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tained in a state court.
Delafield v. Illinois (1841) 2 Hill, 159; Indiana v. Woram (1843) 6 Hill, 33, 40 Am. Dec. 378.
Under the provision of the 11th Amendment that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state,” the courts of the United States have not even a concurrent jurisdiction in such a case, and the court of chancery has all the jurisdiction it possessed before the adoption of the amendment. Garr v. Bright (1845) i Barb. Ch. 157.
State courts are confined in the exercise of their jurisdiction to the limits of their own state, and jurisdiction between citizens of different states is, by the Federal Constitution, conferred on the Federal courts. Douglas v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1892) 63 Hun, 393, 18 N. Y. Supp. 259, in which an attachment in Massachusetts of a debt alleged to be due to a New York corporation was held to be invalid without service on the corporation, citing Plimpton v. Bigelow (1883) 93 N. Y. 592, 598, where the principle is said to be well settled that "a corporation has its domicil and residence alone within the bounds of the sovereignty which created it, and that it is incapable of passing personally beyond that jurisdiction."
Under &$ 711 and 5328 of the United States Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 577, 3622) the Federal courts and the courts of New York have concurrent jurisdiction of an offense committed on the Hudson river, and the offender may be indicted, tried, and convicted in a state court. Such concurrent jurisdiction is not repugnant to the provision of the 5th Amendment that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy. People v. Welch (1893) 74 Hun, 474, 26 N. Y. Supp. 694 (1894) 141 N. Y. 266, 24 L. R. A. 117, 38 Am. St. Rep. 793, 36 N. E. 328.
Jury trial.—The provisions of the 5th Amendment, that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation," and the provision of the 7th Amendment, that "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $20, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,” were intended to be restrictive upon the government of the United States and upon its officers exclusively, and were not intended to limit or control state legislation. Livingston v. New York (1831) 8 Wend. 85, 22 Am. Dec. 622, citing Jackson ex dem. Wood v. Wood (1824) 2 Cow. 819, note; Pratt Institute v. New York (1904) 99 App. Div. 325, 91 N. Y. Supp. 136.
The provision of the 6th Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
securing trial by an impartial jury, does not prevent the legislature from regulating the method of procuring and impaneling a jury; and if the defendant does not take advantage of statutory provisions designed to protect his rights, he should not complain in the absence of proof of injury. People v. Mack (1898) 35 App. Div. 114, 5, N. Y. Supp. 698.
Legal tender act.-Congress had power to pass the legal tender act of 1862, chapter 33. It was incident to the power to borrow money and issue notes therefor. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck (1863) 27 N. Y. 400.
Maritime liens.—The legislature cannot confer on a state court jurisdiction to proceed in rem against a vessel to enforce a maritime lien. The Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction in such cases. Bird v. The Josephine (1868) 39 N. Y. 19.
National banks.—Banks organized under the national banking act are subject to state laws, and it is only when a state law incapacitates them from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional. The validity of private contracts is not a subject of national legislation, but is to be governed by state laws. The power to create a corporation as an appropriate instrument for the execution of a constitutional power does not carry with it authority to confer upon that corporation unlimited privileges or immunities from state law, but only such as are necessary to enable it to effect the legitimate national objects for which it is created. National banks are subject to state usury laws. First Nat. Bank v. Lamb (1872) 50 N. Y. 95, 10 Am. Rep. 438.
It is not competent for Congress to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction in actions against banking corporations under the Federal banking law, or to restrict jurisdiction to particular courts. Cooke v. State Nat. Bank (1873) 52 N. Y. 96, 11 Am. Rep. 667.
Naturalization.—The naturalization clause in the Federal Constitution, article 1, $ 8, subd. 4, confers on Congress exclusive jurisdiction of this subject. State courts may be adopted as agents for the exercise of this power. Re Romsden (1857) 13 How. Pr. 429.
Property.-Congress has not the constitutional power to prescribe for the states a rule for the transfer of property within them, nor has it the power to declare that a contract or conveyance between citizens of a state affecting the title to real estate is void because not stamped as required by the Federal statute. Moore v. Moore (1872) 47 N. Y. 467, 7 Am. Rep. 466.
Treaties.—Under the provision of the Constitution of the United States, article 6, § 2, that "this Constitution and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land," the treaty with France, made in 1843, was not self-executing, and without legislation by Congress the President had no authority to issue a mandate commanding the marshal of New York to surrender a prisoner to the diplomatic agents of the French government. Re Metzger (1847) 1 Barb. 248.
Unreasonable searches and seizures. The production of the records of a public office in obedience to a subpæna for that purpose, though some of such papers may have been made by the accused for the purpose of concealing a crime alleged to have been committed by him, is not a violation of the provision of the 4th Amendment, which guarantees immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Coombs (1899) 158 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 527.
This subject was considered in People v. Adams (1903) 176 N. Y. 351, 63 L. R. A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675, 68 N. E. 636, where it appeared that defendant's private papers were taken by a police officer claiming to act under a search warrant, but the court declined to express any opinion as to the legality of the seizure. The papers were used against him on a criminal trial, and the court held that he was not thereby compelled to be a witness against himself.
Volunteers and substitutes.-The legislature had power, as provided by the act of 1865, chap. 29, $ 4, to limit the amount to be paid to volunteers or substitutes in the Federal Army. Replying to the objection that, under article 1, § 8, subdivisions 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17 of the Constitution, legislation by Congress concerning the Army, and making provision for calling forth the militia, was exclusive, the court said the "act had nothing to do with the militia of the state, nor with calling them forth. Its only object was to encourage volunteering and enlistments, so as to shield the citizens of the state from a draft, and at the same time aid the general government in putting down the Rebellion.” Powers v. Shepard (1872) 48 N. Y. 540.
[BILL OF Rights.] § 1. (Rights of citizens.]—No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
(Magna Charta, chap. 39; New York Charter of Liberties, 1683, par. 13; Const. 1777, art. 13; 1821, art. 7, 8 1; 1846, art. 1, $ 1.)
The introduction of this section by Gilbert Livingston in the first constitutional convention has been noticed in a former volume, and it there appears that the section, as then adopted, has been continued without change of principle in all subsequent Constitutions. It has received frequent judicial attention from various points of view, covering a wide range of questions involving the personal rights of citizens. The following notes are intended to show the general result of this judicial consideration, with occasional expressions of opinion by individual judges.
MEMBERS OF THE STATE.
By the 14th Amendment "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."
A person born of alien parents during their temporary sojourn in the state is a citizen. Lynch v. Clarke (1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. 583.
A corporation is not a citizen. People v. Imlay (1855) 20 Barb. 68; Duquesne Club v. Penn Bank (1885) 35 Hun, 390.
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS.
Accused, rights of.—The right of the accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him (1 Rev. Stat. 94, § 14), though subject to legislative alteration or repeal, is, while it continues in force, a right secured by this section to citizens of the state. The rule is satisfied if, in extreme cases, the accused is confronted by an adverse witness at any time during the proceedings upon the same accusation, and, if the witness afterwards dies, his evidence may be read on a subsequent trial for the same offense. People v. Penhollow (1886) 42 Hun, 103.
Appeal.—"No person has a constitutional right to appeal, and no court has an inherent right to entertain an appeal. The right, if it exists, and in all cases where it does exist, is simply the continuance of an existing practice by the Constitution, subject to the legislative right to curtail or abolish it, or it must be founded in some statute.” People v. Rutherford (1900) 47 App. Div. 209, 62 N. Y. Supp. 224.
Corporations.—Citizens of this state may form a corporation under the laws of another state without in fact going into that state or intending to do business there, and may then, as such corporation, transact business in this state, subject to the restrictions imposed by our laws as to foreign corporations. Demarest v. Flack (1891) 128 N. Y. 205, 13 L. R. A. 854, 28 N. E. 645; Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improv. Co. (1893) 72 Hun, 18, 25 N. Y. Supp. 309, reversed without affecting this point in (1894) 140 N. Y. 576, 24 L R. A. 322, 35 N. E. 964.
Court-martial.-A member of the militia has no inherent right to be tried by jury for a violation of the military code. The creation of a court-martial for the trial of such offenses is a valid exercise of legislative power, and a person made subject to the jurisdiction of such a court is not disfranchised nor deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to citizens of this state. People ex rel. Underwood v. Daniell (1872) 50 N. Y. 274.
The right of the accused to appear not only in person, but by counsel, in any trial in any court, is secured to citizens of this state by & 6 of article 1 of the Constitution. A regulation of the military code denying this right in cases of court-martial was held to be invalid. People ex rel. Garling v. Van Allen (1873) 55 N. Y. 31.
Crimes.- Punishment for crimes need not be uniform in all parts of the state, and the citizens have no inherent and guaranteed right to such uniformity. Section 351 of the Penal Code, prohibiting pool-selling, is constitutional. People v. Stedeker (1902) 75 App. Div. 449, 78 N. Y. Supp. 316. See also People v. Havnor (1896) 149 N. Y. 195, 31 L. R. A. 689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707, 43 N. E. 541; Re Bayard (1881) 25 Hun, 546, where an act was sustained which prescribed in Cohoes punishment for petit larceny different from that prescribed in other parts of the state.
Education. A citizen cannot determine the public school to which he will send his children, nor select the teachers under whose charge they may be placed. These matters are under the control of public school authorities, and the citizen must conform to prescribed regulations, if reasonable. People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton (1872) 13 Abb.