him; the friend heard not the last groans of a friend; all natural ties were dissolved; only one feeling, one thirst, panted in every bosom -revenge. Here it was that the son of Major Peyton, but fifteen years of age, called to his father for help. A ball had shattered both his legs. When we have beaten the enemy then I will help you,' answered Peyton; 'I have here other sons to lead to glory. Forward!' But the column had advanced only a few paces farther when the major himself fell to the earth a corpse. Prodigies of valor were here performed on both sides. History will ask in vain for braver soldiers than those who have fought and fell. But of the demoniac fury of both parties one at a distance can form no idea. Even the wounded, despairing of succor, collecting their last energies of life, plunged their knives into the bosoms of foemen who lay near them still breathing.

"The success of General Hill enabled other generals to once more lead their disorganized troops back to the fight, and the contest was renewed along the whole line, and kept up until deep into the night; for everything depended upon our keeping the enemy at bay, counting, too, upon their exhaustion at last, until fresh troops could arrive to reënforce us. At length, about half past ten in the evening, the divisions of Magruder, Wise, and Holmes, came up and deployed to the front of our army.

"So soon as these reënforcements could be thrown to the front our regiments were drawn back, and as far as possible reorganized during the night, the needful officers appointed, and after the distribution of provisions, which had also fortunately arrived, measures were adopted for the gathering up of the wounded and

the burial of the dead."

In this conflict Gen. McCall was taken prisoner by the Confederates.

During the same day an attack was made upon the corps of Gen. Porter by the divisions of Gens. Wise and Holmes near Malvern Hill, but without success.

On the night of the 30th all the divisions of the Federal army were united at Malvern Hill, a strong position where the whole train, including the siege guns, were sheltered. The army was thus in communication with its transports and supplies. Five days of incessant marching and fighting had passed, during which many had been sun struck by the heat, and others from exhaustion had quitted the ranks and fell into the procession of sick and wounded. Attacked by a force far superior to itself, it had succeeded in reaching a position where it was out of danger and from which, if reënforced, it could have advanced.

Gen. McClellan immediately put his army in a position for defence by arranging his batteries along the high grounds so as not to interfere with the defence by the infantry of the sort of glacis upon which the enemy would be obliged to advance to the attack. About four P. M. on the 1st of July, the Confederate forces

advanced to storm the position. But a destructive fire of grape mowed them down until the fragments of their divisions were compelled to seek shelter in the woods. The position being within range of the gunboats they also opened a destructive fire with their hundred pounders upon the enemy. The attack was a failure, the loss of the Confederates being immense while that of the Federal troops was insignificant. On the evening after the battle the exhausted enemy retired to Richmond to appear no more, and the army of the Potomac took up a position at Harrison's Bar, a spot chosen by the engineers and naval officers as the most favorable for defence and for receiving supplies. These battles were fought at a time when the military strength of the Confederate States had been brought into the field and concentrated at Richmond. Thus the Confederate army greatly outnumbered the Federal force, reduced by losses during the campaign and by sickness, on the banks of the Chickahominy. No official reports have appeared of the losses on either side. They were not far from fifteen thousand men. On the 3d of July the War Department published a despatch from Gen. McClellan dated at Berkeley, Harrison's Bar, stating that he had lost but one gun, which broke down and was abandoned, and that the rear of his train was then within a mile of camp and only one wagon abandoned.

On the 4th of July Gen. McClellan issued the following address to his army:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, July 4, 1862. SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC: Your

achievements of the past ten days have illustrated the ed by superior forces, and without hopes of reenforce

valor and endurance of the American soldier. Attack.

ments, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of military operations. You have saved all your guns except a few lost in battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy.

Upon your march you have been assailed, day after day, with desperate fury, by men of the same race and nation, skilfully massed and led. Under every disadvantage of number, and necessarily of position also, you have in every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaughter.

Your conduct ranks you among the celebrated armies of history. None will now question what each of you may always, with pride, say: "I belonged to the Army of the Potomac." You have reached this new The enemy may at any time attack you-we are prebase complete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. pared to meet them. I have personally established your lines. Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a final defeat.

Your government is strengthening you with the resources of a great people. On this, our nation's birthday, we declare to our foes, who are rebels against the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter the capital of the so-called Confederacy; that our national Constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can alone insure internal peace and external security to each State, must and shall be preserved, cost what it may in time, treasure, and blood.

GEO. E. MCCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding. On the 5th President Davis issued the following address to the Confederate army:

RICHMOND, July 5, 1862. To the Army in Eastern Virginia: SOLDIERS; I Congratulate you on the series of brilliant victories which, under the favor of Divine Providence, you have lately won, and as the President of the Confederate States, do heartily tender to you the thanks of the country, whose just cause you have so skilfully and heroically served. Ten days ago, an invading army, vastly superior to you in numbers and the material of war, closely beleaguered your capital and vauntingly proclaimed its speedy conquest; you marched to attack the enemy in his intrenchments; with well directed movements and death-defying valor, you charged upon him in his trong positions, drove him from field to field over a distance of more than thirty-five miles, and despite his reënforcements compelled him to seek safety under the cover of his gunboats, where he now lies cowering before the army so lately derided and threatened with entire subjugation. The fortitude with which you have borne toil and privation, the gallantry with which you have entered into each successive battle, must have been witnessed to be fully appreciated; but a grateful people will not fail to recognize you and to bear you in loved remembrance. Well may it be said of you that you have "done enough for glory;" but duty to a suffering country and to the cause of constitutional liberty, claims from you yet further effort. Let it be your pride to relax in nothing which can promote your future efficiency; your one great object being to drive the invader from your soil, and, carrying your standards beyond the outer boundaries of the Confederacy, to wring from an unscrupulous foe the recognition of your birthright, community, and independence.

[Signed]

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Early in July Gen. Halleck resigned his command of the army of the West, and in obedience to an order of the President assumed, on the 23d of July, the duties of general-in-chief of the entire army of the United States. This was the position held by Gen. McClellan, previous to his departure from Washington to conduct the peninsular campaign. Its duties had been subsequently performed by the Secretary of War, under the supervision of President Lincoln, assisted by the counsel of Maj.-Gen. Hitchcock, an elderly officer of the army. Gen. Halleck, upon assuming these duties, had his attention immediately called to the army of the Potomac. He thus relates his action in relation to it:

"The first thing to which my attention was called on my arrival here (at Washington), was the condition of the army at Harrison's Landing, on the James river. I immediately visited Gen. McClellan's headquarters for consultation. I left Washington on the 24th and returned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if there was a possibility of an advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing, and if not to favor some plan of uniting the armies of Gen. McClellan and Gen. Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia and on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of reënforcements that could be sent to the army of the

Potomac.

"On the day of my arrival at Harrison's Landing Gen. McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least 50,000 additional troops. I informed him that this number could

not possibly be sent; that I was not authorized to promise him over 20,000, and that I could not well see how even that number could be safely withdrawn from other places. He took the night for considering the matter, and informed me the next morning that he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional 20,000, but immediately on my return to Washington he telegraphed that he would require 35,000, a force which it was impossible to send him without leaving Washington and Baltimore almost defenceless. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of Gen. Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. After full consultation with my officers, I determined to attempt this junction on the Rappahannock, by bringing McClellan's forces to Aquia Creek.

"Accordingly, on the 30th of July, I telegraphed to him to send away his sick as quickly as possible, preparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the with drawal of his entire army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the transfer to Aquia Creek might be made as rapidly as possible, I authorized Gen. MeClellan to assume control of all the vessels in the James river and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet. The quartermas ter-general was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured. On the 5th I received a protest from Gen. Me Clellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing. On the 1st of August I ordered Gen. Burnside to immediately embark his troops at Newport News, transfer them to Aquia Creek, and take position opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness, and reached Aquis Creek on the night of the 3d. His troops were immediately landed, and the transports sent back to Gen. McClellan.

"About this time I received information that the enemy were preparing a large force to drive back Gen. Pope, and attack either Washington or Baltimore. The information was so direct and trustworthy that I could not doubt its correctness. This gave me serious uneasiness for the safety of the capital and Maryland, and I repeatedly urged upon Gen. McClellan the necessity of promptly moving his army so as to form a junction with that of Gen. Pope. The evacuation of Harrison's Landing, however, was not commenced till the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered."

The following correspondence, respecting this removal of the army of the Potomac, took place between Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck:

BERKELEY, Va., August 4, 12 M. Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Commander-in-Chief:

Your telegraph of last evening is received. I must experienced, for I am convinced that the order to with confess that it has caused me the greatest pain, I ever draw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous in

the extreme to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications

as secure.

We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water, during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fortress Monroe is a march of about seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land. The result of the movement would thus be to march one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue; the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign Powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reënforced to enable it to resume the offensive.

It may be said that there are no reenforcements available. I point to Gen. Burnside's force, to that of Gen. Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defence there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of this nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere, here is the true defence of Washington; it is here, on the bank of the James river, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

Clear in my conviction of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war; I do now what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your order to the utmost of my power, devoting to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be, and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster from my country. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General. GEN. HALLECK TO GEN. MCCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, Aug 6, 1862. Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, Commanding, &c., Berkeley, Va.:

GENERAL-Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in

whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview; and even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no other alternative.

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large reenforcements from the south. General Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety. With the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect, neither can reënforce the other in case of such an attack. If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reenforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula is, under pres ent circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the peninsula to some point by water-say Fredericksburg-where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged.

You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, which is now in excellent condition and discipline. cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in the demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your present position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it.

A new base on the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a reenforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the peninsula would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericksburg is. Besides the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy.

The political effect of the withdrawal may at first look unfavorable, but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity; and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments. But you will reply, Why not reenforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview that you required 50,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have "some chance" of success with 20,000; but you afterward telegraphed to me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely reenforced.

If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was

utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reenforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river, and even after you got the reenforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could ad

vance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me-are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the peninsula now advise its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not desire to know, by whose advice or for what reason the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy before them. I must take things as I find them. I find our forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better one, I certainly should have adopted it; but all of your plans require reënforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for reinforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having carefully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at different conclusions from your own. Very respectfully, your

obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. (Official Copy.) J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adj.-Gen. Thus the campaign was closed. The once proud Army of the Potomac was withdrawn from the peninsula to Aquia Creek and Alexandria, and its corps were immediately ordered into the field to reenforce the army of Gen. Pope southeast of Washington, and to act under his command.

By an order of the President on the 27th of June, Maj.-Gen. Pope, who had been in command of a force in the West, entered upon the chief command of the army of Virginia.

The following is the order of the President creating the Army of Virginia, and putting Gen. Pope in command, dated June 27, 1862:

I. The forces under Maj.-Gens. Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brig. Gen. Sturgis, at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia.

II. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to Maj.-Gen. John Pope as Commanding General.

The troops of the Mountain Department, heretofore under command of Gen. Fremont, shall constitute the first army corps, under the command of Gen. Fremont, The troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under Gen. Banks, shall constitute the second army corps, and be commanded by him.

The troops under the command of Gen. McDowell, except those within the fortifications and the city of Washington, shall form the third army corps, and be

under his command.

The creation of the several separate and independent commands which constituted the forces west and southwest of Washington had always been looked upon with distrust. Hence

the consolidation of these forces under one commander was regarded with much satisfaction by the public, as a wise and prudent measure.

The appointment of Gen. Pope to the chief command was not favorably received by Maj.Gen. Fremont. Consequently the following order was issued from the War Department:

War Department, Washington, June 27, 1862. Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, having asked to be relieved from command of the First Army Corps of the Army of Virginia, because, as he says, the position assigned him by the appointment of Maj.-Gen. Pope as commander-in-chief of the Army of Virginia is subordinate and inferior to those heretofore held by him, and to remain in the subordinate command now assigned him would, as he says, largely reduce his rank and consideration in the service

It is ordered by the President that Maj.-Gen. John C. Fremont be relieved from command.

Second, that Gen. Rufus King be and he is hereby assigned to the command of the First Army Corps of the Army of Virginia, in place of Gen. Fremont, relieved by order of the President.

EDWARD M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

On the next day Gen. Fremont issued an order declaring his resignation of the command of his forces and assigning it to Brig.-Gen. Schenck. The ground upon which the resignation of Gen. Fremont was made, was understood to be that Gen. Pope, who had been appointed to the command of the army of Virginia, was his inferior in rank, and he could not consistently command a corps under him. Gen. Schenck, on assuming command, issued the following order:

which the General commanding has done him the honBrig. Gen. Schenck, in assuming the new position to or thus to assign him, desires to express his great satisfaction that it will only somewhat change his relation to the troops which have heretofore been under his He takes this occasion to say to the officers and men command, but without separating him from them. with whom he has been connected, that he congratulates himself on having those who have so commended themselves by their discipline, obedience, and general good conduct, still left in his division. He regrets for and men; and he confidently hopes, as to the troops similar reasons to part with Capt. Rigby, his officers whose accession to the brigade will extend his command, that the relation between himself and them, as well as with all his old companions, will continue to be mutually agreeable and advantageous. By order of Brig.-Gen. SCHENCK.

DONN PIATT, Captain and A. A.-G. Gen. Rufus King had been ordered to the comAt night of the same day he learned that mand of that corps, and sent in his request to be relieved of command in that portion of further learning that Gen. King had been dethe army. But on the subsequent day, still tached and Gen. Sigel ordered to the same command, he withdrew his resignation.

Meantime Maj.-Gen. Pope was making his of July he issued the following address to his arrangements to take the field. On the 14th army:

To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia: By special assignment of the President I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two and your wants, in preparing you for active operations weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and in placing you in a position from which you can act