President, without discrimination. In consequence of this, the chance of an election by the primary vote of the electors, was twice as great as it is now, under the existing provisions of the constitution.

In looking at the principles of compromise, upon which the constitution was founded, as the basis of an argument touching the relative powers of the different members of the confederacy, it is unquestionably proper that we should recur to those principles, as they were arranged by the federal convention. It would not be exhibiting a becoming spirit, for the small states to insist upon making that a common occurrence, which the framers of the constitution evidently regarded as a contingent and unavoidable evil; more especially, as that contingent evil has been rendered almost certain by an amendment, from which any such effect was neither intended nor anticipated. There is no man more disposed to preserve the essential rights of the small states than I am: for I represent a state that belongs to that denomination. But are the small states in any danger? Is it not obvious, from the whole structure of the constitution, that they are the favorite children of the constitution? What, sir, is the relative power of that state, so ably represented by the Chairman of this committee? Has she any cause of complaint, on that score, even in the primary vote for President? With a population not more numerous than the constituents of a single one of the thirty-four members from New York, she has three electoral votes, while the same number of citizens in New York have little more than a single vote.

The true security of the small states consists in their perfect equality in the senate, a co-ordinate branch of the legislature, and in the abolition of all those invidious distinctions, that could lead to their oppression. Sir, the smallest state in this union, when threatened with danger, has a right to invoke-and the invocation, I am sure, would never be made in vain-the whole power of the union for its defence and

preservation. It is in vain for them to think of entering into a competition of power.

And here, sir, I invite the attention of the gentlemen representing small states to an argument, founded on the true interests of the small states. I maintain that, on the score of policy merely, the small states ought to be most anxious to surrender this contingent equality, on the terms proposed in the amendment. What will be the consequence, if they refuse? Will the people of the United States, having the power of preventing it, patiently submit to be governed by a small minority? Will New York and Pennsylvania, and Virginia, submit to the occurrence of a contingency, that will reduce them to a level with Delaware, Illinois and Missouri? Rest assured, sir, the large states will form preliminary combinations to prevent the election from devolving upon the House of Representatives.

With such perfect abhorrence do I look upon the interference of this House, in the election of the President, that if the small states pertinaciously adhere to the present system, and prevent the amendment of the constitution in time for the next election, I will myself, should no other person do it, propose a convention of popular delegates from the whole union, to nominate a President; and I would stand pledged to sustain the nomination. If you will not amend the constitution, the people will rise above it. It is idle to think of preventing the people of this country from exercising the most legitimate and important of their sovereign rights, by paper restrictions. You had as well, sir, attempt to tie down a lion with a cobweb. Where, then, will be the small states, and what the value of a contingent equality, when the contingency will never occur? As a friend to the just rights of the small states, I beseech gentlemen not to persevere in the attempt to retain an unjust power, at the hazard of these combinations among the large states, that will inevitably result in the oppression of their more feeble competitors.

But have the people of the small states any interest

in the possession of this contested equality of power? Though it may increase the power of their politicians, and enable them to secure a large dividend of executive patronage, yet what do the people gain either in power or happiness? Has a small state-merely as a small state-any right or interest, which would be safer in the hands of a President chosen by Congress, than they would be in the hands of a President chosen by the people?

But, sir, is not this a delusive mockery even as to the question of power? Do states really exercise it in point of fact? Consulting the actual operations of the system, we find that the representatives of the small states have as often voted against the will of those states, as in conformity with it. Will the small states contend, then, for the worse than unprofitable right, of being misrepresented on the great subject of the presidential election? Will they persist in a system that serves only to expose their representatives to extraordinary temptation, throwing them into a scene of action, in which, if they had the virtue of Cato, they could not avoid suspicion? But the strong argument in favor of the proposed amendment, in reference to this question of relative power, is the equitable compromise which it involves between the large and the small states. It is that very spirit of mutual concession in which our government originated. By the district. system, the large states give up the power of forming combinations to overpower the small: and by removing the eventual election from this House, the small states give up their contingent equality. What most forcibly recommends this compromise, is the consideration, that the powers mutually surrendered by the large and the small states, are dangerous to the purity of the republic. It is an offering which patriotism requires us to make at the shrine of liberty. Is it possible that we can hesitate?

I do sincerely believe, that we have reached a crisis in our great political experiment, when the fate of that experiment will depend upon the wisdom with

which we act. Never was there a human assembly invoked by higher considerations, to act with disinterested magnanimity. The destiny, not only of the rising millions that are to come after us here, but that of the whole civilized world, hangs trembling on the issue of our deliberations. No nation on earth has ever exerted so extensive an influence on human affairs, as this will certainly exercise, if we preserve our glorious system of government in its purity. The liberty of this country is a sacred depository-a vestal fire, which Providence has committed to us for the general benefit of mankind. It is the world's last hope. Extinguish it, and the earth will be covered with eternal darkness. "But once put out that light, I know not where is that Promethean heat, that can that light relumine."

SPEECH OF HENRY R. STORRS,

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED

STATES, FEBRUARY 17, 1826,

On the following resolutions, "Resolved, That, for the purpose of electing the President and Vice President of the United States, the constitution ought to be so amended, that a uniform system of voting by districts, shall be established in all the states; and that the constitution ought to be further amended, in such manner as will prevent the election of the aforesaid officers from devolving upon the respective Houses of Congress.

"Resolved, That a select committee be appointed, with instructions to prepare and report a joint resolution, embracing the aforesaid objects."

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE propositions to amend the constitution, now before us, which have been submitted by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. M'Duffie,) are not altogether new to our deliberations. So much of them as proposes to change the present mode of electing the President and Vice President, by establishing within the several states a uniform system of voting by districts, was introduced into this House at the last session of the sixteenth Congress and finally rejected. The other branch of the amendment, which takes the second election from Congress, is now for the first time, at least since I have had the honor of a seat here, presented for examination.

It becomes us, sir, in my humble opinion, to approach this subject with the profoundest reverence for this constitution, as the work of that illustrious body of patriots and statesmen, who seem to have been raised up by Providence, at that peculiarly eventful period, to guide by their eminent wisdom and exalted public virtue, the councils of that convention, the result of