greater than our own, was held not to be objectionable because the amount to be paid by such outside companies was subject to the discretion of the legislature of another state. The legislature of this state may take the legislation of another state as the basis for the regulation of our internal affairs, and may therefore make the payment of such a tax dependent on the action of another state. People v. Fire Asso. (1883) 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380.

Free school law. The proposed free school law of 1849, chap. 140, by its own terms was not to become operative until approved by the people at a general election. This delegation of power from the legislature to the people was sustained in Johnson v. Rich (1851) 9 Barb. 680, but was held unconstitutional in Thorne v. Cramer (1851) 15 Barb. 112; Bradley v. Baxter (1853) 15 Barb. 122, and by the court of appeals in Barto v. Himrod (1853) 8 N. Y. 483, 59 Am. Dec. 506.

Local approval.-Several cases are reported in which the courts considered the validity of statutes delegating to the people of a municipality the power to determine whether certain local bills passed by the legislature should become laws, or whether certain specified provisions of laws should be in force as to a given locality.

The act of 1853, chap. 217, proposing amendments to the New York charter, was to be submitted to the people of the city for their approval. In People v. Stout (1856) 23 Barb. 349, the submission was held unconstitutional on the ground that the legislative power of the state could not be delegated to the people of a locality.

The act of 1823, chap. 111, for the construction of the Albany basin at the termination of the Erie and Champlain canals, was, by its terms, to become void unless the corporation of the city of Albany should file its consent to the act within sixty days after its passage. Such consent was duly filed in the office of the secretary of state. The validity of this provision was considered in Corning v. Greene (1856) 23 Barb. 33, and the court there said that a “statute that is not an expression of the legislative will alone has no binding force as a law. It can only become a law, mandatory and obligatory upon those who are subjects of it, by a declaration of the legislative will. An attempt, therefore, to call in another party to aid in the business and divide the responsibilities of legislation, so that the act shall not be the single expression of the legislative will, but the sovereign function is discharged in part, at least, by a party unknown and unrecognized by the fundamental law, would be in contravention of the Constitution, and render the act void." The court held that the act was invalid.

The legislature of 1853 passed an act, chap. 283, authorizing the village of Rome to subscribe for stock in a certain railroad corporation. But such subscription could not be made until the act had been approved by two thirds of the taxpaying voters of the village. This act was sustained in Bank of Rome v. Rome (1858) 18 N. Y. 38, where the court pointed out the distinction between an act which could have no validity until approved by the people, and an act which, by its own terms, is complete in itself, but which vests in a municipal corporation power to do or decline to do what the statute authorizes. The people do not determine that the law shall or shall not take effect; they simply determine whether they will avail themselves of its provisions.

Starin v. Genoa, Gould v. Sterling (1861) 23 N. Y. 439, and Grant v. Courter (1857) 24 Barb. 232, involved the same principle. The only question submitted was whether it was expedient for the town to exercise a new power conferred upon it absolutely by the legislature; namely, whether it would authorize a subscription in aid of the construction of certain railroads.

Clarke v. Rochester (1864) 28 N. Y. 605, belongs to the same class. The act construed authorized the subscription for railroad stock after a vote of the people. The court say that the electors of municipal corporations may be made the "depositories of such powers of local government as the legislature may see fit to prescribe, and the exercise of which is not repugnant to any of the general arrangements of the Constitution."

Another view of this subject was presented by the general village law of 1847, chap. 426, which authorized the people in any existing village to adopt a resolution to apply specified portions of the act to that village. The court of appeals in Bank of Chenango v. Brown (1863) 26 N. Y. 467, sustained the act. Discussing the distinction between a statute which could not take effect without a vote of the people of the state, or which delegated to the people the power to accept or reject it as a part of the law governing them, and the submission of a similar question to the people of a specified locality, the court say that the "people of a particular municipality or local body are not the constituents of the legislature. They are not the people of the state of New York who have irrevocably committed their power of legislation to the legislature by a delegation which does not permit that legislature to remand any legislative question to their constituency. A city or a town or a village is a separate recognized local body, which, without exercising legislative power, may signify, if permitted, its assent or dissent to any grant or withdrawal

of powers or privileges. The vote of the whole people of the state upon a question of the expediency of a general statute may be essentially an act of legislation. The vote of a local constituency is an assent or dissent to an act of grant or deprivation done by the legislature, but affecting themselves." While it was not necessary to have the corporate consent to the adoption of specified statutory provisions, such consent did not invalidate the law. Several statutes were cited which submitted charter provisions to the people of specified localities, or authorized the creation of debts and the subscription for corporate stock, but only on the assent of a specified number of taxpayers or voters. This decision furnished ample judicial authority for similar provisions in the general village law of 1870, chap. 291, and of 1897, chap. 414, under which villages incorporated by special act might reincorporate under the general law.

It is competent for the legislature to delegate to the people of a specified district power to determine whether a license to sell intoxicating liquors shall be granted therein. Gloversville v. Howell (1877) 70 N. Y. 287.

Local boards.-The New York city public health law of 1866, chap. 74, did not contain an unconstitutional delegation of power to the board of health. The board might properly be vested with power to make and enforce by-laws and ordinances relating to public health. Cooper v. Schultz (1866) 32 How. Pr. 107. See also People ex rel. Cox v. Special Sessions Justices (1876) 7 Hun, 214; Re Zborowski (1877) 68 N. Y. 88.

In Schuster v. Metropolitan Bd. of Health (1867) 49 Barb. 450, it was said that the metropolitan board of health "hold office by the appointment of the governor, and are not elected by the people of the city of New York, nor appointed by any power so elected. They are not officers holding from a source permitting the exercise of local legislation to be conferred on them."

The same principle was declared in People v. Acton (1867) 48 Barb. 524, construing the act of 1867, chap. 806, which concentrated in the metropolitan board of police various powers and functions theretofore vested in several municipal bodies. The court say that "the legislature cannot confer the power to discharge duties and make regulations and pass laws relating thereto, upon state officers, no matter how appointed, whether by the governor and senate or by the legislature; and, although the legislature might have the power to take the discharge of such duties from the mayor or common council, they were required to place the performance of them with

local officers or boards, and could not vest officers appointed under authority of the state with the performance of such duties."

The power conferred upon commissioners appointed under the New York rapid transit act of 1875, chap. 606, to determine the necessity of railways, to fix the routes and prescribe the plan of their construction, is administrative, and not legislative. Re New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 70 N. Y. 327; Gilbert Elev. R. Co. v. Kobbe (1877) 70 N. Y. 361.

Municipal corporations.-The legislature may delegate to a municipal corporation the power to make by-laws and ordinances, and such an ordinance, when within the scope of municipal authority, has all the force of a statute. Carthage v. Frederick (1890) 122 N. Y. 269, 10 L. R. A. 178, 19 Am. St. Rep. 490, 25 N. E. 480; Hoey v. Gilroy (1891) 129 N. Y. 132, 29 N. E. 85; Rochester v. Simpson (1892) 134 N. Y. 414, 31 N. E. 871; Jorgensen v. Squires (1895) 144 N. Y. 280, 39 N. E. 373; Ford v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1898) 33 App. Div. 474, 53 N. Y. Supp. 764; Buffalo v. Hill (1903) 79 App. Div. 402, 79 N. Y. Supp. 449; People v. Timmerman (1903) 79 App. Div. 565, 80 N. Y. Supp. 285; Tanner v. Albion (1843) 5 Hill, 121, 40 Am. Dec. 337; New York v. Ryan (1854) 2 E. D. Smith, 368.

Official terms.-Construing § 3 of article 10 that "when the duration of any office is not provided by this Constitution, it may be declared by law, and if not so declared, such office shall be held during the pleasure of the authority making the appointment,” it was said in People ex rel. Percival v. Cram (1900) 164 N. Y. 166, 58 N. E. 112, that the power could not be delegated by the legislature to a civil service commission.

United States.-"While the Federal government, as an independent sovereignty, has the power of condemning lands within the states for its own public use, we see no reason to doubt that it may lay aside its sovereignty, and, as a petitioner, enter the state courts and there accomplish the same end through proceedings authorized by the state legislature." The state may delegate its powers to an independent political corporation where the use is public and the convenience shared by its own citizens. Re United States (1884) 67 How. Pr. 121.

Villages.-The legislature may delegate to the people of a village the power to discontinue its corporate existence. Blauvelt v. Nyack (1876) 9 Hun, 153.

DISCRIMINATION.

In People v. Lowndes (1892) 130 N. Y. 455, 29 N. E. 751, construing the Penal Code provision prohibiting the planting or gathering of oysters by nonresidents, the court say the act was passed for the purpose of establishing a discrimination between citizens and nonresidents as to this particular business, and that it was a lawful exercise of legislative power over the common property of the citizens of the state.

ELECTIONS.

Declaring result of election.—“The legislature can provide for the manner in which the result of an election shall be determined and declared, and their enactment is binding." People ex rel. Conliss v. North (1878) 72 N. Y. 124.

Election districts.-The legislature has power to determine the boundaries of an election district, and may locate the polling places according to its own judgment and discretion, or it may delegate this power to local authorities, who may constitutionally, within reasonable limits, and if deemed more convenient for the voters, locate a polling place outside the district. People ex rel. Lardner v. Carson (1898) 155 N. Y. 491, 50 N. E. 292. This case has already been cited under the suffrage section (article 2, § 1).

Special elections.—In annexing to New York a part of Westchester county, and creating a separate judicial district in such annexed territory (Laws 1873, chap. 613), the legislature had power to provide that the first election should be held under the election laws applicable to Westchester county, instead of under the New York election law, though the act, as a whole, was not to take effect until after such election. People v. Flanagan (1876) 66 N. Y. 237.

Town meetings.-"The election of a public officer must be referred to the day upon which the electoral body, in which the right of selection resides, expresses its choice by voting for candidates for the office, and not to some subsequent day when the result is declared. When the votes of the electors have been given the choice is made, though the precise result may not be officially ascertained for weeks or months afterwards. The canvass of votes or statements is a ministerial act, following the election, and evidence of the result, but the will of the voters, expressed by the deposit of their