The provision in the New York charter of 1873, chap. 335, authorizing the police board to remove a police officer on charges made under its rules. The police commissioners "are a subordinate and an administrative tribunal, vested with disciplinary powers, and not a court limited in its functions, within the provisions of the Constitution." People ex rel. Flanagan v. Board of Police (1883) 93 N. Y. 97.

The provisions of the New York city tax law of 1843, chap. 230, authorizing summary proceedings for the collection of unpaid taxes. Proceedings for the assessment and collection of taxes are administrative, and not judicial. McMahon v. Palmer (1886) 102 N. Y. 176, 55 Am. Rep. 796, 6 N. E. 400, affirmed in (1889) 133 U. S. 660, 33 L. ed. 772, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, citing Re New York Protestant Episcopal Public School (1864) 31 N. Y. 574.

The New York rapid transit act, 1898, chap. 4 Re Rapid Transit R. Comrs. (1892) 65 Hun, 63, 19 N. Y. Supp. 561.

The provision of the New York consolidation act of 1882, chap. 410, as amended by chap. 84, Laws 1887, which authorizes the board of health to require a supply of water in tenement houses under specified conditions. Health Department v. Trinity Church (1895) 145 N. Y. 32, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579, 39 N. E. 833.

An order of the health department of the city of New York, prohibiting the occupation of certain premises until prescribed repairs had been made. No notice of the order was given and none was required, for the action of the health department was not final and conclusive. Notwithstanding the order, the questions involved were still open to judicial inquiry. Egan v. Health Department (1897) 20 Misc. 38, 45 N. Y. Supp. 325, Sp. T.

The provisions of various statutes relating to the widening of Elm street, in the city of New York. Browning v. Collis (1897) 21 Misc. 155, 47 N. Y. Supp. 76, Sp. T.

The provisions of the New York charter, §§ 707, 712, as amended by the act of 1901, chap. 466, relating to commitments of persons convicted of vagrancy. People ex rel. Abrams v. Fox (1902) 77 App. Div. 245, 79 N. Y. Supp. 56.

Niagara reservation.-The provision in the Niagara Reservation act of 1883, chap. 336, which made final and conclusive the second report of the commissioners appointed to appraise damages. Re State Reservation (1885) 37 Hun, 537, (1886) 102 N. Y. 734, 7 N. E. 916. The same subject was considered in a proceeding under the railroad law. Re Prospect Park & Coney Island R. Co. (1881) 85 N. Y. 489.

VOL. IV. CONST. HIST.-7.

Nuisances.-The metropolitan sanitary district act of 1866, chap. 74, which authorized the board of public health to abate nuisances. Summary proceedings for the abatement of nuisances are due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution. Cooper v. Schults (1866) 32 How. Pr. 107; Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister (1868) 37 N. Y. 661.

The act of 1892, chap. 646, prohibiting in certain localities the business of fat rendering or other specified noxious manufactures. People v. Rosenberg (1893) 67 Hun, 52, 22 N. Y. Supp. 56. The judgment of conviction was reversed on other points in (1893) 138 N. Y. 410, 34 N. E. 285.

Recognizance. The remedy under the act of 1844, chap. 315, which authorizes a summary judgment on a forfeited recognizance.. The execution of a recognizance was a voluntary act, and a waiver of ordinary legal proceedings for its enforcement. People v. Quigg (1874) 59 N. Y. 83.

Summons, substituted service.-Section 435 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for a substituted service of summons. Continental Nat. Bank v. Thurber (1893) 74 Hun, 632, 26 N. Y. Supp. 956, affirmed in (1894) 143 N. Y. 648, 37 N. E. 828.

Taxes. The act of 1873, chap. 119, which authorized boards of supervisors to determine claims for taxes erroneously paid on account of disputed town boundaries. The remedy was cumulative. A town is not deprived of its property without due process of law, and the taxpayers specially interested and the towns were entitled to be heard before the board of supervisors. This, if on reasonable notice, was due process of law. People ex rel. Witherbee v. Essex County (1877) 70 N. Y. 228.

The provisions of the tax law authorizing the collector to levy and sell, for an unpaid tax, any property in the possession of the person from whom the tax is due. "Possession under the statute is not merely a badge of ownership, it is title, so as to subject the property to seizure and sale for a tax against the possessor. . Although the right to take the plaintiff's property for the tax was not adjudged in a judicial proceeding, the act of the legislature and the acts of the administrative officers thereunder, is, we think, due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution." Hersee v. Porter (1885) 100 N. Y. 403, 3 N. E. 338.

The act of 1881, chap. 689, relating to certain public improvements in the town of New Lots, Kings county, directing a levy of the amount due to the state on account of the cancelation of taxes which had been held to be invalid, and directing the apportionment

of the amount on property therein specified, after a hearing by the owners thereof. The property owners were not entitled to be heard as to the aggregate amount to be collected; that subject was within the discretion of the legislature, and the amount could not be changed by any hearing. "The legislature determines expenditures and amounts to be raised for their payment. . . . It may err, but the courts cannot review its discretion." Spencer v. Merchant (1885) 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682, affirmed in (1887) 125 U. S.. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921.

The act of 1882, chap. 287, making a tax deed in certain counties conclusive after a lapse of fifteen years. It does not assume to

cure jurisdictional defects. "It raises a conclusive presumption of regularity, but leaves the question of the assessor's jurisdiction and authority unaffected." Ensign v. Barse (1887) 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401.

The provisions of the Lewis county tax law (chap. 153, Laws 1884, as amended by chap. 215, Laws 1885) prohibiting the owner of land on which the tax has been returned as unpaid, from peeling bark or cutting timber on such land until the tax is paid, subject to a penalty of $500. It is not an unwarrantable interference with the use of property by its owner. He owes a duty to the state, which has a right to preserve the property on which the lien and the tax attaches, and prevent its destruction until the tax is paid. Prentice v. Weston (1888) 111 N. Y. 460, 18 N. E. 720.

Statutes transferring from the comptroller to county treasurers power to sell land for unpaid taxes do not deprive persons of property without due process of law. People v. Ulster County (1885) 36 Hun, 491.

The provision of the charter of the city of New Rochelle, 1899, chap. 128, § 208, fixing the lineal assessment for a local improvement begun under the previous village charter. People ex rel. Scott v. Pitt (1901) 64 App. Div. 316, 72 N. Y. Supp. 191, affirmed in (1902) 169 N. Y. 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662.

The special franchise tax law of 1899, chap. 712. New York ex rel. Brooklyn City R. Co. v. State Tax Comrs. (1905) 199 U. S. 48, 50 L. ed. 79, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713, affirming (1903) 174 N. Y. 417, 63 L. R. A. 884, 67 N. E. 69.

Trusts. The act of 1893, chap. 452, which provided, among other things, that when the beneficiary of the income of personal property should become entitled to the remainder in the trust fund, he might execute a release or conveyance thereof to himself, whereupon the trust estate should cease and determine and the whole estate should be merged in the remainder, or reversion. Re Heinze (1897) 20 Misc. 371, 46 N. Y. Supp. 247. The same subject is considered in

Nuisances.-The metropolitan sanitary district act of 1866, chap. 74, which authorized the board of public health to abate nuisances. Summary proceedings for the abatement of nuisances are due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution. Cooper v. Schults (1866) 32 How. Pr. 107; Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister (1868) 37 N. Y. 661.

The act of 1892, chap. 646, prohibiting in certain localities the business of fat rendering or other specified noxious manufactures. People v. Rosenberg (1893) 67 Hun, 52, 22 N. Y. Supp. 56. The judgment of conviction was reversed on other points in (1893) 138 N. Y. 410, 34 N. E. 285.

Recognizance.-The remedy under the act of 1844, chap. 315, which authorizes a summary judgment on a forfeited recognizance.. The execution of a recognizance was a voluntary act, and a waiver of ordinary legal proceedings for its enforcement. People v. Quigg (1874) 59 N. Y. 83.

Summons, substituted service.-Section 435 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for a substituted service of summons. Continental Nat. Bank v. Thurber (1893) 74 Hun, 632, 26 N. Y. Supp. 956, affirmed in (1894) 143 N. Y. 648, 37 N. E. 828.

Taxes.-The act of 1873, chap. 119, which authorized boards of supervisors to determine claims for taxes erroneously paid on account of disputed town boundaries. The remedy was cumulative. A town is not deprived of its property without due process of law, and the taxpayers specially interested and the towns were entitled to be heard before the board of supervisors. This, if on reasonable notice, was due process of law. People ex rel. Witherbee v. Essex County (1877) 70 N. Y. 228.

The provisions of the tax law authorizing the collector to levy and sell, for an unpaid tax, any property in the possession of the person from whom the tax is due. "Possession under the statute is not merely a badge of ownership, it is title, so as to subject the property to seizure and sale for a tax against the possessor. Although the right to take the plaintiff's property for the tax was not adjudged in a judicial proceeding, the act of the legislature and the acts of the administrative officers thereunder, is, we think, due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution." Hersee v. Porter (1885) 100 N. Y. 403, 3 N. E. 338.

The act of 1881, chap. 689, relating to certain public improvements in the town of New Lots, Kings county, directing a levy of the amount due to the state on account of the cancelation of taxes which had been held to be invalid, and directing the apportionment

of the amount on property therein spectrin... owners thereof. The property owners a as to the aggregate amount to be cau the discretion of the legislature an changed by any hearing. "The er and amounts to be raised for me but the courts cannot review (1885) 100 N. Y. 585, 3 M. E t 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Re

The act of 1882, chap. 28 Th conclusive after a lapse of ime cure jurisdictional defects Tem regularity, but leaves the quest t authority unaffected." Ensig N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401.

The provisions of the Lew: 1884, as amended by ding 2 of land on which the tax ma bark or cutting timber in to a penalty of $500 I 11 the use of property by L பது which has a right to preser the tax attaches, and prevET Prentice v. Weston (18: Statutes transferring irr power to sell land for property without due proce (1885) 36 Hun, 491.

The provision of the cu chap. 128, 208, fixing ment begun under the te Scott v. Pitt (1901) 62 mus in (1902) 169 N. Y. 52= The special franchise rel. Brooklyn City R. C. 50 L. ed. 79, 25 Sup C63 L. R. A. 884, 67 N. E Trusts. The act of 1 things, that when the should become entitie execute a release of trust estate should cea

be merged in the re

C. 371, 46 N. Y. Sug.