mine foreman shall be the agent of the operator. Recurring to the contract, we ascertain that it provides the mine foreman shall have control of the work, and the contractor and all his employees shall be subject to his orders and directions. It will thus be seen that the contract specifically provides for the control of the means of performance by the mine foreman. that the manner of doing the work shall be to the satisfaction of the manager, that the defendant shall have the right to suspend or terminate the work without notice to the contractor, with the right to remove from the work any workmen who in the opinion of its manager are incompetent, careless, or for any other reason unsatisfactory, and that the interpretation of the contract with reference to the work shall be by the manager whose decision shall be conclusive. It is therefore manifest that through the manager and mine foreman full control over the means and manner of performance was reserved to defendant, and there was left in the contractor no independence in manner and means of performance whatever. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the relation of the deceased to the defendant was that of employee, and not independent contractor. In so holding and awarding compensation to his widow, the court below was right. The judgment is affirmed. TOLAN v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION BOARD'S FINDINGS AS TO NATURE OF PRIVATE ROAD, ETC., NOT DISTURBED. It is not within the province of the court to disturb the compensation board's findings of fact that a private road was a means of carrying on the business of an employer and an instrumentality used by it in the conduct of its business and as such a part of the company's premises, and that an injury sustained thereon by an employee was by accident in the course of his employment and caused by the condition of the employer's premises. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County; H. C. Bechtel. Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Edward Tolan for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company. Compensation was awarded and the award affirmed by the. court of common pleas, and the employer appeals. Award affirmed. and appeal dismissed. The following is the opinion of Bechtel, P. J.. in the court below: It will be noted that this case was decided prior to the passage of the act of 1919 (Act June 26, 1919 [P. L. d. 642; Pa. St. 1920, § 21993 L. p. 736; Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.]). The claimant was injured it seq.]) amending the Compensation Law of 1915' (Act June 2, 1915 [P. in attempting to reach his place of work on the morning in question while traversing a private road leading into the workings of the defend ant company, which said private road was used by the defendant company for the purpose of transporting materials to and from the colliery, by the public in hauling coal therefrom and by the workmen in going to and from the colliery. This has been the case for many years. Among the findings of fact of the Compensation Board. in the fourth finding of fact the following appears: "This road is a means of carrying on the business and activities of the coal operations of the defendant company and is an instrumentality used by it in the conduct of its business and in furtherance of its affairs and as such is part of the premises of the defendant company." The sixth finding of fact is as follows: "The injury sustained by the claimant was by accident in the course of his employment and was caused by the condition of the defendant's premises, the claimant's presence thereon being required by the nature of his employment." If these findings of fact are correct, the conclusions of law reached by the Board naturally follow. It is not our province to disturb them. We have considered carefully the opinion of the referee and the opinion of the Board in support of its findings. This opinion has carefully considered the case, and its conclusions are amply supported by authorities cited therein. We do not feel that we could profitably add anything thereto. And now, February 2, 1920, the conclusion of the Board in this case is hereby affirmed. Argued before Frazer, Walling. Simpson. Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. John F. Whalen. of Pottsville, for appellant. Roger J. Dever, of Wilkes-Barre. for appellee. PER CURIAM. The testimony in this case is competent and clearly supports the conclusion reached by the Workmen's Compensation Board that an award should be made in favor of the plaintiff. The award is affirmed and the appeal dismissed on the opinion of the learned court below. HUTNO v. LEHIGH COAL & NAVIGATION CO. - MASTER AND SERVANT INJURY WHILE VOLUNTARILY DRIVING IN PARADE ON HOLIDAY WITHOUT PAY HELD NOT COMPENSABLE. Where decedent was driving a team in a parade in honor of employees who had enlisted in the military service as his voluntary act and his individual contribution towards the parade, and it was not held during working hours and he was not under pay at the time, compensation for his death from falling under the wheels of his wagon was properly disallowed. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County; Richard H. Koch, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, $21916 et seq.) by Katie Hutno for compensation for the death of her husband. Frank Hutno, opposed by the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company, employer. Compensation was denied by the court of common pleas, and the claimant appeals. Appeal dismissed. The parade mentioned in the opinion was held about 6 p. m. in honor of employees of the coal and navigation company who had enlisted in the military service and were about to leave for an army camp. Deceased was a stable helper and teamster in defendant's employ, and while driving a team in the parade. the clutch, holding his seat, slipped and he fell to the ground, where wheels of the wagon passed over him, fatally injuring him. Argued before Frazer, Walling, Simpson. Sadler, and Schaffer. JJ. PER CURIAM. The competent evidence produced at the hearing clearly warrants the findings of the Compensation Board that "at the time of the parade deceased was driving a team of mules belonging to defendant, as his voluntary act and as his individual contribution toward the parade," and that "the parade was not held during the working hours of the deceased and he was not under pay of the defendant at that time." The disallowance of compensation was therefore not error. The appeal is dismissed. YODIS v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 7, 1921.) 113 Atlantic Reporter, 73. MASTER AND SERVANT EVIDENCE IN COMPENSATION CASE HELD TO SHOW DEATH FROM HEMORRHAGE WAS In workmen's compensation proceedings for death of an employee caused by hemorrhage of the brain, evidence held to sustain finding of Compensation Board that death resulted from hemorrhage of the brain, caused by blow from dump wagon used in the course of his employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant. Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County; H. C. Bechtel, Judge. Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act (June 2, 1915 [P. L. 736]), by Augustina Yodis for compensation for death of her husband, opposed by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, employer. Award of Compensation Board for claimant was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and employer appeals. Affirmed. The following is the opinion of Bechtel, P. J., in the court below: This case comes before us on an appeal from the judgment of the Compensation Board. While a number of exceptions have been filed, they raise but one question. and that is the correctness of the findings of fact of the board. It has been held in cases such as this that the question before the court is whether or not there was any competent evidence before the board upon which the findings of fact were based. We have gone over the evidence in this case very carefully. The claimant was assisting in pushing a dump wagon, and when he and the party whom he was assisting were dumping the buggy, the buggy went back and hit the claimant on the head. The claimant went back a little bit, and then sat awhile by the buggy, and got up and again attempted to help to push the buggy but was unable to do so and became unconscious. He was taken to his home. from there to the hospital, at which place he died, without ever regaining consciousness. The only eyewitness was the party whom he was assisting in pushing the buggy, who testified to the buggy's hitting him on the head. He died as the result of a rupture of an artery in the brain, which caused a hemorrhage of the brain, producing paralysis and unconsciousness. Defendant claims that he died as the result of a stroke of apoplexy. and that he suffered from arteriosclerosis. All of the doctors, however, seem to agree that the condition of the arteries was not such as that the apoplexy would have resulted without some exciting or inducing cause. The majority of them, if not all, agree that a blow, such as described by the witness. might be the inducing cause which would produce the apoplexy. The defendant argues at great length that the blow which the deceased received did not cause the hemorrhage of the brain, for the reason that the physicians testified to the finding of a recent scar on the head over the place where the hemorrhage was found in the brain, but that in their judgment it was improbable that the wound should have healed to the extent that it had at the time of his death, if it had been the result of the blow upon the head received from the buggy. There is nothing that we have found in the evidence, however. to show that this scar, or the wound that made the scar, was the cause of the hemorrhage of the brain. That seems to have been assumed by counsel rather than proven in the case. We do not know, nor does the evidence disclose, what force would be necessary, in a blow such as this, to produce a hemorrhage of the brain. There is one thing that seems to be proven, however, beyond any question, and that is that the deceased had been working prior to this time without any evidence whatever of any discomfort or illness; that he assisted in the pushing of the buggy; that he received a blow upon the head, after which he immediately became ill, and in a short time lapsed into unconsciousness, from which he never rallied. Under the evidence in this case, we feel that the board was justified in making the findings which it did, and that there was sufficient legal, competent evidence to sustain their findings. And now, April 19, 1920, the finding of the board is hereby affirmed, exceptions thereto are herewith dismissed, and judgment is directed to be entered in favor of the plaintiff claimant against the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, defendant, for the sum of $2,500. Counsel for defendant excepts and bill sealed. Argued before Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Sadler, and Schaffer. JJ. John F. Whalen, of Pottsville, for appellant. Roger J. Dever, of Wilkes-Barre, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We have examined the testimony offered before the referee and commission, and find it competent and sufficient to sustain the finding of the referee and the compensation board. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. on the opinion of Judge Bechtel. ZUKOWSKY v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 21, 1921.) 113 Atlantic Reporter, 62. MASTER AND SERVANT FINDING OF COMPENSABLE INJURY FROM STRAIN CAUSING FATAL HEMORRHAGE SUSTAINED. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.) to obtain compensation for the death of a servant, a finding that decedent, while in the performance of his duties, met with an accident in attempting to lift a brake stick, and thereby suffered such strain internally as to cause hemorrhages of the stomach and bowels that his death followed as a natural consequence thereof, held sustained by the evidence. (For other cases, see Master and Servant. Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County, Charles E. Berger, Judge. Proceeding by Emily Zukowsky. under the Workmen's Compensation Act, to obtain compensation for the death of her husband, opposed by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company. the employer. From an award in plaintiff's favor, affirmed by the court of common pleas, the employer appeals. Award confirmed, and appeal dismissed. Argued before Frazer, Walling, Simpson. Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. John F. Whalen. of Pottsville, for appellant. Roger J. Dever, of Wilkes-Barre, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals from an award in plaintiff's favor by the Workmen's Compensation Board and affirmed by the court of common pleas of Schuylkill county. On August 7, 1919, the husband of plaintiff, while engaged at defendant's colliery in loading coal, complained of receiving injury from which he died three days later. Plaintiff's contention is that her husband's injury was the result of a sprain received while at work, which ruptured a blood vessel of the stomach. The Compensation Board accepted this theory of the death, awarded compensation, and the common pleas affirmed the Board's action. The defense was that plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the Board's second finding of facts, as follows: "While in the performance of his duties as such employee [deceased] met with an accident in attempting to lift a brake stick, and thereby suffered such strain internally as to cause hemorrhages of the stomach and bowels, that his death followed as a natural consequence thereof." A careful reading of the testimony convinces us that the Board's conclusion should be sustained. |