1. What truth is.

2. A right joining, or sepa-

rating of signs, i. e. ideas

or words

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propositions.

4. Mental propositions are

very hard to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but joining

or separating ideas, with-

out words.

6. When mental proposi

tions contain real truth,

and when verbal.

7. Objection against verbal

truth, that thus it may be

all chimerical,

8. Answered, real truth is

about ideas agreeing to

things.

9. Falsehood is the joining

of names, otherwise than

their ideas agree

10. General propositions to

be treated of more at

large.

11. Moral and metaphysical

truth.

CHAP. VI.

Of universal propositions, their

truth and certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of words, neces-

sary to knowledge.

2. General truths hardly to

be understood, but in ver-

bal propositions.

3. Certainty twofold,

of

truth, and of knowledge.

4. No proposition can be

known to be true, where

the essence of each spe-

cies mentioned, is not

known.

5. This more particularly

concerns substances.

6. The truth offew universal

propositions concerning

substances, IS to be

known.

7. Because, co-existence of

ideas in few cases is to be

known.

8, 9 Instance in gold.

10, As far as any such co ex.

istence can be known, so

far universal propositions

may be certain

But this

will go but a little way,

because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make

our complex ideas of sub-

stances, depend mostly

on external, remote, and

unperceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach far-

ther, but that is not know-

ledge.

14. What is requisite for our

knowledge of substances.

15. Whilst our ideas of sub-

stances contain not their

real constitutions, we can

make but few general,

certain propositions con-
cerning them.

16. Wherein lies the general

certainty of propositions.

SECT.

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

1. They are self-evident.

2. Wherein that self-evi-

dence consists.

3. Self-evidence not pecu-

liar to received axioms.

4. First. as to identity and
diversity, all propositions
are equally self evident.
5. Secondly, in coexistence,
we have few self evident
propositions.

6. Thirdly, in other rela-
tions we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning

real existence we have

none.

8. These axioms do not
much influence our other
knowledge

9. Because they are not the
truths the first known.

10. Because on them the

ther parts of our know-

ledge do not depend.

11. What use these general

maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not

taken in the use of words,

may prove contradictions.

13. Instance in vacuum.
14. They prove not the exist-
ence of things without us.
15. Their application danger-
ous about complex ideas.

16-18. Instance in man.

19. Little use of these max-

ims, in proofs, where we

have clear and distinet

ideas.

Of the existence of a God.

SECT.

1. We are capable of know-

ing certainly that there is

God.

2. Man knows that he him

self is.

3. He knows also, that no-

thing cannot produce a

being, therefore some-

thing eternal.

4. That eternal being must

be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.

6 And therefore God.
7. Our idea of a most per-
fect being, not the sole
proof of a God.

8. Something from eterni-
ty.

9. Two sorts of beings, co-
gitative and incogitative.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our know-

ledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from

maxims.

2. (The occasion of that

opinion.)

3. But from the comparing

clear and distinct ideas,
4. Dangerous to build upon
precarious principles,
5. This no certain way to
truth.

6. But to compare clear,
complete ideas under
steady names.

7. The true method of ad-
vancing knowledge, is by

considering our abstract

ideas.

8, By which morality, also,

may be made clearer.

9. But knowledge of bodies

is to be improved only
by experience.
10. This may procure us con-
venience, not science.
11. We are fitted for moral
knowledge, and natural
improvements.

12, But must beware of hy-
potheses and wrong prin-
ciples.

3. Being that, which makes
us presume things to be
true, before we know
them to be so.

4. The grounds of proba
bility are two; confor-
mity with our Own
experience, or the

testimony of others

experience.

5. In this all the arguments,

pro and con, ought to

be examined before we

come to a judgment.

6. They being capable of

great variety.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of assent.

SECT.

1. Our assent ought to be
regulated by the
grounds of probability.
2. These cannot be always

actually in view, and

then we must content

ourselves with the

remembrance, that we

once saw ground for

such a degree of assent.
3. The ill consequence of

this, if our former judg

ment were not rightly

made.

4. The right use of it, is

mutual charity and for-
bearance.

5. Probability is either of
matter of fact or specu

lation

6. The concurrent experi

ence of all other men

with ours produces

assurance approaching

to knowledge.

7. Unquestionable testi-
mony and experience
for the most part pro-
duce confidence.
Fair testimony, and the
nature of the thing in-
different, produces also
confident belief.

8.

2

daries.

Faith and reason what, as

contra distinguished

3. No new simple idea can be
conveyed by traditional re-
velation.

4. Traditional revelation may
make us know propositions,

knowable also by reason,

but not with tb same cer.

tainty that reason doth

5. Revelation cannot be admit-
ted against the clear evi-
dence of reason

6. Traditional revelation much
less.

7. Things above reason.
8. Or not contrary to reason, if

revealed, are matter of faith,

9. Revelation in matters where

reason cannot judge, or but

probably, ought to be heark-
ened to.

10. In matters, where reason can
afford certain knowledge,
that is to be bearkened to.
11. If the boundaries be not set
between faith and reason,

no enthusiasm, or extrava-

gancy in religion, can be

contradicted.