terfered with, or insulted, or thwarted France; overy change of government has been accepted; every advance indicative of friendship has been courteously received. And yet France keeps up 600,000 men and a first-rate fleet for the purposes of defence! The results of such a policy are obvious. The world will not believe that the French people make these sacrifices merely to insure an independence which nobody threatens. When, year after year, fleets and armies are constant objects of solicitude, when the levy of conscripts never fails, and the dockyards ring continually with the construction of new engines of war, then Austria, Prussia, England, and the whole of Central and Western Europe, are forced to be on their guard also. Thus millions of men are under arms on a Continent where the most cynical politician would not dare to say he expected war.—London Times, 1857.

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.-When asked what plan I would propose for reducing the military establishments of Europe, I cannot say that I have any plan, or that I believe that any one else has; but we may gradually induce such a state of feeling and opinion as would, almost unobservedly, lead to that reduction. Men, I know, are seldom satisfied with these undefined and distant hopes. The human mind delights in specifics, and is apt to believe that for every evil there is a specific remedy. If something hitherto unknown were found out, there would, they are apt to think, be no more wars. But there is no specific, I fear, to be found out for persuading potentates to disband armies; and there is always the pretext, and often the good excuse, for a potentate, that he cannot disband any portion of his army while a neighboring potentate maintains his full force.

Now, who is to begin the good work? Happy indeed would it be for mankind if the work were of a nature that could be left to obscure students to settle. All that they can do is to point out the nature and extent of the evil, and to dwell upon it without exaggerating it; to illustrate, from the rich resources of history, the magnitude of the evil; to prophesy disaster from it, when they can honestly do so, and to show that its consequences are such as in the long run to promote the destruction, rather than the stability, of empires. If they can sow any of this good seed, they must leave it to fructify in the minds of other men of their own time, and in the minds of other men of future generations. For this is not an evil that will be cured in a day.

LIBERTY AND STANDING ARMIES.

It is time for our statesmen to treat the question of increasing our army as one above the ordinary range of party politics, and to re-affirm on this subject the sentiments of our ancestors. They deprecated such armies as the chief foes of liberty. Taught in the stern school of experience, and by the no less impressive lessons of national tradition, they hesitated even to trust the work of the Revolution to any forces of this character. Almost any other resort was to be preferred to this.

And if they had good reasons for such fears, the example of Washington, returning from military command when the strife was won, the symbol of an army melting away when the occasions of liberty no longer required its existence, was then in the future, and so unlike the examples

of history, that vigilant patriots might be excused for regarding the anticipation of it as an illusion of fancy. Philip of Macedon had subdued the militia of the Greek Republic by a standing army, and Rome had carried her conquests to the end of the world by this terrible enginery. Feudal and municipal liberties in Europe fell before standing armies, like grass before the scythe. When Charles VII. of France had learned the secret of English success in his wars with England, the power of troops comparatively regular over feudal militia, and had gained permission to keep a standing army, the sequel was as certain as fate. He levied subsidies without the concurrence of the States-General, the sword gave him the purse; and, with sword and purse in his hand, the cities, the nobility, even the clergy, were not long in coming to his feet. Louis XI. improved on this example. Inheriting a standing army, that army was the irresistible means of its own increase; its increase rendered necessary a more grind. ing taxation, and that taxation was readily enforced. Charles VIII. put Italy in terror by his standing army, and its cities opened their gates to him, with a sense of utter helplessness against the disciplined invaders.

Standing armies inaugurated in one nation became at length a necessity for neighboring nations, who were not slow in learning the fatal lesson. They sprang up everywhere, props of despotism at home, and the terrible agents of kings and courtiers in the game of centuries for the balance of power in Europe. Since their rise in modern Europe, they have almost never served a good cause, except as God has overruled the madness of human passion to his praise. In the sacred name of order they have stifled liberty as their habitual vocation. To-day all Europe groans under the burden of taxation for the support of this monstrously expensive nonproducing class, and they serve no earthly purpose but to keep up the pageantry of courts, and perpetuate the servitude of the people.

Among the causes to which, under God, we owe our liberties, is the fact that England was able, by her insulated position, to keep clear in part from the fatal mesh which spread itself over the Continent-the advantages of position still further favored by the power of the nobility, whose union among themselves enabled them to resist the encroachments of the royal prerogative, and by the influence of the commons, whom it was necessary for kings to encourage as a make weight against the nobility, and who were not likely to bring upon themselves knowingly the scourge of a standing army. Alas, when nobles or commons did yield, they suf fered an experience which became monitory; and, as if to make the circle of their experience complete, it was left for the armies of Cromwell to show that military power may become the bane and downfall of a republic.

So taught, our fathers feared standing armies with a most salutary dread. They believed that we could do without them, and our trial of their scheme has proved satisfactory. We have had in times of peace only the nucleus of an army, a sort of military police, and a defence against Indians. It is left for these degenerate days to witness the maintenance of military force for the terror and control of our own citizens; and our experience in that direction has been too much like that which made our fathers jealous of standing armies, to encourage the increase of such bodies but for reasons most palpable and imperative. A standing rmy is the only external force which can destroy our liberties.--Bap

ist Examiner.

MASSACHUSETTS MILITIA.

The militia system has ever been a pet with politicians; and Gov. Banks, after giving it a cold shoulder in his first message three years ago, has since atoned very fully for that slight by an excess of zeal in its behalf. He has made we know not how many elaborate addresses in its praise on sundry muster-fields; and we must do him the justice to say, that. he has succeeded quite beyond our expectations in redeeming it for the time being from some of the most serious objections to which it had been so justly exposed. We have no faith in the thoroughness or permanency of its reform, as we deem it in these respects incurable; but we are glad to acknowledge and chronicle any proofs of amendment.

"The enrolled militia of the Commonwealth," says Gov. Banks in his last annual message, "numbers 157,848 men, an increase of 4,277 on the number of last year. The active uniformed militia numbers 5,736 men. Seven companies have been disbanded during the year for non-compliance with the law.

The expenditures of the department during the year, excluding salaries, amounted to $64,057, a reduction upon the preceding year of $1,372, and, making allowance for the excess of men in 1859 compared with 1858, of more than $4,000.

THE STATE ENCAMPMENT.

Departing from the general usage, the troops were brought into camp in full force at Concord, during the third week in September last. The camp was established at Concord chiefly on account of advantages offered the troops, more liberal than the terms proposed by those connected with other localities. It was honored by the presence of both Houses of the Legislature, by Major-General Wool, of the Army of the United States, and by the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company. The general interest of the troops is exhibited in the fact that, of an entire force of 5,736 officers and men, but 413 absentees were reported. It is believed that the drill of the troops was never more constant in camp, their discipline and organization never more effective, and, assuming the maintenance of a well-regulated militia to be necessary, it presented a military force of which any State in the world might be proud.

The advantages of the State encampment were manifold. It cost the Commonwealth and the troops less than the camp of any preceding year. With exception of six companies from the western counties, whose expenses were returned by the Legislature,-all the troops were, for the first time, without any transport or forage charges whatever, making a sum saved to them upon estimate, of $4,700. Other charges incidental to this department, including the increased number of men, were $1,374 less than in 1858; $8,000 less than 1857; $12,481 less than in 1856; and including the reduced expenses of the troops, with the reduction to the State, upwards of $18,000 less than in 1854. The cost of the department, excluding salaries, has been for the last six years as follows:

The troops during the continuance of the camp were constantly under orders. Strict discipline was maintained; public order was in no instance disturbed; intoxicating liquors were, as a general rule, excluded from the head-quarters of commanding officers, and from the field; and the troops received the benefit of extended marches, of drill by regiments, brigades and divisions, and in concerted line and field movements of the three divisions.

But the great public advantages of the camp, in my estimation, is the test to which for the first time it subjected the habits and character of our people. When first contemplated, representations were made by competent police authorities, that with six thousand troops in camp, for nearly five days, with such concourse of spectators, as must be drawn together, it would be impossible to avoid scenes of violence and public disorder, or crime and loss of life. Nearly six thousand troops were in camp for the better part of five days and four nights. A hundred thousand spectators were present in the course of three days of active military duty. No disturbance arose, not an affray occurred, not a fruit garden was invaded, not the slightest injury to person or property was reported. But eleven persons were arrested in the town during the week, of whom seven were discharged without examination, two paid slight fines, and one was bound over for passing a worthless bill-all offences, except the last, of the most trivial character."

Here is doubtless as plausible a plea as can well be made in behalf of our militia system; but, after all, will it, in the judgment of sober, thoughtful men, justify its continuance for an hour? It seems, from the Governor's figures, that it has, during the last six years, cost the State alone an average of some $72,000 a year, "excluding salaries." The cost to the troops themselves, including time and expenses, must have been several times as much more; and we have seen the sum total expenses of the military display at Concord reckoned, in all, at several hundred thousand dollars. We doubt whether even this sum would cover all the loss to the community; but, were it only a tenth part this amount, what equivalent could it show for even such an expenditure? What good does it all do, or what necessity is there for it? In such a community as ours, with a civil police organized in every city, and in our country towns the whole people a virtual police, we can hardly conceive an emergency among ourselves that could not be fully met without the military. As to defence against invasion, why, since the British troops evacuated Boston, more than eighty years ago, not an invader has once set foot upon our soil' nor is there the slightest danger that any one ever will. But, if there should, we have in our 160,000 citizens liable to military service on any such emergency, all the defenders we can ever need. Why should the State and individuals sperd in time and money several hundred thousand dollars every year to prepare for what is likely never to occur, and, if it should, might as well be met by other means always on hand?

The moral character of the late encampment, so exempt from the evils of former musters, we must regard as a temporary exception to a general rule. The Governor and the prominent officers of the militia had been working hard and long to obviate in that case the objections so justly

charged on these parades. For once they succeeded; but, however creditable, the success of one year cannot wipe out or countervail the failure of twenty. The general rule is pretty sure to prevail hereafter as heretofore.

ORDINARY TREATMENT OF SOLDIERS.

66

"There were," says John Henry, in giving his own experience, on the island in New York, a number of carts, to which eight or ten men were attached, with leather harness, and in them they hauled wood, brick, stone, and did all the work incident to a garrison. But the soldier is better off on an island than on the main land. They generally have the privilege of the island from sun to sun, whereas, on the main land, they are shut up in small forts, perhaps three or four hundred in an enclosure of ten or fifteen rods square, never permitted to go outside without a written pass from an officer, except when they are taken out to work, and then under the command of a non-commissioned officer and a guard. When they have a pass, and stay out a little over the time allotted for their return, the guard-house, for a month or more, is their portion at night, and hard labor by day, with a ball weighing eighteen to twenty-four pounds fastened to the leg with a chain, and a part of their rations are stopped.

I have seen men, for a trifling offence, made to kneel in front of the line, their heads shaved, their clothes patched with all kinds of colors, a ball and chain on their leg, part of their rations stopped, and then sent to work out the remainder of their time on the fortifications at Mobile, New Orleans, or some other sickly place, without pay. In 1820, when I was at Detroit, a detachment of prisoners from Plattsburg, Greenbush, and other places, was brought there, on their way to St. Joseph's. Each man had a collar of iron around his neck; they were united two and two by a chain, the thumb of the right hand of one made fast to the thumb of the left hand of the other, and in this manner they were marched from the boat to the fort.

I never knew a man of the rank and file to have a bed in the barrack. There are bunks three stories high, each bunk holding two men. They have board bottoms, so that they have one blanket under and one over, summer and winter. While on Governor's island, a man in the same company with myself got some cloth and made a sack, and filled it with the falling leaves of the Lombardy populars, in order to have a bed. He enjoyed it one night; the next day he was made to throw it way, and take a flogging with a raw hide to pay for the luxury. The life of a slave on the plantation, or a convict in the penitentiary, is for the time being preferable to the life of the American soldier.

CONTINENTAL MONEY:

ONE OF THE FINANCIAL EVILS INSEPARABLE FROM WAR.

Our forefathers drew the sword in part to relieve themselves from the burden of taxes, like that of the stamp act, and the tea duty, imposed by the British Government. Let us see one of the manifold pecuniary evils which that war drew upon them in what is called Continental Money, issued on the public faith to meet the emergency.

The whole amount of this money, says the biographer of James Sulli