not protected by the Constitution was considered at some length, but not decided, in People ex rel. Woodworth v. Burrows (1858) 27 Barb. 89. It was urged that an acceptance of an office at a fixed salary was not a grant, and did not create an unalterable contract. An officer must be deemed to accept such an office knowing that the legislature may, in its discretion, and for reasons satisfactory to itself, reduce the compensation for official service.

A public office is not a grant, and the right to it does not depend upon or partake of the nature of a contract, and the legislature may abolish an office or shorten its term, unless it is protected by the Constitution. Long v. New York (1880) 10 N. Y. Week. Dig. 405. Patents of land. The patent to Zephaniah Platt, in 1784, of a tract 7 miles square on both sides of the Saranac river, and bounded east by Lake Champlain, conveyed an exclusive property in the river, it not being a navigable stream. The patent was an executed contract within the principle of Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 6 Cranch, 136, 3 L. ed. 177, and the state could not pass an act impairing the estate of the patentee or rendering it null and void. The court accordingly held that the acts of 1801 and 1813, requiring the owners of dams on certain streams so to reconstruct them that they would permit the free passage of salmon, violated the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of contracts and were void as to this patent, for if the dam were adjudged to be a nuisance the grant would be manifestly impaired, because the grantee would be prohibited the use and enjoyment of a valuable and essential part of it. "The principle adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States extends as fully to a case where a material and essential part of the grant is impaired, as to a case where it is entirely impaired." People v. Platt (1819) 17 Johns. 195.

The act of 1797, to provide for settling disputes concerning certain land in Onondaga county, did not impair the obligation of a contract. The land was held under a patent from the state, and the act did not assume to affect the patentee's title. The legislature had power to enact laws intended to settle disputes concerning the title to this land, which had been conveyed by the patentee to different grantees. Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire (1830) 3 Pet. 280, 7 L. ed. 679.

Preferred creditors.-"The legislature could, for reasons of public policy and justice, give classes of creditors preference over other classes, so long as creditors not preferred are left with substantial remedies.... The holders of registered policies were given a preference of payment upon a fund substantially created with money

contributed by them." A statutory provision giving them a preference over other policy holders did not violate the obligation of a contract. Atty. Gen. v. North America L. Ins. Co. (1880) 82 N. Y. 172.

Public printer.-The provision of the election law of 1896, chap. 909, which authorized the secretary of state to procure the printing of the compilation of election laws, and to purchase registration books wherever he deemed it desirable for the best interest of the state, did not impair the obligation of a contract for the public printing. People ex rel. Weed-Parsons Printing Co. v. Palmer (1896) 18 Misc. 103, 41 N. Y. Supp. 878.

Railroads. The act of 1864, chap. 402, providing for the confirmation of railroad aid bonds issued by towns, did not violate the provision against impairing the obligation of contracts. The subject of issuing the bonds in the first instance, and the validation of their issue to cure supposed defects, is within the power of the legislature. People ex rel. Albany & S. R. Co. v. Mitchell (1865) 45 Barb. 208, (1866) 35 N. Y. 551.

The act of 1875, chap. 600, which fixed the maximum street car fare in Buffalo at 5 cents, did not impair the obligation of a contract between two street railroad companies, under which they were authorized to charge a higher rate. The contract was deemed to have been made subject to the possibility that the legislature might change the rate of fare. Buffalo East Side R. Co. v. Buffalo Street R. Co. (1888) 111 N. Y. 132, 2 L. R. A. 384, 19 N. E. 63.

Income bonds which conferred certain voting rights on the holders were issued by a railroad company which afterwards sought to consolidate with a foreign corporation. In an action to restrain such consolidation on the ground that it affected the rights of the bondholders, it was held that the consolidation did not impair the obligation of the contract. Hart v. Ogdensburg & L. C. R. Co. (1893) 69 Hun, 378, 23 N. Y. Supp. 639.

The provision of § 98 of the railroad law, 1890, chap. 565, authorizing local authorities to regulate the speed of street cars, confers a continuing power, and such authorities cannot bind their successors by an exercise of the power; and it seems that an ordinance prescribing the rate of speed does not become a contract which will prevent further action by local authorities. Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R. Co. (1897) 20 App. Div. 31, 46 N. Y. Supp. 651.

City authorities cannot add to the burdens of a corporation which received its rights from the legislature. The corporation having accepted a grant and built a road, a contract obligation was

established which neither party alone could interpret or fix the liability of the other; and the authorities of a city in which the road was located could not determine what the corporation should do in the performance of its contract, except as prescribed in its franchise. Thus, a corporation could not be required to aid in the construction of an asphalt pavement under a contract which only required it to keep the street in repair. Binghamton v. Binghamton & P. D. R. Co. (1891) 61 Hun, 479, 16 N. Y. Supp. 225, distinguished in Mechanicville v. Stillwater & M. Street R. Co. (1901) 35 Misc. 513, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1102, where Justice Russell held that the company was liable to construct a pavement ordered by village authorities, notwithstanding the terms of the franchise. The Binghamton paving question appears again under new contracts and legislation in Davidge v. Binghamton (1901) 62 App. Div. 525, 71 N. Y. Supp. 282.

The constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent legislation relating to grade crossings. Such legislation is an exercise of the police power. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Adam (1902) 70 App. Div. 427, 75 N. Y. Supp. 515.

Recording acts.-"It is within the undoubted power of state legislatures to pass recording acts by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded within the limited time; and the power is the same whether the deed is dated before or after the passage of the recording act. Though the effect of such a law is to render the prior deed fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law impairing the obligation of contracts." Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire (1830) 3 Pet. 280, 7 L. ed. 679. Compare Varick v. Briggs (1839) 22 Wend. 543.

Remedies.-The jail liberties act of 1798, chap. 91, was not a violation of this provision. It did not impair the remedy of the creditor by confinement of the debtor's body. The constitutional provision "cannot be understood to apply to all the detail of municipal regulations rendering more easy or less inconvenient the process and proceedings for the recovery of debts. . . . The Constitution could not have an eye to such details so long as contracts were submitted, without legislative interference, to the ordinary and regular course of justice and the existing remedies were preserved in substance and with integrity." Holmes v. Lansing (1802) 3 Johns. Cas. 73.

The act of 1797, chap. 51, relating to the settlement of certain disputes concerning lands in Onondaga county, does not violate this provision. It is a statute of limitations and relates only to the remedy. Barker v. Jackson (1826) 1 Paine, 559, Fed. Cas. No. 989.

The act of 1846, chap. 274, which, while abolishing distress for rent, also repealed the provisions of the Revised Statutes (1 Rev. Stat. 746, §§ 12 to 17 inclusive), which gave the landlord having a claim for rent a preference over other creditors of the tenant, did not impair the tenant's obligation to pay rent. The preference in favor of the landlord was not the result of an agreement between him and the tenant. "In the nature of things, there is a distinction between the change of a contract and a change of the remedy to enforce the performance of the contract." Stocking v. Hunt (1846) 3 Denio, 274.

The act of 1842, chap. 277, which reduced the time for advertising a foreclosure sale from twenty-four weeks to twelve weeks, did not violate this constitutional provision. It applied to all mortgages whether executed prior or subsequent to its passage. The power of sale was to be executed according to the law in force at the time of the foreclosure. James v. Andrews (1852) Selden's Notes, pt. 1, p. 6, affirming (1850) 9 Barb. 482.

The act of 1842, chap. 157, making additional exemptions from execution, applies to debts contracted before as well as after its passage. "The contracting of a debt does not, in any legal sense, create a lien upon the debtor's property. He is as much at liberty to deal with and to transfer it bona fide as though he were entirely free from debt. The right which a creditor, by becoming such, acquires is to have the use and benefit of the laws for the collection of debts which may be in force when he shall have occasion to resort to them to enforce his demand against the debtor. But it is admitted that a contract may be virtually impaired by a law which, without acting directly upon its terms, destroys the remedy, or so embarrasses it that the rights of the creditor under the legal remedies existing when the contract was made are substantially defeated. With this necessary qualification the jurisdiction of the states over the legal proceedings of their courts is supreme." Morse v. Goold (1854) 11 N. Y. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 103.

The act of 1846, chap. 274, abolishing distress for rent, simply changed the remedy on the contract. Guild v. Rogers (1850) 8 Barb. 502. The provision of the same statute authorizing a re-entry for the nonpayment of rent applied to leases made prior to its passage. Van Rensselaer v. Snyder (1855) 13 N. Y. 299.

The same rule was applied even where the lease in terms authorized the landlord to distrain or re-enter for nonpayment of rent. The legislature may abolish or modify the remedy specified in the contract, and itself prescribe the remedy to which parties must resort

for the enforcement of contract obligations. Conkey v. Hart (1856) 14 N. Y. 22. See also Tyler v. Heidorn (1866) 46 Barb. 439.

The act of 1857, chap. 344, providing for security on the transfer of a cause from a district court to the court of common pleas in New York, did not impair the obligation of a contract. It affected the remedy only. Johnson v. Ackerson (1870) 40 How. Pr. 222, affirmed in (1871) 3 Daly, 430.

A statute which gave to persons claiming to have paid an illegal tax an opportunity to present to the board of supervisors a claim for reimbursement did not vest in such persons any absolute right beyond legislative control, and a repeal of the statute did not impair the obligation of a contract. People ex rel. Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Montgomery County (1876) 67 N. Y. 109, 23 Am. Rep. 94.

State contract.-A contractor cannot compel the state to proceed with the erection of a public building under a contract with him. The state, like an individual, may abandon an enterprise which it has undertaken and refuse to allow the contractor to proceed, or it may commit the completion of the contract to its own immediate servants and agents, or make a new contract with other persons without any default by the original contractor. While the state might thus violate the contract, its obligation is not impaired, and the original party would have a claim against the state for damages, which would doubtless be recognized and protected by the legislature. Lord v. Thomas (1876) 64 N. Y. 107.

In Danolds v. State (1882) 89 N. Y. 36, 42 Am. Rep. 277, the same principle was applied, and the plaintiff whose contract before its completion had been terminated by the state was awarded prospective profits. The court said the “contracts were binding upon the state; it could refuse to perform them on its part and arrest the performance of them by the contractors, but it could in no way destroy or get rid of the obligation of them."

Statute of limitations.-The act of 1885, chap. 405, requiring actions to be brought within six months against the city of Brooklyn or its registrar of arrears to compel the execution of a lease upon any sale for taxes and assessments or water rates made more than eight years prior to the passage of the act, and requiring the cancelation of sales upon which no leases shall have been given and no action commenced, did not violate this constitutional provision. It was a statute of limitations, and fixed a reasonable time for the enforcement of contracts. Wheeler v. Jackson (1887) 44 Hun, 410, affirmed in (1887) 105 N. Y. 681, (1890) 137 U. S. 245, 34 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76.

VOL. IV. CONST. HIST.-18.