THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING IMPORTANT STATE PAPERS AND PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND ALL THE LAWS OF A PUBLIC NATURE; WITH A COPIOUS INDEX. FIFTEENTH CONGRESS-FIRST SESSION: COMPILED FROM AUTHENTIC MATERIALS. WASHINGTON: PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY GALES AND SEATON. 1854. MARCH, 1818. Internal Improvements. H. OF R. quiry. The powers delegated by it are restricted A constitution of government-the offspring of to the collection and application of the public mutual concession among a people jealous of their revenue. Many, indeed the far greater part of freedom, and divided into many distinct soverthe powers subsequently enumerated, require for eigoties, alike jealous of their authority-ought their exercise no appropriation of money what- not to be construed as a treatise of political phiever. The very few which do require such aux-losophy-the production of one scientific mind. iliary aid, are the most important of them all, as We cannot be surprised at finding its language "to raise and support armies," "to provide and redundant in the delegation as well as the limita maintain a navy;" and they involve the neces- tion of power. Of this, the particular section sary exercise of many powers, which the mere on which I have just commented affords several authority to appropriate the public money does examples. The powers to provide and maintain not comprehend. The latter furnishes but one fleets and armies are embraced in the more commeans of attaining the common end of all the prehensive authority to declare war, the power powers of Congress, the general welfare. It to borrow money, and in that of paying the debts may be employed for this purpose either singly, of the nation. Yet, all these powers are sepaor in conjunction with other powers, alike ne rately and expressly delegated. cessary to this primary and ultimate end of all Government. The defect of the argument which I have sought to answer arises from a supposition that any construction of the clause in question, which extends its import beyond the power of levying taxes, asserts a title to every power whatever, tending in any degree to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. For myself, sir, I totally disavow any such struction. I ask for Congress but the authority, expressly delegated by this clause, to lay and collect taxes, and, when thus collected, so to apply them as to provide for the safety and welfare of the Union. I claim no more, Mr. Chairman, in support of that for which I now contend, than that a power as expressly delegated as any of those which I have enumerated, shall not be subverted by any rule of construction whatever. This power has been exercised from the very foundation of the Federal Government, not merely in the purchase of lands for a variety of purposes, more or less intimately connected with the conconvenience of the Government, or with the military defence and commercial prosperity of the United States. It has been substantially applied (as has been already remarked) to the encouragement of domestic manufactures, and (in a form less disguised) to the promotion of foreign emigration; the advancement of agriculture; the cultivation of science, literature, and taste; the diffusion of sentiments of patriotism, benevolence, and piety. Far from being the unbounded authority at which so much alarm has been expressed, it carries along with it several obvious limitations. The end to be obtained by it must be one of common defence, or of general welfare; it must also be one which requires the appropriation of money; and Congress can then no further participate in its attainment, in virtue of this power, than by contributing towards it the public money. It cannot be contended that this power is rendered unnecessary by that contained in the last clause of this section-" to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into" effect the powers expressly delegated to Congress. The former is a primary and independent power; the latter but secondary, or auxiliary. Had the latter not been expressed, there can be no doubt (to use the language of Publius) "that it would have resulted to the Government by an unavoidable implication," as it did under the Articles of Confederation. It was inserted in the Federal Constitution to obviate, not to create, doubts. But, if deemed essential, this authority extends beyond that in question, and comprehends the power to pass other laws, as well as acts of appropriation. It suffices for my present purpose, while it also obviates an objection of one of my colleagues, (Mr. SMYTH,) that among those acts it expressly authorizes all such as are required for the exereise of the power contained in the clause which I have endeavored to expound. Both clauses resemble each other in one quality, which our adversaries seem to disregard they were designed to enlarge, rather than to abridge (as is contended) the Constitutional powers of Congress. 15th CoN. 1st SESS.-42 The ingenuity of our opponents has not condescended-and surely will not-to distinguish between the release of a debt due to the Treasury, and the appropriation of a sum already collected, in favor of an object of general welfare. One of my colleagues (Mr. SMYTH) has consistently pushed his doctrine of construction to its proper extent. He has denied the constitutionality of the appropriations hitherto made to the Cumberland road, as well as that to the relief of the unfortunate sufferers of Venezuela. The same candor will extend this sentence of condemnation to all the pensions which have been granted, and to all the rewards of valor which have been bestowed by the Federal Government; not only to the whole tariff, but to the institutions in general, to the genius and character of the nation. There remains, Mr. Chairman, one other clause of the Constitution, hitherto unnoticed in this debate, to which I beg leave to call the attention of the Committee, in support of the Constitu tional authority for which I have last contended. The second clause of the third section of the sixth article confers on Congress a power not enumer ated in the section over which we have just passed. It is, "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States. The first branch of this authority was designed, as will appear from the context of the whole section, to enable the Federal Government 1315 H. OF R. Internal Improvements. to regulate and dispose of its own territory, according to the suggestions of the wisdom of Congress; the second embraces a similar power over all other national property, and consequently over the surplus revenue to be found at any time within the public Treasury. The obligation, as well as the power, of rendering productive such portion of the revenue as the public exigencies do not require, and as cannot without considerable loss be applied to the redemption of the public debts before they are due, is clearly deducible from this clause of the Constitution. This surplus must otherwise lie idle in the public Treasury; a Treasury which, in fact, exists in contemplation of law. It must remain in the hands of collectors and the public officers, or be deposited in the vaults of some bank, and, in both cases, be exposed to all the hazard, without retaining the profit, of a loan. MARCH, 1818. pose to constitute a fund for internal improvement. My colleague cannot deny the possibility of forming a system which shall combine individual sagacity, enterprise, and skill, with the national wealth, for the attainment of the far greater part, if not all the objects, upon which this power of appropriation would be exerted. He has not only beheld, but recently co-operated in the execution of such a system, in the State which we both represent. The characteristic feature of that system is, that to every public work, deemed by the legislature worthy of their patronage, and to which three-fifths of the stock necessary to complete it shall have been previously subscribed by private individuals, the State subscribes the remaining two-fifths, with a proviso that the total profit of the stock shall exclusively belong to the individual subscribers, until they shall have received legal interest upon all the sums which they may have advanced; after which the State participates with them in the dividends of the common stock. The subscription of the State operates as a moderate insurance against loss to private adventurers, who are expected to be attracted to all such enterprises, principally by the hope of gain; and is thus calculated to elicit the subscription of individual wealth to public use. While the State regards herself as amply remunerated for a temporary suspension of the interest on her share of the common stock, by the If the imposition or continuance of public tax-accomplishment of a public work, calculated to es, with a view to such an object, be deemed a replace this interest at some future period, and to augment, in the interim, her wealth and popmeasure of doubtful right or expediency, no such doubt can arise, as to such an application ulation. of the sum now proposed to be appropriated, or of the proceeds of the sales of public land, to which this section of the Constitution directly applies. Can it be questioned that such portion of the public money may be constitutionally applied to the purchase of the stock of a canal or turnpike company, as it had already been to the stock of a bank, under such rules and regulations as Congress may prescribe? I do not contend, in virtue of this clause, for the power to establish a banking or any other chartered company; but for the simple authority to invest, by exchange, or sale, one species of property into another, for the public benefit. This system is not more susceptible of application to the circumstances of a single State, than of the United States. It would only be neces sary, in order to extend the scale, to extend also the means of its application. Although, under no Constitutional obligation I would reluctantly appropriate any part of to look beyond the profit which might attend any such application of the public money, Con- the public revenue to roads or canals, without gress might, and undoubtedly would, blend with that security for their judicious, faithful, and that consideration other objects of general ad- economical completion, which would be afforded vantage. As individual subscribers to the stock by associating, in their original structure and subof all canal and turnpike companies usually ex- sequent preservation and repair, the cautious satend their views, even in pursuit of profit, beyond gacity, persevering industry, and unceasing vigi the expected dividends upon their stock, to the lance, of private interest; although I am not beneficial end of its application; so the Govern- prepared to say that there are no works of this dement may often confidently anticipate a benefit, scription to which I would not subscribe, from far surpassing in value any pecuniary profit on its the public Treasury, a larger proportion than stocks, from the success of a public work of gen- two-fifths of the stock necessary for their com eral utility. In all such acquisitions of stock, it pletion; or that there may not be some connected will regard the convenience and safety of the with the common defence, which would be cheapnation, and if the former has a price, the latterly provided for, at the sole cost of the Union. unquestionably has none. This mode of applying the public money, to the structure of roads and canals, is liable to none of the objections urged by one of my colleagues (Mr. SMYTH) to the expediency of passing the resolutions before the Committee. Indeed, when the general purport of the resolutions is considered, these objections must appear to himself premature, since they apply rather to the details of a system anticipated by him, than to the resolutions themselves, which merely pro Two of my honorable colleagues, (Messrs. SMYTH and BARBOUR,) to whose arguments I have so often referred, sought to discourage the smaller States from yielding their support to the resolu tions before us, by suggesting that, under any equitable distribution of the fund, which it is proposed to set apart for internal improvement, but a very inconsiderable allotment would fall to their share; while the other significantly asked, "if Massachusetts would give five millions of dollars to New York or Virginia ?" Sir, the question whether Congress have the Constitutional power so to apply the public money, ought not to be decided by such considerations. Its decision may, indeed, but its truth cannot be affected, in the remotest degree, by the manner in which the power that we seek to sustain, may be hereafter exercised. If the smaller States will receive but little, they require less than those of larger dimensions; and it should satisfy their justice, that what they receive will be in the exact proportion of what they contribute to the common fund. The first suggestion of my colleague reduces the fund to the least sum proposed; the last swells it to millions. I acknowledge that I most earnestly wish to see it augmented to an extent, much beyond the appropriation contemplated by the resolutions on our table. And when a proper occasion shall offer, I will submit a resolution which I hold in my hand, to enlarge it by adding the proceeds of sale of all the lands ceded to the Government of the United States by the Commonwealth of Virginia. The propriety of thus enlarging the proposed fund has been suggested to me, as well by the general policy of such an augmentation, as by the express terms of the Virginia act of cession, to which the United States were a party. There is, in this compact, a reservation of "all the ceded territory, as a common fund for the use and benefit of the several States, including Virginia, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditures set forth in the Articles of Confederation," which would be found, on comparison, to correspond very nearly with that ratio of distribution, provided by the act of the last Congress creating a fund for internal improvement, to which the late President refused his assent. H. of R. Although all the States, or even a majority of them, might not combine in devoting their respective shares of such a fund to one common object, yet some of them occasionally would, so as to obviate, in part, the chief inconvenience resulting from distribution. Is it too much to suppose, that there exists throughout the United States a patriotism which would exult at the accomplishment of a connexion of the Lakes with the Hudson, by the means of the useful and noble work which New York has just commenced, or of that scarcely less important, though much less expensive connexion between the waters of the Ohio and the Chesapeake, which Virginia has so long contemplated? To the smaller States, who are said to have least concern in the decision of this question, every new cement of an Union, essential, indeed, to the future prosperity and happiness of all its members, must be peculiarly interesting, since in any calamity, which might destroy this great bulwark of our common safety, they would be the greatest sufferers. With regard to the general character of that power which we are now, I trust, about to exert, it must be universally acknowledged, that whatever tends to facilitate the necessary intercourse between the remote extremities and the common centre of so vast an empire, has the same propitious effect, as would result, were it otherwise practicable, from contracting the extent of its territory, without reducing its population, impairing its wealth, or narrowing its resources. To the friends of American liberty, who justly regard the State governments as essential parts of a Republican system erected on a scale so extended as to constitute a cause of alarm, or who, with equal truth, consider our union as the bond alike of our independence and freedom, every measure which has the effect of diminishing the extent of the one, or of multiplying and strengthning the ties of the other, must be viewed with anxious solicitude. The compact solemnly subjoins to this reservation, that "this fund shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for the purpose set forth, and for no other purpose whatever." The maxims of good faith, and a positive provision of the Federal Constitution, enjoin upon Congress the ful- For Virginia, so unhappily divided on this. filment of this stipulation; and no mode of giv-question, it should be enough to silence her obing effect to it would better accord with its letter jections, that, situated midway between the coland spirit, than a distribution of the fund among onies of England and Spain, she constitutes the the several States, for the purposes proposed by key of that expanded arch, which, stretching the resolutions. from North to South, binds the whole East in union, and sustains, upon its broad and lofty summit, our Western Empire. The sentiment, I know, Mr. Chairman, exists, and I regret that it does, that, if a fund be provided for internal improvement, it will be misapplied, to gratify local and sectional interests. An effectual security against such an abuse of power, would be created by a distribution of its annual revenue, in conformity with the proviso of the Virginia compact; and if the fund should be augmented to the extent which I have just proposed, such a division of it would not destroy its efficacy. It cannot be believed that there exists a single State in this Union, in which such a fund would not be required, or could not be judiciously applied. No part of America has yet reached a degree of improvement, which leaves its internal intercourse without a demand for an additional road or canal. Representing a district adjacent to the seat of the Government, I have personally, or in behalf of my immediate constituents, less interest in the decision of this question, than those gentlemen who come from the remote sections of the Union; but who can be insensible to the great purpose which should constantly animate all our labors; the preservation and improvement of that noble fabric of Government, under which it is alike our happiness and our glory to live? Mr. BALDWIN followed on the same side, and spoke about three quarters of an hour in support of the resolutions. Mr. TUCKER, of Virginia, said, that he felt himself imperiously called upon to submit to the |