(18948.) Statement of the number of grain and molasses distilleries in operation February 1, 1898, and their daily capacities. Number running January 1, 1898, 503; capacity, 311,050 gallons; increase in January, 21,077 gallons daily. DECISIONS BY THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS. (18949-G. A. 4074.) In ascertaining the market value and wholesale price of goods in Germany, the country of exportation, it is proper to include a so-called "German duty," which, in effect, is a bonus, drawback, or remission of taxes by the German Government on goods there manufactured in bond and withdrawn for export, but which would have been payable if the goods had been withdrawn for sale in the open markets of Germany. United States v. Passavant (18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 219), followed-In re Passavant (G. A. 1602) reversed; in re Goldenberg (G. A. 3577) approved. Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, February 3, 1898. In the matter of the protests, 151f, etc., of Passavant & Co., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per the vessels and entered on the dates named in the schedule. Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser. The merchandise consists of cotton velvets, imported from Germany into the port of New York at the various times shown by the several entries. In ascertaining the market value and wholesale price of the goods in Germany, the country of exportation, the local appraiser included a so-called "bonification tax," designated as "German duty," which, in effect, was a bonus, drawback, or remission of taxes by the German Government on goods there manufactured in bond and withdrawn for export, and on which the tax would have been payable if withdrawn for consumption or sale in the open markets of Germany. The facts involved, as well as the questions of law, are precisely the same as those passed on by the Supreme Court in the United States v. Passavant (18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 219), where it was held by the court (Justices Brown and Peckham dissenting) that the tax in question was properly included as a part of the appraised market value of the goods ascertained under the provisions of sections 10 and 19 of the act of June 10, 1890 (26 Stat., p. 131). It was observed that "the laws of this country in the assessment of duties proceed upon the market value in the exporting country, and not upon that market value less such remis sion or amelioration as that country chooses to allow in accordance with its own views of public policy." This decision reversed that of the circuit court for the southern district of New York, and also the decision of this Board, which had followed a ruling of the Federal courts in a case entirely analogous, rendered in the year 1870, concurred in by the Attorney-General, and acquiesced in by the Treasury Department without appeal. (In re Passavant, G. A. 1602; 18 Opns. Atty. Gen., 109; Treas. Syn. 9800 and 775.) The Supreme Court was unanimous in its opinion that the appraiser and collector having "proceeded on a wrong principle, contrary to law," in deducting the amount of the tax in question, which formed a part of the market value of the goods in Germany, the collector's decision could be attacked by protest, and it was not necessary for the importers to call for a reappraisement under the provisions of section 13 of said act of June 10, 1890. It was further held by the court that the right of the Board was "coextensive" with that of the circuit court, under the jurisdiction conferred by law, to review said decision on appeal taken in the time and mode prescribed by section 14 of said act. It may be added that the doctrine of the Passavant case (18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 219 supra) is in full harmony with the conclusion reached by this Board in re Goldenberg Brothers (G. A. 3577), decided July 13, 1896, involving allowances for drawback made by the French Government on the exportation of silk goods from that country, and with numerous Board decisions holding items of drawback on macaroni exported from Italy to be dutiable as a part of the home market value of such merchan dise in the Kingdom of Italy. In accordance with these decisions, the protests are all overruled, and the collector's decision in each case is affirmed. (18950-G. A. 4075.) Lekin tax. The so-called "lekin tax" of China is an export tax, levied by the "Lekin Board" of Chinese officials, and is imposed on all exported firecrackers, being paid by native manufacturers and merchants before the goods can be exported. It is not, therefore, an element to be considered in determining for dutiable purposes the market value of such goods in China, under the provisions of sections 13 and 19 of the Customs Administrative Act, of June 10, 1890-United States v. Passavant (18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 219), followed and applied. Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, February 3, 1898. In the matter of the protest, 9204 f-5661, of J. D. Nordlinger, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per Fort Stuart, and entered March 23, 1896. Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser. The protest takes exception to the action of the collector and of the local appraiser in adding to the invoice and appraised value of the merchandise (which consists of Chinese firecrackers) an item designated as "lekin taxes." The question is whether this tax properly forms a part of the market value of the goods when sold for consumption in the open markets of China, whence they were exported. We find from official investigation that the tax in question, commonly known as the "lekin tax," is an export tax levied by the Chinese officials, or "Lekin Board," on all exported firecrackers, being paid by the native manufacturers and merchants before the goods can be exported from Canton. The United States consul at Canton, China, in an official communication made to the collector of customs at the port of New York, dated July 13, 1896, says in reference to this subject: The lekin tax on firecrackers is in the nature of an export duty strictly, as it is not levied upon firecrackers consumed here, and is levied on exports only. The "Lekin Board" has no connection whatever with the customs service, and this lekin tax on exports has no relation to or connection with the "export duty" collected by the imperial maritime customs of China at the custom house in Canton. In fact, firecrackers can not reach the custom house for exportation until the lekin tax has first been paid thereon by the native manufacturers or dealers before the same are sold to foreign merchants and shippers for a foreign market. [it is added] the Lekin Board evade the treaty restrictions about duties by collecting this lekin export tax from Chinese subjects while the firecrackers are the property of the native owners. Under the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Passavant (18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 219), decided January 3, 1898, the objection made is properly raised by protest, and its decision falls within the jurisdiction of this Board and of the courts, under the powers conferred by sections 14 and 15 of the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890 (26 Stat., p. 131, c. 407). The question there involved was the legality of the collector's and appraiser's action in having included in the dutiable value of certain imported velvets a so-called "German tax," levied on goods sold for consumption in the German Empire, but remitted on goods there manufactured in bond when sold for exportation. It was held that the market value upon which duties are to be assessed under the provisions of sections 13 and 19 of said act of June 10, 1890, was the home market price, and not the price paid for exported merchandise under German laws allowing a bonus or drawback on such exportations. Under this view of the law, an export tax would not enter as an element into the dutiable value of such merchandise. (Opinion of Atty. Gen., Dec. 31, 1894; Treas. Syn. 15513.) The protest is accordingly sustained, and the collector's decision. reversed, with an order to reliquidate the entry upon a basis of value excluding the so called "lekin taxes." (18951-G. A. 4076.) Cotton webbing. Articles of cotton about 14 to 14 inches wide, described as "glacé shaped," or shaped glacé," designed for use in binding the tops of women's skirts, belong to the class of merchandise known by the generic term "webbing," and are so dutiable. Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, February 7, 1898. In the matter of the protests, 23608 f-66 3, 24661 ƒ-7662, and 24930 ƒ-8379, of Edwin Horrax, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per Nomadic and Bovic, and entered May 25, June 30, and July 13, 1897. We find Opinion by TICHENOR, General Appraiser. (1) That the goods in question, which are described in the invoices as "shaped glacé" and as "glacé shaped," and were returned by the appraiser as "cotton webbing," are articles varying in extreme width from about 1 to 1 inches, the warp and filling threads of which are composed of white or colored cotton. Some of these goods are woven with raised threads forming a cord lengthwise at the center, and the others are woven singly about one-third of the width, the remainder being in double texture or of two thicknesses. All of them have undergone a process of starching or glazing, either before or after weaving. (2) That the goods are suitable and apparently designed for use in binding the tops of women's skirts, but belong to the class of merchandise which has long been known to manufacturers and merchants in the United States by the generic term "webbing," being of the same general character as that which was the subject of the Board's decision of August 19, 1896 (G. A. 3616). These goods were assessed for duty at 45 per cent ad valorem under the provisions for "webbing" in paragraph 263, act of August 28, 1894. The protestant represents that they are known commercially as cotton "skirt bands" or "skirt bindings," and claims that they are dutiable either at 40 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 258 as unfinished cotton wearing apparel or at 35 per cent ad valorem as manufactures of cotton not specially provided for under paragraph 264 of said act. We hold, in accordance with the doctrine of the Board's decision above referred to, that the merchandise is dutiable as assessed, and overrule the protests. |