Argued before BARNARD, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ. DYKMAN, J. This is an action for the recovery of damages resulting from an injury sustained by the plaintiff in going onto one of the trains of cars running upon the defendant's road. The defendant owns and operates a railroad from Brooklyn to Coney Island, over Gravesend avenue, one of the public thoroughfares of the county of Kings, and there are stations along the avenue where the trains running on the road are stopped to discharge and receive passengers. At those stations the company has erected narrow platforms for the convenience of its passengers. The platform where the accident to the plaintiff happened was 12 inches high, 27 inches wide and 97 feet long. On the night of December 2, 1885, about 8 o'clock in the evening, the plaintiff desired to take a train on the defendant's road to go to his home at Coney Island, and for that purpose walked along the highway until he came to the platform, and, as he was about to step upon it, his toe or foot caught, and he fell over the platform, and struck the rail, and injured his knee-cap, and fractured the bone of his leg below his knee. There was no dispute about the injuries, and they were severe and permanent. There was nothing improper or faulty in the location or construction of the platform, and so the trial judge decided, and refused to permit any question on that subject to the jury, but he submitted another question to the jury upon which a verdict was found for the plaintiff. It was nightfall when the plaintiff received his injuries, and it was his claim on the trial that it was dark, and that the platform and the approaches to the same, and to the trains which were to take up passengers at that station, were insufficiently lighted to enable passengers to move along and upon them with safety; and much of the testimony on both sides was directed to that question. The plaintiff undertook to show the absence of lights, and the defendant made an effort to show the place well lighted in the usual manner. There was nothing about the platform itself subject to criticism, or upon which negligence could be charged against the company, and so was the charge of the trial judge, and he instructed the jury that the real question was whether the defendant furnished sufficient light to make the platform reasonably safe and secure for persons desiring to enter the cars; and, further, that it was the duty of the company to make the entrance to its trains reasonably safe for persons whom it invited to become passengers, and that, as far as the character of the platform was concerned, there was no criticism, and no negligence could be predicated thereon. The charge was in all respects faultless, and favorable to the defendant, and we find no errors in the conduct of the trial. The jury found against the defendant upon the question of light, and the finding is sustained by the testimony, and the law will sustain it when based upon such facts. Thomp. Car. 108; Hulbert v. Railroad Co., 40 N. Y. 145. The judgment and order denying new trial should be affirmed, with costs. PEOPLE v. REILLY. (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department. February 11, 1889.) COUNTERFEITING-DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTERFEIT MONEY-EVIDENCE. On indictment under Pen. Code N. Y. $527, as amended by Laws 1887, c. 687, which includes every device for sale or distribution of counterfeit money, it was shown that defendant requested permission to receive letters directed to the care of others; that the name to which they were directed was assumed; that the letters acknowledged receipt of letters, and contained a circular and newspaper slip which were received therewith; that the circular contained propositions to sell money, and stated that the money was perfect, as shown by an accompanying newspaper slip, which stated that government plates were in possession of some outlaw; also that defendant called for and received one of the letters, and sent for others. Held sufficient evidence to convict. v.4N.Y.s.no.1-6 Appeal from court of sessions, Kings county. George Reilly, being convicted of carrying on a scheme for advertising the sale of counterfeit money, etc., appeals. Argued before BARNARD, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ. Jerry A. Wernberg, for appellant. James W. Ridgway, Dist. Atty., and John U. Shorter, Asst. Dist. Atty., for respondent. DYKMAN, J. By the provisions of section 527 of the Penal Code of the state of New York any person who, with intent to defraud, circulates or distributes a letter or circular or any other written or printed matter offering for sale counterfeit coin or paper money, or giving or purporting to give information where counterfeit coin or paper money can be procured, is punishable by imprisonment or fine, or by both. That section of the Code was expanded by an amendment in 1887, so as to include within its ample provisions every device to which resort can be had for the sale or distribution of counterfeit coin or paper money, (chapter 687, Laws 1887;) and the disclosures in the record now before us make it apparent that the enlargement of the statute came none too soon. The scheme devised by this defendant might have afforded him safety, and enabled him to escape detection, if the statute had been less comprehensive, or less explicit and severe. The defendant, who has used several names, called at the place of business of one Mary Casey, in India street, Green Point, about the middle of May, 1888, and requested her to allow a letter to be directed to her place for him. She granted his request, and he gave her a paper, upon which was written the name "C. E. Fuller," as the address; and in reference to the delivery of the letters he informed the woman that he might send a boy or somebody, and directed her to deliver them to any one he might send. In pursuance of that arrangement one letter was received, which was delivered to him personally, when he called for it; and he sent another man for letters on two other occasions, but the man received none. After that several letters came, which were seized and opened by the officers of the law. One of the letters so seized was dated "Thomas, Arizona Territory, May 25, 188—;" addressed to “C. E. Fuller;" and closed with the words, “Address as per slip inside," and upon that slip inside was written, "John S. Green, Solomonville, Graham Co., Arizona." Inclosed in that letter, and returned to "C. E. Fuller, 149 India street, Green Point, Long Island, N. Y., was a circular containing propositions to sell money, and stating that there was no risk, as the money was perfect, as the inclosed newspaper clipping would prove, and requesting the person addressed to come to New York city to consummate the deal, because the writer would only deal face to face with his customer, because that was the safest and most satisfactory way, and closing with these words: “I will always return your letters to you, and as a guaranty of your confidence I also request the return of this letter and newspaper clipping. Address as per slip." The letter from Green was evidently an answer to that circular, and inclosing the same as requested. The newspaper slip purported to contain an account of the arrest and examination of Charles A. Becker for selling counterfeit money, when the experts employed by the department at Washington made a sworn report "that all these United States treasury notes found with Becker were printed from genuine plates used by former workmen in the printing bureau. It was further stated in the slip that it had long been known that some person had possession of a set of plates supposed to have been furnished by one of the engravers in the engraving bureau; that the experts stated that they could not say the bills examined in court were counterfeit, as they were positive the bills were as good as any issued by the government; that some one was growing rich in a safe, fast, and sure manner. It was also stated that the same parties were in possession of the original plates of the dominion of Canada notes,-ones and twos, and a five. There were 10 letters of a similar character, addressed to C. E. Fuller, from different persons, each con taining a returned circular, received at the India-Street station of the defendant, and all to the same purport as the one which we have described. But the defendant did not confine his operations to one place. On the 19th day of May, 1888, he went to the store of Ellen Dougherty, at 610 Manhattan avenue, Green Point, and desired to have a letter directed to him at her store, and she consented, and he said his name was John P. Hays, and wrote his address down on a small piece of paper. One letter came on the following Tuesday, which the defendant received, and two others after that day, which were handed over to the detectives. These two letters received at 610 Manhattan avenue, and handed to the detectives, were similar to the other letters, and each contained the same circular. The defendant was indicted for a violation of the section of the Penal Code already mentioned, and was tried and convicted on three counts of the indictment, which charges him with using a name and address other than his own for the purpose of carrying on, or assisting others in carrying on, the unlawful business prohibited by the statute, and of carrying on a scheme or device for advertising the sale of counterfeit money by receiving and taking from the mail a letter directed to the false address of C. E. Fuller, that name being other than the correct name and address of the defendant. The defendant has appealed from the judgment of conviction, and, aside from some questions relating to the admission of testimony, the insistance is that it was necessary for the public prosecutor, before he could ask for a conviction of the defendant, to prove that the letters received at India street and Manhattan avenue were directed and sent there by reason of some relation or correspondence with the defendant; and it is insisted that there was no proof to show knowledge in the defendant of the reception of such letters; that he made any attempt to get them; that he knew the writers of such letters, or was in correspondence with them, or knew the contents of the letters. Such are the objections which require examination. It is to be observed upon this question that natural inferences from established facts constitute legitimate evidence in all cases, both civil and criminal; and the deduction to be drawn from the uncontradicted testimony and the established facts in this case connect the defendant with the issuance of the circular beyond any reasonable doubt. Letters were received at India street, addressed to C. E. Fuller, for the defendant, under an arrangement made by him for that purpose. They each acknowledged the receipt of a letter from the person addressed, and were auswers to such letters. With the letters were a circular and a newspaper article which had been sent to the writer by the person whose letter he answered, and which were returned in pursuance of a request contained in the circular. Such are the undisputed facts, and the natural inference from them is this: The letters were written and sent to the person from whom the circular and newspaper clipping were received, for they were answers to that circular. As, therefore, the letters were sent to the defendant, it follows that he sent the circular and newspaper clipping to the person who wrote and sent the answer to the circular to him. The address of such answer to the defendant under the fictitious name designated by him at the place selected by him can be accounted for naturally upon no other assumption, and that theory harmonizes all the facts and transactions developed upon the trial. The same conclusion is reached respecting the letters sent to Manhattan avenue for the defendant. Upon such lines of reasoning we easily reach the conclusion that the defendant sent out the circular offering for sale counterfeit paper money, and used fictitious and assumed names other than his own proper name. The object of the newspaper article is also plainly apparent. That was sent out with the circular to create a belief that the money offered was made from government plates, and therefore genuine, or as good as genuine. The story related in the article is doubtless a fabrication, and invented to subserve the purpose for which it was employed. It would be idle to suppose or Bills believe that such a proceeding could transpire in a court of justice. struck from government plates, obtained surreptitiously, would be as fraudulent and spurious as if printed from counterfeit or false plates, because they would be without the sanction of authority, and the interposition of such a defense would be destitute even of plausibility, and fail to deceive any court or secure the discharge of any person accused of a violation of the statute under consideration. Our conclusion therefore is that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of circulating and distributing a circular offering for sale counterfeit paper money, and of using a false, fictitious, and assumed name to promote and carry on a scheme for the sale and offering for sale counterfeit paper money, and that his conviction for such crime under this statute was justified by the evidence. It was in the power of the defendant to explain or deny much of the testimony adduced against him upon the trial if the same was susceptible of denial or explanation, and his failure to make any effort in that direction leaves all the testimony to operate against him with undiminished force. The conclusion reached upon the main question determines some of the questions of testimony involved adversely to the defendant, and we find no error in the proceedings during the trial, either in the admission of testimony or in the charge of the trial judge. The conviction and judgment appealed from should therefore be affirmed. All concur. CLEVELAND et al. v. CITY OF YONKERS et al. (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department. February 11, 1889.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EXTENSION OF SEWER-PROPERTY BENEFITED. Where the state grants the land under water in front of the mouth of a sewer, and the grantee fills such land, an extension of the sewer, thereby rendered necessary, amounts to a construction of a section of the sewer within the provision of a city charter, by which the construction, extension, enlargement, and repairs of sewers are to be paid for by an assessment upon the property benefited. Such extension cannot be classified as repairs. Appeal from special term, Westchester county. Action by Cyrus Cleveland and others against the city of Yonkers and others, to restrain defendants from imposing or confirming an assessment for work on a sewer. Plaintiffs appeal. The following is the opinion of the special term: "BARNARD, P. J. The assessment in question is justified under title 7, § 17, of the charter of the city of Yonkers. By section 16 of the same title, the construction, extension, enlargement, and repair of sewers were to be paid for by an assessment upon the property benefited. If the enlargement in question had been made at the same time with the Ashburton-Avenue sewer, which ended at low-water mark, there would have been no question. This extension is made necessary because the state has granted the lands under water in front of the mouth of the sewer; and, unless the old sewer is extended, it will become useless and dangerous, as the grantee from the state has filled in the space in front to the channel bank of the river. The power to extend sewers is a continuing power, and therefore the case does not fall within the cases cited, where the power had been spent when one assessment had been made. The length of time intervening between the construction of the Ashburton-Avenue sewer and the grant from the state gives no right whatever to the city of Yonkers as against the state and its grantees. The motion for an injunction should therefore be denied, with $10 costs.” Argued before DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ. George C. Holt, for appellants. Joseph F. Daly, for respondents. DYKMAN, J. A careful examination discloses no errors in the proceedings for the prolongation of the sewer in Ashburton avenue. The extension amounted only to a construction of the sewer in sections. It was all new work, and cannot be classified with repairs in any way or by any construction. We concur entirely with the views of the judge who made the order appealed from, and the order should be affirmed upon his opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur. In re UNION EL. R. Co. (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department. February 11, 1889.) EMINENT DOMAIN-PUBLIC USE-RAILROAD CROSSING. Under the rapid transit act, § 17, (Laws 1875, c. 606,) giving to companies formed thereunder the right to acquire such real estate as may be necessary to enable them to operate their railways, such a company, which has two routes, crossing each other at right angles, whereby the danger from collision is great, may acquire the corner property at such crossing for the purpose of providing the curve necessary to allow the trains on one route to turn into the street occupied by the other, and thereby to avoid such danger. Appeal from special term, Kings county. Petition by the Union Elevated Railroad Company of Brooklyn to acquire title to property of Jacob Levy and others. The company has two routes, crossing each other at right angles,-one through Hudson avenue, and the other through Myrtle avenue. To avoid the danger of collision at this point, the company decided to turn its Hudson-Avenue trains into Myrtle avenue, instead of allowing them to cross the latter. In order to provide the curve required for this purpose, it is necessary to acquire the corner property, owned by Levy and others. The rapid transit act. § 17, (Laws 1875, c. 606,) under which the company was formed, gives such companies "the right to acquire and hold such real estate, or interest therein, as may be necessary to enable them to construct, maintain, and operate the said railway or railways." The application was granted, and the property owners appeal. Argued before BARNARD, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ. Johnson & Lamb, (Jesse Johnson, of counsel,) for appellants. Wingate & Cullen, (G. W. Wingate, of counsel,) for respondent. PRATT, J. The seventeenth section of the act gives the right to acquire such real estate, etc., as is necessary to operate said railways. The grant was comprehensive, and covers the whole ground of controversy. Experience has shown that to carry on the operation of the road in the restricted manner first attempted will expose the public to great danger. Were the charter a narrow one, the court might well feel itself called upon to be astute in construing the charter in aid of the public welfare. No such necessity is imposed upon it. The charter is amply broad to convey the power to erect all needed appurtenances. As was well said by the judge at special term, to hold that this road could compel a connection with the roads of other corporations, and was yet without the power to connect its own branches, would be an absurdity. Order affirmed, with costs. All concur. PEOPLE ex rel. PROSPECT PARK & C. I. R. Co. et al. v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF TOWN OF GRAVESEND et al. PEOPLE ex rel. BRIGHTON PIER & NAV. Co. v. SAME. (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department. February 11, 1889.) 1. CERTIORARI-WHEN LIES-TO REVIEW ASSESSMENT. A case for review by certiorari is made by a petition alleging that a sewer has been constructed under a certain statute which exempts petitioner's property from assessment therefor, and which provides for a review by certiorari of any such assessment, as prescribed by Laws N. Y. 1880, c. 269; that the board of health and supervisor have delivered papers addressed to the board of supervisors certifying that all the lands in a certain district are benefited by the sewer, and estimating |