"Q. Did he tell you what the character of the money was which constituted that deposit slip of $210, whether it was currency or mixed money, coin or currency?

"Mr. Powers: At the time this conversation took place, I understand you were Mr. Dahrooge's attorney representing him.

66

"A. In justice's court.

"Mr.Powers: I object to it because an attorney cannot disclose a communication made to him by his client. "Mr. Brown: I won't urge that now.

"A. He told me it was money and—

"Mr. Powers (interrupting): I understand that question has been waived.

"Mr. Brown: Why he objects to the question, I understand, is that Mr. Dahrooge, on account of your being his attorney, objects to your telling here what he said. Is that right, Mr. Powers?

"Mr. Powers: If it please the court, we take exception to this method of examination. The prosecuting attorney knows those questions cannot be answered. He asks those questions and makes us except to them to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury. I say this is an improper examination by the prosecuting attorney, and I ask the court not to permit this method of conducting the examination.

"Mr. Brown: You may take the witness."

Of this assignment of error, counsel for the people say:

"Mr. Brown (the prosecutor) could not tell until after asking the questions whether or not any privileged communication would be waived. We submit the court fairly and fully guarded the rights of respondent."

This court has frequently held that confidential communications between attorney and client are not to be revealed at any time. Erickson v. Railway Co., 93 Mich. 414 (53 N. W. 393); Mack v. Sharp, 138 Mich. 448 (101 N. W. 631, 5 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 109); Lorimer v. Lorimer, 124 Mich. 631 (83 N. W. 609). See, also, cases cited in Lorimer v. Lorimer, supra; 40 Cyc. p. 2361, and cases cited in note 81. It may, perhaps, be said that in the case at bar the attorney did not testify to any fact which could have prejudiced the respondent. This, how

ever, we do not think is the proper test to be applied to such testimony. In offering the attorney as a witness and interrogating him as he did, the prosecutor clearly intimated to the jury that, if the attorney was permitted to testify, his evidence would not sustain the statements made by respondent when upon the stand in his own behalf. The mere fact that respondent was compelled to interpose an objection upon the ground of privilege tended to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury. A reading of the foregoing excerpt rather indicates that the prosecutor was fully aware of this fact and deliberately sought such advantage as would naturally flow from the interposition of the objection. If such was the case, it was highly reprehensible. Kerr v. Manufacturing Co., 155 Mich. 191 (118 N. W. 925). The charge is barren of any allusion to the subject, and the remarks of the court during the colloquy certainly had no tendency to correct the error.

The twenty-seventh assignment of error is based upon the refusal to grant a new trial. A new trial should have been granted upon the ground urged in the fifth assignment already discussed.

For the error pointed out, the conviction is reversed, and a new trial ordered.

MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

PEOPLE v. CAMPBELL.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-INFORMATION-THREATS-EXPLOSIVES. In a prosecution for threatening injury to person or property with intent to extort money, as defined by 3 Comp. Laws, § 11488, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 14541, it was sufficient to charge in the information that respondent "did threaten to dynamite the dwelling house" of a person named, with the intent specified by the statute, setting out in full the written communication containing the alleged threat. 3 Comp. Laws, § 11908, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 15079.

2. SAME FORMER OFFENSES-EVIDENCE-HABITUAL CRIMINAL. Evidence of former convictions and sentences imposed on the accused to the State prison for one year or more, was admissible under an information setting up such former convictions, in pursuance of the provisions of 3 Comp. Laws, S 11785, 11786, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) §§ 14977, 14978, authorizing an increased penalty in such cases: and it was essential to a sentence as for a third conviction under such statute, that the information should so allege, and proof thereof be made, so that although respondent did not take the witness stand he could not complain of alleged prejudicial effect by reason of the introduction of such proof.

3. SAME-TRIAL-ARGUMENT.

The prosecuting attorney did not commit reversible error in arguing the case to the jury by referring to and stating the effect of such evidence, which was not objected to or disputed by the accused.

4. SAME-DIRECTED VERDICT.

Nor did the court err in its charge, submitting the other issues to the jury, in advising them that as to the prior convictions it was their duty to find against respondent.

5. SAME SENTENCE.

The sentence, showing all necessary allegations, including the accusation, evidence, and determination of prior sentences, etc., was valid and regular.

Error to Oakland; Smith, J. Submitted November 14, 1912. (Docket No. 131.) Decided December 17, 1912.

Bennie E. Campbell was convicted of threatening injury to the property of another. Affirmed.

Carl H. Pelton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Clinton McGee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. E. E. Hymers, for respondent.

MCALVAY, J. Respondent was prosecuted and convicted before the circuit court of Oakland county upon an information charging that he feloniously and maliciously threatened to dynamite the dwelling house of Mary D. Ward, with intent to extort money from her, and the information also sets forth two prior convictions and sentences of respondent, one for larceny for which he was sentenced for ten years, and one for burglary for which he was sentenced for five years, in both instances to be confined in the State prison at Jackson at hard labor, both convictions having been had in the circuit court for the county of Oakland. Respondent has removed the case to this court after sentence for review upon a writ of

error.

No evidence in the case on the trial was offered or presented on the part of respondent. The material facts relied upon by the people and to establish which evidence was offered and submitted are that respondent and another, acting together, wrote three certain letters to Mrs. Ward, the character of which will be seen from the following copy of the first letter:

'Aug. 22, 1910. Mrs. H. M. Ward. Pontiac, Mich. 'You are requested on Sept. 1st to have ten thousand dollars ($10,000) on Sept. the first you will receive a letter where to deliver the money and furthermore be shure and have the money without any further delay, and this money will hafto be forthcoming or your house will be dynamited. We mean business. This is no fooling."

These letters were written in Pontiac, inclosed in envelopes, and sent through the mail. Two were posted in Detroit by the confederate named Osborne and one in

Pontiac. They were all received by Mrs. Ward. The second letter gives instructions where the money was to be left, and the amount required in bills and the amount in gold, and contained the same threat as the first. The third letter refers to the fact that Mrs. Ward had gone out as directed, but failed to go to the place designated, and contains directions ordering her how and where to go, and concludes with the words:

"This is no fooling. We mean business or trouble."

Mrs. Ward advised with her attorney, the proper officers were notified, and a watch was set upon these parties, who were seen together at the time Mrs. Ward came to the Hodges House with her car. After the receipt of the third letter, a deputy sheriff and other officers went to the place designated, and deposited dummy money. At that time some shots were fired, and later respondent and Osborne were captured.

Osborne, who was under prosecution for complicity in this offense, a young man 19 years old, had lived in Pontiac for five years, and was in the employ of an automobile factory. He was produced as a witness, and testified in detail as to the circumstances of writing and sending the letters. He said Campbell told him he had a scheme whereby to get money, and later gave him the details; that he posted two of the letters in Detroit and the last one in Pontiac; that Campbell dictated two of the letters, and he wrote them down. He testified at length to all the facts up to and including what occurred on the night before their arrest, when both of them went to the place where Mrs. Ward had been ordered to place the money.

Other witneses testified to material facts, including the deputy sheriff, who also testified to a voluntary statement made to him by respondent in answer to questions that he was in the orchard when he fired the shots, and Osborne was further away. There was abundant evidence presented to the jury to warrant the verdict of guilty of the offense charged against respondent.