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by a general term, or common appellative, that is, by a noun which is not a proper name. The words man, horse, mountain, &c. are significant of ideas in this sense of the term, and are general names or common appellatives, because they belong equally to every man, every horse, every mountain. That this may be the better understood, and in order to prepare my hearers for some things that will immediately follow, it is proper to introduce here a few remarks on that faculty of our nature, which some have called abstraction, or the power of forming general ideas by arranging things in classes; a faculty, which the brutes probably have not, and without which both language and science would be impossible.

16. All the things in nature are individual things that is, every thing is itself and one, and not another or more than one. But when a number of individual things are observed to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a class, tribe, or species, to which we give a name; and this name belongs equally to every thing comprehended in the species. Thus, all animals of a certain form resemble each other in having four feet; and therefore we consider them as in this respect of the same species, to which we give the name quadruped; and this name belongs equally to every individual of the species; from the elephant, one of the greatest, to the mouse, one of the least.

17. Again, observing several species to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a higher class, called a genus, to which we give a name; which name belongs equally to every species comprehended in the genus, and to every individual comprehended in the several species. Thus all the tribes of living things resemble each other in this respect, that they have life; whence we refer them to a genus called animal; and this name belongs equally to every species of animals, to men, beasts, fishes, fowls, and insects, and to each individual man, beast, fish, fowl, and insect.

18. Further, All things animated and inanimate resemble each other in this respect, that they are created; whence we refer them to a genus still higher, which may be called creature: a name which belongs equally to every genus and species of created things, and to each individual thing that is created. Further still, all beings whatever exist, or are, and in this respect may be said to resemble each other: in which view we refer them to a genus still higher, called being, which is the highest possible genus.

19. The English word kind is said to have been originally of the same import with genus, and sort the same with species. But the words kind and sort have long been confounded by our best writers; and hence, when we would speak accurately on this subject, we are obliged to take the words genus

and species from another language. All those thoughts or conceptions of the mind, which we express by names significant of genera and species, may be called general ideas, and have been by some philosophers called ideas simply. And those thoughts or conceptions, which we express by proper names, or by general names so qualified by pronouns as to denote individual things or persons, may be called singular or particular ideas, and were by some English writers of the last century termed notions. In this sense of the words, one has a notion of Socrates, Etna, this town, that house; and an idea of man, mountain, house, town. It were to be wished, that the words idea and notion had been still thus distinguished; but they have long been applied to other purposes. And now idea seems to express a clearer, and notion a fainter, conception.

20. Of the manner in which the mind forms. general ideas, so much has been said by metaphysical writers, that without great expence of time, not even an abridgement of it could be given: and I apprehend it would not be easy to make such an abridgement useful, or even intelligible. It appears to me, that, as all things are individuals, all thoughts must be so too. A thought therefore is still but one thought; and cannot, as such, have that universality in its appearance, which a general term has in its signification. In short, as I understand the words, to have general ideas, or general

conceptions, is nothing more, than to know the meaning and use of general terms, or common appellatives. Proper names occur in language much more seldom than general terms. And therefore, if we had not this faculty of arranging things according to their genera and species, general terms would not be understood, and consequently language (as already observed) would be impossible.

21. There is another sort of abstraction, which affects both our thinking and our speaking; and takes place, when we consider any quality of a thing separately from the thing itself, and speak and think of it as if it were itself a thing, and capable of being characterised by qualities. Thus from beautiful animal, moving animal, cruel animal, separate the qualities, and make nouns of them, and they become beauty, motion, cruelty; which are called in grammar abstract nouns ; and which, as if they stood for real things, may be characterised by qualities, great beauty, swift motion, barbarous cruelty. These qualities, too, may be abstracted and changed into nouns, greatness, swiftness, barbarity, &c. Of these abstract nouns there are multitudes in every language.

SECTION II.

Of the Faculty of Speech.

22. THE philosophy of speech is an important and curious part of science. In treating of it, I shall, first, explain the origin and general nature of speech; and, secondly, consider the essentials of language, by shewing how many sorts of words are necessary for expressing all the varieties of human thought, and what is the nature and use of each particular sort.

Origin and general Nature of Speech.

23. Man is the only animal that can speak. For speech implies the arrangement and separation of our thoughts; and this is the work of reason and reflection. Articulate sounds resembling speech may be uttered by parrots, by ravens, and even by machines; but this is not speech, because it implies neither reflection, nor reason, nor any separation of successive thoughts; because, in a word, the machine or parrot does not, and cannot, understand the meaning of what it is thus made to

utter.

24. The natural voices of brute animals are not, however, without meaning. But they differ from speech in these three respects. First, man speaks

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