partnership should continue. The business of the firm was entered upon and carried on in pursuance of the terms of the contract for more than two years, and the partnership was then dissolved by the withdrawal of the defendThe plaintiff acquiesced in the dissolution, but it does not appear there was any agree ment for the transfer by one to the other of any property or business. ant. on in any particular house or office; nor does it seem to us that the business was of such a nature that its patronage would be affected by the particular spot in which it was transacted. If the business had been conducted under an assumed name wholly distinct from the name of either partner, such, for example, as the "Galveston Insurance Agency," it might be held that the probability that the patrons of the partnership would continue to do business with any person or firm using that name constituted a valuable right, and would be the subject of legal disposition upon a dissolution of the firm. But in this case the names of the partners constituted the name of the firm; and neither member had the right to demand that a business should be continued in the partnership name. Such a demand is inconsistent with the undoubted privilege of either to continue the same business in his own name. The suit is not for the division of any tangible assets, nor is it averred that there was any such property on hand at the time of the dissolution. In the absence of fraud, it cannot be questioned that the defendant had the right to dissolve the partnership at his pleasure. There are no circumstances alleged which would have made it fraudulent for the defendant to demand a dissolution; and his right to do so seems not to be denied. There was therefore a lawful dissolution, and, so far as the petition discloses, all the rights of the parties It appears, then, that upon the dissolution of settled and their respective claims adjusted, ex the partnership between the plaintiff and the cept as to the good will of the partnership busi- defendant, there was nothing left which would ness. What is the goodwill of a business, and probably draw to it the custom of the firm. in what did it consist in the case of the partner- The agencies which the partnership had secured ship under consideration? The term is vari-were determinable at the will of the principals, ously defined. and there could be no property in them. They actually ceased upon a dissolution of the firm; and each partner was left free to continue business in his own name, and to procure for himself alone the employment of such of the insurance companies formerly represented by the firm as might desire his services. The success of either in controlling the former custom of the firm depended upon his own personal capac In Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jr. 346, Lord Eldon defined it as "the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place." This has been said to be the best definition. Cassidy v. Metcalf, 1 Mo. App. 601. The definition of Judge Story is more comprehensive : "Goodwill may be properly enough described to be the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment be-ity for attracting and holding patronage, and yond the mere value of the capital stock, funds or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encourage ment which it receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill, or influence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices." Story, Partn. § 99. not upon anything he had received upon the dissolution more than was received by the other. Each had the same opportunities as the other for competing for their old business; and, if one had any advantage over the other in that competition, it could only have been by reason of his personal qualifications, in which the other partner by reason of the contract of partnership certainly acquired no right which continued after the relation of partners had ceased to exist. It appears, therefore, that upon the dissolution each partner by its legal Per-effect took with him his chance of securing the patronage of the old firm, without any advantage over the other, except such as was purely personal to himself. This definition has been frequently quoted with approval. Smith v. Gibbs, 44 N. H. 343; Boon v. Moss, 70 N. Y. 473; Morgan v. hamus, 36 Ohio St. 522; Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 624; Howe v. Searing, 19 How. Pr. 26. We can understand very well how a good will may become a thing of value to a mercantile establishment. As attending a fixed place of business and a name indicating the continuousness, at least in part, of the same proprietorship and management, it may draw to it a custom which is, in itself, a source of profit. This may be the subject of sale. Upon the dissolution of a partnership by death, some authorities hold that the survivors, if they continue the business in their own behalf, may be required to account to the representatives of the deceased partner for its value. Upon this point, however, there is a conflict. In case of the dissolution of a trading partnership, where one partner secures the right to continue the business at the old stand, the probability of the resort of the old customers to the old place might be deemed a valuable right. But, in the present case, what is there left to either partner to which the goodwill can attach? It is not alleged that the business had been carried We do not see that the broad allegation that the goodwill was worth $10,000 helps plaintiff's case. This means, we presume, that if the exclusive right to carry on the old business were secured to either party, or to some third person, it would be worth to the person so continuing the business the sum named. But, in the absence of a special agreement, the law secures this right to neither partner. On the contrary, each member of the firm was entitled to pursue the same business in his own name, and to compete for the former custom of the partnership. Nor does the offer of the plaintiff to pay the defendant $5,000 for his interest in the goodwill affect the question. The plaintiff was not entitled to demand that the defendant should transfer to him his privilege of competing for the old business upon payment of its value; nor can be thrust his own right upon the defendant, and make him pay for it. The alleged fact that the plaintiff paid a sum of money to defendant as a consideration for entering into the partnership does not alter the rights of the parties, so far as this question is concerned. The probability of his being able upon dissolution to retain or secure a fair share of the patronage of the firm is a question the plaintiff should have considered before he paid his money. We have found no case in point, but the principles announced in Austen v. Boys, 2 De Gex & J. 626, are in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. See also Smith v. Gibbs, 44 N. H. 335. Austen v. Boys was a case of a partnership between solicitors, but we see no difference in principle between such a partnership and that of insurance agents. There is no error in the judgment, and it is affirmed. VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS. Philip L. JAMESON, Appt., v. William MAJOR'S ADMINISTRATOR et al. (....Va.....) 1. A decree declaring a person entitled to a share of a legacy, with interest, and adjudging the true construction of a will, with directions that all future proceedings in the cause be in accordance with such construction, but making no decree for any money, is not final. 2. There is no limitation upon the time within which an appeal will lie from an interlocutory decree settling the principles of a cause. The limitation of one year upon the time for appealing provided by section 3455, of the Code, runs only as against a final decree. 3. A will providing that after the death of testator's daughter certain money should be "equally divided amongst her surviving children and the issue of such as may be dead, such issue taking per stirpes and not per capita," annexes the condition of survivorship only to the children of the daughter and not to their issue; and on the death, during the daughter's lifetime, of one of her children, leaving issue, the interest of such issue is vested, and is not defeated by death during the lifetime of such daughter. (April 18, 1889.) ingham Bank, 45 N. H. 270; Sinton v. Boyd, 19 Ohio St. 30; Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 77. Where a testator uses the words "my surviving children," etc., the courts should determine that he meant to refer to those surviving him; and it seems equally true that where he refers, as in this case, to the surviving children of another, he should mean those only who survived such other. See Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79; Brent v. Washington, 18 Gratt. 526; Stone v. Nicholson, 27 Gratt. 1; Swinton v. Legare, 2 McCord, Ch. 440; Re Ryder, 11 Paige, 185. The word surviving, in the fourth clause of William Major's will, was intended by the testator, and should be construed by the court, to qualify both the words children and issue. Where a definite time has been fixed for the endurance of a particular estate with a remainder to a class, the remainder has been held to be vested in those members of the class living at the death of the testator, subject to open and let in after-born members of that class, and to be devested as to those of the class who shall die without issue. Croxall v. Shererd, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 268 (18 L. ed. 572). Messrs. Catlett Gibson and A. McD. Green, for appellees: The nature and effect of such correlated de APPEAL by petitioner, from certain decrees crees as those in this case have been considered of the Circuit Court of Culpeper County, dismissing a petition for rehearing and construing the will of William Major, deceased, and settling the rights arising thereunder. Affirmed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Messrs. Green & Miller, J. W. Bell and G. D. Gray, for appellant: The rule which reads a gift to survivors simply as applying to objects living at the death of the testator, is confined to those cases in which there is no other period to which survivorship can be referred; and where such gift is preceded by a life or other prior interest, it takes effect in favor of those who survive the period of distribution, and of those only. 3 Jarman, Wills, 5th Am. ed. 588. This view of Mr. Jarman has been the controlling rule in many of the courts of America, and has been the subject of direct adjudication in New Jersey, New Hampshire, Ohio and Illinois. Van Tilburgh v. Hollinshead, 14 N. J. Eq. 32; Williamson v. Chamberlain, 10 N. J. Eq. 373; Slack v. Bird, 23 N. J. Eq. 238; Hill v. Rock and adjudicated in Harvey v. Branson, 1 Leigh, 108, and Norfolk Trust Co. v. Foster, 78 Va. 413. The decree of the second of April, 1883, is a final decree. Johnson v. Citizens Bank, 83 Va. 63; Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608. If this was a petition to rebear a final decree, it could not be filed after the expiration of the term of court at which the decree complained of had been entered. Parker v. Logan, 82 Va. 376. The provisions of the Act of 1884, embraced in section 3474 of Code of 1887, apply; and this appeal must be dismissed as having been improvidently awarded. Jordan v. Cunningham, 7 S. E. 540. Upon the death of Corbin D. Jameson, leaving an infant child him surviving, this child took a vested interest in this legacy, which was absolute and indefeasible, and not subject to be devested by her death in the lifetime of her grandmother. Mrs. John Jameson. Upon the death of the infant child unmarried this interest passed to her mother, appellee, as her sole heir and distributee. Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79; Martin v. Kirby, 11 Gratt. 67; Stone v. Nicholson, 27 Gratt. 1; Catlett v. Marshall, 10 Leigh, 83; Row lett v. Rowlett, 5 Leigh, 20. Words of survivorship, added to a tenancy in common, in a will, are to be applied to the death of the testator unless an intent to postpone the vesting is apparent. Maberly v. Strode, 3 Ves. Jr. 450. Where there is a devise to such a class of legatees as survive the period of distribution, and the issue of such as are then dead, the gift to such issue is original and substantive, and not substitutional, and therefore necessarily vests upon the death of their parents. Jarman, Wills, chap. 30, p. 750; White v. Baker, 2 DeG. F. & J. 55; Brent v. Washing ton, 18 Gratt. 531; Clarkson v. Booth, 17 Gratt. 490; 2 Redfield, Wills, 374; Re Merrick's Trusts, L. R. 1 Eq. 551; Martin v. Holgate, L. R. 1 H. L. Cas. 175; Roe v. Jeffery, 7 T. R. 589; Lynch v. Hill, 6 Munf. 114; Re Wildman's Trusts, 1 Johns. & H. 302. In the case of the class being the children of a person named, the remainder will vest in those who answer the description at the time of the devise; and, if any other persons come into being so as to answer the same description, the remainder will so far devest as to permit them to share with those living at the time of the devise and the descendants of those who have since died. The said Elizabeth T. C. Jameson had four children: Corbin D. Jameson (who married the said petitioner, Kate Jameson), John W. Jame son (who survived his mother and died without issue and intestate), Eliza Jameson (who married J. J. Porter and died in 1859, leaving no child), and Philip L. Jameson, the appellant. In her said petition Kate Jameson claimed to be entitled to one third of the said legacy of $6,000, as administratrix and distributee of her said child, Eliza Corbin Jameson. By the de cree of April 2, 1883, she was declared to be entitled to one third of the said legacy, with interest from the date of the death of the said life tenant; the same adjudged to be the true construction of the said fourth clause, and all future proceedings in the cause were directed to be in accordance with said construction. In March, 1886, Philip L. Jameson filed his petition in said cause for a rehearing of the said decree of April, 1883. On the 17th of September, 1887, the prayer of this petition was denied and the petition dismissed. And on the 4th of June, 1888, a decree was rendered directing the receiver to collect certain funds in the cause, and pay over to Kate Jameson the said one third part of the said $6,000; whereupon, the appellant applied for and obtained an appeal to this court. The first question to be here determined arises upon the motion of the appellee, Kate 2 Lead. Cas. Am. Law of Real Estate, 286; Jameson, to dismiss the appeal as improvidently Provost, 4 Johns. 61. Doe v. Lacy, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from three decrees of the Circuit Court of Culpeper County, rendered re spectively on the second day of April, 1883, the 17th of September, 1887, and the 4th of June, 1888. The case is as follows: William Major, the elder, died in 1848, having first made and published his last will and testament, as to the fourth clause of which this controversy has arisen, by which he made provision for his daughter, Elizabeth T. C. Jameson, for her life, and, after her death, for her surviving children and the issue of such as might be dead. The life tenant died in 1871, and in 1883 the appellee, Kate Jameson, filed her petition in the chancery cause then pending in the Circuit Court of Culpeper for the settlement of William Major's estate, the object of which petition was to have a proper construction of the said fourth clause of his will. As much of this clause as is necessary to be stated is as follows: "4th Clause. I give to my executors here inafter named, or to that one who for the time being shall qualify and act as such, the sum of $6,000, in trust for the sole and separate use of my daughter, Elizabeth T. C. Jameson, wife of John Jameson, for and during her life; and after her death the same is to be equally divided amongst her surviving children and the issue of such as may be dead, such issue taking per stirpes and not per capita," etc. The admitted facts are that "William Major, Sr., died in the year 1848; Elizabeth T. C. Jameson died in the year 1871. At the death of William Major, Sr., Corbin D. Jameson, son of Elizabeth T. C. Jameson, was living. Corbin D. Jameson died in 1864, leaving a child, Eliza Corbin Jameson, surviving him, who died in 1865." awarded, upon the ground that the decree on the second of April, 1883, was a final decree as to the matter in hand, and, two years having elapsed before an appeal was applied for, the Statute of Limitations barred the appeal. This question presents neither novelty nor difficulty. As was said by Staples, J., in Ryan v. MeLeod, 32 Gratt. 376: "According to the uniform decisions of this court, a decree which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done by the court, is only to be regarded as final. Vanmeter v. Vanmeter, 3 Gratt. 148; Harvey v. Branson, 1 Leigh, 108. On the other hand, every decree which leaves anything in the cause to be done by the court is interlocutory, as between the parties remaining in court.' In the language of Judge Baldwin in Cocke v. Gilpin, 1 Rob. (Va.) 20: "When the further action of the court in the cause is neces sary to give completely the relief contemplated. then the decree upon which the question arises is to be regarded not as final but as interlocutory." The rule laid down in Cocke v. Gilpin has been repeatedly recognized by this court, and is now the established doctrine." Fleming v. Bolling, 8 Gratt. 292; Ambrouse v. Keller, 22 Gratt. 769, 774; Rawlings v. Rawlings, 75 Va. 76; Elder v. Harris, 75 Va. 68; Battaile v. Maryland Hospital, 76 Va. 63; Pace v. Ficklin, 76 Va 292; Johnson v. Anderson, 76 Va. 766; Wright v. Strother, 76 Va. 857; Miller v. Cook, 77 Va. 806; Norfolk Trust Co. v. Foster, 78 Va 413; Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182; Jones v. Turner, 81 Va. 709; Parker v. Logan, 82 Va. 376. An appeal will lie to this court from a decree adjudicating the principles of a cause, although the same may not be a final decree ( 3454, Code Va.); and an appeal also lies from a final decree; so that a party may ap-ton v. Ayscough, 19 Ves. Jr. 536; 2 Jarman, peal at once from a decree settling the princi- Wills, 736, 738, 740, 741; Taaffe v. Conmee, 10 ples in a cause against him, or he may, at his H. L. Cas. 78; Stone v. Lewis (Va.) 5 S. E. option, await the final decree in the cause and Rep. 282. then appeal. There is no limitation upon the time wherein an appeal will lie from an interlocutory decree settling the principles of the cause, such running only as against the final decree, the statute providing under the law now in force that "No petition shall be presented for an appeal from any final decree which shall have been rendered more than one year before the said petition is presented." Code Va. § 3455. The decree of April 2, 1883, was a decree which adjudicated the principles of the cause; and from it, as such interlocutory decree adjudicating the principles of the cause, the appellant might have appealed, but he was not barred by his failure to do so until the final decree had been rendered in the cause. By the said decree of April 2, 1883, no relief was granted, no money decreed to be paid; something was left for the court to do, and that was to decree the relief prayed for; and that was not done until the 4th of June, 1888, and the appeal was allowed in September following, and was within the statute, which at that time was two years. Code 1873, § 17, chap. 178. The motion to dismiss the appeal must therefore be overruled. The error assigned by the appellant to the decree of April, 1883, is that the circuit court erred in its construction of the fourth clause of the will of William Major, Sr., in decreeing that Kate Jameson, as administratrix of her said child, became entitled to one third part of said legacy of $6,000, with interest from the date of the death of Elizabeth T. C. Jameson, and insists that the rule which reads a gift to survivors simply, as applying to objects living at the death of the testator, is confined to those cases in which there is no other period to which survivorship can be referred, and that, where such gift is preceded by a life or other prior interest, it takes effect in favor of those who survive the period of distribution, and of those only; citing 3 Jarman on Wills, 5th Am. ed. p. 588; Van Tilburgh v. Hollinshead, 14 N. J. Eq. 32; Williamson v. Chamberlain, 10 N. J. Eq. 373; Slack v. Bird, 23 N. J. Eq. 238; Hill v. Rockingham Bank, 45 N. H. 270; Sinton v. Boyd, 19 Ohio St. 30; Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 77. That when a testator uses the words "my surviving children," the court should determine that he meant to refer to those surviving him; but when he refers to the surviving children of another, he should be held to refer to those only who survive such other. The bequest to "my daughter for and during her life, and after her death the same to be equally divided amongst her surviving children," standing alone, provides for the children of the life tenant, and for them only who survive their mother. But the words " and the issue of such as may be dead, such issue taking per stirpes and not per capita,” raise a question of some difficulty, and the precise question appears to have been decided not always uniformly. When the payment of a legacy is postponed to a period subsequent to the decease of the testator, if futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended; but if it appears to relate to the time of payment only, it vests instanter. If the bequest is to a person at the age of twenty-one years, or at the end of a definite period after the death of the testator, or is made contingent upon the happening of some future event, as the death of the life tenant before the death of the legatee, the vesting, not the payment merely, is deferred; and, consequently, when the legatee dies before the period ends or the contingency happens, the legacy fails. It would be otherwise, obviously, if the legacy should be given in the first instance to the legatee and then payment postponed: and when the question arises upon the construction of a clause substituting the children of legatees who die before the period of distribution or enjoyment, if there are express provisions requiring the children thus substituted to survive in like manner such period or event, the rule would be the same as to them. But that is not this case. Here we have no express requisition that the children thus substituted shall survive such period; and the question is whether the substituted gift is by necessary intendment to be construed as applying only to such issue as may happen to be living at such period, or whether the issue surviving the parent are absolutely entitled-in other words, whether the gift to the issue is by implication subject to the same contingency of survivorship as the gift to the parents. Before any adjudication upon this, Mr. Jarman says, the prevalent notion seems to have been that in such cases it was not allowable to ingraft on the gift to the issue an implied qualification, in order to assimilate their interests to that of their parents; V. C. Wood observing in Re Wildman's Trusts, 1 Johns. & H. 302, which was approved by Turner, L. J., in Re Pell's Trust, 3 DeG. F. & J. 293: "It is said that there is no satisfactory reason why a condition of survivorship should attach to a parent and not to a child-a remark with which This question is one of intention, and the Ì cannot altogether agree, for there is a very cardinal rule is to collect the intention of the considerable difference in the positions of partestator from the whole will taken together, ents and their issue. It is intelligible that a without regard to anything technical: and if gift to children should be limited to those who the intent be lawful-that is, does not create survive the tenant for life, there being a gift perpetuities or violate any rule of law-then over to their issue; but, in the case of issue, the courts will give it effect. Words of sur- why a share should be distributed among vivorship, in cases where these come in ques- surviving issue, giving nothing to the repretion, are to be referred to the period of the sentatives of those who may be dead, is not so death of the testator, unless some contrary in clear. If all are to participate, any of them, tent appears. Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 611, in making arrangements on marriage or other 612; Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79-94; New-wise, may rely upon this, that should he die before the share falls in, his family will take it. | gregor, 2 Coll. Ch. 192 and in Re Kirkman's This observation does not apply to the case Trusts, 3 DeG. & J. 558. of children under a condition that they But in favor of the contrary constructionmust survive the tenant for life, with substi- | that which gave to the child a vested interest tuted gifts to issue; because, notwithstanding at its birth-was the authority of the late the condition of survivorship, their families C. Shadwell in Lyon v. Coward, 15 Sim. 287; are provided for. On the construction that of the late V. C. Parker in Barker v. Barker, would limit the issue entitled to those who sur-5 DeG. & Sm. 753; of V. C. Stuart and L. J. vive the tenant for life, the objects of the testator's bounty are placed in a position which is not such as the testator would desire. To these considerations must be added the inclination of the court to avoid the suspense of shares, as far as can be done consistently with the expressed intention. These considerations have often been held to outweigh the authority of contrary decisions, and it is now settled that children are not by implication required to survive the period of distribution as expressed with regard to their parents, in whose place they stand, whether the gift to the issue be original, as when it is to such of a class of legatees as survive the period of distribution and the issue of such as are then dead, or strictly substitutional-that is, devesting a previous vested gift to the par ent. In the late case of Martin v. Holgate, decided in the House of Lords in 1866 ( L. R. I H. L. Cas. 175), the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth) said: "There has been a conflict of decisions on this question, and I do not hesitate to say that in the course of the argument, and even since, my mind has from time to time considerably fluctuated. I have come to the conclusion that the appellant is right.' The decision by the Master of the Rolls is reported in 34 Beav. 79, Holgate v. Jennings. The testator by his will gave the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate and effects, in trust to pay over the annual proceeds there of to my said dear wife, for and during the term of her natural life; and from and immediately after her decease to distribute and divide the whole of my said residuary estate amongst such of my said four nephews and two nieces (naming them) as shall be living at the time of her decease, in equal shares; but if any or either of them should then be dead, leaving issue, then it is my will and meaning that such issue shall be entitled to their father's and mother's share, but in equal proportions." What happened was that the wife survived her husband, and at the death of the testator all these four nephews and nieces were living. Two of the nephews died during the lifetime of the tenant for life, without leaving issue. Another of them, Edward Jennings Martin, died during the lifetime of the widow, leaving a daughter, Augusta Mary Martin, who after wards died an infant, also in the lifetime of the testator's widow; so that, at the death of the widow, only one nephew and two nieces were living. The Master of the Rolls decided that the property became divisible into three parts, and went to the surviving nephew and two nieces; to which the representatives of Augusta Mary Martin excepted and appealed. Turner. And the Lord Chancellor was of the opinion, and it was so decided by the House of Lords, that Augusta Mary Martin took a vested interest in one fourth of the residuary estate of the testator. The case was regarded, however, as one of so great nicety that the costs were decreed out of the testator's estate, the word "issue" being construed to mean children, aud the gift to the children was held not to be substitutional, but an original gift-Lord Chelmsford observing: "It is not to the nephews and nieces absolutely, and, in the event of their dying in the lifetime of the tenant for life, then to their children; but to such of the nephews and nieces as shall be living at the death of the tenant for life, and to the children of such as shall then be dead, leaving children. The share which the children were to take could never have vested in their parents, because it is only in the event of the parents not having become entitled to them that they are given to the children. This distinction between original and substitutional gifts may furnish some aid to the construction of the will. When a gift is substitutional it may much more easily be presumed that a contingency on which the origi nal gift depends is intended to be applied to the gift which comes in its place than in the case of two independent gifts." The case of Austin v. Bristol, 40 Conn. 120, is a case somewhat similar to the one at bar. the grandchild in that case surviving the father (who predeceased the testator), and then dying before the tenant for life. In that case it was held that the grandchild took an immediate vested interest under the will, and that her administrator was entitled, after the death of the widow, to one fifth of the estate; citing Martin v. Holgate, supra, and the subsequent case of Re Orton's Trust, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 375; and the case was decided upon the weight of authority, the Judges expressing some hesitation in the matter. We see no defect in the reason of the rule that if futurity is attached to a gift, which postpones the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended, because the will so provides, and the intention of the testator must be given effect. But if futurity is not expressly attached to the substance of the gift, it is by presumption only that it can be so annexed, and there is no reason to presume it in the case of one gift because it is annexed to another independent gift, and it is more reasonable to presume that the testator expressed his intention than that it was omitted. The taking of the children is expressly postponed to the death of their mother, and the gift is then to such as survive her; but the gift is simply to the issue of such as may be dead, this being a gift to the issue, not of what the The decision of the Master of the Rolls was father took under the will, but of what he sustained by the authority of Lord Langdale could not take, and because he could not take in Bennett v. Merriman, & Beav. 360, and Lord it under the contingency; and the issue took Justice Knight Bruce in Macgregor v. Mac-not by substitution, but an original gift, to |