equipment, clothing, and improved arms in time to take an efficient part in the campaign about to begin. Fortunately, while chief of the Cavalry Bureau, I had induced the chief of Ordnance to contract for all the Spencer magazine carbines that could be turned out, and, as this was the best repeating firearm so far invented, I at once made requisition for five thousand, or enough to supply the entire division, but it was three months before the contractors could deliver them. Meanwhile, the regiment did the best it could with Burnside, Smith, Sharp, and Colt carbines, supplemented by sabers and revolvers. Under the prevailing conditions it was uphill work to establish regular discipline and repair the deficiencies of equipment and outfit, but the officers and men were excellent in quality and character, and gave most cheerful assistance in the work to be done. I had hardly got acquainted with its extent and character when I was summoned to Washington as a witness before a general courtmartial. Fortunately, General Grant was called there the same day, and as we traveled on together I acquainted him with the actual condition of affairs. He was sympathetic and gave me assurance of both personal and official support in such measures as I might find necessary to get my division ready for service.

I was absent five days, but before leaving the front I had started the work, and during my absence was able to hurry forward remounts and new equipment. The next two weeks constituted a period of incessant activity, not only on my own part, but on the part of my quartermaster and ordnance officer. Through Sheridan's intercession the cavalry

picket line was reduced to a few points of observation, and the greater part of the mounted troops returned to camp, where they at once engaged in drilling and refitting for an active campaign.1 Dana, the assistant secretary of war, spent several days with us, and became personally acquainted with the condition of the army, and especially of the cavalry. Through his aid much was done to repair the waste of the previous campaigns. Drills were instituted, reviews were held, inspections were made, instruction given, and a system of daily administration was instituted, so that by the first of May a visitor to the army would have been impressed by the apparent readiness of the cavalry, as well as of the infantry, for the onward movement. During the early stages of the campaign the First Vermont, one of the best cavalry regiments in the army, returned to the division, and the Twenty-second New York, a new cavalry regiment, was assigned to it, mainly, I always supposed, because it was so green that no one else wanted it. The last few days in camp were taken up with final arrangements, with visits to Sheridan and Grant and with return visits from Grant's staff officers. It was a time of intense activity to all. Grant was on trial with a new army in a new theater of operations, and yet he was actual generalissimo of all the Union forces, subject only to the President as commander-in-chief.

The Army of the Potomac and the Confederate army of North Virginia had been facing each other without any decisive engagement since the battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 2, and 3, the year before. Grant's headquarters were at Culpeper Court 10. R. Serial No. 60, p. 909, Sheridan to Meade, Apr. 19, 1864.

House, sometimes known as Fairfax, in Piedmont, Virginia, with the Blue Ridge in sight, sixty-five miles south-southwest from Washington. Lee's were at Orange Court House, also in sight of the Blue Ridge, about twenty miles farther on by the same railroad, and about seventy miles by its connections, northwest from Richmond. The distance between them was unequally divided by the Rapidan, with outposts of both on that stream.

Grant held the country between the Rapidan, the Blue Ridge, and Washington, and drew his supplies at first by rail, afterwards, as he moved forward, by rail and water. Lee, with two corps at Orange and east of Orange and one at Gordonsville and to the south, covered the junction of the railroads to Lynchburg and Richmond, and drew supplies from the country tributary to both places. The entire region south of him, with the exception of the sea coast, the larger bays, and the estuaries, was under his control. Grant's strength was about one hundred and fifteen thousand; Lee's about eighty-five thousand men for duty. The conditions, as they then existed, put upon Grant the necessity of assuming the offensive, while they imperatively required Lee to stand on the defensive.

From this statement it is evident that the first battle must be fought south of the Rapidan, and as an advance by the left flank would necessarily shorten Grant's line of supply and make his movements safer, he wisely concluded to open the campaign by moving in that direction. As Lee's main body occupied the region eastward from Orange Court House to Mine Run, a small stream flowing north into the Rapidan, which had stayed Meade's

march in the unfortunate mud campaign of the late winter, it was apparent that, while the Union army's advance must be generally southeast, its flank would be exposed to a counter movement from Lee nearly at right angles to the roads it must follow.

The distance from the center of Grant's army to Spottsylvania Court House was from twenty-five to thirty miles by the several country roads, while the distance from the center of Lee's line east of Orange to the same points was on the average about five miles less. As much of the region, soon to become the scene of a series of the bloodiest battles of modern times, was covered by forest trees and tangled underbrush which appropriately gave it the name of the Wilderness, the advantages were about equally divided. As Grant knew exactly when his columns would begin to move, and Lee could not be certain about either their direction or weight, and must gather these essential facts from the report of his outposts and spies, it may be fairly assumed that, with proper secrecy and celerity, Grant's columns could have passed through the Wilderness and reached the open country beyond before Lee could reach or confront them. When it is considered that about half the distance to be traversed was on the north side of the Rapidan, where the initial movements could be made under cover of darkness beyond the observations of the enemy, it will be seen that the advantages of a surprise might have been realized had the details been carefully worked out beforehand and the invading columns pushed forward with the utmost confidence and celerity.1

1

By far the best Confederate accounts of this campaign are Longstreet's "From Manassas to Appomattox" and Alexander's "Military Memoirs of a Confederate.''

XV

GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN

First to cross the Rapidan-Craig's Meeting House— Catharpen Road-Todd's Tavern-ChancellorsvilleSedgwick's flank turned-Grant's behavior-Occupation of Spottsylvania Court House-Meade, Warren, and Sedgwick-Incident with Warren-Meeting with Grant-Defective organization of army.

Grant having completed his plans for a general and simultaneous advance, it was the duty of his subordinates to perform the part assigned them to the best of their ability. The details of the preliminary movements were worked out by Meade and his officers. This done, a calm, full of anxiety, fell upon Grant's staff, and, realizing that the responsibility was now on other shoulders, Rawlins, Porter, Babcock, and Badeau rode over to my headquarters on the evening the advance began. Knowing that I would have the lead, they came to wish me success and Godspeed. We passed a pleasant hour, exchanging confidences and good cheer, and then, with a hearty hand-shake all round, parted to meet again on the field of strife a few days later.

My division was as nearly ready as volunteer cavalry ever is, and as it had the extreme left and front at Stevensburg, five miles from Culpeper and