transferring, combining, and coordinating noncombatant services, activities, and operations and such property, records, personnel, funds, and so forth, as are necessary to achieve the intent.

Majority Leader McCormack also pointed out in his remarks that Secretary Wilson was not in agreement with the President as to the need for more unification in the DOD. The Secretary was of the opinion that the decentralized supply and service operation of General Motors was the type that should be followed in DOD. Congressman McCormack also stated:

I have reviewed General Eisenhower's statements on the need for more unification in supply and service activities in 1945, 1946, 1947, 1949, while a candidate in 1952, and since he has been President. I cannot help but believe that his true position is that which he stated to the Woodrum Committee on June 2, 1945, "efficiency must be obtained with maximum economy. This means expensive duplication must be ruthlessly eliminated."

The House of Representatives failed to adopt the second O'Mahoney amendment and it was eliminated by the conferees with this statement:

This language was stricken with the understanding that the appropriate legislative committees have the matter under consideration and that legislation will be forthcoming.20

But the understanding of progress in the making once more was based upon hope rather than reality for again nothing happened.

THREE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS SEPARATELY ADMINISTERED

The hopes of those who endorsed the National Security Act of 1947 that a strong Secretary of Defense would be able to achieve the desired economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in DOD were soon dashed upon the rocks. Secretary of Defense Forrestal who as a Navy partisan from 1944 to 1947 had insisted on maintaining the autonomy of the Navy 27 was in the unenviable position of having to drink from his own chalice when he became Secretary of the tripartite organization. At the time of his departure from office, Secretary Forrestal advised the Senate Armed Services Committee that the act contained "weaknesses and inconsistencies" and that the authority of the Secretary was "vague, confusing, and specifically limited by the provision which reserves to the respective departmental Secretaries all powers not expressly conferred upon the Secretary of Defense." 28 And before his death Secretary Forrestal admitted that he had been "hoist with his own petard."

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958

Despite attempts to strengthen the National Security Act of 1953 by means of Reorganization Plan No. 6, heavy pressure continued for still more positive action, especially in supply and service activities. Following President Eisenhower's state of the Union message to the 2d session of the 85th Congress in which he called for "real unity" in the Department of Defense, the President submitted to Congress on April 3, 1958, his proposed defense reorganization plan. A primary purpose of this reorganization plan was to strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the military departments. The Presi

26 Conference Rept. No. 841, July 23, 1957, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6.

27 "The Forrestal Diaries," p. 167.

28 Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on S. 1269 and S. 1843, Mar. 24, 1949, p. 8.

dent stated in his message that one effect of the "separately administered" concept of the National Security Act was to "impede such techniques for the increased efficiency and economy as the single manager plan" in the Department of Defense.

M'CORMACK-CURTIS AMENDMENT

The Congress not only modified the "separately administered" clause but it also adopted the McCormack-Curtis amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. This legislation removed any possible doubt as to the authority of the Secretary of Defense to integrate supply and service functions when it would be in the best interest of Government. Moreover, the amendment was a renewed expression of the intent of Congress that positive and continued action be taken by the Secretary of Defense to eliminate duplication and waste in military supply and service programs and to develop ways to bring about efficient performance in this area.

The amendment reads:

Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate. For the purposes of this paragraph, any supply or service activity common to more than one military department shall not be considered a "major combatant function" within the meaning of paragraph (1) hereof. (See app. 12 for text of par. (1).)

INTENT OF M'CORMACK-CURTIS AMENDMENT

House Majority Leader McCormack carefully explained the intent and the scope of the amendment he introduced.29 This can become a most important piece of legislation as it has been estimated that up to 60 percent of the annual DOD appropriation is for supply and service activities.

One of the most important aspects of the amendment is that it definitely removes supply and service activities common to two or more departments from being categorized as "major combatant functions" and hence subject to veto action by the military departments. So for the first time the Congress had given to the Secretary of Defense specific authority to organize and operate common supply and service activities without being subject to compromise or a veto by separately administered departments autonomous in all functions whether or not directly or remotely related to major combatant functions.

This specific congressional language clearly gave the executive branch of the Government a charter for positive action.

LAG IN USE OF AMENDMENT

Though the Department of Defense Reorganization Act was signed on August 6, 1958, and everyone seemed to favor the McCormackCurtis amendment, progress was slow in implementing it. Accordingly, on January 15, 1959,30 Senator Douglas requested information from the Secretary of Defense as to (1) the scope of the amendment in the Secretary's judgment, (2) what had been done to implement it, and (3) what was planned for its implementation. (See p. 2 for subsequent action.)

29 See Congressional Record, June 12, 1958, pp. 9927-9932.

80 Staff report, pp. 210-211.

PART III-C

CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HISTORY OF INTEGRATION OF COMMON CLASSES OF COMMODITIES

GENERAL

The history of integration of the management of common classes of commodities within the Army and the Navy and among the three departments has been one of start and stop, on and off, for many years. It reflects the contending philosophies of economy and efficiency versus service autonomy. The two forces are ever present but the latter has had the upper hand. When a prime objective of a department is to remain autonomous, it is not difficult to understand that it endeavors to create and perpetuate differences.

Commonality leads to unification. Common things can be managed in a common way. This explains, in part, the long and costly task of preparing a uniform catalog. Though the President himself ordered that such a catalog be developed in 1945 and Congress enacted special legislation for the purpose,1 it is only now being completed at a cost of $200 million. Likewise, in the development of standards and specifications there has been a great amount of foot dragging. It is apparent that two identical items can be procured, stored, inventoried, issued, and maintained in a common way much more economically and efficiently than can the different items.

Special items that vary but slightly in size, finish, color, design, etc., require special attention and treatment in every aspect of supply management.

General Eisenhower emphasized the benefits of unity when he stated:

* * * through real integration, forces of the several arms and services multiply rather than merely add their separate tactical effects. (See pp. 1, 66.)

Conversely, the fruits of disunity are a mass of organizations, committees, conferences, paperwork, etc., which generate more work than the job itself. A good illustration is that provided by Secretary Stimson who stated that during World War II it took 100 committees to bridge the gap between the Army and the Navy. Today with three departments and four services there is a geometric increase so that we have approximtaely 557 boards, committees, councils, etc.2

DRAPER-STRAUSS REPORT (FEBRUARY 1945)

In an endeavor to obtain greater coordination of procurement between the War and Navy Departments, the Secretary of the Navy, Hon. James A. Forrestal, and the Undersecretary of War, Robert P.

1 The Defense Cataloging and Standardization Act of 1953 (66 Stat. 318; 5 U.S.C. 173). Hearings, pp. 80-106.

3

Patterson, instituted the study of common classes of commodities where apparent need of coordination and procurement were desirable. A series of individual studies was undertaken under Col. William H. Draper, Jr., General Staff Corps, and Capt. Lewis L. Strauss, U.S. Naval Reserve. The final report listed the results of separate studies on medical supplies and equipment, subsistence supplies, standard stock items, textiles, clothing and shoes, and athletic equipment; fuels and lubricants; small boats and internal combustion marine engines and parts; ordnance materiel; packing and packaging; electronic equipment; construction machinery and mechanical equipment; automotive equipment; chemical warfare material; aircraft equipment.

Of particular interest was the development toward a single agency in two fields:

1. Medical supplies and equipment.

2. Textiles and clothing.

On December 22, 1944, Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Patterson, for the Navy and Army respectively, established a joint purchasing agency to procure all medical and surgical supplies for the two departments.

On January 6, 1945, a similar memorandum of agreement was signed by the same parties for the establishment of a joint procurement office for textiles and clothing. Both the medical and textile and clothing agencies were located in New York City.

In all, some 17 common commodity classes were listed for eventual treatment in the same way. The basic plan was to bring the offices physically together as a first step.

Genuine progress was made with respect to medical and textile and clothing coordination during the war and shortly thereafter.

MEDICAL SUPPLY SITUATION IN 1951

But the seeds of disintegration were deeply planted and very viable. By the spring of 1951 the Bonner subcommittee which was studying military supply management found that there was some coordination of medical procurement with both the Army and the Navy in the same building, on different floors, with different stock status report periods, different accounting systems, etc., but much remained to be done.

There was no coordination with respect to distribution. The Joint Purchasing Agency procured medical and dental supplies and equipment which were shipped to five Army depots and five Navy depots for distribution to the ultimate users. (See p. 68.)

In Oakland, Calif., the Army had a large medical supply depot on one side of the street and the Navy had a similar facility on the opposite side of the street.

In distribution there was inexcusable crosshauling and duplication and waste. The Naval Station at Pensacola, Fla., got its medical supplies from Edgewater, N.J., bypassing nearer Army sources at Atlanta. Conversely, the Army facility at Fort Dix, N.J., bypassed

3 "Coordination of Procurement Between the War and Navy Departments," vol. 1, final and interim reports, February 1945. See also background material on development of the single manager plan in H. Rept. 674, 86th Cong., 1st sess., "Military Supply Management (Single Manager Agencies)," pp. 10 ff.

the Navy at Edgewater and got its supplies from Schenectady, N.Y. The same criss-crossing nationwide made an enormous overlay of spider webbing.

The Bonner subcommittee issued its strong report (see p. 63) and announced hearings beginning July 19, 1951. On July 17, 2 days before the scheduled hearings, the Department of Defense issued a directive on supply systems proclaiming the initiation of a feasibility test to determine if one service could buy, store, and distribute commor commodities for all three services. The first commodity group to be tested was medical supplies and equipment with other classes soon to follow.

Eventually, on March 15, 1952, a test was actually started at Alameda, Calif., and was to continue for a 6-month period or to the end of August 1952. The Bonner subcommittee, well aware of the delay and strife that had taken place in initiating the test, decided to hold hearings at Alameda on the operation of the test. This was done on August 21, 1952.

In brief, the hearings on August 21, 1952, revealed that the test had been successful, the Army had done a good job running it, the Air Force was pleased, but the Navy was glum. There were many things which could have been done to make the test more successfulthe use of standard forms, the use of one stock fund instead of each service owning the stocks used in the test, the use of better requisitioning procedures in order to save time and effort, etc.

As stated above, the test was found to be successful; in fact, so successful that it was opposed vehemently by the Navy, though the Army and Air Force were in favor of its continuation and broader application. Finally in November 1954 the test was completely abandoned. Then in May 1956 a similar but broader program called a single manager for medical materiel was established under Navy management.

LOW EBB IN INTEGRATION OF COMMON COMMODITIES

At the end of 1954 the opponents of supply integration were in the saddle. The ASTAPA project had been condemned and abandoned. The Army clothing buying office had been moved on July 1, 1954, from New York to Philadelphia, thus ending the "proximity" collaboration set up in 1945 through the housing of both Army and Navy procurement offices in the same building.

The Alameda medical supply test had been ordered closed and soon was disjointed, with the Army and Navy at great expense moving their belongings from the common operation at Alameda, Calif., to Stockton and Oakland, respectively.

The many other common commodity classes which were to be "given priority study to determine the feasibility of assigning to a single military department the responsibility for procurement, distribution. including depot storage and issue for classes of common items of supply and equipment and depot storage" and were not studied, and the Supply Systems Study Group which was established for the purpose was itself dissolved with the reversal of policy in the Wilson era. 1953-54.