was applied in People v. Francisco (1902) 76 App. Div. 262, 78 N. Y. Supp. 423, construing the effect of a comptroller's deed under 132 of the tax law.

The retroactive effect of statutes was considered in O'Reilly v. Utah, N. & C. Stage Co. (1895) 87 Hun, 407, 34 N. Y. Supp. 358, construing 1903 and 1904 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to actions to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, and it is there said that "statutes affecting remedies, or rules of procedure for enforcing rights, are declared to be retroactive on grounds which would be deemed insufficient to give a retroactive effect to statutes enlarging or restricting substantive rights." But the constitutional amendment on this subject, added in 1894 (art. 1, 18), which abrogated the money limitation in such actions, was held not retroactive, applying the general rule applicable to statutes (New York & O. Midland R. Co. v. Van Horn [1874] 57 N. Y. 473), that a "law is never to have retroactive effect unless its express letter or clearly manifested intention requires that it should have such effect. If all its language can be satisfied by giving it prospective operation, it should have such operation only."

The drainage act of 1895, chap. 384, passed to carry into effect the drainage provision of the Constitution of 1894, was held not retroactive, and it could not be used to sustain proceedings, otherwise invalid, taken and then pending for the purpose of draining agricultural lands under previous statutes which limited the right to cases affecting the public health. Re Penfield (1896) 3 App. Div. 30, 37 N. Y. Supp. 1056.

"It is the duty of courts to assume that the legislature did not intend to violate the Constitution, and to so construe this statute as to bring it within the constitutional limitations, if possible. The presumption is that such a retrospective operation as to affect rights already accrued was not intended, unless the words used admit of no other reasonable conclusion." It was held that the legislature could not authorize an appeal from a judgment after the existing statutory time had elapsed, for the reason that the rights of the parties under the judgment had become fixed, and could not be made the subject of legislative action. Germania Sav. Bank v. Suspension Bridge (1899) 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33, citing Burch v. Newbury (1852) 10 N. Y. 374, 394 (appeals in equity cases under 460 of the Code of Procedure of 1849); Dunlop v. Edwards (1850) 3 N. Y. 341 (appeals under § 457 of the Code of Procedure of 1849); Benton v. Wickwire (1873) 54 N. Y. 226 (mechanic's lien). In Bay v. Gage (1862) 36 Barb. 447, the court considered the

subject of retrospective statutes, and said that "whether a law is prospective or retrospective is a question of construction, in the absence of any express declaration in the act by which it is determined. Laws are not unconstitutional simply for the reason that they are retrospective. Retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect vested rights, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws, are not forbidden by the Constitution." The act of 1861, chap. 221, amending the revised statutes in relation to the effect of a judgment in ejectment, was held not retroactive. "Considerations of propriety as to the right of reviewing judgments are not sufficient to raise the presumption that the law was intended to act upon judgments previously recovered." The court cited People v. Carnal (1852) 6 N. Y. 463, where it was held that the statute which authorized a writ of error in behalf of the people, to review a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, did not authorize such a writ to review a judgment rendered prior to its passage. Ely v. Holton (1857) 15 N. Y. 595, involving the construction of an amendatory act authorizing a further appeal in certain cases, but it was given only a prospective effect.

Statutes presumed valid.-"Before the court will deem it their duty to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional, a case must be presented in which there can be no rational doubt." Ex parte M'Collum (1823) I Cow. 550; Morris v. People (1846) 3 Denio, 382; Beecher v. Allen (1849) 5 Barb. 169; People ex rel. Rochester v. Briggs (1872) 50 N. Y. 553; Kerrigan v. Force (1877) 68 N. Y. 381; Central Crosstown R. Co. v. Twenty-third Street R. Co. (1877) 54 How. Pr. 168; People ex rel. Hatfield v. Comstock (1879) 78 N. Y. 356; Sweet v. Syracuse (1891) 129 N. Y. 316, 27 N. E. 1081, 29 N. E. 289; Schneider v. Rochester (1895) 90 Hun, 171, 35 N. Y. Supp. 786; Fort v. Cummings (1895) 90 Hun, 481, 36 N. Y. Supp. 36; Rathbone v. Wirth (1896) 6 App. Div. 277, 40 N. Y. Supp. 535; Ziegler v. Corwin (1896) 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. Supp. 855; Gilbert Elev. R. Co. v. Handerson (1877) 70 N. Y. 361. "Every presumption is in favor of the validity of legislative acts." New York & L. I. Bridge Co. v. Smith (1896) 148 N. Y. 540, 42 N. E. 1088; Re New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 70 N. Y. 327, 342; Wright v. Hart (1905) 103 App. Div. 218, 93 N. Y. Supp. 60.

"Every act of the legislature must be upheld by the courts unless it be in substantial conflict with some provision of the Constitution." Pearce v. Stephens (1897) 18 App. Div. 101, 45 N. Y. Supp. 422; People ex rel. Simpson v. Wells (1905) 181 N. Y. 252.

In construing a statute the court must assume "that the legis

lature had evidence before it which created the demand" for the particular legislation, and if any state of circumstances would justify the statute, the court must presume that it existed. Re Annon (1888) 50 Hun, 413, 2 N. Y. Supp. 275, affirmed in (1889) 117 N. Y. 1, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 Am. St. Rep. 460, 22 N. E. 670.

It is to be presumed that an act was not passed by the legislature without mature reflection and full consideration of the provisions contained in it and of the well-settled constitutional principles relating to it. Roosevelt v. Godard (1868) 52 Barb. 533.

"If it cannot be made to appear that a law is in conflict with the Constitution by argument deduced from the language of the law itself, or from matters of which a court can take judicial notice, then the act must stand. The testimony of expert or other witnesses is not admissible to show that, in carrying out a law enacted by the legislature, some provision of the Constitution may possibly be violated. . . . If the act upon its face is not in conflict with the Constitution, then extraneous proof cannot be used to condemn it." People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston (1890) 119 N. Y. 569, 7 L. R. A. 715, 16 Am. St. Rep. 859, 24 N. E. 6, citing People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson (1873) 55 N. Y. 50; People ex rel. Wood v. Draper (1857) 15 N. Y. 532; Re New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 70 N. Y. 327, 342.

ATTORNEYS.

In Re O'Neill (1882) 90 N. Y. 584, the court say "they have no doubt of the power of the legislature to admit persons not citizens to practise as attorneys and counselors of the courts of this state," but it was held that, under the statute and rules of the court of appeals then in force, an alien could not be admitted as an attorney.

COMMERCE.

Congress has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate navigation between the several states, but cannot control navigation employed in an internal commerce which does not concern other states. North River S. B. Co. v. Livingston (1824) 1 Hopk. Ch. 170, affirmed in (1825) 3 Cow. 713.

A bond to indemnify the city of New York against expenses which might be incurred in maintaining immigrants is valid, and not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. Candler v. New York (1828) 1 Wend. 493.

The New York statute of 1832, chap. 131, incorporating the Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad Company, and which authorized the company to erect a bridge over the Hudson river between Troy and Green island, was not a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. By the delegation of power to the Federal government, as expressed in the Constitution, the entire sovereignty over the waters of the states vested in Congress and the several state legislatures. The power to build bridges was not delegated to the Federal government; it therefore continues in the state; but the exercise of this power must not interfere with free navigation. A bridge with a draw sufficient for the use of coasting vessels was held to be a proper exercise of the state's power over navigable streams. People v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co. (1836) 15 Wend. 113, 30 Am. Dec. 33.

In an action to recover off-shore pilotage (Cisco v. Roberts [1867] 36 N. Y. 292) in which the owner of the vessel denied his liability, the court say that no issue is presented as to the relative boundaries of state and Federal jurisdiction, for in this respect all that belongs to either is confessedly vested in the states, in the absence of Federal legislation. Every maritime nation claims the power "to exercise such rights on the neighboring seas-the common domain of all-as are essential to the protection of its own territorial dominion. . . . The regulations of port pilotage stand substantially on the same footing with our quarantine laws. It is the right and the duty of the state, by appropriate legislation, to guard the public health and the security of general commerce, and to provide against the dangers to which every maritime people are exposed by intercepting and averting them on the sea, without the bounds of exclusive territorial dominion." The plaintiff's right to pilotage under the state law was sustained.

The provision of the act of 1871, chap. 721, prohibiting the possession of certain game birds after a specified date, is not a violation of the commerce provision of the Federal Constitution. Phelps v. Racey (1875) 60 N. Y. 10, 19 Am. Rep. 140. See People v. Bootman (1904) 95 App. Div. 469, 88 N. Y. Supp. 887, affirmed in (1904) 180 N. Y. 1, 72 N. E. 505.

In the absence of legislation by Congress regulating commerce among the states, as authorized by the Federal Constitution, article 1, § 8, subd. 3, state laws creating railroad corporations, and authorizing them to effect a consolidation with other similar corporations in other states, are valid. Boardman v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (1881) 84 N. Y. 157.

The power of the state to prohibit within its borders the sale of

lottery tickets issued in another state was considered in People v. Noelke (1883) 94 N. Y. 137, 46 Am. Rep. 128. Our penal statutes against lotteries do not violate the interstate commerce provision of the Federal Constitution. These statutes do not constitute an impairment of a contract obligation: they "prohibit the making of certain contracts within our boundaries, but do not undertake to say what contracts may or may not be made under a foreign law." The franchise tax act of 1881, chap. 361, is not a regulation of commerce. Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York (1891) 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. ed. 164, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 57, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403, affirming (1887) 105 N. Y. 76, 11 N. E. 155.

The acts of 1884, chap. 534, and 1885, chap. 499, are not obnoxious to the commerce clause as to a telegraph company which has become an agency of the general government, and entitled to construct lines on post roads. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New York (1889) 3 L. R. A. 449, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 533, 38 Fed. 552.

A state license fee imposed on a telegraph company doing business in several states is not a violation of the interstate commerce provision of the Federal Constitution. Philadelphia v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. (1893) 67 Hun, 21, 21 N. Y. Supp. 556.

The mileage book act of 1895, chap. 1027, did not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Dillon v. Erie R. Co. (1897) 19 Misc. 116, 43 N. Y. Supp. 320; Beardsley v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. (1897) 15 App. Div. 251; Purdy v. Erie R. Co. (1900) 162 N. Y. 42, 48 L. R. A. 669, 56 N. E. 508.

The state cannot prohibit the sale therein of convict-made goods which are not marked as such. Such attempted prohibition is a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. People v. Hawkins (1898) 157 N. Y. 1, 42 L. R. A. 490, 68 Am. St. Rep. 736, 51 N. E. 257.

A city ordinance which requires nonresidents to obtain a license and pay a specified fee before selling or offering for sale certain products within the city is obnoxious to the commerce clause. Buffalo v. Reavey (1899) 37 App. Div. 228, 55 N. Y. Supp. 792.

The section of the labor law (Laws 1897, chap. 415, § 14) which provides that "all stone of any description, except paving blocks and crushed stone, used in state or municipal works within this state, or which is to be worked, dressed, or carved for such use, shall be so worked, dressed, or carved within the boundaries of the state," is a regulation of commerce, and repugnant to the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. "The citizens of other states have the right to resort to the markets of this state VOL. IV. CONST. HIST.-14