ings in the organization of a corporation. Syracuse City Bank v. Davis (1853) 16 Barb. 188.

Elections.-The legislature may ratify an irregular election of a public officer. People v. Flanagan (1876) 66 N. Y. 237.

Repealed statute.-The legislature may ratify the acts of public officers performed under a statute which had inadvertently been repealed, but which was afterwards re-enacted. McKee Land & Improv. Co. v. Williams (1901) 63 App. Div. 553, 71 N. Y. Supp.

1141.

State officers.-Where property has been sold or services rendered to state officers for state purposes with an expectation that compensation would be made therefor, the legislature may ratify the acts of such officers though previously unauthorized. O'Hara v. State (1889) 112 N. Y. 146, 2 L. R. A. 603, 8 Am. St. Rep. 726, 19 N. E. 659.

Towns.-Commissioners of highways by direction of the voters of a town brought an action relating to town affairs in which they were unsuccessful, and were obliged to pay costs. The town refused to reimburse them for these costs. They brought an action against the town to recover the amount and failed. The legislature then passed an act authorizing the question of the payment of the amount to be submitted to and determined by the electors of the town, and at such an election the claim was rejected. Afterwards the legislature passed an act providing for the audit and payment of the claim, and directing that a tax on the town be raised for this purpose. The legislature had power to validate a private claim against a town and require its payment by taxation. Guilford v. Chenango County (1855) 13 N. Y. 143; followed in Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica (1890) 119 N. Y. 204, 23 N. E. 542, sustaining a statute legalizing the acts of town authorities in the purchase and erection of a bridge.

The legislature may validate irregular acts of a town in relation to a subscription to the stock of a railroad company, and the statute for that purpose may be given a retrospective effect. People ex rel. Albany & S. R. Co. v. Mitchell (1866) 35 N. Y. 551.

Unconstitutional acts.-Although an act is unconstitutional, the legislature may, by a subsequent act, direct the expenses incurred by such legislation to be paid. People ex rel. Kingsland v. Bradley (1872) 64 Barb. 228.

The same principle was applied in Knapp v. Newtown (1874) 1 Hun, 268, where it was held that the legislature may require a town to pay bonds issued for a local improvement, though the statute un

der which they were issued is unconstitutional. See also Duanesburgh v. Jenkins (1874) 57 N. Y. 177, where it was held that the legislature might validate irregular acts in relation to railroad aid bonds. Also Rogers v. Stephens (1881) 86 N. Y. 623.

But where the required percentage of a subscription by an individual to the stock of a private corporation had not been paid, and the subscription was therefore invalid, the legislature could not, by an attempted validation of the subscription, make a binding contract between parties when none existed before. It cannot take the private property of one individual without his consent and give it to another. New York & O. Midland R. Co. v. Van Horn (1874) 57 N. Y. 473. The legislative validation of a contract was sustained in Davidge v. Binghamton (1901) 62 App. Div. 525, 71 N. Y. Supp. 282.

So, where town railroad commissioners issued bonds without obtaining the town's consent, such bonds could not be validated by the legislature. "As the legislature had no power to compel the town to issue its bonds in aid of the railroad without its consent, it could not, by subsequent act, dispense with the condition in the original act requiring such consent as a prerequisite to their issue." Hardenbergh v. Van Keuren (1878) 16 Hun, 17. Also Horton v. Thompson (1878) 71 N. Y. 513, where the act of 1871, chap. 809, ratifying certain informalities in railroad aid bonds, was held to be unconstitutional. This act was sustained in Thompson v. Perrine (1880) 103 U. S. 806, 26 L. ed. 612, the court declining to follow the state court.

REMEDY.

The legislature may change the prescribed mode by which rights are to be determined, and such change may be applied to existing conditions. Re Smith (1833) 10 Wend. 449.

"Where the legislature have the power to provide redress for either a public or private wrong, the remedy or mode of redress is wholly a subject of legislative discretion." People ex rel. New York Inebriate Asylum v. Osborn (1870) 57 Barb. 663.

"Legal remedies are, in the fullest sense, under rightful control of the legislatures of the several states, notwithstanding the provision in the Federal Constitution securing the inviolability of contracts; and it is not a valid objection to legislation on that subject that the substituted remedy is less beneficial to the creditors than the one which obtained at the time the debt was contracted." The court sus

tained the act of 1842, chap. 157, which provided for additional exemptions from execution; the law affected the remedy only. Morse v. Goold (1854) 11 N. Y. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 103.

Applied in Johnson v. Ackerson (1870) 40 How. Pr. 222, affirmed in (1871) 3 Daly, 430, sustaining an act requiring an undertaking on the transfer of a cause from a district court to the court of common pleas of New York; also in Cook v. Gregg (1871) 46 N. Y. 439, sustaining the acts relating to animals running at large, 1862, chap. 459, 1867, chap. 814. People ex rel. Witherbee v. Essex County (1877) 70 N. Y. 228; Cole v. State (1886) 102 N. Y. 48, 6 N. E. 277, where it is said that "the legislative power is sufficient, even as between individuals, to afford new remedies and to create liabilities not before existing, where they are based upon general principles of justice." People ex rel. Miller v. Ryder (1891) 124 N. Y. 500, 26 N. E. 1040, where it was held that laws affecting remedies which are intended to have retroactive effect must be strictly construed. See also O'Reilly v. Utah, N. & C. Stage Co. (1895) 87 Hun, 406, 34 N. Y. Supp. 358, where the court considered §§ 1903 and 1904 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to actions to recover damages for injuries causing death, and also the new constitutional provision on this subject, article 1, § 18, and held that such provision did not have a retroactive effect. Persons v. Gardner (1899) 42 App. Div. 490, 56 N. Y. Supp. 822, 59 N. Y. Supp. 463, giving a retroactive effect to the banking law amendment of 1897, chap. 441, in relation to actions by receivers.

Appropriations. The act of 1866, chap. 876, § 10, which prohibited the recovery of a judgment against the city of New York except upon proof that there was money remaining in the city treasury which had been appropriated for the particular claim, did not affect the debt, but only the remedy. Tribune Association v. New York (1867) 48 Barb. 240.

Contract not affected.-Statutes of limitation which prolong or shorten the period within which an existing remedy may be enforced are constitutional. Applied to a statute extending the time for appeal. Burch v. Newbury (1849) 4 How. Pr. 145.

"A remedy does not attach to a contract or a right, but may be repealed or modified. It simply changes the mode in which a contract or a right may be enforced." People ex rel. Waldron v. Carpenter (1866) 46 Barb. 619. A remedy may be suspended if the ultimate liability on the contract is not thereby impaired. Wolfkiel v. Mason (1863) 16 Abb. Pr. 221.

Insurance law.-Section 56 of the insurance law, which restricts

to the attorney general the right to take proceedings against an insurance company, affects only the remedy, and does not impair the contract of a policy holder. Swan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. (1898) 155 N. Y. 9, 49 N. E. 258.

Judgments.-"A judgment creditor of an owner [of land] has no estate or proprietary interest in the land. He stands wholly upon the law, which gives him a remedy for the collection of his debt by a sale of the land under execution, in case sufficient personal property of the debtor should not be found. This remedy is not secured by contract, but is purely statutory. . . . Acts have been passed shortening and lengthening the duration of the liens of existing judgments, and even providing for their extinguishment without any proceeding to which the judgment creditor was a party. . . . It is clearly within the power of the legislature to abolish the lien of all judgments at any time before rights have become vested or estates acquired under them, and, placing real estate on the same footing as personal property, to confine the remedies of the creditor to the property held by the debtor at the time of issuing the execution." Watson v. New York C. R. Co. (1872) 47 N. Y. 157.

Mechanic's lien.-The legislature may regulate a remedy according to its pleasure. Construing the New York city mechanic's lien law of 1851, chap. 513, the court say: "It was competent [for the legislature] to provide a new remedy for the builder or mechanic who was already under a contract for the work, and to limit it to cases where the work was yet to be performed." Hauptman v. Catlin (1859) 20 N. Y. 247; Miller v. Moore (1854) I E. D. Smith, 739. Penalty. Where a penalty has been imposed by law the legislature has power to repeal it entirely, or to limit the cases in which it is recoverable, even though an action has been brought for its recovery. Fire Department v. Ogden (1879) 59 How. Pr. 21.

Pending action.-"The legislature are in the habit of changing the form of proceeding to try rights in various ways." The court sustained an act which altered the mode of proceeding in point of form in a suit pending when the act was passed. It did not affect a vested right, but only altered the form of the remedy. People ex rel. Israel v. Tibbets (1825) 4 Cow. 384.

Remedy a matter of right.—It is not competent for the legislature to deny, for any cause, to a party who has been illegally deprived of his property, access to the constitutional courts of the state for relief. "If he is denied all remedy for the wrong inflicted upon him, the deprivation of his property becomes just as effectual as though it had been taken from him by direct legislative enactment." A stat

ute which destroys his muniments of title has this result and is unconstitutional. Gilman v. Tucker (1891) 128 N. Y. 190, 13 L. R. A. 304, 26 Am. St. Rep. 464, 28 N. E. 1040. See McMullen v. Middletown (1905) 46 Misc. 360, 92 N. Y. Supp. 410.

The same subject was considered in Re St. Lawrence & A. R. Co. (1892) 133 N. Y. 270, 31 N. E. 218. So in People ex rel. Reynolds v. Buffalo (1893) 140 N. Y. 300, 37 Am. St. Rep. 563, 35 N. E. 485, the court say that "the obligation of a contract is impaired, in the constitutional sense, by any law which prevents its enforcement, or which materially abridges the remedy for enforcing it which existed when it was contracted, and does not supply an alternative remedy equally adequate and efficacious. ... No property right acquired under a state statute can be devested by repeal."

Retrospective acts.-In Syracuse City Bank v. Davis (1853) 16 Barb. 188, the court, referring to the general rule that rights absolutely vested cannot be affected or subverted by the legislature, quotes from Kent's Com. the statement that "this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes which may be of a retrospective character, provided they do not impair contracts or disturb absolutely vested rights; and only go to confirm rights already existing; and are in furtherance of the remedy by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations," and applied the principle to a statute legalizing the incorporation of a bank. "Acts are valid which give remedies where none existed before, through defects that would have been fatal had the legislature not interfered and given a perfect remedy by curing intervening irregularities."

Revival of action.-The legislature may revive proceedings which have abated by the death of a party. Re Grove (1873) 64 Barb. 526. Service of process.-Service of process is within the discretion of the legislature. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co. (1881) 87 N. Y. 137.

Torts. "There is no inhibition in the Constitution against depriving a person of a cause of action originating in a naked tort. Though the legislature may not pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts, it unquestionably has power to pass a statute which shall operate retrospectively, and sweep away any right of action that arose from a tort." Guillotel v. New York (1878) 55 How. Pr. 114

SEPARABLE PROVISIONS.

"Where part of a law is in conflict with the Constitution, and that