sistent with a peaceable compliance on his part with all his neutral duties. And, surely, there is nothing in the case of the Catharina Elizabeth which says otherwise.

Another case in the same collection, (vol. 3, p. 278. The Despatch,) tells us that if a neutral master endeavors to rescue or recover by force the captured property, it shall be condemned, because the captor is not bound as against a neutral to keep military possession of the thing captured, or justified in holding the neutral master and crew as prisoners. On the contrary, he is to rely upon the duty of the neutral to submit, and hope for restitution and compensation from a court of prize; and if this duty be violated by the neutral master and crew, confiscation is the result. This is explanatory of the judgment in the case of the Catharina Elizabeth, and is there used by sir William Scott for that purpose. It shows, as the facts of the case also show, that the court intended to confine its decision in the Catharina Elizabeth to the case of an enemy master already captured, for whom, as he is in the custody of the captor, whose business it is, not to trust, but to guard and keep him, the neutral shipper is no longer answerable. That the enemy master ceases the moment he becomes a prisoner, and his vessel prize, to be, for any purpose, the agent, or in any sense the associate of the neutral owner of the cargo, and that their connexion is utterly dissolved by the seizure, is perfectly clear. It would, therefore, be monstrous to fasten upon the neutral owner of the goods a continuing suretiship for the peaceful conduct of the enemy master, after he ha into the state

L

tile attempt of the enemy master after capture consummated-which attempt was really and constructively his own personal act, not procured, or facilitated, or influenced, directly or indirectly, remotely or immediately, by the owner of the cargo, to whom in law he had become a stranger. Who is it that can persuade himself that there is any resemblance between that case and the present, or that, if in that case there was supposed to be an arguable reason, (if I may be allowed that expression,) for visiting upon the neutral shipper the hostile conduct of the enemy master, the same tribunal would, in our case, have hesitated to condemn?

Observe the contrast between the two cases.

In our case, at the epoch of the resistance, the relation was subsisting in its full extent between him who made that resistance, and him who provides the means without providing any check upon the use of those means; in the other case, it was extinguished. In our case, the force employed was the original force, hired by the owner of the cargo, and left by him to the direction of a hostile agent, who used it, as he could not but be sure he would, hostilely; in the other case, there was no original force; and that which was used was the personal force of the enemy master, and not that of the vessel. In our case, the force was exerted in direct opposition to the neutral's obligation of submission with reference to the cargo; and in the other, the neutral had already submitted, and his goods were in the quiet possession of the captors. In our case, a general capacity, legal and actual, of annoy ance, as well as of resistance, had been given, by or for the neutral, to the vessel as a belligerent vessel, (a capacity which she preserved during her voyage,) for which alone, independently of resistance in fact, the neutral is, as I confidently contend, liable to the penalty of confiscation; in the other, the vessel was an ordinary, unarmed commercial vehicle, which the neutral

might hire and employ with perfect innocence and safety.

*

The little strength, with which I set out, is at last exhausted, and I must hasten to a conclusion. I commit to you, therefore, without further discussion, the cause of my clients, identified with the rights of the American people, and with those wholesome rules which give to public law simplicity and system, and tend to the quiet of the world.

We are now, thank God, once more at peace. Our belligerent rights may. therefore, sleep for a season. May their repose be long and profound! But the time must arrive, when the interests and honor of this great nation will command them to awake, and when it does arrive, I feel undoubting confidence that they will rise from their slumber in the fulness of their strength and majesty, unenfeebled and unimpaired by the judgment of this high court.

The skill and valor of our infant navy, which has illuminated every sea, and dazzled the master states of Europe by the splendor of its triumphs, have given us a pledge, which, I trust, will continue to be dear to every American heart, and influence the future course of our policy, that the ocean is destined to acknowledge the youthful dominion of the West. I am not likely to live to see it, and, therefore, the more do I seize upon the enjoyment presented by the glorious anticipation. That this dominion, when God shall suffer us to wrest it from those who have abused it, will be exercised with such justice and moderation as will put to shame the maritime tyranny of recent times, and fix upon our power the affections of mankind it is the dus all to hope; but it is equally our duty to he we shall not inordinately just to others just to our

SPEECH OF DANIEL WEBSTER,

IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF

JAMES PRESCOTT,

JUDGE OF THE PROBATE OF WILLS, &C. FOR THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, FOR MISCONDUCT AND MALADMINISTRATION IN OFFICE; BEFORE THE SENATE OF MAS SACHUSETTS, 1821.*

Mr. Webster for the respondent.

MR. PRESIDENT,

I AGREE with the honorable managers, in the importance which they have attributed to this proceeding. They have, I think, not at all overrated that importance, nor ascribed to the occasion, a solemnity which does not belong to it. Perhaps, however, I differ from them, in regard to the causes which give interest and importance to this trial, and to the parties likely to be most lastingly and deeply affected by its

* The articles of impeachment against judge Prescott, embraced the following charges:

That he had held courts, for the transaction of Probate business, at times and places other than those authorized by law;

That he had taken illegal fees of office;

That he had acted as counsel and received fees in cases pending in his own court, before himself, as judge.

The twelfth article was as follows:

That "he, in June, 1815, at Framingham, in said county of Middlesex, one Alpheus Ware, who before had been, and then was guardian of one Jotham Breck, a person non compos mentis, being about to present his account of his guardianship of his said ward for allowance, and thereupon a controversy having arisen between the said Ware and one Nathan Grout, who, as one of the overseers of the poor of the town, in which said Breck had his settlement, attended said court to examine said accounts, respecting some property belonging to the ward of said Ware, and thereupon the

progress and result. The respondent has as deep a stake, no doubt, in this trial, as he can well have in any thing which does not affect life. Regard for reputation, love of honorable character, affection for those who must suffer with him, if he suffers, and who will feel your sentence of conviction, if you should pronounce one, fall on their own heads, as it falls on his, cannot but excite, in his breast, an anxiety, which nothing could well increase, and nothing but a consciousness of upright intention could enable him to endure.

said Prescott, overhearing the conversation between the said
Ware and the said Grout, respecting said ward's estate, proposed
to advise and instruct them therein; and thereupon the said Pres-
cott, being then and there judge as aforesaid, did advise with and
direct the said Ware and Grout, concerning the settlement of the
account aforesaid, and the interest and estate of the said ward,
and the guardianship of the aforesaid Ware, and the said account
thereafter, on the day aforesaid, was sworn to by the said Ware,
and was examined, and, with the consent of said Grout, was al-
lowed by the said judge; and the said Prescott then and there
first demanded of said Grout, as fees for advice and counsel as
aforesaid, the sum of five dollars, and upon the refusal of said
Grout to pay the same, the said Prescott demanded the same of
the said Ware; and the said Ware objecting to the payment
thereof, the said Prescott then and there proposed to the said
Ware, that if he would pay the said sum of five dollars, he would,
in his said office of judge, insert and allow the same to the said
Ware, in his said account of guardianship, then before sworn to,
and with the consent of said Grout, allowed by the said judge.
And the said Ware then and there still objecting thereto, because
the said account, as allowed, had been consented to by the afore-
named Grout, acting as overseer to the poor as aforesaid; the said
Prescott insisted on the payment thereof, and to overcome the
objection of said Ware thereto, stated to the said Ware, that the
overseers of the poor need know nothing about it.' And the said
Ware then and there, upon the urgent and repeated demands of
the said Prescott, and upon his proposition to insert the same
charge in the guardian ccount aforesaid, and to allow the
same without the kno
Prescott the said su
Prescott did insert, b
the money so paid to
of said are, and did
M
er's obser
ordi

roration o

reupon the said ve dollars, for nship account ly."

the said Grout, did pay to the said
dollars. And
on, a charg
said, in the
the same o
is article,
are insert

with the ex*PILER.

1