NATIONAL BANK.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 3.
NEGLIGENCE.
See RAILROAD, 6.
1. By an agreement of partnership between A, B, and C, A sold, for sums
specified, to B one half, and to C one fourth, of his interest in certain
bonds of a railroad corporation, secured by mortgage, retaining one
fourth himself, and was to hold the bonds as collateral security for
the payment of those sums; the whole amount of the bonds was to be
held together, and neither partner was to sell or dispose of the whole
or any part of his interest without the consent of the others; "but A
shall have the privilege of selling the whole amount of bonds at his
discretion at any time, and apply the proceeds to the payment of said
sums due to him; " or A might, if he deemed best, foreclose the mort-
gage; and the proceeds of a foreclosure, " or, if the bonds are sold, the
net proceeds of the sale, after paying the said sums of money and ex-
penses of foreclosure, shall be considered as due to each party in pro-
portion as the bonds are now held, but may be held by A as collateral
security for the payment of the aforesaid sums respectively;" and
special provisions were made for the application to the payment of
certain small debts, and for the distribution among the partners, of
"any profits arising from the sale, foreclosure, or any other disposition
of said bonds." Upon a contract made by A for a sale of the bonds,
which was not carried out, he received in part payment stock in an-
other corporation; and he afterwards sold the bonds to another per-
son for cash, retaining this stock. Held, that he was not bound, ov
receiving the stock, to apply it at once to the payment of the sums due
him from his copartners, but might hold it as the property of all the
partners under the partnership agreement. Simonton v. Sibley, 220.
2. A person who conducts himself with reference to the general public in
such a way as to induce a person, acting with reasonable caution, to
believe that he is a partner in a partnership, is liable as such to a
creditor of the partnership who contracted with it under such belief,
although he may not be in fact a partner. Sun Insurance Co. v.
Kountz Line, 583.
3. The conduct of the several appellees towards the general public in their
business relations with each other was such as to induce a shipper,
acting with reasonable caution, to believe that they had formed a
combination in the nature of a partnership, or were engaged as joint
traders under the name of the Kountz Line. Ib.
1. The reissued letters-patent No. 4372, issued to Nelson W. Green, May
9, 1871, for an improved method of constructing artesian wells, are for
the process of drawing water from the earth by means of a well driven
in the manner described in the patent, and are for the same invention
described and claimed in the original letters-patent issued to Green,
January 14, 1868. It is a reasonable inference from the language em-
ployed in the original description that the tube, in the act of being
driven into the earth, to and into a water-bearing stratum, would form
an air-tight connection with the surrounding earth, and that the pump
should be attached to it by an air-tight connection. The changes
made in the amended specification did not enlarge the scope of the
patent, or describe a different invention; but only supplied a defi-
ciency in the original description, by describing with more particularity
and exactness the means to be employed to produce the desired result.
The omission in the second claim of the words, "where no rock is to
be penetrated," which are found in the first claim, did not change the
obvious meaning of the original claim. Eames v. Andrews, 40.
2. The reissued letters-patent No. 4372, to Nelson W. Green, were not for
the same subject as the letters-patent issued to James Suggett, March
29, 1864, and do not conflict with them; nor was the invention
patented in them anticipated in any of the publications referred to in
the opinion of the court within the rule as to previous publications
laid down in Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516; Cohn v. United States
Corset Co., 93 U. S. 366; and Downton v. Yeagher Milling Co., 108
U. S. 466. lb.
3. The evidence shows a clear case of infringement on the part of the
defendant in error.
4. The case of Eames v. Andrews, just decided, is applied to the issues in
this case, so far as they are identical with those in that case. Beedle
v. Bennett, 71.
5. The use of this invention by the inventor in the manner stated in the
opinion of the court, and his delay in applying for a patent under the
circumstances therein detailed for more than two years prior to his
application, did not constitute an abandonment of his invention, or a
dedication of it to the public, and did not forfeit his right to a patent
under the law, as it stood at the time of his application. Ib.
6. The use by the respondents of driven wells for their personal use on their
farms, which wells were operated by means of the process patented to
Green, constituted an infringement of that patent. Ib.
7. Claim 3 of letters-patent No. 215,679, granted to George Bartholomae,
as assignee of Leonard Meller and Edmund Hoffman, as inventors,
May 20, 1879, for an "improvement in processes for making beer,"
namely, "3. The process of preparing and preserving beer for the
market, which consists in holding it under controllable pressure of
carbonic acid gas from the beginning of the kraeusen stage until such
time as it is transferred to kegs and bunged, substantially as described,”
is a valid claim to the process it purports to cover. New Process Fer
mentation Co. v. Maus, 413.
8. The state of the art of brewing beer, so far as it concerns the invention
of the patentees, explained. Ib.
See CONTRACT, 2;
EQUITY PLEADING, 3;
JURISDICTION, B.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See INSURANCE, 2,
S. contracted with D. in writing, in which, after reciting that D. had pur
chased 400 shares of a certain stock at $50 per share, S., in considera-
tion of one dollar, agreed at the end of one year from date if D. desired
to sell the shares at the price paid, to purchase them of him and pay
that amount with interest. When the time expired, D. elected to sell,
and tendered the stock; and, S. refusing to take it and pay for it, D.
sued him for the contract price, declaring on a contract whereby the
plaintiff sold and agreed to deliver the defendant 400 shares of the
stock at $50 per share, to be paid by defendant on delivery, in consid-
eration whereof the defendant undertook and promised to accept the
stock and pay for the same on delivery. Held, That this declaration
set forth properly the legal effect of the contract, and the omission of
the statement of the nominal consideration was immaterial, and need
not be proved. Struthers v. Drexel, 487.
See LOCAL LAW, 1;
MANDAMUS, 1, 2;
TRESPASS ON THE CASE, 2;
WARRANTY.
1. When exceptions taken by the plaintiff to a ruling in favor of the
defendant at one trial have been erroneously sustained and a new trial
ordered, and a contrary ruling upon the same point at the second
trial has been erroneously affirmed upon exceptions taken by the
defendant, this court, upon a writ of error sued out by him, will not,
on reversing the judgment of affirmance, direct judgment to be entered
on the first verdict, but will only order that the second verdict be set
aside and another trial had. Shepherd v. Thompson, 231.
2. The assignment or error in this case is precise and specific, and com-
plies with the requirement of the rule in that respect.
Clinton v.
Missouri Pacific Railway, 469.
3. No exceptions were necessary to bring before this court the judgment
of the Circuit Court below dismissing the appeal from the Cass County
Court to the District Court of that county. Ib.
4. When a cause is removed from a state court to à Cireuit Court of the
United States, the transcript from the state court forms part of the
record in the Circuit Court, and in any writ of error from this court
necessarily becomes a part of the record here. Ib.
5. V. sued to recover mining ground. Defendant answered, and V. filed a
replication. V. transferred his interest in the mine to a company.
The company appeared, was substituted as plaintiff, and filed a new
complaint, substantially identical with the first, to which the defend-
ant filed a new answer, substantially like the first answer.
No repli-
cation was filed to this. The parties went to trial without objection
for want of a plea of replication, and judgment was entered for plain-
tiff. Held, That it was too late to take the objection in this court.
Argentine Mining Co. v. Terrible Mining Co., 478.
6. The instructions asked by the defendant below were sound in law; but
their refusal worked him no injury, as, when the jury found the dis-
puted fact in favor of the plaintiff, the principle involved in the
instruction asked cut off the right asserted by the defendant. Ib.
7. If a record in error contains the charge in full, with a memorandum at
the close that certain portions are excepted to, but they are not veri-
fied or included in a proper bill of exception, it is not part of the
record for any purpose. Struthers v. Drexel, 487.
1. The joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress of March 2, 1861,
12 Stat. 251, relinquishing to the state of Iowa certain lands along the
Des Moines River above the mouth of Raccoon Fork, did not oper-
ate to determine the withdrawal of all the lands on that river above
Raccoon Fork from entry and preëmption which was originally made
in 1850, and which was continued in force from that time and of
which renewed notice was given in May, 1860: that resolution was
only a congressional recognition of the title which had passed to
grantees of the state of Iowa to lands certified to the state under the
act of 1846, which certificates had been held by this court in Dubuque
& Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66, to have been issued with-
out authority of law. Bullard v. Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railroad.
167.
2. The court rested its judgment in this case, 121 U. S. 325, not upon the
fact of the grant to Beaubien and Miranda being an empresario grant.
but upon the fact that Congress, having confirmed it as made to Beau-
bien and Miranda, and as reported for confirmation by the Surveyor
General of New Mexico to Congress, without qualification as to its
extent, acted in that respect entirely within its power, and that its
action was conclusive upon the court. Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 365.
8. The court stated in its former opinion, and repeats now, its conviction
that the grant by Armijo to Beaubien and Miranda described the
boundaries in such a manner that Congress must have known that the
grant so largely exceeded twenty-two leagues that there could be no
question upon that subject, and it must have decided that the grant
should not be limited by the eleven leagues of the Mexican law. lb.
4. The court repeats the conviction expressed in its former opinion, with
further reasous in support of it, that Beaubien, in the petition which
he presented against the intrusion of Martinez, did not refer to his
own grant as being only fifteen or eighteen leagues, but to the grant
under which Martinez was claiming. 1b.
5. The court assumes that references in the petition to newly discovered
and material evidence touching the fraudulent character of the grant
are addressed to the Secretary of the Interior and the Attorney Gen-
eral, as the rehearing in this court can be had only on the record before
the court, as it came from the Circuit Court. Ib.
6. The court remains entirely satisfied that the grant, as confirmed by
Congress, is a valid grant; that the survey and the patent issued upon
it, as well as the original grant by Armijo, are free from fraud on the
part of the grantees or those claiming under them; and that the decis-
ion could be no other than that made in the Circuit Court, and affirmed
by this court. Ib.
1. There is no rule of law to restrict railroad companies as to the curves they
shall use in its freight stations and its yards, where the safety of pas-
sengers and of the public are not involved. Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand
Haren & Milwaukee Railway, 189.
2. The engineering question as to the curves proper to be made in the
track of a railroad within the freight stations or the yards of the rail-
road company is not a question to be left to a jury to determine. Ib.
3. Brakemen and other persons employed by a railroad company within the
freight stations and the yards of the company, when they accept the
employment assume the risks arising from the nature of the curves
existing in the track, and the construction of the cars used by the
company; and they are bound to exercise the care and caution which
the perils of the business demand. Ib.
4. Rails and other articles which become affixed to and a part of a railroad
covered by a prior mortgage, will be held by the lien of such mort-
gage in favor of bona fide creditors, as against any contract between
the furnisher of the property and the railroad company, containing a
stipulation that the title to the property shall not pass till the property
is paid for, and reserving to the vendor the right to remove the prop-
erty. Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 267.
5. Notice of such a contract to a purchaser of bonds covered by such mort-
gage will not affect his rights if he purchased the bonds from those
who were bona fide holders of them, free from any such notice. Ib.
6. The foreman of a section gang on a railway, knowing that a train was
approaching, ran his hand-car into a deep cut, and was struck by the
train and injured. He sued the company to recover damages for the
injury, claiming that there was negligence on the part of the engineer
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