the senate, nor by any power short of that, which is competent to create the office, and that we have seen is the treaty-making power. The President can appoint a minister to the republic of Colombia, because such an office exists under the law of nations, and is, therefore, a legitimate object of the appointing power; and he may instruct such minister to communicate with the Congress of Panama; but he cannot appoint a minister to take a seat in that Congress, because we have no conventions with the powers represented there, by which, as to us, the office is created; nor can he send a minister as an ambassador or legate to that Congress, because the Congress, as such, has not the rights of embassy. If it be said that this is mere form, the answer is obvious; form becomes substance in this case, by force of the constitutional provision which requires the assent of two thirds of the senate to the ratification of a treaty, while a bare majority is sufficient to give effect to an exercise of the appointing power.

Let us consider this question for a moment, freed from the prejudices which operate in favor of the Spanish American republics. If the states represented in the Congress of Vienna, or Verona, or the holy alliance, had given us an invitation to be represented there, apart from the expediency of the measure, would it have been within the "constitutional competency" of the President to have sent ministers to take their seats in either of those assemblies? If the nations of Europe should, by treaties, provide for a Congress to devise the means of abolishing the slave trade, of resisting the extortions of the Barbary powers, or of suppressing the piracies of the West Indian seas, would the President, the United States not being parties to those treaties, of his own mere will, make us members of that Congress, by sending deputies to represent us there? The question is proposed in this form, because our ministers would, of necessity, if received at all, be members, and not ambassadors, since

such a Congress is neither competent to send or to receive an embassy.

Why, then, in the creation of this office of deputy or minister to the Congress of Panama, was not the constitutional organ, the treaty-making power resorted to? What would have been the result of such a course, is obvious, I think, in the recorded votes of the senate, on the preliminary questions which have arisen. The object could not have been effected. The office would not have had existence, or the senate, in the exercise of their legitimate powers, would have so modified the treaty, as to have limited the functions of the ministers to those objects of which they would have approved.

Such, sir, are some of the views which I have taken of this very interesting question. I will not fatigue the senate by a recapitulation of them. They are, perhaps, erroneous. If this measure is to be adopted, I sincerely hope they may be so. Such as they are, however, they are respectfully submitted to the senate, as the result of patient inquiry, and a sincere disposition to arrive at truth. It has not been my purpose to arraign the motives which have produced this nomination; but of the measure itself, I have spoken with the freedom which I thought became me. All that remains is, that I should record my vote, and that duty I am now ready to perform.

SPEECH OF DANIEL WEBSTER.

ON

THE PANAMA MISSION,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

UNITED STATES, APRIL 14, 1826.*

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I AM not ambitious of amplifying this discussion. On the contrary, it is my anxious wish to confine the debate, so far as I partake in it, to the real and material questions before us.

*The following Resolution being under consideration, in committee of the whole House upon the state of the union, viz:

“Resolved, That in the opinion of the House, it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send ministers to the Congress of Panama."

Mr. M'Lane, of Delaware, submitted the following amendment thereto, viz:

"It being understood as the opinion of this House, that, as it has always been the settled policy of this government, in extending our commercial relations with foreign nations, to have with them as little political connexion as possible, to preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all nations, and to form entangling alliances with none: the ministers who may be sent shall attend at the said Congress in a diplomatic character merely; and ought not to be authorized to discuss, consider, or consult, upon any proposition of alliance, offensive or defensive, between this country and any of the Spanish American governments, or any stipulation, compact, or declaration, binding the United States in any way, or to any extent, to resist interference from abroad, with the domestic concerns of the aforesaid governments; or any measure which shall commit the present or future neutral rights or duties of these United States, either as may regard European nations, or between the several states of Mexico and South America leaving the United States free to adopt, in any event which may happen, affecting the relations of the South American governments, with each other, or with foreign nations, such measures as the friendly disposition cherished by the American people towards the people of those states, and the honor and interest of this natiou may require;"

Our judgment of things is liable, doubtless, to be affected by our opinions of men. It would be affectation in me, or in any one, to claim an exemption from this possibility of bias. I can say, however, that it has been my sincere purpose to consider and discuss the present subject, with the single view of finding out what duty it devolves upon me, as a member of the House of Representatives. If any thing has diverted me from that sole aim, it has been against my intention.

I think, sir, that there are two questions, and two only, for our decision. The first is, whether the House of Representatives will assume the responsibility of withholding the ordinary appropriation, for carrying into effect an executive measure, which the executive department has constitutionally instituted? The second, whether, if it will not withhold the appropriation, it will yet take the responsibility of interposing, with its own opinions, directions or instructions, as to the manner in which this particular executive measure shall be conducted?

I am, certainly, in the negative, on both these propositions. I am neither willing to refuse the appropriation, nor am I willing to limit or restrain the discretion of the executive, beforehand, as to the manner in which it shall perform its own appropriate constitutional duties. And, sir, those of us who hold these opinions have the advantage of being on the common highway of national politics. We propose nothing new; we suggest no change; we adhere to the uniform practice of the government, as I understood it, from its origin. It is for those, on the other hand, who are

To which Mr. Rives proposed to add, after the words,“ aforesaid governments," in the 12th line, the following:

"Or any compact or engagement by which the United States shall be pledged to the Spanish American States, to maintain, by force, the principle that no part of the American continent is henceforward subject to colonization by any European power."

The preceding motions to amend being under consideration, Mr. Webster delivered the following speech.

in favor of either, or both, of the propositions, to show us the cogent reasons which recommend their adoption. The duty is on them, to satisfy the House and the country that there is something in the present occasion which calls for such an extraordinary and unprecedented interference.

The President and senate have instituted a public mission, for the purpose of treating with foreign states. The constitution gives to the President the power of appointing, with the consent of the senate, ambassadors, and other public ministers. Such appointment is, therefore, a clear and unquestionable exercise of executive power. It is, indeed, less connected with the appropriate duties of this House, than almost any other executive act; because the office of a public minister is not created by any statute or law of our own government. It exists under the law of nations. and is recognized as existing by our constitution. The acts of Congress, indeed, limit the salaries of public ministers; but they do no more. Every thing else, in regard to the appointment of public ministers, their numbers, the time of their appointment, and the negotiations contemplated in such appointments, is matter for executive discretion. Every new appointment to supply vacancies in existing missions, is under the same authority. There are, indeed, what we commonly term standing missions, so known in the practice of the government, but they are not made so by any law. All missions rest on the same ground. Now the question is, whether the President and senate, having created this mission, or, in other words, having appointed the ministers, in the exercise of their undoubted constitutional power, this House will take upon itself the responsibility of defeating its objects, and rendering this exercise of executive power void?

By voting the salaries, in the ordinary way, we assume, as it seems to me, no responsibility whatever. We merely empower another branch of the government to discharge its own appropriate duties, in that