The Sally Magee-The Stephen Hart [July 30, 1863—Note.-The substance of the decisions rendered by the court in the four following suits is announced, in order that parties desirous of seeking a review in any of them may have opportunity for an immediate appeal to the approaching term of the Supreme Court. Some of the suits have been long in prosecution, but have been delayed to this late period by the concurrence of the respective parties or their counsel. The opinions, in detail, cannot be drawn up and put on file until after the summer vacation of the court.] THE BARK SALLY MAGEE AND CARGO. Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, the claimants being, at the time of the capture, citizens and residents of one of the seceded States of the Union. (Before BETTS, J., July 30, 1863.) BETTS, J.: The above suit, as presented on the hearing before the court, on the pleadings and proofs therein, raised two main questions for the consideration of the court: First. Whether the claimants, being citizens and residents of one of the seceded States of the Union at the time of the capture of the above vessel and cargo, had imputable to and impressed upon them the character of alien enemies because of the condition of public hostilities then subsisting between the State of their residence and the United States; and, Second, whether, upon the proofs in the case, the claimants possessed such proprietary interest in the cargo captured as to constitute them owners thereof within the rules of the prize law; and, due deliberation being had in the premises, it is considered and found by the court that the aforesaid vessel and cargo so seized were, at the time, enemy property, and that the claimants then possessed the legal ownership thereof; wherefore, judgment of condemnation and forfeiture against the same is ordered. Decree accordingly.* THE SCHOONER STEPHEN HART AND CARGO. Vessel and cargo condemned for the following reasons: 1. At the time of her seizure the vessel was laden with and transporting articles contraband of war, with intent to furnish and supply them to the use and aid of the enemy. 2. She was, when seized, navigated with the attempt and design to violate the blockade of ports of the enemy held in lawful blockade by the naval forces of the United States. (Before BETTS, J., July 30, 1863.) BETTS, J.: The allegations and proofs of the respective parties in this suit, and the arguments of counsel on both sides therein, being fully heard and considered, and due deliberation had in the premises, *An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from this decree, as to the cargo, but not as to the vessel. That court, at the December term, 1865, affirmed the decree of the district court. (See 3 Wallace.) The Springbok. and it satisfactorily appearing to the court thereupon: First. That the course of procedure in the suit, in its institution and subsequent prosecution, is regular and valid at law; Second. That, at the time of her seizure, the vessel was laden with and transporting articles contraband of war, with intent to furnish and supply them to the use and aid of the enemy; Third. That the vessel, when seized, was navigated with the attempt and design to violate the blockade of the port of Charleston and other ports of the enemy held in lawful blockade by the naval forces of the United States; therefore, it is ordered and adjudged, that the said schooner Stephen Hart and her cargo be condemned and forfeited as lawful prize of war: Decree accordingly.* THE BARK SPRINGBOK AND CARGO. Vessel and cargo condemned on the following grounds: 1. The vessel was, at the time of her capture at sea, knowingly laden, in whole or in part, with articles contraband of war, with intent to deliver such articles to the aid and use of the enemy. 2. The true destination of the vessel and cargo was not to a neutral port, and for trade and commerce, but to some port lawfully blockaded by the forces of the United States, and with intent to violate such blockade. 3. The papers of the vessel were simulated and false. (Before BETTS, J., July 30, 1863.) BETTS, J.: This suit having been heard by the court upon the pleadings, proofs, and allegations of the parties, and evidence legally invoked therein from other cases, and the premises being fully considered, and it being found by the court, therefrom, that the said vessel, at the time of her capture at sea, was knowingly laden, in whole or in part, with articles contraband of war, with intent to deliver such articles to the aid and use of the enemy; that the true destination of the said ship and cargo was not to Nassau, a neutral port, and for trade and commerce, but to some port lawfully blockaded by the forces of the United States, and with intent to violate such blockade; and, further, that the papers of said vessel were simulated and false; therefore, the condemnation and forfeiture of the vessel and cargo is declared. Ordered, that a decree be entered accordingly.t *An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from this decree. That court, at the December term, 1865, affirmed the decree of the district court. (See 3 Wallace.) † An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from this deeree, and was argued at the December terin, 1865, but the court held it over till the following term, for decision. The Peterhoff. THE STEAMER PETERHOFF AND CARGO. Vessel and cargo condemned on the following grounds: 1. The vessel, knowingly laden, in whole or in part, with articles contraband of war, was transporting them at sea. not to a neutral port, for purposes of trade and commerce, within the authority and intendment of public law, but to some other port or place, and in aid and for the use of the enemy, and in violation of the law of nations. 2. The vessel's papers were simulated and false as to her real destination. (Before BETTS. J., July 30, 1863.) BETTS, J.: This cause having been brought to hearing before the court, upon the pleadings and proofs, and the issues of law and fact involved therein, and upon questions affecting the rules and doctrines. of public law in relation to the case, and the rights and liabilities of the respective parties assured thereby, and the admissibility, relevancy, and effect of the various classes and items of proof heard in the said cause, relating to acts or declarations of parties on board of the said ship on the voyage in question, and being part of her crew or ship's company, or others having authority to act in her behalf, and whether such evidence be direct and positive, or presumptive and inferential, as, also, in respect to acts of misfeasance on the voyage, in the spoliation, mutilation, or concealment of papers transported in the ship on such voyage, or attempts to disguise the character of the cargo on board and its destination, and the premises aforesaid, with the allegations and arguments of counsel for the respective parties thereupon, having been fully heard and understood, it is considered and found by the court: First. That the said steamship Peterhoff, in the premises mentioned, was knowingly, on the voyage aforesaid, laden, in whole or in part, with articles contraband of war, and had them in the act of transportation at sea; Second. That her voyage, with the said cargo, was not truly destined to the port of Matamoras, a neutral port, and for purposes of trade and commerce, within the authority and intendment of public law, but, on the contrary, was destined for some other port or place, and in aid and for the use of the cnemy, and in violation of the law of nations; Third. That the ship's papers were simulated and false as to her real destination. Wherefore, it is considered by the court, that the said vessel and her cargo are subject to condemnation and forfeiture, and it is ordered that a decree therefor be entered accordingly.* *An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from this decree, but it has not yet (April, 1866) been argued. The Sally Magee. THE BARK SALLY MAGEE AND CARGO. Suppression, in the test oath to the claim, of the fact that the claimants were resident traders in the enemy's country, it averring that they were citizens of the United States. The case of The Hiawatha (2 Black, 635) determines that the United States government is, in this war, clothed with all the rights conferred by international law upon separate nationalities in a state of public hostilities with each other; and that a vessel and the cargo on board of her, being the property of residents in an insurrectionary State of the United States, are enemy's property, and subject, in the federal courts, to condemnation, on capture at sea, as lawful prize. A libel in a prize case need contain no further averment than that the property seized is prize of war. In contemplation of law, the cargo in this case became the property of the consignees from the time of its being laden on board of the vessel and from the execution of the bills of lading therefor. It is a settled principle of prize procedure that belligerent captors are discharged of liens or equities of neutral creditors resting upon the effects of an enemy seized at sea. The acts of Congress of July 13, 1861, August 6, 1861, and March 3, 1863, (12 U. S. Stat. at Large, 255, 319, 762,) relate to confiscations for intraterritorial offences, and not to captures at sea. (Before BETTS, J., decided July 30, 1863, but this opinion delivered subsequently.) BETTS, J.: The above vessel and cargo were captured, as prize, at sea, off Cape Henry, June 26, 1861, by the United States ship-ofwar Quaker City, and were sent to this port for adjudication. A libel was filed against the prize July 9 thereafter, in which were set forth, under special allegations, various causes of seizure, amounting to confiscable offences, according to public law. Three several claims were interposed thereto by the same proctor, July 23, 1861, in which, on the accompanying test oaths, it is attempted to raise particular issues of pleading in the suit. 1. Alexander Soule intervened, as master of the vessel, on behalf of David Currie, William Currie, George Allen, Isaac Davenport, jr., Robert Edmond, and James H. Blair, as owners of the vessel, her tackle, and furniture, averring that they were citizens of "the United States of America," and not disclosing the fact that they were resident traders in Richmond, Virginia,, an insurrectionary State, then in open rebellion and war against the United States, although the master attached his test oath to the claim, asserting his knowledge of the ownership and citizenship of the claimants. 2. Charles M. Fry, Overton M. Price, and Chapman J. Leigh intervened on behalf of themselves and Dunlop, Moncure & Co., and claimed 473 bags of coffee marked X, and 1,450 bags marked D M, of the said cargo, on the allegation, in substance, that the consignment made on the voyage to Dunlop, Moncure & Co., the last-mentioned firm, was, on arrival of the said vessel as prize, liable to the claimants in the sum of $35,326 and upwards, for acceptances and The Sally Magee. advances of money agreed to be made, and actually made, in good faith, and that the claimants were directed and authorized to receive the said coffee, and take charge of and sell the same, and apply the proceeds thereof, so far as needed, towards the payment of their own demands, and to hold the surplus for account of Dunlop, Moncure & Co. The test oath to this claim was made by Overton M. Price, one of the claimants. 3. The same claimants intervened and filed a further claim in the name of C. M. Fry & Co., to 1,529 bags of coffee marked E D, and 10 half barrels of tapioca, part of the cargo of the vessel, and alleged their right and title to the coffee and tapioca to have thus accrued—that the firm of Charles Coleman & Co., of Rio Janeiro, were directed, as factors and commission merchants, there residing, to purchase and ship the merchandise above specified, for the account and to the consignment of Edmond, Davenport & Co., but that, by its invoice, it appearing that the purchase was not made at or within the limits as to price, the said Davenport & Co. refused it as purchasers, or otherwise than on account of the shippers, Charles Coleman & Co., and Davenport & Co. authorized the claimants to receive the same in their place and behalf; and that the firm of Coleman & Co. is composed of subjects of the Queen of England, residents in Rio Janeiro, and that of Davenport & Co. of citizens of the United States. The test oath to this claim was made by Overton M. Price, one of the claimants, who swears to the residence and citizenship of the respective parties from his own knowledge, excepting that no other than his own firm reside within this district; and he adds, that he believes, from the correspondence of the parties, the other facts to be true. But he omits to state, what he must necessarily have ascertained from the correspondence, that the firm of Davenport & Co. were citizens and residents of Virginia, an insurrectionary State. It appears from the ship's papers, the proofs taken in preparatorio, and the oath on the ship's registry, that the vessel was built at Baltimore, in 1857, and was registered in the port and district of Richmond, in Virginia, on the 5th of August, 1857, in the names of David Currie, William Currie, George W. Allen, Robert Edmond, Isaac Davenport, jr., and James H. Blair, all of Richmond, aforesaid, her only owners, and on the oath of one of the said owners. It was admitted, on the hearing, by both parties, that the vessel was despatched from Richmond, on the outward voyage in question, |