erly assessed at its par value, though its president testifies that its personal estate is not worth more than half the sum arrived at on the basis of the selling price of the stock, and that the value of the stock is prospective, by reason of the erroneous supposition that certain rights of the company not utilized are valuable, and that such value is inflated by speculators, and that the road does not earn 6 per cent. on its stock. Appeal from special term, New York county. Certiorari, on relation of the Central Park, North & East River Railroad Company, to the commissioners of taxes and assessments, to review an assessment. The president of relator testified that the method of valuing the company's stock by reference to its quoted price was not just, because its personal property would not equal the amount thus arrived at by 100 per cent.; that the buying and selling value of the stock was derived in great part from the prospects of the company, from certain rights which were supposed to be valuable, such as the right to carry freight and use steam, which would not be profitable or practicable; that the value was often inflated from cornering, or attempts to secure a controlling interest in the company; and that the road had not earned legal interest from the time it was opened, and was not earning 6 per cent. interest, and its average percentage of earnings was but a little over 3 per cent. The assessment was confirmed, the writ dismissed, and relator appeals. Argued before DANIELS and BARTLETT, JJ. De Los McCurdy and B. W. Franklin, for appellant. George S. Coleman, for respondents. DANIELS, J. The writ of certiorari was issued in this case to review the assessment made by the commissioners of taxes and assessments upon the capital stock of the relator in the year 1884. The valuation adopted by the commissioners was the par value of the stock of the company, amounting to the sum of $1,800,000. They deducted from this amount the assessed value of the real estate and tracks of the company, and the shares of stock owned by it in other corporations, taxed upon their capital, leaving a balance of $1,354,779. These deductions, for the reasons stated in considering the assessment on the capital for the year 1883, (ante, 41,) are all that the company was entitled to claim; and the only point remaining to be considered is whether the commissioners were right in assuming the par value of the stock as the valuation upon which the assessment should proceed. For this purpose they had before them the admission in the report of the treasurer of the company that a dividend of 8 per cent. had been paid during the last preceding year upon the stock. They also had in the report of 1883, which they were at liberty to consult for this purpose, the further statement that the stock was worth 130 per cent.; and the general evidence given before the referee did not detract from or overcome the effect of these statements. In the report made in 1884 the statement of the value of the stock was omitted. But as the dividend remained still the same as it was previously stated to be in the report of 1883, it was only reasonable to assume that the actual value of the stock was the same, and that was 130 per cent. That justified the commissioners in assessing it at its par value, which was 30 per cent. less than from this evidence appeared to be its actual value. They also had the reports made and published in a journal called "The Stockholder," devoted to this subject, giving what were stated to be larger offers than this, for the purchase of shares of stock in the company. And this evidence, from these different sources, was not overcome in its effect by the facts related in the course of the examination of the president of the company, more particularly that the value of the stock was inflated or advanced by speculative parties at times desiring to obtain its control. The bonded, as well as the floating, indebtedness of the company, which remained very nearly the same as in the preceding year, was without doubt fully considered by the commissioners in their estimate of the assessable value of the stock; and upon no ground appearing, and not controverted by the return of the commissioners, would the court be justified in interfering with this assessment. It should accordingly be affirmed, together with the usual costs and disbursements. All concur. PEOPLE ex rel. CENTRAL PARK, N. & E. R. R. Co. v. COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department. January 28, 1889.) Appeal from special term, New York county. Certiorari to the commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York, issued on relation of the Central Park, North & East River Railroad Company, to review an assessment. Assessment confirmed, and writ dismissed, and relator appeals. Argued before DANIELS and BARTLETT, JJ. De Los McCurdy and B. W. Franklin, for appellant. George S. Coleman, for respondents. DANIELS, J. The writ of certiorari was issued in this proceeding to review the assessment made of the relator's capital stock for the year 1885. In this assessment the assessable liability of the company was advanced to the sum of $1,461,518. This balance was obtained by taking the stock at its par value, and deducting from the amount the real estate, tracks, and stock of other corporations. The difference seems to have been made, increasing the amount from the assessment of 1884, by diminishing the assessments upon the real estate and tracks of the company, and deducting the reduced amounts from the capital. Further evidence was submitted to the commissioners, consisting of an inventory of the property of the company, and an affidavit of its treasurer stating its expenditures, and giving his judgment of the financial situation of the company. By his affidavit it appeared that the funded debt of the company consisted of bonds secured by a mortgage upon its property and franchises amounting to the sum of $1,200,000; and these statements were considered by the commissioners, together with the other evidence already referred to, which they had before them, leading them to the adoption and adjustment of this balance as the amount for which the capital stock of the company could be legally and properly assessed for taxation. The reasons already given in the other cases (ante, 41 et seq.) appear to justify this action of the commissioners. In addition to that, they have mentioned the further fact that, according to the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a journal devoted to financial affairs, and containing quotations of the prices of stocks, the stock of the relator in the journal of January 3, 1885, was quoted at 140 bid, 142 asked; and in the same journal, published on the 10th of the same month, the amount bid was given as 141, and asked 144%. They certainly, therefore, were still justified in holding the stock at least at its par value; and, as they made all the deductions which the law required should be made, the order should be affirmed, with same direction as to costs. BARTLETT, J., concurs. PEOPLE ex rel. CENTRAL PARK, N. & E. R. R. Co. v. COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department. January 28, 1889.) Appeal from special term, New York county. Certiorari to review an assessment, issued on relation of the Central Park, North & East River Railroad Company to the commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York. The assessment was confirmed, the writ dismissed, and relator appeals. See opinions on assessments for the years 1883 to 1885, ante, 41 et seq. Argued before DANIELS and BARTLETT, JJ. De Los McCurdy and B. W. Franklin, for appellant. G. S. Coleman, for respond ents. DANIELS, J. The writ of certiorari in this case was issued to review the assessment of the relator's capital stock for taxation in the year 1886. It was still retained by the commissioners at its par value, although it was considered to be of the market value of $1.41. The balance which was adopted as the measure of the assessment was the sum of $1,473,753. The increase between this and the preceding assessment consisted in the further reductions made for the assessed value of the real estate and the railway tracks and road-bed of the company. Those assessments were deducted from the valuation placed upon the company's capital stock; and that was all which it could exact from the commissioners for this portion of its property. They also deducted the stocks owned by the company in other corporations taxed on their capital; and that furnished the precise balance which the commissioners adopted and considered to be the amount for which the company should be assessed, and was assessed, upon its capital stock. It still appeared by the report of the company made in April, 1886, that the same annual dividend of 8 per cent. continued to be paid upon its stock; and the fact was not denied or explained, which was stated in its report in 1883, that the stock was of the value of 130 per cent. The commissioners were sustained in the action which they took, and the order should be affirmed, with $10 costs, and also disbursements. All concur. WHITMAN et al. v. HAINES et al. (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department. January 28, 1889.) 1. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES-FAILURE TO PAY OVER MONEY-Contempt. Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 2268, providing that where a contempt of court is committed by the failure to pay money as required by order of court, and the court is satisfied that a personal demand has been made, the offender may be committed, does not require such personal demand of a deputy-sheriff who fails to pay money into a depository, after service on him of the order requiring such payment. 2. SAME-INTEREST. Interest is chargeable on money collected by a sheriff, and withheld by him from the time of the service of the order requiring him to pay it over. 3. SAME-ORDER OF COURT-SEVERAL ACTIONS. Such an officer having simultaneously collected different sums by process in several different actions against the same defendant, one order requiring him to pay it over may be properly made in all the actions. 4. SAME-FINE-INDEMNITY TO AGGRIEVED PARTY-COSTS. Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 2284, providing that if actual loss shall result by reason of the misconduct of a defendant in contempt proceedings, and the case is not one for which an action for damages is provided by law, a fine sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party shall be imposed and collected and paid over to him, authorizes an allowance of counsel fees, costs, and disbursements as part of the fine imposed on such defaulting sheriff. Appeal from special term, New York county. On December 8, 1885, a warrant of attachment against the defendants' property was issued in each of the above actions to Alexander V Davidson, then sheriff of New York county, who deputized George W. Schaffer, the respondent, as his deputy, to execute the same. Under these attachments Schaffer levied on merchandise belonging to the defendants, and on debts owing to the defendants from about 19 merchants doing business in the city of New York, aggregating over $6,000. Between December 8, 1885, and February 17, 1886, Schaffer collected from the property so attached $4,865.08. In January, 1886, the plaintiffs' attorney requested Schaffer not to pay to Sheriff Davidson the moneys that had been collected under the warrants of attachment, for the reason that his term of office had expired, and rumors were afloat to the effect that he was insolvent. Schaffer then informed the plaintiffs' attorney that he had already paid Davidson about $2,900 of the money, but promised that he would keep the rest. In February, 1886, Davidson absconded, and thereupon the plaintiffs' attorney called upon Schaffer, and asked him if he had the money, and Schaffer then told the attorney that Davidson had compelled him to pay it all over to him a day or two before he absconded. This statement was not true. The fact was that at that time Schaffer had collected $4,865.08 and had paid Davidson $3,063.95, and had in his possession $1,801.13. On February 26, 1886, an order was entered in the above actions which contained the following directions: "It is ordered that Alexander V. Davidson, late sheriff of the city and county of New York, and his attorney, Edward J. Shelley, and each and every of the deputies and exdeputies and clerks and assistants of the late sheriff, forthwith deposit in the United States Trust Company of New York, to the credit of said five actions, any and all moneys now in their hands, or in the hands of any of them, or which may hereafter come into their hands, or into the hands of any of them, or under their control by virtue of the warrants of attachment, or any of them, granted in the above-entitled actions, or any of them." On March 8, 1886, a copy of the above order was duly served on Schaffer, and in obedience thereto he deposited in the trust company $90.25, and notified the plaintiff's attorney of the fact, who thereupon demanded that Schaffer deposit the rest of the moneys in the trust company, and Schaffer then repeated the statement that he had paid it all over to Davidson. Thereupon the plaintiffs' attorney applied to the several merchants upon whom the warrants of attachments had been served, and obtained from them the canceled checks by which they had made their payments into the sheriff's office; and, seeing from the indorsements on these checks that only about $3,000 had been received by Davidson, he opened communication with Davidson, through Mr. Shelley, who was Mr. Davidson's attorney in fact, and Davidson pronounced Schaffer's statement to be false, and he made an affidavit to that effect. Davidson sent this affidavit to Shelley, who showed it to Schaffer, and threatened that if he didn't pay over the money he had collected he would deliver the affidavit to the plaintiffs' attor ney in order that he might take proceedings to have him (Schaffer) punished for contempt; and Schaffer then for the first time admitted that he had not paid over all the money to Davidson, and promised that if Shelley would give him time to get the money together he would pay it over, and early in the year 1887 he paid over $1,037.80, leaving a balance still in his hands of $673.08. In June, 1887, these plaintiffs instituted proceedings in this court to punish Schaffer as for a contempt for his disobedience of the order requiring him to deposit the money in the trust company. That proceeding was adjourned from time to time, and in August Schaffer paid over $465.63 more of the money he had collected, leaving a balance still in his hands of $207.45. The proceedings were thereafter adjourned to the 10th of October, 1887, and were then dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' rights to renew their application as they might be advised. On the 7th day of November, 1887, this present proceeding was commenced, to punish Schaffer as for a contempt for disobeying said order. The motion came on before Mr. Justice BARRETT, at chambers, in December, 1887, when it was referred to George Putnam Smith, Esq., as referee, to take the proofs, and report the same with his opinion. The referee made his report, which, together with the testimony, was filed in the office of the clerk of this court on April 3, 1888. The referee reported that the respondent had willfully disobeyed said order, and was guilty of a contempt of court, and that he should be fined for his misconduct; and on the motion to confirm the referee's report the final order was entered on April 26, 1888, directing that Schaffer be fined for his misconduct in the following sums: (1) The amount still in his hands collected under said attachments, $207 45 (2) Interest on that sum from the date of the service of the order requiring the deposit, 25 94 (3) Interest on $1,037.80 from the date of the service of the order requiring the deposit down to the day Schaffer paid over that sum, 54 10 (4) The amount paid by the plaintiffs for their expenses in prosecuting this proceeding, 320 00 (5) The taxable costs of this proceeding, 162 45 $769 94 From this order the respondent Schaffer appeals to this court. Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 2268, provides that where a person commits a contempt of court by failing to pay over money required by order of court, if the court shall be satisfied that a personal demand has been made on him, it may commit him. Section 2284 authorizes the imposition of a fine on a person guilty of contempt of court in case of an actual loss resulting from such offense, which shall be sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party, to whom such fine when collected shall be paid. V.4N.Y.S.no.1-4 Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BRADY and MACOMBER, JJ. BRADY, J. The learned justice who directed a reference in this proceeding, upon the coming in of the referee's report, and upon proper application therefor, confirmed it, with one exception. He directed that the fine imposed be stricken out, and thus relieved the appellant from that burden. He expressed himself upon the subjects involved in this appeal as follows: "BARRETT, J. Whitman v. Haines, and 4 other actions. 1. The plaintiffs having proceeded by order to show cause, the caption of the actions was properly preserved. It is only where the proceeding is by attachment that the respondent's views are sustained by the Code and the authorities. "2. The order of the 26th of February, 1886, was served upon Schaffer, and was binding upon him. The deputies are servants of the sheriff, and in law they are considered but one officer. Allen, Sher. 81, 86; Pond v. Leman, 45 Barb. 154. "3. The order was for the benefit of the plaintiffs, and upon its service compliance was required without any special demand. It directed payment to a trust company, and the contempt consisted in not making the payment to the trust company, as directed. Besides, Schaffer complied in part, and thus recognized his duty under the order. And he gave a false reason for non-compliance generally, but a reason which had no relation to the validity of the order, or the sufficiency of the service, or to any question of demand. It was simply a case where an officer of the court, having moneys in his hands, collected under process, is required to bring such moneys into court. Upon service of such an order, and proof of non-compliance, the officer is in contempt. "4. Upon the merits there can be no doubt that the referee's conclusions are correct. Schaffer received the moneys from Crager and Bookman, and has failed to establish their payment to Davidson. It is not necessary to analyze the testimony upon this head. It could not be done without reflecting seriously upon Schaffer's position. Suffice it to say that, after reading all that has been testified to, I am satisfied that these moneys never were paid over, and that Schaffer is in contempt for non-compliance with the order, which in substance directed their deposit in the trust company. I see no evidence to warrant Mr. Stuart's last criticism as to $10, part of the $160.43 received from Bookman. He has referred to no testimony supporting his contention, and the referee seems to be correct even in that minor particular. But I do not agree to the conclusion as to a fine generally. Such a fine is only proper where no damages are proved, and where costs and expenses are alone awarded. I mean in civil contempts. Here the fine of $250 should be disallowed. The rest is allowed. And it is not necessary to add much to what was then said.” We have thus, on the facts, a careful consideration of the evidence, not only by the referee, but by the learned judge who presided at the special term, when the motion for confirmation was made. A further examination confirms the correctness of the result declared. The only points to which it is deemed nécessary to pay a passing consideration are-First. As to the interest charged upon the sums withheld by the appellant after the receipt of the order of February 26, 1888. There can be no doubt that he was properly charged with the interest, because the order was, in effect, a direction to pay the money into court; and if he had any rights in reference to it they would in that way have been preserved. And, secondly, as to the proposition that the order, having been made in five actions, with different plaintiffs, was void, it is only necessary to say that the attachments were issued simultaneously, and the whole fund in the possession of the appellant was applicable to them, and for that reason it was a beneficial way to the appellant of presenting the application. It prevented the imposi |