for bringing together borrowers and lenders, to the material profit of both, and though this society carried on business as bankers, there might be some question whether this could be considered as trading for a purpose like the present. But however that might be, and assuming every word in Dixon v. Holden (ubi supra) to be absolutely correct, the Court must have some discretion in a case like this, and in exercising this discretion he ought to take into consideration the conviction he felt that there was no malice. If he granted the injunction, he would do more against the liberty of unlicensed printing, or, as it is correctly called, the liberty of the press, than had ever been done in any decided case, in this century at any rate; this he was not prepared to do, and therefore he refused the motion. Solicitors-Mr. J. P. Poncione, for plaintiff; Messrs. Ashurst, Morris & Co., for defendant. 30 On the 21st of December, 1852, Thomas Pocknall effected an insurance on his life with the defendant company for the sum of 1001., the annual premium being 21. 88. 3d., and the number of the policy being 6,121. On the 20th of October, 1863, the said T. Pocknall deposited this policy, and also another numbered 15,163, with the plaintiff as security for the sum of 150l. owing from him to the plaintiff on two promissory notes. In 1865 T. Pocknall became bankrupt, and the defendant T. Liddle was appointed his assignee. At the time of the bankruptcy the policies were still in the hands of the plaintiff, and the sum of 250l. was owing to him from T. Pocknall on the security of them. The plaintiff was not at the time aware of Pocknall's bankruptcy. No formal notice of it was ever served on him or on the insurance office. He never proved under the bankruptcy for his debt. However, at Pocknall's request, he paid the premium on the policy No. 6,121 in December, 1865, and shortly afterwards he and Pocknall surrendered the other policy to the office, the price of the surrender being paid to him. T. Pocknall paid the other premiums on the policy, No. 6,121, which became due during his life, and died in July, 1870, appointing his wife his executrix. She proved his will, and acting with the assignee in bankruptcy of T. Pocknall, she refused to admit the plaintiff's title to the proceeds of the policy. Thereupon this suit was instituted, and in the course of it the company paid the sum assured into Court, and the bill was dismissed as against them. Before the litigation commenced the plaintiff offered to pay Mrs. Pocknall 201. if she would concur in the payment to him of the money payable under the policy, but she refused this offer. The amount of the debt remaining due to the plaintiff very much exceeded the proceeds of the policy. Mr. Methold, for the plaintiff.-The defendants' claim to the whole proceeds of the policy is absurd. It was pledged to us at the time of the bankruptcy, and nothing has been done to release it from our debt. At the most, they can only claim the amount of the premiums paid by Pocknall. But these payments must be considered as having been made in performance of the promise to keep up the policy given to us on making the deposit. Although all liability under that promise may have been barred by the bankruptcy, its moral existence would be sufficient to give us the benefit of these payments. At the most, the payments were voluntarily made for our benefit, and even then they could not be in any way reclaimed. Mr. E. S. Ford, for the defendants.— Pocknall being under no obligation to pay these premiums, and having an interest in the policy subject to the payment of the plaintiff's debt and his other creditors, the payments must be taken to be of the nature of salvage money, and must form a first charge on the policy. Mr. Methold, in reply, cited the following cases Burridge v. Row, 1 You. & C.C.C. 183; s. c. 13 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 173; Clack v. Holland, 19 Beav. 262; s. c. 24 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 13; Norris v. Caledonian Insurance Company, 38 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 721; s. c. Law Rep. 8 Eq. 127. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS expressed his opinion that the premiums paid by Pocknall after his bankruptcy were of the nature of salvage money, and that by each payment he acquired a lien on the policy for the amount of it, together with simple The proper de interest at 41. per cent. cree to make would therefore be to take an account of the sums so paid, declare the lien, and reserve costs; because if it appeared that the amount of the lien did not exceed 201., the sum offered by the plaintiff, the defendants would be ordered to pay the costs of the suit. Mr. Methold pointed out that the amount of the premiums, with interest, would certainly fall short of 201., and it was then arranged to take an order for payment of the sum in Court to the plaintiff, and give no costs. A banker with whom a contributory has formerly kept an account, may be summoned under s. 115 of the Companies Act, 1862, and compelled to produce his books relating to the contributory's account, and to give all information in his power touching his affairs. This Company was in liquidation. Mr. Forbes was the holder of twenty-five shares in it, and owed calls to the extent of 80l. per share. He had left the country, and in March, 1872, an order was made for substituted service upon him at the Charing Cross branch of the Union Bank, where it appeared that he kept an account. This service was effected, and the manager of that establishment was now summoned to produce the books relating to Mr. Forbes's account, and to give evidence on the matter. He thereupon filed an affidavit stating that the notice served had been forwarded to Mr. Forbes, and that shortly afterwards his solicitor called and offered to pay the Bank what was due to them, and required them to deliver up the securities they held, and to close Mr. Forbes's account, with which, acting on the advice of counsel, they complied. He submitted that he could not be called upon to give any further evidence. Sir R. Baggallay, for the official liquidator, cited Re The Financial Assurance Company, Bloxam's Case, 36 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 687; where the managing clerk of a bank at which a contributory had an account was held liable to be summoned. Re Smith, Knight & Co. Law Rep. 4 where the bankers of a person who supplied a shareholder with money were ordered to attend ; Re the Bank of Hindustan, China and Eq. 675; where the sister and nephew of a contributory were summoned and held bound to answer, although there were no facts proved except the relationship; Re The Bank of Hindustan, China and where the mother-in-law of a contributory was compelled to give information; and Re The London Gas Meter Company, Webber's Case, 41 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 145. Mr. Southgate and Mr. Everitt, for the bank, pointed out that the present case was not covered by any of those cited. The bank of course had no interest in the matter, but it had been held that a banker was liable to an action if he disclosed matters relating to his customers' accounts. They therefore did not like to produce their books except under the order of the Court Foster v. Bank of London, 3 F. & F. Re Contract Corporation, 40 Law J. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the witness must attend and produce the books relating to Mr. Forbes's affairs, and give all the information in his power touching Mr. Forbes's property, and the securities furnished by him to the bank. He thought the Bank were justified in requiring the matter to be brought before the Court, and he should give no costs. The liquidator would have his costs out of the estate. Solicitors-Messrs. Linklaters & Co., for official liquidator; Messrs. Davies, Campbell & Reeves, for respondents. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that any person who was indebted to a contributory might be summoned under section 115 of the Companies Act, 1862, and compelled to give all the information he could respecting the means of the contributory. He would not compel the witnesses to pay costs in this case, but considering the rule to be now established, he should in future give costs against recalcitrant witnesses. LORD ROMILLY, M.R. 1872. May 2. Re THE LAND CREDIT COMPANY OF IRELAND; TROWER & LAWSON'S CASE. Companies Act, 1862, s. 115-Witness -Contributory-Debtor-Costs. Any person indebted to a contributory in a company may be summoned under s. 115 of the Companies Act, 1862, and compelled to produce his books relating to his dealings with the contributory, and give information respecting the means of the contributory. Messrs. Trower & Lawson were summoned to attend for examination in the winding up of the above-named company. They were in partnership as wine merchants, and admitted that H. Trower, a brother of the first-named witness and a contributory of the company, had formerly been in partnership with them, but stated that he had left the firm and now resided abroad. They objected to produce the ledger, the cash book and the cheque book of the firm ; but admitted that there was a sum due to H. Trower from the firm. Mr. Southgate and Mr. H. M. Jackson, for the official liquidator, asked that Messrs. Trower & Lawson might be ordered to attend for examination and produce the books. They referred to Forbes's Case (supra p. 467) decided by his Lordship the preceding week. Sir R. Baggallay and Mr. Merewether, for the witnesses. ... A testator by his will devised his real estate (subject to certain charges) in strict settlement, and gave all his "railway, canal and navigation shares. and personal estate" to C., his executor, upon trust, to pay his debts and legacies, and gave his “residuary personal estate and effects" to M. Testator was possessed of two navigation shares, which by the Act creating them were made of the nature of real estate. Before testator's death, the undertaking to which these shares belonged became vested in a railway company, by an Act which provided for the extinguishment of the freehold rights in the shares, upon their conveyance to the railway company. Testator's shares were never conveyed to the railway company, but Held, that by the railway company's Act, or if not by his will, they were converted into personal estate, and went to the residuary legatee under the gift of his "personal estate and effects." This was a Special Case. William Carr, by his will, dated the 7th of June, 1862, devised his residuary real estate (subject to certain annuities thereby charged thereon), to William Cadman, |