by persons residing outside of the Confederate lines and adhering to the National Government, so long as no intercourse or connection is kept up with the inhabitants of the enemy's country. As stated in the case from which we have cited, it was commercial intercourse and correspondence between citizens of one belligerent and the other, and the engagement in traffic between them, leading to the transmission of money or property from one belligerent country to the other, which was forbidden. "There was, therefore, nothing in the sale of the cotton on the plantations or of cotton to be raised thereon, there being no agreement respecting its movement across the border of the contending sections, which brought the transaction within the prohibitions of any rule of international law or the proclamations of the President. of the United States in 1861. (12 Stat. 257, 1262; 13 Stat. 731.) "Those who may desire to examine the decisions of the courts as to the nature and extent of the prohibitions upon transactions beeween subjects of countries at war, or between subjects of the same country respecting property situated in the enemy's country, will find in the opinion of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, in Kershaw . Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, the subject ably and exhaustively considered, with an analysis of the most important decisions of the English and American courts." Briggs . United States (1892), 143 U. S. 346, 351, 353. In April, 1862, during the civil war in the United States, Charles S. Morehead, a citizen of Kentucky, by a bill of sale sold to C. M. Briggs, a citizen of the same State, the cotton to be grown during that year on two plantations belonging to the former in Mississippi. It having been determined that the transaction was not invalid as a case of trading between enemies, the question arose whether the sale was sufficient to pass title to the cotton, existing or to be raised. The court said: "The delivery of the crops was not essential to pass the title as between Morehead and Briggs. The law on the subject of the sale of personal property does not require impossibilities, as would be a delivery in a case of that kind. The cotton was not at the time grown, and even if the sale be deemed incomplete until the actual appearance of the crop, it could not then be removed from the soil for delivery; besides, it was within the limits of a recognized enemy's country, and any attempt to transport it to the Union side for delivery would have been unlawful. "By the common law a sale of personal property is complete and the title passes as between vendor and vendee when the terms of transfer are agreed upon, without actual delivery." Briggs v. United States (1892), 143 U. S. 346, 354. The act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. 589), to suppress insurrection and for other purposes, had no effect on sales or transfers of the estate and property of persons in rebellion after September 23, 1862, except as against the United States. As against that Government, the transfers of property liable to seizure were null and void, but they were not void as between private parties or against any other party than the United States. Williams r. Paine (1897), 169 U. S. 55, 75. It is within the power of a citizen within the United States lines to give to an enemy within the enemy's lines an evidence of debt which shall be valid on the return of peace. Hart v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 414. In 1862, A, domiciled in Athens, Ala., agreed to sell B, of Nashville, Tenn., a plantation, with the personal property thereon, situated in Tennessee. At the time of the agreement of sale, Athens, Nashville, and the plantation were all within the lines of the military forces of the United States. At the time the deed was made Athens and the plantation were within the Confederate lines, as was the place of B's residence at the time. Held, that neither contract nor deed was invalid. Brown . Gardner, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 145. A contract made in 1862 by a county court within the Confederate lines, and under the control of the government of Virginia at Richmond, is valid and binding on such county (now forming a part of the State of West Virginia), where such contract was made under the Virginia statute of May 9, 1862, authorizing counties to purchase salt to be disposed of to the people, and the salt was actually delivered. Stuart, Buchanan & Co. r. County of Greenbrier, 16 W. Va. 95. Contracts made by prisoners of war in the enemy's country for the purpose of obtaining subsistence are binding. Crawford v. The William Penn, 3 Wash. C. C. 484. (2) SUSPENSION OR DISSOLUTION OF CONTRACTS. § 1137. The effect of war is to dissolve a partnership between citizens of hostile nations. The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377. See, also, Griswold r. Waddington (1819), 16 Johns, 438. As to exceptions, see Matthews r. McStea (1875), 91 U. S. 7. A transfer of property to a creditor by an enemy debtor, though made to an agent of the creditor and in payment of a debt contracted before the war, is void, and can not be made lawful by any ratification. United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. 72. A sale of real estate during the rebellion, under a power in a deed of trust previously given to secure the payment of promissory notes of the grantors in the deed, is valid, though said grantors at the time of the sale were citizens and residents of one of the States declared to be in insurrection. University . Finch, 18 Wall. 106. In May, 1859, Lieutenant R., of the United States Army, who was then stationed at Carlisle Barracks, in Pennsylvania, and his wife, executed a power of attorney to the latter's brother to convey their interest in certain lands in the city of Washington, D. C. After the civil war broke out, R., who was a native of North Carolina, resigned his commission and entered the Confederate service. His wife accompanied him to the South. Her brother remained with the United States Army, of which he was an officer. During the war the lands were sold and a deed for them was given by him under the power of attorney. The purchase money was duly paid and the share of Mrs. R. was paid over to her while she was within the lines of the Southern army with her husband. Some years afterwards, after the death of R. and his wife, a bill was filed by their children to have the deed executed by Mrs. R.'s brother under the power of attorney declared null and void as a cloud upon the title of the complainants in the property. In support of this petition is was argued, among other things, that the power of attorney was revoked by the war which existed between the sections in which the principals and the agent, respectively, lived. It was held, however, that the war did not revoke the power of attorney. War did not, said the court, necessarily revoke every agency existing between inhabitants of the contending countries. Certain kinds of agencies were undoubtedly revoked by the breaking out of hostilities. It had been held that the agent of an insurance company came within the rule (Insurance Company v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, 429); and Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion in that case, had said that, in order that the agency might subsist during the war, it must have the assent of the parties. This remark was made with reference to the case. then before the court in which the agent of a New York company, who resided in Virginia, entered the Confederate service and thereafter refused to receive premiums, on the ground that he had no receipts from the company, and that the money, if received by him, would be confiscated by the Confederate government. A claim was subsequently made for the insurance, on the ground that the insured was guilty of no laches and that at the close of the war the policy revived. The court held that the agency was revoked by the war, since its continuance would have involved an active and continuous business of such a nature that it could not be carried on during the war, where the principal and the agent resided in different belligerent countries. The general subject of contracts and business between the citizens of States at war was examined with great care in Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Massachusetts, 561, by Mr. Justice Gray, who held that, while the law of nations prohibited all contracts involving intercourse between citizens of the two belligerents, the prohibition would not be carried further, and that the court was not disposed to declare unlawful contracts such as had not previously been adjudged to be inconsistent with a state of war. The Supreme Court thought that the power of attorney in the present case was not revoked by the war, and that, as it was manifestly the interest of the principal that the agency constituted before the war should continue, his assent to its continuance would be presumed. And the act of the agent was ratified by the receipt by the principal of the money obtained by the sale. Williams v. Paine (1897), 169 U. S. 55; opinion by Mr. Justice Peckham. During the war, a sale of land within the Union lines was made under a deed of trust given before the war to secure the payment of a debt. The grantor, at the time of the sale, was a resident within the Confederate lines. Held, that the sale was valid. Mitchell v. Nodaway County, 80 Mo. 257. With regard to life insurance contracts, it was held that, as the companies elected to insist upon the conditions of time as to the payment of premiums, the payment of which had been prevented by the existence of war, the policies must be considered as extinguished by nonpayment of the premiums, but that the insured were entitled ex æquo et bono to recover the equitable value of the policies, with interest from the close of the war. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham (1876), 93 U. S. 24. See Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1871), 13 Wall. 158; New York Life (3) CESSATION OF INTEREST. § 1138. Interest did not run during war on a mortgage debt due by an inhabitant of the United States to a British subject. The reporter in a note states that this had been the uniform holding in the courts of Pennsylvania. Hoare v. Allen, Supreme Court of Pa., 1789, 2 Dall. 102. This principle was affirmed in the case of Foxcraft and Galloway r. Nagle, Supreme Court of Pa., 1791, 2 Dall. 132. See, to the same effect, Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177. See Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 4313. There should be no abatement of interest on a judgment during the war, the counties in which the plaintiff and defendant respectively lived being judicially known not to be in territories which were hostile to one another. Kent, Paine & Co. v. Chapman, 18 W. Va. 485. 3. JUDICIAL REMEDIES. (1) SUSPENSION AND REVIVAL. § 1139. An alien enemy is not permitted to sue. Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dall. 69; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U. S. 7; Sanderson v. Morgan, 39 N. Y. 231; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124; Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137; Grinnan v. Edwads, 21 W. Va. 347; Haymond v. Camden, 22 W. Va. 180; Sturm . Flemming, 22 W. Va. 404; Stephens v. Brown, 24 W. Va. 234. This rule obviously does not operate as to alien enemies who are by treaty permitted to continue their residence and business, on condition of observing the laws. The existence of war does not prevent the citizens of one belligerent power from taking proceedings for the protection of their own property, in their own courts, against the citizens of the other, whenever the latter can be reached by process; and where an alien enemy is thus sued, he may defend himself in the action. McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259; United States v. Shares of The right to sue revives after peace. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; Stiles v. Eastley, 51 Ill. 275. See, also, Citizens of the loyal States were not prevented from suing citizens of the Confederate States in the Federal courts in those States as soon as such courts were opened. Before any official proclamation of the end of the civil war was made courts of the United States were held in the several States which had been engaged in rebellion, and their |