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May 16.

Grant had concentrated three army corps, with not far from forty-five thousand men, within close supporting distance of each other, while Pemberton, with twenty-five, and Johnston, with ten or fifteen thousand men at most, were separated by thirty-five or forty miles of poor country, and neither force strong enough to make head against his confident opponent. Johnston's orders on this occasion, as well as throughout the campaign, were well enough, but they were in every instance too late to meet the rapidly changing condition of affairs. Grant, in the midst of Johnston's scattered divisions, had the short line to all possible points of the field, except Vicksburg, and, aided by his own staff, as well as by the quickened movements of both Sherman and McPherson, he was enabled in every instance to "get there first with the most men." Had McClernand been as active and aggressive as he should have been, and promptly put in, when ordered, his three other divisions, idle throughout the fight, Pemberton's army might have been taken both in flank and rear, as well as in front, and captured or at least completely scattered at Champion's Hill.

The capture of the tête de pont at the railroad crossing of the Big Black by Lawler the next day has already been sufficiently described, and as this opened the way to Vicksburg and made it easy to bridge the river wherever the Union columns might come to it, the rest of the field operations were simple enough for all concerned. But the night we reached the Big Black was a particularly busy one for me.

We had but one regular pontoon train in that

army, and as Sherman's advance now in the right front was hastening its march to the river at Bridgeport on the direct road to Hayne's Bluff, the future base of supplies, the train was sent to him. The bridge was promptly laid, and by the time Pemberton was safe inside his works, Sherman was well on his way to the new base on the Yazoo, which, before noon of the next day, was safely within his control. But McClernand's corps on the railroad, and McPherson's, with its right at Amsterdam, had also to cross the river without delay, and to this end it was necessary to build three additional bridges out of such materials as could be found at hand. The duty of designing and supervising their construction was mine. Fortunately, the task turned out to be a simple one. The first bridge was made of the dry trestlework timbers, which were cut down, dragged to the water one by one, rafted into place and kept steady by longitudinal side rails, all lashed firmly together and connected at both ends with proper land approaches. The actual work was most efficiently directed by Lieutenant Hains of the regular engineers.

The second bridge, two miles above, was made of cotton bales fastened end to end with a framework of scantling taken from nearby plantation houses and covered by joists and flooring held together by rack lashings applied in the usual manner.

The third, at Amsterdam, was like the first, but the dry timbers composing it were obtained by tearing down cotton gins and barns in and near the village, dragging them to the river, and making a solid raft of them across the sluggish stream. The practical work on the second and third was ably and

rapidly done by Captain Hickenlooper, McPherson's chief engineer, and all were ready for the troops to begin crossing before sun-up. Each served its purpose perfectly. Counting these improvised bridges, as well as those used between Milliken's Bend, New Carthage, and Bruinsburg on the west side of the Mississippi, there were between five thousand and six thousand feet of such bridges constructed during the Vicksburg campaign, and what is still more noteworthy is the fact that most of them were built during the night, so that no part of the army was compelled to delay its march while the bridges were under construction.

While the work was under way, Grant, Rawlins, Dana, and I spent the time together, passing from bridge site to bridge site, encouraging officers and men in their novel and necessary work. And no one could witness what was done on the Big Black without conceiving the deepest admiration for the American volunteer soldier and his unequaled capacity for the practical work of bridge building. It was only necessary to indicate and briefly explain what was wanted and leave him to do the rest. Other soldiers may be as courageous as he, but none can beat him in the general business of campaigning. He is at all times alert, active, and intelligent, and, I must add, I never saw a man or an officer of volunteers hesitate to obey orders. All he ever needs is reasonable certainty as to what is expected of him and then, if fairly well instructed and led, he is not only obedient but invincible. As General Grant used to say, "the common soldiers are as smart as town folks," and when the campaign is going right, which they are quick to perceive, they show their satisfaction

by the cheerfulness with which they march and the spirit with which they fight. All this was especially noticeable in the campaign east of the river which, from start to finish, was as gay and far more exciting than a picnic excursion, while its skirmishes and battles were "gentle and joyous jousts" which would have gladdened the hearts of the Knights at Ashby de la Zouche.

VIII

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG

First assault-Complete investment-Hot weather-Grant rides the lines-McClernand relieved-Close investment-Pemberton surrenders-Reorganization of volunteer army.

Grant's army, having closed in on Vicksburg, made a spirited effort the next morning to rush the enemy's entrenchments, but owing principally to the rough and unknown ground, covered by fallen trees and entanglements, the assault was necessarily too broken and disjointed to succeed. It was justified, however, by the chance that it would find the enemy too much discouraged and demoralized to make an effective defense or too much spread out to fully cover his whole line. According to precedent such a dash might have succeeded the evening before, immediately after our troops arrived on the ground, but the marching columns had to find their places and deploy, which on a strange terrain took too much time. Later in the war, darkness, which came on before the troops got fully into position, might have favored a successful attack, as at Selma and Columbus, in 1865, but in May, 1863, no one had had sufficient experience to venture upon such an undertaking. Besides the troops, having been march

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