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lated by 8 14 of the prohibitory act of 1853, chap. 539, which made a person offending against the act a competent witness against any other person so offending, and he might be compelled to testify in a judicial investigation of the offense, but the testimony so given could not be used against him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal. "If a witness objects to a question on the ground that an answer would criminate himself, he must allege, in substance, that his answer, if repeated as his admission on his own trial, would tend to prove him guilty of a criminal offense." But if he is protected by statute, and the testimony so given cannot be used against him, he is not privileged. People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly (1861) 24 N. Y. 74; People v. Sharp (1887) 107 N. Y. 429, 1 Am. St. Rep. 851, 14 N. E. 319, in which $ 79 of the Penal Code was held constitutional; Perrine v. Striker (1839) 7 Paige, 598, construing the act of 1837, chap. 437, to prevent usury, which guaranteed immunity to a party who might give evidence in an action under the statute.

"No one shall be compelled in any judicial or other proceeding against himself, or upon the trial of issues between others, to disclose facts or circumstances that can be used against him as admissions tending to prove his guilt or connection with any criminal offense of which he may then or afterwards be charged, or the sources from which or the means by which evidence of its commission or of his connection with it may be obtained. . . . Nothing short of absolute immunity from prosecution can take the place of the privilege by which the law affords protection to the witness.” People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes (1894) 143 N. Y. 219, 38 N. E. 303. This rule is reiterated in People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien (1903) 176 N. Y. 253, 68 N. E. 353, with the additional statement that "where the court can see that the refusal to answer is a mere device to protect a third party, and that the witness is in no possible danger of disclosing facts that would lead to his own indictment and conviction, an answer may be insisted upon." In this case the defendant was sustained in his refusal to answer whether he had ever been in a certain building which was alleged to have been used as a gambling place. Section 342 of the Penal Code does not afford a witness full constitutional protection, for the reason that it does not "prevent the use of evidence against him which may be obtained through his testimony, but simply excludes such testimony." This case was decided in October, 1903. The legislature of 1904, by chap. 649, amended § 342 of the Penal Code to read as follows: "No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or

producing any books, papers, or other documents before any court or magistrate, upon any investigation, proceeding, or trial, for a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, upon the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding."

Upon the passage of this law a new proceeding was instituted against the same defendant and involving the rights of the same witness. People ex rel. Lewisohn v. General Sessions Court (1904) 96 App. Div. 201, 89 N. Y. Supp. 364, affirmed November 15, 1904, 179 N. Y. 594, 72 N. E. 1148. Justice Ingraham, writing the opinion in the appellate division, considers the effect of the constitutional declaration that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, and says "the right of a witness to refuse to answer a question upon the ground that it would tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or to disgrace or degrade him is not protected by a constitutional provision. It is within the power of the legislature to determine the extent and limit of the personal right of a witness to refuse to answer questions asked him in the course of a judicial proceeding. The legislature has power to require a witness to answer any question, except so far as he is protected by the constitutional provision which prohibits his being compelled to be a witness against himself, and it follows that if the answers to the questions asked cannot in any way be used against the witness in a criminal proceeding, the provisions of the Constitution are not violated." The new statute was held to give "the witness complete immunity from prosecution for any crime in relation to the acts about which he was interrogated, and if he has this immunity it necessarily follows that compelling him to answer in relation to the crime, although he was directly connected with it, does not compel him to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding." Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. ed. 819, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 369, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, was cited as sufficient authority for sustaining the amended Penal Code section, for the reason that the section is almost identical with the statute under consideration in that case, and that the provision in relation to the

immunity of the witness is the same in the state Constitution as in the Federal Constitution.

The prohibitory law of 1855, chap. 231, did not compel a person to be a witness against himself. People v. Quant (1855) 12 How. Pr. 83, 88.

The right secured by this provision is violated by the forcible examination of a female prisoner for the purpose of ascertaining her condition. People v. McCoy (1873) 45 How. Pr. 216.

This right was not violated by requiring a defendant on a criminal trial to stand up so that a witness could see him for the purpose of identification. The defendant was not thereby compelled to be a witness against himself. People v. Gardner (1894) 144 N. Y. 119, 28 L. R. A. 699, 43 Am. St. Rep. 741, 38 N. E. 1003.

False and fraudulent statements intended to become the basis of an illegal charge for official fees may, even if they have not become public documents, be used against the defendant when produced in response to a subpoena, and such use of them as evidence is not a violation of this provision. The defendant is not thereby compelled to give evidence against himself. People v. Coombs (1899) 158 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 527.

Where private papers of the defendant were unlawfully seized by police officers and used in evidence against him on a prosecution for a crime, his constitutional right was not thereby violated. He was not called as a witness, and was not compelled to give evidence against himself. The possession of the papers was of itself a crime. People v. Adams (1903) 176 N. Y. 359, 63 L. R. A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675, 68 N. E. 636.

Where, as under the act of 1873, chap. 777, to suppress obscene literature, punishment of the offense is seriously augmented if committed by a person of twenty-one years of age or upwards, "it may well be doubted whether the convict would be properly required to expose himself to it by any information supplied by his own oath. That would be making him a witness against himself, which the Constitution of the state has prohibited in criminal cases. Under this restraint the court must act on the best information that can be obtained, and not unfrequently that will be supplied by the prisoner's own appearance." The judge may consult his own senses and act upon the conclusion which they suggest. People ex rel. Ziegler v. Special Sessions Justices (1877) 10 Hun, 224.

Silence no presumption.-In any proceeding by the state to deprive a citizen of his liberty or property, "the facts which in law justify it must be alleged and established. The legislature has no VOL. IV. CONST. HIST.-6.

producing any books, papers, or other documents before any court or magistrate, upon any investigation, proceeding, or trial, for a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, upon the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding."

Upon the passage of this law a new proceeding was instituted against the same defendant and involving the rights of the same witness. People ex rel. Lewisohn v. General Sessions Court (1904) 96 App. Div. 201, 89 N. Y. Supp. 364, affirmed November 15, 1904, 179 N. Y. 594, 72 N. E. 1148. Justice Ingraham, writing the opinion in the appellate division, considers the effect of the constitutional declaration that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, and says "the right of a witness to refuse to answer a question upon the ground that it would tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or to disgrace or degrade him is not protected by a constitutional provision. It is within the power of the legislature to determine the extent and limit of the personal right of a witness to refuse to answer questions asked him in the course of a judicial proceeding. The legislature has power to require a witness to answer any question, except so far as he is protected by the constitutional provision which prohibits his being compelled to be a witness against himself, and it follows that if the answers to the questions asked cannot in any way be used against the witness in a criminal proceeding, the provisions of the Constitution are not violated." The new statute was held to give "the witness complete immunity from prosecution for any crime in relation to the acts about which he was interrogated, and if he has this immunity it necessarily follows that compelling him to answer in relation to the crime, although he was directly connected with it, does not compel him to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding." Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. ed. 819, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 369, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, was cited as sufficient authority for sustaining the amended Penal Code section, for the reason that the section is almost identical with the statute under consideration in that case, and that the provision in relation to the

immunity of the witness is fe the Federal Constitution.

The prohibitory law of = to be a witness against himent Pr. 83, 88.

The right secured by s examination of a female pre condition. People v. MJE

This right was not viclet inal trial to stand up so i pose of identification The to be a witness against

t

Y. 119, 28 L R A. 690 43 Am E False and fraudulent statement an illegal charge for offical iss public documents, be used agant response to a subpoena, and succ violation of this provision

to give evidence against hume: Y. 532, 53 N. E 577

Where private papers of the police officers and used in em for a crime, his constitutiona was not called as a witness am w against himself. The possessor People v. Adams (1903) 171 X Rep. 675, 68 N. E. 636.

Where,

as under the act

literature, punishment of fir mitted by a person of twen well be doubted whether th expose himself to it by an That would be making Constitution of the state this restraint the court me be obtained, and not unire oner's own appearance and act upon the comm Ziegler v. Special Session

Silence no presumption prive a citizen of his justify it must be aliege

VOL. IV. CONSTR

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