previous good character may be destroyed and a bad one created by discussion of the circumstances connected with the offense, as well before as after the formal charge of legal proceedings is had."

It is well settled that, when a witness is called to attack or defend character, he can only be asked, on his examination in chief, as to the general character of the person in question; and he will not be allowed to testify as to particular facts, either favorable or unfavorable to such person; but, upon cross-examination, he may then be asked, with a view to test the value of his testimony, as to particular facts. 1 Taylor on Evidence, § 352; 3 Rice on Criminal Evidence, § 375; State v. Merriman, 34 S. C. 16 (12 S. E. 619).

Evidence, however, of general good character previous to the date of the transaction charged cannot be rebutted by evidence of bad character after the act, and the crossexamination must be confined to acts prior in time to the act charged. People v. Laird, 102 Mich. 135 (60 N. W. 457), and note.

Ora May Sylvia, another daughter of respondent, was sworn as a witness in her behalf. On her direct examination she had testified that she was at respondent's home, and saw the latter undo various articles and put them back into her pocketbook, and also saw respondent put certain wrapping paper into her pocketbook, which came off from the bundles, presents, bought before Christmas, and described how they were folded up and put back. The people had offered evidence tending to show that certain articles were found in the pocketbook, unwrapped, and that there was folded wrapping paper in the bag at the time of respondent's arrest. This witness had also testified that respondent was intending to send some presents to a sister at Midland.

Upon cross-examination this witness was interrogated as to the articles and wrapping paper, and the following occurred:

"Q. You got some Christmas presents up to your moth

er's house that you gave over to the officers, who took them back to the stores, didn't you?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Respondent's Counsel: That is under the same objection and exception.

"Q. You found out afterwards that this tablecloth that your mother gave you for a Christmas present belonged to one of the stores overtown?

"A. Well, I haven't found out yet.

"Q. It has been returned, hasn't it? "A. Not that I know of.

"Q. That is the way you understand it?

“Ă. Well, I don't know; I don't understand anything about it.

"Q. You never made any claim for it, did you? "Respondent's Counsel: The same exception. "Q. When the officers came up and said, 'We want that stuff that your mother gave you for Christmas,' you just handed it right over and said nothing, didn't you?

"A. Well, supposing, if you had never been in trouble, a couple of large men would come up and say 'Are you so and so?' tell them 'Yes.' Well, they come in; they come right in the house; they never waited for me to ask them in, or nothing; they come right in; they walk through the kitchen, through the dining room, into the front parlor, front room of the house; and they sit down. I didn't ask them to sit down, and I didn't know what they was going to do. I was alone with my baby, and they came in there, and they said they wanted the Christmas presents that my mother and sister had given me for Christmas. Well, of course, what would any one do but hand them over? They had to. You would do the same if you never had been in trouble yourself.

"Q. You handed the presents right over?

"A. I told you that I gave them to him.

"Q. You have made no claim to them since, have you? "A. No, sir."

In the argument to the jury, the prosecuting attorney, against the objection and exception of respondent's counsel, made the following argument and used the following language when referring to this witness:

"Under the testimony in this case, do you think that that girl got Christmas presents from her mother and

178 MICH.-40.

couldn't tell today what she got? If you don't believe that, then how did she get this stuff that she doesn't remember what it was? Why, that is dead easy; that is easy to me; under the testimony she got it as her mother got it, without regard to when or what it was. And when these men came up there to get it she recognized immediately the unlawful possession of it, and the unlawful right to have it given to her, and she just simply says, 'take it, take it, take it,' and they go in there and get whatever they want, and she doesn't know what they took; and she didn't know yesterday what these men had taken out of her house, goods of these storekeepers around town here that she says she got as a Christmas present; and the testimony doesn't support her statement that it was a Christmas present, but it would rather support the theory that she had gotten them at the times, or about the times, when the mother had gotten them, and that she hadn't paid any particular attention to it."

The remarks of the prosecuting attorney, relating to this witness, were unwarranted by the evidence. Witnesses are entitled to respectful consideration; and it is the duty of the court to see that they are protected from the insinuations and attacks of counsel. There was nothing in the evidence to warrant the claim of the prosecutor that this witness was guilty of either larceny or receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, and yet she was charged by him with both offenses. The case is fairly within the doctrine stated by us in People v. Lieska, 161 Mich. 630-638 (126 N. W. 636), and the cases there cited are applicable here.

The people's principal witness in the case was Joseph U. Smith, chief of detectives of the police department of Grand Rapids. His testimony was vital to the people's case, and there was a sharp conflict between his testimony and that of the respondent.

On the argument of the case, the prosecuting attorney went entirely outside of the evidence upon the subject, and used the following language relative to the witness Smith:

"And Mr. Smith, a man of years and years of skill and

practice in his business, as he looks over that store, he sees these two women coming down along there, and skilled in the business, and he has mighty few equals, and we don't know of any superiors, in that branch of the business, detecting people with their countenance and their conduct, and things of that kind."

In our opinion, it was highly improper and reversible error for the prosecuting attorney, in the absence of testimony on the subject, to thus praise and extol the skill and standing of a witness for the people. Juries are apt to consider the prosecuting attorney as unprejudiced and impartial, and statements of fact made by him are apt to have great weight. This court has held that it is improper for the trial court to call attention to the high character of a witness in the charge. Wisner v. Bardwell, 38 Mich. 278. It is equally improper for the prosecuting attorney to go outside the testimony and make such statements.

It is urged by the people that no ruling was made by the court upon the improper remarks of counsel. The record shows, however, that counsel for the respondent promptly objected to the remarks and called the court's attention to the matter. The court declined to rule, and told respondent's counsel to take an exception.

In People v. Sartori, 168 Mich., at page 318 (134 N. W. 204), this court said:

"Where, as in this instance, the attention of the court is called to the objection, a ruling requested, and no ruling made, we think the effect of the refusal or failure to rule should be held to be the same as an adverse ruling."

For the errors pointed out, we are constrained to say that the respondent did not have that fair and impartial trial which the Constitution and laws of this State guarantee her. We find no other reversible error in the record. The conviction is reversed and set aside, and a new trial granted.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

PEOPLE v. TIBBETTS.

CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-JURY-EXHIBITS-TAKING EXHIBITS TO JURY ROOM.

On the trial of a criminal prosecution for keeping a house of ill-fame, it was not so erroneous as to constitute reversible error to permit the jury to take to the jury room an exhibit offered in evidence and examined by the jurors and consisting of a list of telephone numbers and names of subscribers whom the inmates of the house were accustomed to call up and invite in: although the practice is not commendable, the court will not reverse the conviction unless the respondent was prejudiced.

Exceptions before sentence from the superior court of Grand Rapids; Stuart, J. Submitted January 21, 1913. (Docket No. 146.) Decided February 18, 1913.

Effie Tibbetts was convicted of keeping a house of illfame. Affirmed.

Louis T. Herman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Dunham & Dunham, for respondent.

BROOKE, J. The respondent was convicted of being the keeper of a house of ill-fame resorted to for the purposes of prostitution and lewdness.

Upon the trial there was introduced in evidence upon behalf of the people the following exhibit: