ored race from all the disqualifications, as well as all the bondage, of the slave system, belong to American and not to English history. But the Alabama dispute led to consequences which are especially important to England, and which shall be described in their due time. Meanwhile, it is necessary, for the proper appreciation of the final terms of settlement, that we should see exactly how the dispute arose, and what was the condition of public feeling in this country at the time when it grew into serious proportions. If the final settlement was felt to be humiliating in England, it must be owned that those who are commonly called the governing classes had themselves very much to blame. Their conviction that the Civil War must lead to the disruption of the Union was at the bottom of much of the indifference and apathy which for a long time was shown by English officials in regard to the remonstrances of the United States. The impression that we might do as we liked with the North was made only too obvious. The United States must, indeed, then have felt that they were receiving a warning that to be weak is to be miserable. It is not surprising if they believed at that time that England was disposed to adopt Sir Giles Overreach's way of thinking "We worldly men, when we see friends and kinsmen Upon their heads to press them to the bottom." It is not certain that the supporters of the Southern side at any time actually outnumbered the champions of the North and of the Union; but they seemed for the greater part of the war's duration to have the influence of the country mainly with them. A superficial observer might have been excused at one time if he said that England, as a whole, was on the side of the secession. This would have been a very inaccurate statement of the case; but the inaccuracy would have been excusable, and even natural. The vast majority of what are called the governing classes were on the side of the South. By far the greater number of the aristocracy, of the official world, of members of Parliament, of military and naval men, were for the South. London club life was virtually all Southern. The most powerful papers in London, and the most popular papers as well, were open partisans of the Southern Confederation. In London, to be on the side of the Union was at one time to be eccentric, to be un-English, to be Yankee. On the other hand, most of the great democratic towns of the midland and of the north were mainly in favor of the Union. The artisans everywhere were on the same side. This was made strikingly manifest in Lancashire. The supply of cotton from America nearly ceased in consequence of the war, and the greatest distress prevailed in that county. The "cotton famine," called by no exaggerated name, set in. All that private benevolence could do, all that legislation, enabling money to be borrowed for public works to give employment, could do, was for a time hardly able to contend against the distress. Yet the Lancashire operatives were among the sturdiest of those who stood out against any proposal to break the blockade or to recognize the South. Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright, and the Manchester School generally, or at least all that were left of them, were for the North. A small but very influential number of thoughtful men, Mr. John Stuart Mill at their head, were faithful to their principles, and stood firmly by the cause of the Union. But the voice of London; that is, the voice of what is called society, and of the metropolitan shopkeeping classes who draw their living from society-all this was for the South. It was not a question of Liberal and Tory. The Tories, on the whole, were more discreet than the Liberals. It was not from the Conservative benches of the House of Commons that the bitterest and least excusable denunciations of the Northern cause and of the American Republic were heard. It was a Liberal who declared with exultation that "the republican bubble" had burst. It was a Liberal-Mr. Roebuck—who was most clamorous for English intervention to help the South. It was Lord Russell who described the struggle as one in which the North was striving for empire and the South for independence. It was Mr. Gladstone who said that the President of the Southern Confederation-Mr. Jefferson Davis-had made an army, had made a navy, and more than that, had made a nation. On the other hand, it is to be remarked that among the Liberals, even of the official class, were to be seen some of the stanchest advocates of the Northern cause. The Duke of Argyle championed the cause from warm sympathy; Sir George Lewis from cool philosophy. Mr. Charles Villiers and Mr. Milner Gibson were frankly and steadily on the side of the North. The Conservative leaders, on the whole, behaved with great discretion. Mr. Adams wrote, in July, 1863, that "the Opposi tion leaders are generally disinclined to any demonstrations whatever. Several of them, in reality, rather sympathize with us. But the body of their party continue animated by the same feelings to America which brought on the Revolution, and which drove us into the war of 1812." Lord Derby, indeed, expressed his conviction that the Union never could be restored; but Lord Palmerston had done the same. Mr. Disraeli abstained from saying anything that could of fend any Northerner, and gave no indication of partisanship on either side. Lord Stanley always spoke like a fair and reasonable man, who understood thoroughly what he was talking about. In this he was, unfortunately, somewhat peculiar among the class to which he belonged. Not many of them appeared precisely to know what they were talking about. They took their opinions, for the most part, from the Times and from the talk of the clubs. The talk of the clubs was that the Southerners were all gentlemen and very nice fellows, who were sure to win; and that the Northerners were low, trading, shopkeeping fellows who did not know how to fight, were very cowardly, and were certain to be defeated. There was a theory that the Northerners really rather liked slavery, and would have it if they could, and that a negro slave in the South was much better off than a free negro in the Northern States. The geography of the question was not very clearly understood in the clubs. Those who endeavored to show that it was not easy to find a convenient dividing line for two federations on the North American continent were commonly answered that the Mississippi formed exactly the suitable frontier. It was an article of faith with some of those who then most eagerly discussed the question in London, that the Mississippi flowed east and west, and separated neatly the seceding States from the States of the North. The Times was the natural instructor of what is called society in London, and the Times was, unfortunately, very badly informed all through the war. After the failure of General Lee's attempt to carry invasion into the North, and the simultaneous capture of Vicksburg by General Grant, any one, it might have been thought, who was capable of forming an opiņion at all must have seen that the flood-tide of the rebellion had been reached and was over; that the South would have to stand on the defensive from that hour, and that the overcoming of its defence, considering the comparative resources of the belligerents, was only a question of time. Yet for a whole year or more the London public were still assured that the Confederates were sweeping from victory to victory; that wherever they seemed even to undergo a check, that was only a part of their superior policy, which would presently vindicate itself in greater victory; that the North was staggering, crippled and exhausted; and that the only doubt was whether General Lee would not at once march for Washington and establish the Southern Government there. Almost to the very hour when the South, its brave and brilliant defence all over, had to confess defeat and yield its broken sword to the conquerors, the London public were still invited to believe that Mr. Davis was floating on the full flood of success. While the hearts of all in Richmond were filled with despair, and the final surrender was accounted there a question of days, the Southern sympathizers in London were complacently bidden to look out for the full triumph and the assured independence of the Southern Confederation. On the last day of December, 1864, the Times complained that "Mr. Seward and other teachers or flatterers of the multitude still affect to anticipate the early restoration of the Union," and in three months from that date the rebellion was over. Those who read and believed in such instruction and up to the very last their name was legion -must surely have been bewildered when the news came of the capture of Richmond and the surrender of Lee. They might well have thought that only some miraculous intervention of a malignant fate could thus all at once have converted victory into defeat, and turned the broken, worthless levies of Grant and Sherman into armies of conquerors. In the end the Southern population were as bitter against us as the North. The Southern States fancied themselves deceived. They too had mistaken the unthinking utterances of what is called society in England for the expression of English statesmanship and public feeling. It is proper to assert distinctly that at no time had the English Government any thought of acting on the suggestion of the Emperor of the French and recognizing the South. Lord Palmerston would not hear of it, nor would Lord Russell. What might have come to pass if the Southern successes had continued a year longer it would be idle now to conjecture; but up to the turning-point our statesmen had not changed, and after the turning-point change was out of the question. There is nothing to blame in the conduct of the English Government throughout all this trying time, except as regards the manner in which they dismissed the remonstrances about the building of the privateers. But it is not likely that impartial history will acquit them of the charge of having been encouraged in their indifference by the common conviction that the Union was about to be broken up, and that the North was no longer a formidable power. CHAPTER XLV. PALMERSTON'S LAST VICTORY. DURING the later months of his life the Prince Consort had been busy in preparing for another great International Exhibition to be held in London. It was arranged that this Exhibition should open on May 1st, 1862; and although the sudden death of the Prince Consort greatly interfered with the prospects of the undertaking, it was not thought right that there should be any postponement of the opening. The Exhibition building was erected in South Kensington, according to a design by Captain Fowke. It certainly was not a beautiful structure. None of the novel charm which attached to the bright exterior of the Crystal Palace could be found in the South Kensington building. It was a huge and solid erection of brick, with two enormous domes, each in shape so strikingly like the famous crinoline petticoat of the period that people amused themselves by suggesting that the principal idea of the architect was to perpetuate for posterity the shape and structure of the Empress Eu |