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compels a peddler of flour, etc., to pay a fee of $4 a day or $100 a year for the privilege of going about from place to place in the city and selling and offering for sale such commodities shows an abuse of legislative discretion vested in the council by charter or statute?

In discussing this subject, Mr. Tiedeman, in his work on Municipal Corporations (section 123), says:

"Although it is a judicial question whether the sum exacted is a reasonable one, a wide latitude is given to the exercise of legislative discretion, in the determination of the amount of the license fee. The license may be required as a police regulation, for the purpose of insuring the proper police supervision, whenever the character of the trade or business is such that the absence of the police supervision would occasion injury to the public, dealing with those engaged therein, * *because it furnishes abundant opportunities for the perpetration of frauds, which without police supervision will very likely prove successful. On these general grounds, it is competent for a municipality to require licenses, and subjection to police supervision of * ** peddlers and itinerant venders, and others, upon whose honesty and care the public have to depend, often without previous acquaintance with them, and usually without opportunities for investigation."

The supreme court of Minnesota has held that a license fee of $3 a day for peddling is not excessive. Neither is a fee of $5 a day, $60 for six months, or $100 a year excessive. In re White, 43 Minn. 250 (45 N. W. 232); Duluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn. 435 (49 N. W. 235). In the first case above cited it was said:

"What is a reasonable fee must depend largely upon the sound discretion of the city council, having reference to all the circumstances and necessities of the case; and unless the amount is manifestly unreasonable, in view of its purpose as a police regulation, the court will not adjudge it a tax."

We understand the rule to be that every presumption is indulged in favor of the reasonableness of such an ordinance. The above Minnesota cases are cited with approval by this court in People v. Baker, 115 Mich. 201

(73 N. W. 115). In City of Muskegon v. Zeeryp, 134 Mich. 181 (96 N. W. 502), this court held that a license fee of $10 a week and $50 a year, exacted for peddling spices, etc., was not excessive, unjust, oppressive, or in restraint of trade, and that the ordinance was not as a whole unreasonable. We held, in People v. Grant, 157 Mich. 24 (121 N. W. 300, 133 Am. St. Rep. 329), that the license fee of $2 per day, $10 per week, $25 per month, and $50 for three months, was not unreasonable. City of St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41 (Gil. 16) (90 Am. Dec. 278), where a license fee of $200 a year for keeping a butcher's stall was held not be an abuse of legislative discretion, the supreme court of Minnesota said:

In

"The very object of a charter is to empower them (the council) to provide for the well-being of the city, by such regulations and ordinances as their daily observation of what is going on around them will qualify them to enact more judiciously than a body, constituted as a State legislature ordinarily is, could be expected to do.”

In City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670 (64 N. W. 29, 32 L. R. A. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 472), the validity of an ordinance licensing and regulating pawnbrokers, junk dealers, and dealers in secondhand goods, was attacked on the ground that the license fee of $50 and a bond of $5,000 for pawnbrokers, and the fee of $25 and bond of $2,000 for junk and secondhand dealers, was so unreasonable that the ordinance should be declared void. This court, in an opinion by Justice GRANT, said:

"The charter expressly confers upon the common council the power to license and regulate pawnbrokers, junk dealers, and dealers in secondhand goods. Courts cannot interfere with legislative discretion, and are slow to declare ordinances invalid because unreasonable, when the power to legislate upon the subject has been conferred upon the common council. The council's discretion, and not the court's, must control. In such matters the city authorities are usually better judges than the courts "-citing many cases.

See also, City of Grand Rapids v. Norman, 110 Mich.

544 (68 N. W. 269); People v. Blom, 120 Mich. 45-48 (78 N. W. 1015).

We are of opinion that the council did not exceed its authority in passing this ordinance, and that we should not say that the license fees therein mentioned are unreasonable, excessive, or exorbitant.

This leads us to the conclusion that the order and judgment of the learned circuit judge denying the mandamus should be reversed.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. SNYDER.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-CROSS-EXAMINATION-WITNESSES. On the trial of a respondent charged with taking indecent liberties with a child, the prosecutor is not justified in asking a character witness, on cross-examination, as to opinions formed after learning about the accusation, or as to its effect on his opinion.

2. SAME

CHARGE-OPINION EXPRESSED BY COURT.

It is error for the court to indicate to the jury his opinion as to the guilt of the respondent in a criminal case; so that the court improperly stated to the jury in the course of his instructions, "The question is asked, why not bring all the people in the theater up here to prove that, words to that effect. Of course, the offense was not committed on the stage; it was not part of the performance that afternoon; and it is possible and very likely that he tried to commit it so nobody else would see him," etc.

Exceptions from the recorder's court of Grand Rapids; Stuart, J. Submitted January 17, 1913. (Docket No. 117.) Decided February 18, 1913.

Ray Snyder was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor female child. Reversed.

Earl F. Phelps, Prosecuting Attorney, and Louis T. Herman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Edward N. Barnard, for respondent.

KUHN, J. The information in this case charges the respondent with taking indecent and improper liberties with a girl under the age of 14 years.

It is claimed that the offense occurred in the Idea Theater, a moving-picture showhouse, in the city of Grand Rapids. On the trial the respondent, in his defense, attempted to establish his previous good reputation, and produced Mr. Thomas Hefferan as a witness, who testified as follows:

"Direct examination by Mr. Barnard: I am president of the People's Saving Bank; I am acquainted with Mr. Snyder; I have always considered his reputation as very good; I have known him for about 40 years or so, since the Civil War.

"Cross-examination by Mr. Herman: I have been in the courtroom and heard the story of the girl.

"Q. If the story of the girl is true, you would not consider a man's reputation

66

Mr. Barnard: (interrupting): I object to that. Just a minute.

"Q. You would not consider a man like that of good repute, would you?

"A. Not if it is true.

"Mr. Barnard: I want to object to that.

"The Court: Overruled.

"Mr. Barnard: An exception.

66 Mr. Herman: That is all.

"Redirect examination by Mr. Barnard:

"Q. Do you know what his reputation is as to his char

acter in the community?

"Mr. Herman: Just a minute.

"Q. He resides in?

"A. How?

"Q. Is that good or bad? Do you know what his gen

eral reputation for character is in the community in which he resides?

"The Court: Character in what regard ?

"A. I would consider his moral character good.

"Recross-examination by Mr. Herman: It is 22 years ago since I lived anywheres near him, when I was a resident of Eastmanville, Ottawa county; he lived at the Soldiers' Home in the city here. I don't know anything about him for the last 20 years, except as I have done business with him; I haven't heard anything against him.

"Q. (Mr. Herman): You talked to a single person in the community in which he resides; that is, the Soldiers' Home?

"A. I don't know as I ever talked with anybody.

"Q. (Mr. Barnard): Never heard anybody say anything against him?

"A. No.

"Q. (Mr. Herman): And never heard anybody say anything for him ?

"Mr. Barnard: What is this, a dialogue ?

Q. (Mr. Herman): How far do you live from the Soldiers' Home ?

"A. Probably six miles.

"Q. It is a pretty strong statement when you say you know his reputation and what people say about himwhat his neighbors say of him ?

"A. I say only what I know of him.

"Q. What you know personally?

"A. Yes.

"Q. That is not reputation.

"A. What I know personally of his reputation.

"Q. You don't know what his reputation is since he has been at the Soldiers' Home?

"A. Only what I know.

"The Court: A man's reputation is what people say about him.

"A. I never heard anything said about him wrong."

It was improper for the prosecuting officer to cross-examine this witness with reference to opinions formed subsequent to the date of the crime with which respondent was charged; and, although we will not say that it would be reversible error in this case, nevertheless, it is contrary to the well-established rules of evidence. This matter is

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