Brannan.

3. The third, to be called the Western District, will comprise that part of Florida west of the line before described as running north from Cedar Keys to the Georgia line. The headquarters of this district will remain at Fort Pickens, as at present, with Brig.-Gen. L. G. Arnold commanding.

The preparations, commenced by Gen. Sherman for the capture of Fort Pulaski, were pushed forward by Gen. Hunter, until the fort surrendered in April, as has been above described. The subsequent movements under Gen. Hunter consisted in reconnoissances in force toward Charleston. The southern boundary of the harbor of Charleston is formed by James Island. This island is bounded on the north by the harbor of Charleston and the Ashley river, on the northwest by Wappoo Creek, on the south and southwest by Stono river, and on the east are a few small islands and the ocean. Wappoo Creek connects with the Ashley river in the immediate rear of Charleston, and by entering Stono river and into Wappoo Creek, gunboats can reach Charleston. The next island south of importance is John's Island, and the next Edisto Island. Between these and Hilton Head is a number of islands of much less size. Early in May Com. Dupont ordered the channel of Stono river to be sounded out and buoys to be placed. This was completed on the 20th of May, and the gunboats Unadilla, Pembina, and Ottawa crossed the bar and entered the river. Along the river, owing to its great importance as a means of access to the city, a vast number of earthwork fortifications had been erected. All of

these were abandoned as the gunboats proceeded. The distance from the mouth of the Stono to Wappoo Creek is about eight miles. Little was done in the river by the fleet for many days, except silencing some of the Confederate batteries, and preventing the erection of ed on the march toward Charleston, of which others in commanding points likely to be needthis was designed as a preliminary movement. No signs of the approaching army appeared for two weeks, during which several reconnoissances were made by the fleet. The fire of the forts at the entrance to Wappoo Creek was drawn from two large rifled cannon at the lower battery of seven guns. The Huron and Pembina were anchored within range of these guns and within three miles of Charleston. From their mastheads could be seen a dozen spires, cupolas and observatories, the top masts of two or three large ships, and nearly all the northwestern part of the city. On the 2d of June the military advance with Gens. Hunter and Benham arrived and were landed on James Island, to await the coming of Gen. Wright with cavalry, artillery, and additional infantry from the Edisto. An important fortification which had been vacated was occupied on James Island. On the 5th the additional forces arrived, and a series of skirmishes ensued for the next ten days both on James and John's islands. On the 13th a sharp contest occurred between several New York and Pennsylvania regiments and the 47th Georgia.

Meanwhile a diversion was made by a small Confederate force against Hilton Head, which caused much consternation there, but effected nothing further.

It was soon manifest that the Confederate force had been increased, and nothing of importance could be further effected by Gen. Hunter without reënforcements. As the Government had none at this time to send, not being able to reënforce the more important army in Virginia, military operations were comparatively suspended.

Up to this time movements of some importance had taken place in Missouri and Arkansas. Two sharp skirmishes for the numbers engaged took place,-the one at Mt. Zion, eighteen miles southwest of Sturgeon, on the 28th of December, 1861, and the other near Fayette, on the 8th of January of the year 1862. In the former, Brig.Gen. Prentiss commanded, and in the latter Major Torneru. They produced no special influence on the campaign in that department. On the 29th of January, Gen. Earl Van Dorn took command of the Confederate forces in the trans-Mississippi district, which comprised a considerable portion of the State of Missouri, with his headquarters at Little Rock. On the preceding day, the division of the Union army under the command of Col. Jeff. C. Davis left Marseilles for Springfield. It consisted of four regiments-the 8th

and 22d Indiana, 37th Illinois, and 9th Missouri, with two batteries, and three companies of cavalry. The other forces immediately moved forward, and combined under Gen. Curtis. On the 11th of February this army moved forward from Lebanon, formed in three divisions-the right under Col. Davis, the centre under Gen. Sigel, and the left under Col. Carr. Six miles from Springfield on the 12th, a skirmish took place between the advance of this force and a body of Confederate troops, with serious loss to both sides. During the night a continuous fire was kept up between the pickets. On the next morning the Confederate force had retreated, and Gen. Curtis occupied Springfield without opposition. About six hundred sick and a large amount of stores were left behind by the Confederate General Price. Gen. Halleck, in command of this department, sent the following despatch to the commander-in-chief, Gen. McClellan, at Wash

ington:

ST. LOUIS, February 14, 1862.

The flag of the Union floats over the court house in Springfield. The enemy retreated after a short engagement, leaving a large amount of stores and equip ments, which were captured by Gen. Curtis. Our cav alry are in close pursuit.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. Such had been Gen. Halleck's skilful management of this department, that a few days previous he had received the following despatch from the Secretary of War:

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, St. Louis: Your energy and ability received the strongest commendation of this Department. You have my perfect confidence, and you may rely upon my utmost support in your undertakings. The pressure of my engagements has prevented me from writing you, but I will do so fully in a day or two.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. As Gen. Price retreated Gen. Curtis followed rapidly in pursuit. On the 16th his army had advanced sixty-nine miles south of Springfield, and on the 18th had crossed the Arkansas line. Several skirmishes took place in the mountain defiles. The following despatch was sent to Washington by Gen. Halleck:

ST. LOUIS, February 18, 1862. To Maj.-Gen. McClellan, Washington: The flag of the Union is floating in Arkansas. Gen. Curtis has driven Price from Missouri, and is several miles across the Arkansas line, cutting up Price's rear, and hourly capturing prisoners and stores. The army of the Southwest is doing its duty nobly.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. On the 19th Gen. Price had been reënforced by Gen. McCulloch, and made a stand at Sugar Creek crossing, but was defeated after a short engagement, and retreated. Squads of recruits from Missouri, on their way to join the Confederate force, were captured at this time, among whom was Brig.-Gen. Edward Price, son of Gen. Price. On the 26th Gen. Price had been driven from his stronghold at Cross Hollows, leaving his sick and wounded, and such stores as he could not destroy. He burned his

extensive barracks at that place. The Federal forces had now, for some days, been subsisting chiefly on provisions which they had captured. On the 27th, Gen. Halleck sent the following despatch to Washington:

HEADQUARTERS, ST. LOUIS, February 27. Maj.-Gen. McClellan:

kansas, capturing a large number of prisoners, stores, Gen. Curtis has taken possession of Fayetteville, Arbaggage, &c.

The enemy burnt a part of the town before they left. They have crossed the Boston Mountains in great confusion. We are now in possession of all their strong

holds.

Forty-two officers and men of the Fifth Missouri cavalry were poisoned at Mud Town by eating poisoned food which the rebels left behind them. The gallant Capt. Dolfort died, and Lieut. Col. Von Dutch and Capt. Lehman have suffered much, but are recovering. have been restrained from retaliating upon the prisonThe anger of our soldiers is very great, but they H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

ers of war.

Gen. Price thus reported his retreat from Missouri, under date of Feb. 25:

"About the latter part of January my scouts reported that the enemy were concentrating in force at Rolla, and shortly thereafter they occupied Lebanon. Believing that this movement could be for no other purpose than to attack me, and knowing that my command was inadequate for such successful resistance as the interests of my army and the cause demanded, I appealed to the commanders of the Confederate troops in Arkansas to come to my assistance. This, from correspondence, I was led confidently to expect, and relying upon it, I held my position to the last moment, and, as the sequel proved, almost too long; for on Wednesday, February 12, my pickets were driven in, and reported the enemy advancing upon me in force. No resource was now left me except retreat, without hazarding all with greatly unequal numbers upon the result of one engagement. This I deemed it unwise to do. I commenced retreating at once. I reached Cassville with loss unworthy of mention in any respect. Here the enemy in my rear commenced a series of attacks running through four days. Retreating and fighting all the way to the Cross Hollows in this State, I am rejoiced to say my command, under the most exhausting fatigue, all the time with but little rest for either man or horse, and no sleep, sustained themselves, and came through, repulsing the enemy upon every occasion with great determination and gallantry. My loss does not exceed four to six killed and some fifteen to eighteen wounded."

On the 1st of March, Gen. Curtis issued the following address to the people of the South

west:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST,
CAMP HALLECK, ARK., March 1, 1862.

I have received a private communication from an intelligent writer, a citizen of Arkansas, who says: "We, as citizens, have left our homes and firesides for the purpose, as we supposed, of having to defend ourselves ble homes, and outrage the chastity of our wives and against a brutal soldiery that would lay waste our humdaughters, and place our own lives in jeopardy. We

prop

have organized what is called Home Guard Companies, partly of Union men and partly of Southern men, all of whom are anxious to return to their homes. We are happy to find that you and your men are not composed of that class of persons commonly called jayhawk ers, who do not regard the rights of citizens and erty, but confine the war to its legitimate object.' The falsehoods circulated concerning us have driven thousands from their homes, and I take the liberty of responding publicly to the sentiments expressed by the writer, because these falsehoods have involved the whole community in the troubles which he seeks to mitigate.

The only legitimate object of the war is peace, and the writer only does me justice when he says I adhere to this legitimate object. Peaceable citizens shall be protected as far as possible. I act under strict orders of Maj.-Gen. Halleck. The flight of our foes from their camps, and the imitation of their conduct by the citizens, in fleeing from their homes, leaving their effects abandoned as it were for the victors, have much embarrassed me in my efforts to preserve discipline in my command, as these circumstances offered extraor dinary temptations.

The burning of farms and fields of grain in Missouri, and extensive barracks and valuable mills in Arkansas by the enemy, has induced some resentments on the part of my troops, which I have severely punished. Necessary supplies for my command could not keep up with my rapid movements, and peaceable citizens not being at home to sell them to my quartermasters, I am compelled to take them without purchase, making settlement difficult and doubtful; occasioning irregularities which I have always labored to counteract. If peaceably disposed citizens will stay at home, or return home, and check the clandestine, stealthy warfare that is carried on under the cover and cloak of peaceable citizens, much of the havoc of war will be avoided, and many poor families can be protected from distress and misery. I have followed the war-path through the entire State of Missouri, have seen the havoc and devastation surrounding it, and I deplore the prospect of these disasters in the virgin soil of Arkansas.

Armed men, in the garb of citizens, are concealed by citizens, and the unfortunate condition of Missouri will be transferred to Arkansas, if you allow this complicity of yourselves in the struggle. If you do not discriminate by requiring soldiers to wear some distinctive badge, you must not complain if we cannot discriminate.

There is no honor, no glory, no good that can be gained by taking up arms in this way, to defend your homes, for we do not wish to molest them if you are peaceably disposed. We only wish to put down rebelfion by making war against those in arms, their aiders and abettors. We come to vindicate the Constitution, to preserve and perpetuate civil and religious liberty, under a flag that was embalmed in the blood of our Revolutionary fathers. Under that flag we have lived in peace and prosperity until the flag of rebellion involved us in the horrors of civil war.

We have restored the Stars and Stripes to northwestern Arkansas, where I am glad to find many who rejoice to see the emblem of their former glory, and hope for a restoration of the peace and happiness they have enjoyed under its folds. A surrender to such a flag is only a return to your natural allegiance, and is more honorable than to persist in a rebellion that surrendered to the national power at Forts Henry and Donelson, at Nashville and at Roanoke, and throughout the most powerful Southern States. Why then shall the West be devastated to prolong a struggle which the States of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee cannot successfully maintain? Disband your companies; surrender your arms; for in all instances where men in arms have voluntarily surrendered and taken the oath of allegiance to our common country, they have been discharged. No prisoners have, to my knowledge, been shot or hung, or cruelly treated by us.

I know of no instance where my troops have treated

females with violence, and I have not heard of a complaint of any kind. I enjoin on the troops kindness, protection, and support for women and children. Í shall, to the best of my ability, maintain our country's flag in Arkansas, and continue to make relentless war on its foes, but shall rejoice to see the restoration of peace in all the States and Territories of our country that peace which we formerly enjoyed and earnestly desire; and I implore for each and all of us that ultimate, eternal peace "which the world cannot give or take away." I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Brig.-Gen. Commanding Army of the Southwest. On reaching Arkansas the forces of Gen. Price were rapidly reënforced by regiments which had been stationed in Arkansas and the Indian Territory. Knowing this fact, Gen. Curtis expected an attack would soon be made upon him. He therefore selected Sugar Creek, as the strongest of several strong places taken from the enemy, to make a stand against any and all odds. The position of Gen. Curtis's force on the 6th of March was as follows: The first and second divisions, under Gens. Sigel and Asboth, were four miles southwest of Bentonville under general orders to move round to Sugar Creek about fourteen miles east. The third division, under Col. Jeff. C. Davis, had moved to take position at Sugar Creek, under orders to make some preparatory arrangements and examinations for a stand against the enemy. The fourth division was at Cross Hollows under command of Col. E. A. Carr, about twelve miles from Sugar Creek on the main telegraph road from Springfield to Fayetteville. The number of his force is stated by Gen. Curtis to have been not more than 10,500 cavalry and infantry with forty-nine pieces of artillery. The following were the forces engaged in the battle of Pea Ridge: 1st division, under command of Col. Osterhaus,36th Illinois, 12th Missouri, 17th Missouri, battalion of 3d, two battalions of Benton Hussars cavalry, one battalion 39th Illinois cavalry, batteries A and B, twelve guns. A brigade, consisting of the 25th and 44th Illinois, was commanded by Col. Coler. Another brigade was commanded by Col. Greusel.

The second division, commanded by Brig.Gen. Asboth, consisted of the 2d Missouri, Col. Schæfer; 2d Ohio battery, six guns, Lieut. Chapman; 15th Missouri, Col. Joliet; 6th Missouri cavalry, Col. Wright; light battery of six guns, Capt. Elbert; battalion 4th Missouri cavalry, Maj. Messaur. These two divisions were commanded by Gen. Sigel.

The third division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, consisted of 2 brigades: the 1st, commanded by Col. Barton, was composed of the 8th, 18th and 22d Indiana, and an Indiana battery of six guns. The 2d brigade, commanded by Col. White, was composed of the 37th Illinois, 9th Missouri, 1st Missouri cavalry, and a battery of four guns.

The fourth division, commanded by Col. Carr, consisted of 2 brigades; the 1st, commanded by Col. Dodge, was composed of the 4th Iowa, 35th

Illinois, and an Iowa battery. The 2d brigade, commanded by Col. Vandever, consisted of the 9th Iowa, 25th Missouri, 3d Illinois cavalry, and a battery. There were also two battalions of the Iowa 3d cavalry and a mountain howitzer battery of four guns. A considerable number of sick soldiers belonging to many of these regiments had been left at Rolla and Lebanon.

On the 5th of March, a cold, blustering day, snow having fallen so as to cover the ground, as Gen. Curtis was engaged in writing, not apprehending an immediate attack, he was informed by scouts and fugitive citizens that the enemy were rapidly approaching to give battle. His cavalry would be at Elm Springs, twelve miles distant, that night, and his infantry had then passed Fayetteville. Couriers were immediately sent to Gen. Sigel and Col. Carr to move with their divisions to Sugar Creek.

The Confederate forces were under the command of Gen. Van Dorn, who had arrived at their camp on the 2d of March. They were stated to be composed of between twenty-five and thirty thousand men, as follows: Missouri troops under Brig.-Gen. Price; Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texan troops under Brig.-Gen. McCulloch; Choctaw, Cherokee, and Chickasaw Indians under Brig.-Gen. Pike.

Gen. Sigel, upon receiving the orders of Gen. Curtis to march to Sugar Creek, and becoming aware of the dangerous position of his command, immediately ordered Col. Schæfer to break up his camp, and send the cavalry company to Osage Springs to cover his right flank and to march with his regiment to Bentonville. All the other troops he ordered to be prepared to march at two o'clock on the next morning. Commencing his march in the morning, he reached Bentonville, and, retaining a small force to set as a rear guard, he sent his train forward. At ten o'clock it was reported that large masses of troops, consisting of infantry and cavalry, were moving from all sides toward the front and both flanks of the rear guard at Bentonville. By a mistake a part of this force designed to act as rear guard had gone forward, leaving about six hundred men with five pieces of the light battery. These troops were ordered by Gen. Sigel to march in the following order: two companies of the 12th Missouri regiment at the head of the column deployed on the right and left as skirmishers, followed by the light battery; one company of the same regiment on the right and one on the left of the pieces, marching by the flank, and prepared to fire by ranks to the right and left, the remainder of the regiment being behind the pieces; two companies of cavalry to support the infantry on the right and left, and the rest of the cavalry with one piece of artillery following in the rear. Thus the troops advanced slowly in this formation, modified from time to time according to circumstances, fighting and repelling the enemy in front, on the flanks, and rear, whenever he stood or attacked, for five hours and a half, when re

enforcements from Gen. Curtis arrived. What made this march a more difficult achievement, was the condition of the roads, which were in many places very narrow and badly cut up. This movement brought Gen. Sigel's division to the west end of Pea Ridge, where he formed a junction with Gen. Davis and Col. Carr. On this day Gen. Curtis had been engaged in diligently preparing earthwork defences and cutting timber to check the progress of the enemy along the Fayetteville road, where they were confidently expected by him. But during the day and the ensuing night Gen. Van Dorn moved his entire army around the west side of Gen. Curtis's army, so that Gen. Price occupied the Fayetteville road north of Gen. Curtis's camp, while Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh lay north of Gen. Sigel. Thus the Confederate forces fronted south, and the division under Gen. Price formed their left wing. The distance apart of the main bodies of the two wings of each army was nearly three miles, thus forming in fact four distinct armies. Gens. Van Dorn and Price were opposed to Gen. Curtis, who had with him Gen. Davis and Cols. Carr and Asboth, leaving one division to Gen. Sigel opposed to Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh. Gen. Curtis was thus compelled to make a change of front, and formed it almost two miles further north and resting on the brow of a range of hills fronting north, called Pea Ridge. In this position_the enemy occupied the line of retreat for Gen. Curtis, if defeated. The battle commenced on the 7th on the right of Gen. Curtis's column, and raged furiously during the entire day. The brunt of it was borne by Col. Carr's division. The Confederate forces, owing to their superior numbers, the numerous and deep ravines and the thick brush which covered the hills, succeeded in driving the Union right from the ground occupied in the morning, with a severe loss on both sides. They encamped on the battle ground during the night, and the right wing of Gen. Curtis fell back nearly a mile. The field occupied by this portion of both armies during the day did not exceed three fourths of a mile in diameter.

On the left wing Gen. McCulloch commenced in the morning by moving his force to the south and east, evidently intending to form a junction with Gens. Van Dorn and Price. Gen. Sigel, perceiving this movement and the effect it would have toward surrounding the Federal force, sent forward three pieces of light artillery, with a supporting force of cavalry, to take a commanding position and delay the movement of the enemy until the infantry could be brought into proper position for an attack. Hardly had the artillery obtained their position and opened fire, when an overwhelming force of the enemy's cavalry came down upon them, scattering the cavalry and capturing the artillery. This terrible onslaught of the enemy allowed their infantry to reach unmolested the cover of a dense wood. On the west of this

wood was a large open field. Here and in the surrounding wood a protracted struggle ensued between Gen. McCulloch and the forces of Col. Osterhaus. But the arrival of Gen. Davis's force, as a reenforcement, so strengthened Gen. Sigel that the enemy were finally routed and driven in all directions. At the same time Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh and a number of the Confederate officers were killed.

Thus the right wing of Gen. Curtis was defeated, and his left was victorious. The discipline of the right wing, however, was such as to keep the troops completely together, while the right wing of the enemy, which was defeated, was greatly disorganized in consequence of their loss of officers and lack of discipline. During the night all the Confederate forces formed a junction on the ground held by their left wing, which was a strong position, and they felt confident of a complete victory on the next day. On the Federal side the prospect was gloomy. The night was too cold to sleep without fires, and their position and nearness to the enemy would not allow fires along the advance lines. The men were exhausted by two days' fighting and the loss of sleep. The enemy's forces, in far superior numbers, held the only road for their retreat, and nearly a thousand of their companions were dead or wounded. No alternative was presented to them but to conquer or be destroyed.

With the rising sun the battle commenced. Col. Carr's division had been reënforced by a large part of that of Gen. Davis, thus enabling the right barely to hold its position. Gen. Sigel began to form his line of battle by changing his front so as to face the right flank of the enemy's position. For this purpose he first ordered the 25th Illinois, Col. Coler, to take a position along a fence in open view of the enemy's batteries, which at once opened fire upon the regiment. He next ordered a battery of six guns, partly rifled twelve-pounders, into a line one hundred paces in the rear of the 25th infantry, on a rise of ground. The 15th Missouri then formed into a line with the 25th Illinois on their left, and another battery of guns was similarly disposed a short distance behind them. Thus more infantry with batteries in their rear was placed until about thirty pieces of artillery, each about fifteen or twenty paces from the other, were in continuous line, the infantry in front lying down. Each piece opened fire as it came in position, and the fire was so directed as to silence battery after battery of the enemy.

For two hours the Confederate forces stood unshaken before that fire, with their crowded ranks decimated and their horses shot at their guns. One by one their pieces ceased to reply. Then onward crept the infantry and onward came the guns of Gen. Sigel. The range became shorter and shorter. No charge of the enemy could face those batteries or venture on that compact line of bayonets. They turned and fled. Again the Union line was advanced with a partial change of front, when an order to

charge the enemy in the woods was given. Then the infantry rising up pressed forward into the dense brush, where they were met by a terrible volley, which was fiercely returned; volley followed volley, still the line pushed forward until more open ground was obtained, when the Confederate force broke in confusion. As Gen. Sigel advanced, Gen. Curtis also ordered the centre and right wing forward. The right wing turned the left of the enemy and cross-fired into his centre. This placed him in the arc of a circle. The charge was then ordered throughout the whole line, which utterly routed their forces as above stated, and compelled them to retire in complete confusion, but rather safely through the deep and almost impassable defiles of Cross Timbers. Gen. Sigel followed toward Keetsville, and the cavalry continued the pursuit still further. The Union loss in this battle was 212 killed, 926 wounded, and 124 missing. The Confederate killed and wounded was larger in numbers, with a loss of nearly 1000 prisoners. Among their killed were Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh.

On the 9th Gen. Van Dorn, under a flag of truce, requested permission to bury his dead, which was readily granted. In the reply to this request Gen. Curtis said: "The General regrets that we find on the battle-field, contrary to civilized warfare, many of the Federal dead, who were tomahawked, scalped, and their bodies shamefully mangled, and expresses the hope that this important struggle may not degenerate to a savage warfare."

To this statement, Gen. Van Dorn replied: "He hopes you have been misinformed with regard to this matter, the Indians who formed part of his forces having for many years been regarded as civilized people. He will, however, most cordially unite with you in repressing the horrors of this unnatural war; and that you may cooperate with him to this end more effectually, he desires me to inform you that many of our men who surrendered themselves prisoners of war, were reported to him as having been murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be Germans. The general commanding feels sure that you will do your part, as he will, in preventing such atrocities in future, and that the perpetrators of them will be brought to justice, whether German or Choctaw."

Gen. Curtis in answer further said: "I may say, the Germans charge the same against your soldiers. I enclose a copy of a letter from Gen. Sigel, addressed to me before the receipt of yours, in which the subject is referred to. As 'dead men tell no tales,' it is not easy to see how these charges may be proven, and the General hopes they are mere 'camp stories,' having little or no foundation. The Germans in the army have taken and turned over many prisoners, and the General has not before heard murder charged against them; on the contrary, they have seemed peculiarly anxious to exhibit