contentment of their society. But now, for this reason, God cannot be imagined to tempt men to sin, because that would be the way to make them unlike Himself, and such as His soul could take no pleasure in.

Another design that bad men have in seducing others to sin, is thereby to give countenance to their bad actions, and to be some kind of excuse and apology for them. Among men, the multitude of offenders does sometimes procure impunity, but it always gives countenance to vice; and men are apt to allege it in their excuse, that they are not alone guilty of such a fault-that they did not do it without company and example; which is the reason of that law, (Exod. xxiii. 2) "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; implying, that men are very apt to take encouragement to anything that is bad, from company and example. But neither hath this reason any place in God, who, being far from doing evil Himself, can have no reason to tempt others to do so, by way of excuse and vindication of Himself.

And when the devil tempts men to sin, it is either out of direct malice to God, or out of envy to men. Out of malice to God, to spoil His workmanship, and to pervert that which came innocent and upright out of His hands; to rob God of His subjects, and to debauch them from their duty and allegiance to Him; to strengthen the rebellion which he has raised against God, and to make Him as many enemies as he can. But for this end God cannot tempt any man; for this would be to procure dishonour to Himself, and to deface the work of His own hands.

Another reason why the devil tempts men is envy. When Sel he was fallen from God and happiness, and by his own rebellion hin had made himself miserable, he was discontented to see the happy condition of man, and it grieved him at his very heart; and this moved him to tempt man to sin, that he might involve him in the same misery into which he had plunged himself. It is a pleasure to envy to overturn the happiness of others, and to lay them level with themselves. But the Divine nature is full of goodness, and delights in the happiness of all His creatures. His own incomparable felicity has placed Him as much above any temptation to envying others, as above any occasion of being contemned by them. He grudges no man's happiness, and therefore cannot tempt men to sin, out of a desire to see them miserable. So that none of those considerations which move the devil to tempt men to sin, and evil men to tempt one

another to do wickedly, can be imagined to have any place in God.

And thus you see the force of the apostle's argument, that because "God cannot be tempted to evil," therefore He can tempt no man. None tempt others to be bad, but those who are first so themselves. I shall now, in the

(Second place), Consider the nature and kind of the argument which the apostle here useth; "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth He any man." He does not reject this impious proposition barely upon his own authority; but he argues against it from the nature and perfection of God; and therein appeals to the common notions of mankind concerning God. We might very well have rested in his authority, being an apostle commissioned by our Saviour, and extraordinarily assisted and witnessed to, by the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost, wherewith he was endowed: but he condescends to give a reason of what he says, and appeals to the common principles of mankind. For all men will readily agree to this, that God hath all imaginable perfection: but it is a plain imperfection to be liable to be tempted to evil, and therefore, "God cannot be tempted to evil." And, if so, it is as impossible that He should tempt others to it; for none can have either an inclination or interest to seduce others to evil, but those who have been first seduced to it themselves.

Now, in this method of arguing, the apostle teacheth us one of the surest ways of reasoning in religion; namely, from the natural notions which men have of God. So that all doctrines plainly contrary to those natural notions which men have of God are to be rejected, what authority soever they pretend to; whatever plainly derogates from the goodness or justice of God, or any other of His perfections, is certainly false, what authority soever it may claim from the judgment of learned and pious men; yea, though it pretend to be countenanced from the texts and expressions of Holy Scripture; because nothing can be entertained as a Divine revelation, which plainly contradicts

the common natural notions which mankind have of God. For all reasoning about Divine revelation, and whether that which pretends to be so be really so or not, is to be governed by thoso natural notions. And if anything that pretends to be a revelation from God, should teach men that there is no God, or that He is not wise, and good, and just, and powerful: this is reason enough to reject it, how confident soever the pretence be, that it is a Divine revelation.

And if anything be, upon good grounds in reason, received for a Divine revelation (as the Holy Scriptures are amongst Christians), no man ought to be regarded, who from thence pretends to maintain any doctrine contrary to the natural notions which men have of God; such as clearly contradict His holiness, or goodness, or justice, or do, by plain and undeniable consequence, make God the author of sin, or the like because the very attempt to prove any such thing out of Scripture, does strike at the Divine authority of those books. For if they be from God, it is certain they can contain no such thing. So that no man ought to suffer himself to be seduced into any such opinions, upon pretence that there are expressions in Scripture which seem to countenance them. For if they really did so, the consequence would not be the confirming of such opinions, but the weakening of the authority of the Scripture itself. For just so many arguments as any man can draw from Scripture for any such opinion, so many weapons he puts into the hands of atheists against the Scripture itself.

I do not speak this as if I thought there were any ground from Scripture for any such doctrine; I am very certain there is not. And if there be any particular expression, which to prejudiced men may seem to import any such thing, every man ought to govern himself in the interpretation of such passages, by what is clear and plain, and agreeable to the main scope and tenor of the Bible, and to those natural notions which men have of God, and of His perfections. For when all is done, this is one of the surest ways of reasoning in religion; and whoever guides himself, and steers by this compass, can never err much: but whoever suffers himself to be led away by the appearance of some more obscure phrases in the expressions of Scripture, and the glosses of men upon them, without regard to this rule, may run into the greatest delusions, may wander eternally, and lose himself in one mistake after another, and shall never find his way out of this endless labyrinth, but by this clue.

If St. James had not been an apostle, the argument which he useth would have convinced any reasonable man, that God tempts no man to sin, because He "cannot be tempted with evil" Himself; and therefore it is unreasonable to imagine He

should tempt any man. For He argues from such a principle, as all mankind will, at first hearing, assent to.

And thus I have done with the first thing asserted by the apostle here in the text, that God tempts no man to sin; "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth He any man." Before I proceed to the second assertion, that every man is his own greatest tempter, I should draw some useful inferences from what has been already delivered; but I reserve both the one and the other to the next opportunity.

THE SINS OF MEN NOT CHARGEABLE UPON

GOD, BUT UPON THEMSELVES.

Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth He any man; but every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.-JAMES i. 13, 14.

WHEN I made entrance upon these words, I told you, that, next to the belief of a God and a Providence, nothing is more fundamentally necessary to the practice of a good life than the belief of these two principles-That God is not the author of the sins of men; and that every man's fault lies at his own door. And both these principles St. James does clearly and fully assert in these words.

(First), God tempts no man to sin.

(Secondly), Every man is his own greatest tempter.

The first of these I have largely spoken to in my former discourse; and from what I then said, I shall only draw a few useful inferences, before I proceed to the second: viz., these which follow.

(First), Let us beware of all such doctrines as do anyways tend to make God the author of sin; either by laying a necessity upon men of sinning, or by laying secret designs to tempt and seduce men to sin. Nothing can be farther from the nature of God than to do any such thing, and nothing can be more dishonourable to Him than to imagine any such thing of Him: "He is of purer eyes than to behold evil;" and can we think, that He who cannot endure to see it should have any hand in it? We find that the holy men in Scripture are very careful to remove all thought and suspicion of this from God. Elihu (Job xxxvi. 3) before he would argue about God's providence with Job, he resolves, in the first place, to attribute nothing to God that is unworthy of Him. "I will (says he) ascribe righteousness to my Maker." So likewise St. Paul (Rom. vii. 7) "What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid." "Is the law sin?" that is, hath God given men a law to this end, that He might draw them into sin? Far be it from Him. (Gal. ii. 17) “Is Christ the minister of sin? God forbid."

You see then how tender good men have always been of ascribing